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                                 ABSTRACT   
Since 2009, terrorism has become one of the biggest challenges facing the Nigerian State. As 
a legal response to this, the National Assembly in 2011 enacted the Terrorism (Prevention) Act 
(as amended). However, there have been heated debates amongst scholars, lawyers and human 
rights organisations about the relevance and coherence of the Act in addressing terrorism in 
Nigeria.   
This thesis discusses the measures adopted by Nigeria against terrorism and their effects on 
human rights. A fundamental question that will be addressed in this thesis is: how can Nigeria 
deal with its domestic terrorism, through the Terrorism Act, without unnecessarily infringing 
on human rights? The thesis analyses and assesses  the Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 (as 
amended) to find out whether the Act provides a ‘coherent’ legal code relevant to terrorism in 
Nigeria? In order to determine this, the thesis juxtaposes the provisions of the Terrorism Act 
by reference to Nigeria’s domestic, regional and international constitutional obligations under 
the Constitution of Nigeria 1999, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights  and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) respectively. The research also 
compares the TPA 2011 with the United Kingdom’s Terrorism Act 2000. Although 
emphasizing the major differences in the nature of the challenges faced by the UK and Nigeria, 
the thesis explores whether there are elements of the UK’s legal measures in preventing 
terrorism from which Nigeria could learn. And if so, what possible recommendations for law 
reforms would flow from this?  
The main theme that emerges from this research is that several inadequacies exist under the 
Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 (as amended). The measures adopted by Nigeria against 
terrorism are generally inconsistent with human rights provisions in the country. For example, 
the police in Nigeria arrest individuals without a reasonable suspicion of committing an offence 
and detain terror suspects for as long as they want without judicial approval. These measures 
are also inconsistent with Nigeria’s human rights obligations under the Constitution 1999, the 
African Charter and under the ICCPR. The current view is that the measures adopted by Nigeria 
against terrorism, especially under the TPA 2011, needs to be reviewed. In order to address 
this, the research puts forward proposals and recommendations which Nigeria should adopt to 
make her counter-terrorism law and practices human rights compliant and fit for purpose.   
    
   
4 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Declaration  
Abstract                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Table of Contents    
Acknowledgements 
List of Abbreviations 
           
Chapter 1. Introduction..……………………....……………………….………………… 10 
   The research agenda/aims and objectives ………………………………………………... 14 
   The justifications for comparing Nigeria’s Terrorism Act 2011 (as amended) with the  
   United Kingdom’s Terrorism Act 2000, 2006 …………………………………………… 17 
   Defences against “legocentricism”………………………………………………………... 19 
  “Coherent”, “Consistent” & “Comprehensive;” explanation of key terms……...………. .  20 
   Methodologies; the black-letter, socio-legal, and comparative approaches...…....……....   20 
   Sources and problems encountered ….…………………………………………………… 28 
   Outline of the thesis……………………………………………………………………….. 28 
 
Chapter 2. Literature Review …………………………... ..……………………………… 31 
    Introduction………………………………………………………………………………. 31 
    Literature review -Nigeria……............................................................................................32 
    Literature review-United Kingdom ……………………………………………………… 42 
    Illustrating originality…………………………...…………………………………………………53 
    Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………... 56 
 
Chapter 3. Analysis of Nigeria’s Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 (as amended) …… 57 
     Introduction……………………………………………………………………………… 57 
     A critical analysis of key provisions of the Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 (as 
     Amended)………………………………………………………………………………... 58 
               Definition of Terrorism under the TPA 2011…………………………………………………..   58 
              Arrest……………………………………………………………………………………. …………     66 
              Detention……………………………………………………………………………………………..   69 
             Encouragement of terrorism ………………………………………………………………………    72 
              Proscription………………………………………………………………………………………….   74 
             List of proscribed organisation under the TPA 2011……………………………………….......   77 
      Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………. 77 
 
Chapter 4.  Analysis of the United Kingdom’s Terrorism Act 2000…..……………….  80 
     Introduction……………………………………………………………………………...  80 
     A critical analysis of key provisions of the UK’s Terrorism Act 2000, 2006 ………......  80 
               Definition of terrorism under the T.A 2000……………………………………………………..  81 
              Arrest……………………………………………………………………………................... 84 
              Detention……………………………………………………………………………………..87 
              Encouragement of terrorism…………………………………………………………………89 
              Proscription……………………………………………………………………………….....92 
             List of proscribed organisation under the T.A……………………………………………………..94 
    Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………95 
 
Chapter 5. A Comparative Analysis of the Nigerian Terrorism 2011 (As amended) &  
                    The United Kingdom’s Terrorism Act 2000 ……………………………….98 
   
5 
 
 
Chapter 6. A Socio-legal Assessment of Nigeria’s Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011....118 
 
    Introduction………………………………………………………………………………118 
               Definition of terrorism under the T.A 2000……………………………………………………..118 
              Arrest & pre-charge detention ……………………………………………………………..121 
             Encouragement of terrorism………………………………………………………………...128 
            Proscription………………………………………………………………………………….130 
     Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………………….……131 
 
Chapter 7. A Socio-legal Assessment of UK Terrorism Act 2000/2006………...………134 
 
     Introduction……………………………………………………………………………...134 
               Definition of terrorism under the T.A 2000…………………………………………………….139 
              Arrest…………………………………………………………………………….................147 
             Detention………………………………………………………………………….…………151 
             Encouragement of terrorism……………………………………………………………...…152 
            Proscription…………………………………………………………………………….……156 
      Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………….159 
 
Chapter 8. A Comparative Socio-legal Assessment of the Nigerian Terrorism  
                  (Prevention) Act 2011 & the UK Terrorism Act 2000/2006………………...161 
                     
Chapter 9. An Assessment of the TPA 2011 (as amended) by Reference to Nigeria’s 
                  Domestic, Regional, & International Constitutional obligations……...……169 
 
      Introduction ……………………………………………………………………….……169 
      An exploration of Nigeria’s obligations under the Constitution 1999, the African  
      Charter on Human and People’s Right & the International Covenant on Civil & Political 
      Rights  (ICCPR)…………………………………………………………….………......169 
      An assessment of key provisions under the TPA 2011 by reference to the Constitution   
     1999,  The African Charter, & the ICCPR…………………………..…………………..173  
      Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………...….202 
     
Chapter 10. An Assessment of the UK’s Terrorism Act 2000 by Reference to its  
                     Domestic, Regional & international obligations…………………………..205  
        
      Introduction……………………………………………………………………………..205 
      An exploration of the UK’s obligations under the Human Rights Act 1998, the European 
      Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)  and the ICCPR …...……………………….....210 
      An assessment of key provisions under the terrorism Act 2000 by reference to the  
      Human Rights Act 1998, the ECHR, and the ICCPR…………………………………..215 
      Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………....231 
     
Chapter 11. Proposals & Recommendations for Policy and Law Reforms in Nigeria and    
                      United Kingdom ……………………………………………………………233 
     
    Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………...233 
    Lessons learnt by Nigeria from the comparative analysis and constitutional/ socio-legal  
    assessment with the UK……………………………………………………………...... ..233 
    Proposals for law reforms in Nigeria…………………………………………………….239 
   
6 
 
    Lessons learnt by the UK from the comparative analysis and constitutional/ socio-legal  
    assessment with the Nigeria……………………………………………………………...243 
    Proposals for law reforms in the UK …………………………………………………….244 
    Conclusion………………………………………………………………………..………244 
 
Chapter 12. Conclusions …………………………………………………………...…….245    
 
Bibliography………………………………………………………………………….........255 
       
       Text Books………………………………………………………………………………………..255 
       Cases……………………………………………………………………………………...………257 
      Journal Articles………………………………………………………………………………..…263 
      Newspaper Reports & Other Online Sources………………………….………………….…278 
      Statutes, Statutory Instruments, Covenants, Conventions……………………………....287 
       
Appendixes …..…………………………………………………………………….….…...290 
             
 
 
 
                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
7 
 
                    ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS                   
First and foremost I would like to thank Almighty God for giving me the courage, wisdom and 
strength in completing this thesis.  
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my Director of Studies, Dr Ian David Turner, 
for his patience, motivation, enthusiasm, support, and guidance through every step of this work. 
Ian’s comments really helped to develop my thoughts and to enrich my ideas.    
I would also like to thank Prof. Michael Salter for his insightful comments, guidance, support, 
and encouragement in writing this thesis.  
My sincere appreciation also goes to Dr Kim Mcguire for her comments, support, and guidance 
in completing this research.  
I would also like to thank Dr Borgusia Puchalska for her help and advice at various stages of 
my research, especially for organising numerous discussions and lectures on related topics that 
have helped to improve my knowledge in the area.  
My sincere gratitude goes to Professor Helen Codd and Dr. Adrian Hunt for reading my thesis 
and their positive feedback.  
Most importantly, none of this would have been possible without the support and love of my 
family. I have to give a special thanks to my dad, Mr Moses Onireti, to whom I dedicate this 
thesis, for his financial support from the beginning of this research to the end-despite the 
constant fall in the Nigerian Naira against the Pound. Only God can repay you for this.   
I also take this opportunity to acknowledge my dearest wife, Biola Victoria Onireti, for her 
prayers, support and patience. You have been a constant source of love, joy, and support all 
through the years.  
 
 
 
 
 
   
8 
 
                               List of Abbreviations 
ACHPR    African Charter on Human and People’s Right 
AI Amnesty International 
AQIM Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb  
ART Article 
AU African Union 
BH      Boko Haram 
CC Criminal Code 
CFRN Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights 
EFCC Economic and Financial Crimes Commission  
ECrtHR European Court of Human Rights 
FRN Federal Republic of Nigeria 
HRA Human Rights Act 1998 
HRW Human Rights Watch 
HRC United Nations Human Rights Committee 
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
IRA Irish Republican Army  
JTAC Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre  
JTF     Joint Military Task Forces 
MLPA   Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 
NHRC Nigeria’s National Human Rights Commission 
OAU Organisation of African Unity  
POAC Proscribed Organisation Appeal Committee  
PICTU Police International Counter Terror Unit  
S.  Section 
SC Supreme Court 
   
9 
 
SARS Special Anti-Robbery Squad  
TA     Terrorism Act 
TPA Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 
TPAA Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act 2013 
TPIMS Terrorism Prevention Investigation Measure 
UK United Kingdom 
US United States of America 
UN United Nations 
UNGA United Nations General Assembly  
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
10 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION  
This thesis is based on a comparative analysis and constitutional assessment of Nigeria and 
United Kingdom’s legal responses to terrorism.  The study explores the constitutionality of 
some key provisions under the Terrorism Acts of both States, at the national level, the 
domestic level and at the international level.  
The study has been significantly influenced by the emergence of the terrorist group “Boko 
Haram” in Nigeria and the legality of government responses, especially under the Terrorism 
(Prevention) Act 2011. The writer is concerned about the effects of the counter-terrorism 
measures adopted under the Nigerian TPA 2011 Act on human rights and the rule of law in 
the Country.  
‘Boko Haram’ whose original name is “Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’ await Wal-Jihad” 
(meaning -people committed to the propagation of the prophet’s teachings and jihad) vowed to 
establish an Islamic caliphate ruled by Sharia law (the Islamic legal code) throughout Nigeria.1 
According to Sanni, the group emanated from an orthodox teaching slightly resembling that of 
the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan.2 Since 2009, terrorist attacks by Boko Haram have 
continued unabated.3 In fact, the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) for 2015 described Boko Haram 
as the “world deadliest” terror group, responsible for 81% of deaths in Nigeria in 2013 and 
86% in 2014.4 In 2016, the Global Terrorism Index ranked Nigeria third in its list of countries 
most impacted by terrorism with about 4,095 people  killed by Boko Haram within that year 
alone.5 The report described Boko Haram as having the second highest death toll out of all 
terrorist groups since 2000. Only the Taliban has killed more people than Boko Haram.6 
As a result of the terror attacks from Boko Haram, the Nigerian government adopted far-
reaching measures against terrorism in the Country.  One of these is the enactment of the 
                                                          
1 Michael Mwankpa, ‘The Politics of Amnesty International in Nigeria; A comparative Analysis of the Boko 
Haram and the Niger Delta Insurgencies’ Journal of Terrorism Research , Vol 5, Issue 1 
http://ojs.standrews.ac.uk/index.php/jtr/article/view/830/709  accessed 24th June, 2016   
2 Shehu Sanni, ‘Boko Haram; History , Ideas, and Revolt’, Journal of Constitutional Development, Vol 11 No 4, 
[2011] Pg 26 
3 Its violent attacks on media houses, government offices, the United Nations office in Abuja, Churches, 
Mosques, School, Markets places threatens to destabilize the country. 
Andrew Walker, What is Boko Haram? Special Report U.S institute for Peace May 30, 2012 
http://www.usip.org/publications/what-boko-haram accessed 2nd of June, 2015 
4 Global Terrorism Index 2015, Institute for Economic & Peace http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf accessed 20th Jan 2016 
5 Global Terrorism Index 2016, Institute for Economic & Peace Pg 26  http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2016.2.pdf accessed July 2017 
6 Ibid Pg 26 
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Terrorism (Prevention) Act (TPA) 2011. In addition to that, in June 2011, the Nigerian 
Government set up a special Joint Military Task Force (JTF) in Maiduguri consisting of the 
army, navy, air force, department of state security and the Nigerian Police to tackle terrorism 
in the country.7 
 
1. The Research Agenda/ Aims and Objectives  
 
Although the measures adopted by the Nigerian government could arguably be seen as a 
genuine response to terrorism, it has also created some human rights controversy. This 
controversy is rested upon the alleged brutality unleashed by the security forces, and some 
“draconian” measures adopted by the Terrorism Prevention Act which, if unchecked, could 
impact negatively on the human rights of individuals in the country. For instance the JTF have 
resorted to the extra-judicial killings of terror suspects, arbitrary arrest of innocent citizens, 
prolonged detention of terror suspects, and clamp downs on media houses under the guise of 
fighting Boko Haram. These events have raised serious concerns from local and international 
media, domestic/international human rights organisations, as well as western nations especially 
over the significant number of casualties arising from the anti-terror activities of the JTF.8  
Serious concerns have also been raised by scholars and human rights proponents about the 
relevance and coherence of the Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 (as amended) in addressing 
terrorism in the country.9 To be clear, this thesis acknowledges that States are able to derogate 
from certain liberties and human rights freedoms under international law in emergency 
situations such as terrorist attacks. However it is not certain whether the measures adopted by 
Nigeria under its Terrorism Act can be said to fall within these derogations. Likewise, the 
constitutionality, fairness, and appropriateness of some of the provisions under the TPA (2011) 
are in doubt. It is against this background that the present study aims to evaluate the Nigerian 
Terrorism Act 2011 (as amended) to determine whether it is internally coherent and 
                                                          
7 Hussein Solomon, Counter-terrorism In Nigeria Responding to Boko Haram, The RUSI Journal [August 2012] 
VOL.157 No 4 Pg7 
8 Hakeem Onapajo, ‘Why Nigeria is not winning the anti-boko Haram war’,  E-International Relations [ 2013] Pg 
4 
9 For instance Ekundayo voiced concerns about the excessive and draconian character of the 
Act which is gradually leading to a weakening of human rights in the country 
Vera Ekundayo, ‘Nigerian Terrorism Act: A right step forward’, Punch Newspaper (January 24, 2012) 
http://www.punchng.com/opinion/nigerian-terrorism-act-a-right-step-forward/   accessed 6th February, 2012 
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constitutionally justifiable in providing a legal code relevant to terrorism? And more 
importantly, assess the effects of the Act on human right provisions in Nigeria?  
This thesis also compares key provisions under the Nigerian Terrorism Act with similar 
provisions under the UK’s Terrorism Act.  In so doing, the terrorism laws in the two states, 
their variations, and their effects on human rights will be discussed. Although the study admits 
that there are differences in the challenges and nature of the terrorist threats faced by the UK 
and Nigeria, as well as differences in cultural, legal and constitutional backgrounds within both 
states, nonetheless the writer is of the opinion that there are lessons which Nigeria could learn 
from the UK to further improve its terrorism law, and vice -versa.  
In analysing, assessing and comparing the Nigerian TPA 2011 with UK’s TA 2000, the study 
focuses on five main provisions under the Acts. These are the definition of terrorism, the 
powers of arrest, the pre-charge detention of terror suspects, proscription, and encouragement 
of terrorism. This will be followed by an assessment of the Acts by reference to Nigeria and 
the UK domestic, regional and international human rights constitutional obligations.  
At the domestic level, Nigeria’s TPA 2011 (as amended) will be assessed by reference to the 
Constitution 1999 while the UK’s Terrorism Act of 2000 will assessed by reference to the 
Human Rights Act 1998. At the regional level, Nigeria’s TPA 2011 will be assessed by 
reference to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights while the UK’s TA 2000 will 
be assessed by reference to the European Convention on Human Rights. At the international 
level, the Terrorism Act of both states will be assessed by reference to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  
The justification for the choice of the Constitution 1999 and the Human Rights Act 1998 as a 
yardstick for determining whether the Terrorism Act is human right “compliant” at the 
domestic level is that in the case of Nigeria, the Constitution is the final and supreme law in 
the country.10 Section 1(3) of the Nigerian Constitution provides that “if any law is inconsistent 
with the provisions of the Constitution, the constitution shall prevail, and that law shall to the 
extent of the inconsistency be void.” Secondly, the Constitution expressly guarantees the 
fundamental human rights for every person in Nigeria.11  Unlike Nigeria, the UK does not have 
a single written Constitution that spells out citizens’ rights. Much of what can be regarded as 
                                                          
10 S.1 CFRN 1999  
11 Ss 33-46 CFRN 1999 
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the UK’s ‘Constitution’ can be found in Statutes, Acts of Parliament, Court judgements, 
Treaties, Protocols, Covenants, and European Union (EU) law. However, the UK Parliament 
enacted the Human Rights Act 1998, which incorporates the European Convention of Human 
Rights (ECHR) into domestic law. Section 3 (1) HRA   provides that;  “so far as it is possible 
to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way 
which is compatible with the Convention rights.”12    
The rationale for choosing the African Charter and the ECHR as the basis for determining the 
“coherence” and “consistence” of Nigeria’s TPA 2011 and the UK’s Terrorism Act 2000 at the 
regional level is because the African Charter is the regional “legal code” that protects human 
rights on the African continent. In fact, Nigeria’s National Assembly incorporated the African 
Charter into the domestic law of Nigeria through the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (Enforcement and Ratification) Act 2 of 1983 and is now contained in Cap 10, Laws of 
the Federation of Nigeria, 1990.  As a result of this, the African Charter is now part of the laws 
in Nigeria.  As the name suggests, the European Convention of Human Rights protects human 
rights freedoms within the European region. Art 1 of the Convention imposes a positive 
obligation on the Contracting Parties to the convention. It provides that ‘the High Contracting 
Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in 
Section I of the Convention.’ This section clearly obliges Contracting Parties not to infringe the 
rights protected in the Convention and to apply the Convention rights within its jurisdiction.  
The justification for the choice of the ICCPR as a basis for assessing Nigeria’s TPA 2011 (as 
amended) and the UK’s TA 2000 by reference to international constitutional obligations is 
because of the positive obligation it imposes on state parties to promote universal respect for, 
and observance of, human rights and freedoms as recognised under the ICCPR.13 
The result of the assessment of Nigeria’s TPA 2011 and the UK’s Terrorism act 2000 by 
reference to their regional constitutional and international obligations will be used as a 
yardstick for assessing whether the Acts are coherent, consistent, and or whether they 
unnecessarily infringes human rights?  It is however important to note that given the dangers 
of assuming causal relations between enacting any laws and empirical changes to, say, the 
                                                          
12 HRA 1998 
13 Pre-amble ICCPR Para 
Art 2(1) ICCPR specifically obliges ‘‘each State Party to the Covenant  to respect and to ensure to all individuals 
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status.’’ 
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distribution and extent of political violence, the research restricts itself to issues concerning 
Nigeria anti-terrorism’s internal coherence, constitutionality and consistency with the most 
credible interpretation of applicable international standards. It does not address the fraught 
question of practical “success” of Nigerian law as to answer this would entail a large-scale 
multi-disciplinary social scientific project beyond the scope of a single PhD, even then it could 
involve highly speculative contentions because any empirical correlation between legal 
changes and increases or decreases in the extent or distribution of acts of political violence 
would not in themselves establish any causal link sufficient to assess the “effectiveness” of the 
former.  
1.1 Aims & Objectives of the research 
The aims of the research are to critically analyse key sections of the Nigerian Terrorism 
(Prevention) Act 2011 (as amended), critically analyse key sections under the UK’s Terrorism 
Act 2000, and undertake a comparison between the provisions of the Nigerian Terrorism 2011 
(As amended) with   the United Kingdom’s Terrorism Act 2000. 
The research also aims to undertake a comparative socio-legal assessment of key provisions 
under the Nigeria’s Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 and the UK Terrorism Act 2000/2006 to 
determine how the provisions of the Acts are applied in principle and in practice with particular 
attention to the need for a proper balance between legitimate security interests and the 
protection of fundamental rights.  
Furthermore, the research aims to assess Nigeria’s existing legal measures in preventing 
terrorism by reference to its domestic, regional, and international constitutional obligations 
under  the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the African Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights and the ICCPR.  
Equally, the research will assess the UK’s existing legal measures in preventing terrorism by 
reference its domestic, regional and international constitutional obligations under the Human 
Right Act 1998, the ECHR and the ICCPR.  
Assuming Nigeria’s legal measures in preventing terrorism disproportionately infringe its 
domestic constitutional, regional constitutional obligations, what legal measures could Nigeria 
learn from the UK, and vice-versa? If relevant, proposals for Nigerian law reform will be 
formulated. 
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Also, assuming the UK’s legal measures in preventing terrorism disproportionately infringe on 
its domestic constitutional obligation under the Human Rights Act 1998 and/or its regional 
constitutional obligation under the European Convention on Human Right, what legal measures 
could the UK learn from Nigeria, if any at all? If relevant, proposals for the UK law reform 
will be formulated.  
1.2 Justifications for Focusing on Five Provisions Under the Terrorism Acts of  
       Nigeria  
 
The writer chose to focus on the definition of terrorism, pre-charge detention of terror suspects, 
arrest, proscription and encouragement for two main reasons. The first is simply that it will be 
almost impossible to analyse, assess, and compare the entire provisions of the Nigerian and the 
UK’s Terrorism Act within a single PhD Thesis. The second reason is that these five provisions 
of the Terrorism Act raises the most concern over their interference with the fulfilment of 
human rights freedoms in Nigeria. This conclusion is based on preliminary readings, 
assessment, and the writer’s previous law practice in Nigeria. The Nigerian Police and the 
Department for State Security are notorious for making arbitrary arrests and prolonging the 
detention of  suspects without due consideration for human rights provisions. These fears are 
further heightened by the broad definition of terrorism under the Act and wide ranging powers 
given to the law enforcement agencies to counter terrorism in the country.  Without adequate 
judicial supervisions, these five provisions under the Nigerian Terrorism Act could have 
devastating consequences on the human rights of terror suspects in Nigeria. 14  
The justification for selecting the definition of terrorism as the first issue to be analysed is that 
the definition  provided under the Terrorism Acts of both States becomes the ‘gateway’ to 
counter terror powers such as arrest and detention of terror suspects, exercised by the state 
agents of Nigeria and the U.K. The definition spells out what constitutes acts of terrorism in 
the country. Without a proper understanding of the exact meaning of the terms used in the 
definition of terrorism under the Act it will be difficult to critically analyse and assess the Act.  
Also, the definition points the direction of the law to acts which are prohibited. any person who 
commits these prohibited acts are arrested and charged under the Terrorism Act. The meaning 
attributed to terrorism under the Act is  crucial to establishing its scope as well as the power of 
the state to impose criminal sanction on breaches. A failure to properly analyse the meaning 
                                                          
14 Amnesty International Report NIGERIA 2014/15 
 https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/nigeria/report-nigeria/ accessed 20th June 2015 
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given to the definition of the Act could have an impact on all other analyses that will be done 
under the Act.  
The justification for choosing  arrest and pre-charge detention as the second and third issue to 
be analysed is that since the emergence of Boko Haram in 2009, the manner by which the 
Police and other security agencies make arrests and detain terror suspects under the guise of 
preventing terrorist attacks is questionable. According to Nigeria’s Human Rights Commission 
(NHRC), innocent civilians are arrested arbitrarily and held in unofficial detention sites, with 
inadequate documentation and outside the safeguards provided by the Constitution of Nigeria 
and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.15 Accordingly, the study will seek to 
find out whether the power of arrest and pre-charge detention of terror suspects under the 
Terrorism Act is consistent with human rights provisions in Nigeria and also whether these 
arrests/pre-charge detentions follow the rule of law and due process or whether they violate 
domestic and international norms and individual legal rights to liberty and security.   
More than ever before, people are able to disseminate information with ease and relative 
anonymity. This is made possible with the existence of chat rooms, internet forums and social 
media apps like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and You-Tube. These platforms have opened up 
a world of possibilities to radicalise people into committing terrorist acts. In order to address 
this, the Nigerian TPA 2011 (as amended)  made provisions for encouragement of terrorism as 
an offence. Without doubt, these offence raise serious concerns about freedom of expression, 
and without adequate checks and balances, fundamental liberties such as freedom of speech 
and the press, or the right to privacy, may be infringed upon unnecessarily under the guise of 
countering-terrorism.  
In order to address a complex crime such as terrorism, one of the basic tools available to 
government is to identify and ban terrorists groups or their affiliates. This is called proscription. 
However, without proper safeguards, the State’s powers to proscribe an organisation under the 
Nigerian Terrorism Act raise concerns about the right to assembly and freedom of association. 
The Nigerian government have in the past (between 1994 and 2008) banned non-violent 
organisations/groups such as the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS), the 
Academic Staff Union (ASUU), and the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People 
                                                          
15 Atika Balal, ‘JTF committing atrocities, says rights commission’, Daily Trust (01 July 2013), 
http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/daily/old/index.php/top-stories/58113-jtf-committing-atrocities-says-rights-
commission accessed 7th Oct, 2013. 
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(Mosop).16 It is against this background that “proscription” is chosen as the last provision for 
analysis and assessment in this study.   
The most common argument against adjustments in the balance between individual rights and 
the state obligation to provide security is where to draw the line? The research seeks to 
demonstrate the extent to which the current anti-terrorism legislation in Nigeria and the UK 
has negatively impacted on human rights in both countries, as well as how the States’ duty to 
combat terrorism must comply with international human rights norms. 
2. Justifications for Comparing Nigeria’s Terrorism Act 2011 with the United  
Kingdom’s Terrorism Act 2000, 2006. 
 
A principal aim of this thesis is to critically analyse and assess the Nigerian TPA 2011 (as 
amended) in the light of the experiences of another common law jurisdiction in dealing with 
terrorism. The writer’s choice of the UK is not unexpected.  According to Walker, the UK has 
witnessed episodes of political violence during its troubles with the IRA in the 70’s, 80’s, and 
90’s.17  The UK has also faced, and is still facing, terrorist attacks and threats from domestic 
and international terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaida and ISIL. These events have shaped 
the British counter-terrorism measures under its Terrorism Acts.18  Having fought terrorism for 
more than five decades, it is safe to assume that the UK has “significant” experience in tacking 
terrorism. Nigeria on the other hand is fairly new to terrorism challenges, at least when 
compared to the UK, although it would be historically inaccurate to claim that what is 
happening in Nigeria is the same or even broadly similar to the IRA attacks against the British 
Government in the 1970’s, 80’s and 90’s. The aims and methods of the IRA were different 
from those of Boko Haram, but more importantly the context in which the British state 
responded to the IRA attacks were clearly different from that of Nigeria presently.  What 
however does need to be recognised is that the UK Terrorism Act 2000 as amended has been 
described to be ‘amongst the most extensively and fiercely debated of a device in the past 
decade.’19 The counter-terrorism measures adopted under the  TA 2000 have been extensively 
challenged and criticised on various constitutional and human rights grounds which this thesis 
                                                          
16 George Kieh, ‘Beyond State Failure and Collapse: Making the State Relevant in Africa’ (Lexington ) 2000 Pg 
163-165  
17 Clive Walker, ‘Terrorism and Criminal Justice’, [2004]  Crim LR 311 
18 The UK government when faced with terrorist threat from the IRA adopted the Prevention of Terrorism 
(Temporary Provisions) Acts (PTA). 
19 C. Walker, Blackstone’s Guide to the anti-terrorism Legislation (3nd Edition, Oxford University Press, 2009) Pg 
9 
   
18 
 
will attempt to show. On the other hand, the Nigerian TPA 2011 (as amended) remains largely 
unchallenged with little or no research that compares the  Act with another Terrorism 
legislation, and it is possible that where it overlaps with the British legislation it could be open 
to similar challenges and critique. Comparing the Terrorism Acts of both states provides an 
opportunity for an evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the Nigerian and UK 
Terrorism Acts with a view to acquiring knowledge on how to improve the Nigerian TPA 2011 
and how to make it human rights compliant.  
It is important to note that notwithstanding the U.K’s successes in preventing terrorism, it 
would be erroneous to think that the Terrorism Act 2000 is faultless. It has its flaws too. 
According to Rowe, some powers under the Act are intrusive and unnecessarily violate the 
ECHR.20 He contends that individual cases of arrest and detention may unlawfully engage 
Article 5(1). It is against this background, for example, that the UK’s Terrorism Act 2000 will 
be critically analysed and assessed to determine if it is consistent with human rights provisions 
in the UK and then compared with Nigeria’s TPA 2011 (as amended).   
Comparative legal research such as this necessitates that both jurisdictions have similar legal 
systems. Both Nigeria and the UK operate a common law legal system. However, it must be 
noted that the legal system of both countries reflects not only different national cultures and 
local traditions, but also different kinds of power structures, degrees of civil society 
development, faith in state institutions and styles of legal interpretation and application. But 
despite the admittedly limited commonalities between the two States and national differences, 
the comparative research is interested in developing and testing theories that would be 
applicable beyond boundaries of a single society, regardless of cultural, historical, and political 
difference.21  
In any comparative legal research, there is the problem of ‘comparability’ of the empirical units 
selected for comparison and analysis.22 This problem was addressed in this research as the 
writer compared and also contrasted ‘like’ for ‘like’. For example definition, arrest and pre-
charge detention of suspect under Nigeria’s TPA 2011 is contrasted and compared with the 
definition, arrest and detention under UK’s T.A 2000.  Although there are commonalities in 
                                                          
20 J.J Rowe, ‘The Terrorism Act 2000’ [2000] Crim LR 1 
21  According to Oyen, There is a demand for cross-national comparison to specific problem, the aim which is to 
reduce unexplained variance and find patterns and relationships. Else Oyen Comparative methodology Theory 
And Practice In International Social Research (Sage Publisher, 1990) Pg 1 
22 Difficulties could arise due to confusion in the two legislation’s logical interrelationship. There could also be 
a tendency to trying to link logical propositions devoid of any empirical content 
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the provisions of the Acts in both states, terrorism remains unpredictable. This is because its 
multiple contexts are dynamic, nonetheless there are great insights that we can learn from the 
comparative study.  
3. Defences against ‘legocentricism’23 
 
To guard against ‘legocentric’ bias, the thesis makes clear that even though the law is a strategic 
tool in countering terrorism, it does not view the law as the only way to address terrorism in 
Nigeria. Terrorism is multifaceted and as such can only be addressed through a multi-
dimensional approach. It is also important to state here that the fact that a country has a well-
developed counter-terrorism law does not necessarily mean that it is more capable of preventive 
responses or more likely to use lawful methods in counter-terrorism.24 In the same way, the 
lack of formal counter-terrorism legislation does not necessarily mean that a country is “quiet” 
in dealing with terrorism.25 The research compares the anti-terrorism statutes and policies of 
both states, the goal of which is to learn lessons concerning their internal coherence and 
constitutionality rather than creating and testing socio-legal theories or causal hypotheses.   
The comparative research looks at legal problems and legal institutions with a view of   making 
observations and gaining insight that, owing to the often parochial and nationalistic orientation 
of legal research, are often missed by those whose study is limited to the law of a country.26 
Countries that are similar are more likely to borrow from one another, even if those similarities 
are an illusion of doing better in one area.27 To guard against lifting measures adopted by the 
UK without a thorough scrutiny, the writer adopts an objective test where necessary. The study 
also adopts a realistic approach by looking at other areas outside the law which the UK adopts 
in tackling terrorism, for instance the “CONTEST” Strategy, with the aim of providing new 
insight to tackle terrorism in Nigeria.  
 
                                                          
23 “Legocentricism” means that the law is treated as a given necessity and a natural path to the ideal, regional 
or optional conflict resolution and ultimately to social order guaranteeing peace and harmony.  
G. Franken, ‘Critical Comparisons; Re-thinking Comparative Law’, (1986) 26 Harvard Int. Journal 441 at 445 
24 J. Ford, ‘African Counter-terrorism Frameworks a decade after 2001’, (2011) Institute for Security Studies  pg 
44-45 
25 ibid 
26 K. Zweigert and H. Kots, An Introduction to Comparative law (Tony Weirs Trans, 2nd Edition, 1987) Pg 1 
27 Henry Teune, ‘’Comparing Countries: Lessons Learned“in Else Oyen, (ed) Comparative Methodology (Theory 
and Practice in International Social Research London: Sage, 1990) 38.  
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3.1 Explanation of key terms - “Consistent” “Coherent” “Comprehensive”  
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “Consistent” as ‘following the rules of standards.’ According 
to Professor MacCormick, for a law to be “consistent,” the requirement is that the standard to 
which it is made must not conflict with an accepted rule of the legal system.28 MacCormick 
also defines the term “coherent” as the standard of having a general 'fit' with the other rules of 
the system.29 He refers to “coherence” of the law as the “test of its soundness” which is not 
fully satisfied by mere consistency.’30 He stated further that coherence of the law is a “matter 
of their making sense” by being rationally related as a set instrumentally and intrinsically, either 
to the realisation of some common values of the fulfilment of some common principles. 31 
Unlike coherence, the term “comprehensive” has different meanings. In this thesis the term is 
used to determine whether the TPA 2011 (as amended) is ‘thorough’ and ‘exhaustive’ in its 
provisions. This “term” would be considered in this thesis particularly as it concerns the offence 
of encouragement of terrorism.  
From the writer’s viewpoint, the “coherence” of the TPA 2011 to provide a legal code relevant 
to terrorism in Nigeria connotes the justifiability of the Terrorism Act, when taken together 
with reference to other laws, legislations, Charter, Conventions or statutes in Nigeria. It could 
also mean “soundness” of the Act.  The test for coherence or soundness of the TPA 2011 in the 
research is determined whether it “has a general fit” (borrowing McCormick’s definition) with 
the Constitution 1999, the African Charter and the ICCPR.  
4 Methodologies 
Since the aim of the research is to analyse, assess, and compare the Nigerian and the UK’s 
Terrorism Acts, the study will adopt a combination of the black-letter methodology, the socio-
legal methodology, and the comparative methodology. 
 
 
                                                          
28 Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Reasoning and the requirements of consistency, coherence and 
consequences. Sources of Law (Volume 22) 5. Legal Method and Reform 622. 
29 Ibid  
30 Neil MacCormic, ‘Coherence in Legal Justification’, in ed, Theory of Legal Science by Aleksander Peczenik, L. 
Lindahl (Springer 1983 ) Pg 235 
31 Ibid 239 
   
21 
 
4.1 Black-letter methodology and ; Rationale, Strength and Limitations 
The ‘black-letter’ approach will be adopted in this study because it is a starting point for legal 
analysis. This approach to research aims to describe, often in great detail, the technical, purely 
legal meaning of rules and principles. In this thesis, emphasis will be placed on providing a 
detailed description of formal legal rules and principles under the Terrorism Acts of Nigeria 
and UK. The main advantage of the black-letter methodology is that it focuses on legal 
doctrines that are contained in primary sources of law. This approach to legal research is 
consistent with the law and it is readily available for verification.  
The use of the black-letter approach alone is restrictive as it does not treat the topic in its wider 
perspective.32 The black-letter approach will show you “what,” but not “why,” and more 
importantly the effect of the law in practice. The black-letter will for example speak of 
‘reasonable,’ and ‘necessary’ but what is defined in practice as ‘reasonable’ and ‘necessary’ 
and the public understanding of these and their effect will require more than a doctrinal 
interpretation especially from the various ‘actors’ involved.  The black-letter is also selective 
in interpreting rules and describes commentary on points of law within a legal doctrine only. It 
relies on court judgments and statute to explain the law.33  More importantly, the black-letter 
methodology does not answer some of the specific research questions that this study has put 
forward such as how are the provisions of the Terrorism Acts in Nigeria and the UK applied in 
principle and in practice? And, does the Police and other security agencies in implementing the 
provision of the Act pay particular attention to the protection of fundamental rights of terror 
suspects? The questions will require more than doctrinal approach.  
In analysing and examining the terrorism legislation of Nigeria and the UK , criticisms under 
the black-letter are limited in nature and scope in exposing ambiguities and loop–holes within 
existing law.34 The black-letter does not access legislation in its critical form, as such does not 
encourage intellectual inputs. Another disadvantage of this approach is that it does not relate 
law in books to law in action thereby ignoring  the fact that laws are made for certain purposes 
and in interpreting the law the intention of the parliament  has  to be considered to determine 
its failures or success. 
                                                          
32 Reza Banakar, the Paradox of Contextualization in Socio-legal Research (I.J.L.C 487, 2011) Pg 487 
33 Wing Hong Chui & Mike McConville, Research Methods For Law (Edinburg University Press, 2007) Pg 3 
34 Ibid Pg 45 
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4.2 Socio-legal methodology; Rationale, Strength and Limitations 
Since the black-letter methodology alone is not adequate enough to address the research 
questions posed in this thesis, the writer will also adopt the socio-legal methodology.  Socio-
legal methodology exposes discrepancies between law in books and law in action.35Socio-legal 
approach assumes that no account of legal rules is complete unless it is based on an empirical 
grasp of how rules are used in practice.  This methodology transcends doctrinal analysis of 
legal texts. The socio-legal research will focus on the policy behind the legal rule as much as 
the rule itself. Accordingly, this methodology will be used in this research  to investigate how 
the Terrorism Acts of Nigeria and the UK are applied in practice. But firstly, it should be noted 
that there are many types of “socio-legal” research that can be applied to  a broad range of 
research topics.36 This is because the approach encompasses a diversity of interdisciplinary and 
multi-disciplinary contextual approach within a legal research. This methodology bridges the 
divide between law and sociology, social policy and economics. In this thesis, the socio-legal 
methodology will be used to investigate the impact of the law in action as well as the key role 
played by ideological   factors including public policy.37 The main strength of the socio-legal 
approach is that it exposes discrepancies between law in books and law in action.38 This 
approach portrays the social effect of law as a meeting point of societal outlook and legal 
output. For example, the legal basis for an arrest and the pre-charge detention of a suspect under 
                                                          
35 Although it is difficult to comprehensively define ‘socio-legal’ approach to legal studies, Philip Thomas 
summed it up as the understanding of law as a “component part of a wider social and political structure 
inextricably related to in in an infinite variety of ways, which can only be understood if studied in that 
context.”  
Philip Harris , ‘Curriculum Development in Legal studies’ (1986) 20 Law Teacher 112 
36 According to the Socio-legal Studies Association (SLSA), while some studies within the socio-legal school 
focuses on the place of the law in relation to other social institution, others seek to understand legal decision 
making by individuals or groups. Some other studies seeks to describe and explain legal system and identify 
patterns of behaviour, while others focus on the impact of the law or reforms and the criminal justice system 
and the roles played by legal actors.  (This thesis focuses on the latter). Salter & Mason, Op Cit 2007 Pg 123 
In addition to the diversity of topic that can be addressed using the socio-legal research, this approach can be 
used  under four different contextual methods. These are; Empirical socio-legal research (that is, the gathering 
and analysis of facts about law in action, experiences of the practical impact of legal proceedings upon 
different groups in the society);Theoretical Socio-legal research (that is, the debates over the validity of 
different concepts in law and understanding the law in terms of competing theories of society more generally); 
Policy Oriented research (which questions how any existing area of legal regulation reflects changing 
government policies); and lastly, the Comparative socio-legal approach.  These approaches can be used 
individually and, or  in a combination with other methods.  
Salter & Mason, Op Cit 2007 Pg 165 
37 Ibid Pg 119 
38 Ibid pg 119-120 
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the Nigerian Terrorism Act is ‘reasonable suspicion to have committed or likely to commit an 
offence.’ Whilst the black-letter approach defines and explains  the content of this legal rule 
under the Act, the socio-legal approach focuses on the social nature, functions, and the 
implications of this rule. This is done by investigating and exposing the behaviour of legal 
actors like the Police/Military in the implementation of the law. This way we understand the 
operation and the practical impact of the law in action. For instance, In Nigeria, it is alleged 
that even where legal rules apply in principle, they are in practice often either selectively 
enforced or bypassed This approach to legal research involves the relationship between legal 
rules and the society they serve.39 The socio-legal approach believes that the law does not exist 
in a vacuum, but directly incorporated into the social political and economic ethos of the 
surrounding society. Through this, the researcher records events, situations and actions of the 
people and the society and correlate this observation to the law as it is. For example, the offence 
of encouragement of terrorism will be looked at from the context and means through which the 
statements alleged to incite/encourage terrorism were made and how it was understood by 
members of the public.40  
An important point to recognise is that, rules (law) do not exist independently of their use, 
social actors use them strategically to further their interests and their desires in a particular 
context of interaction.41The ideas behind the socio-legal theory of law are to keep a close eye 
on what legal actors and non-actors are doing relative to law, and to discover and pay attention 
to the ideas that informs their actions. Tamanaha argues that it is these ideas, beliefs, and 
actions that give rise to law, determine the uses to which the law is put, and constitute the 
reactions and consequences of law.42This standpoint signifies that the law must be viewed both 
as intervening in the complex of their activities and as itself a social process. The question then 
is how will a researcher identify those social practices which involve ‘law’ as opposed to 
something? The writer is of the view that there is no clear cut answer to this question. 
Nevertheless, spending some time in a society gives an individual the chance to get ideas about 
the operation of the law in that society. As Nelken recognises, living in a country allows you 
                                                          
39 Ibid pg 138 These actors include Judges, Magistrate, prison officials  and law enforcement agencies 
40 The outcome of this approach to legal research reveals a theoretical empiricism which is from a display of 
policy-oriented approaches covering huge range of situation. According to Lewin, the Socio-legal methodology 
is often referred to as ‘action research method’ because the researcher is actively involved with the subject of 
study. Lewin Kurt, Socio-legal, in (ed) TR.g Cummings and C.G Worley, Organisation development and change 
(Ohio, 1997) Pg 113 
41 Ibid pg 163 
42 Ibid Pg 65-66 
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to see whether you have the grasp of the way the culture works through the experience of trying 
to work with the rules and through making group affiliations, and at the same time a person 
can witness social change at first hand.43  But while the Socio-legal methodology allows for 
the inclusion of diverse methods and perspectives, critics argue that this approach could 
sometimes be seen as compilations of observation and information with no direct value.’44 
Another criticism of the socio-legal approach is that it takes legal research outside the legal 
‘realm’ and supplements or replaces it with a different type of research drawn largely from the 
social sciences. Also, this approach appears to pull ideas from different directions thereby 
creating conflicting results and making its reforms intellectually weak. In the course of pulling 
ideas from different sources, distortions could be introduced into the analysis and the purpose 
of law could be substituted for the researcher’s own-or someone else’s-view.45 
4.3 Comparative Methodology; Rationale, Strength and Limitations  
Since the principal aim of this study is to compare the Nigerian Terrorism (Prevention) Act 
2011 (as amended) with the UK’s Terrorism Act 2000, the writer will also adopt the 
Comparative methodology. The comparative approach provides a valuable framework through 
which conflicts and differences between legal concepts and particular provision can be 
explained and common ground solutions identified. Comparative research introduces legal 
concepts, styles, ideas, and categorisations that are previously unknown thereby opening 
possibilities in the very notion of law.46 Lessons from a comparative legal research can be 
helpful in understanding the workings of a foreign legal system and at the same time helps to 
understand our own laws and culture better.47 Likewise, comparing a law with a similar 
legislation in another jurisdiction makes us question and re-examine core principles of 
constitutional order and human rights values and through this ideas, rules, norms, principles 
are revealed that could improve the status quo. This is in turn may lead us to question our 
presuppositions about justice, fairness, rule of law, and the way in which the law is created in 
our legal culture. As a result of globalisation, we are increasingly affected by what is done 
elsewhere and increasingly aware of developments in other places. The comparative 
                                                          
43 David Nelken, ‘Doing Research into Comparative Criminal Justice,’ in Ed, Brian Tamanaha, Realistic Socio-
legal Theory. (Oxford Clarendon Press 1997) Pg 257  
44 Brian Tamanaha, Realistic Socio-legal Theory. (Oxford Clarendon Press 1997) Pg 15 
45 C. E Reasons and R.M Rich, The sociology of law: A conflict perspective (Butterworth, 1978) pg 28. 
46 David Price, Legal and Ethical Issues of Organ Transplantation (Cambridge University Press, 2000) Pg 8 
47 Edward Eberle, the Method and Role of Comparative Law (The Washington University Global Studies 
Review, Vol 8, 2009) Pg 451 
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methodology allows borrowing of ideas and concepts from other jurisdictions and disciplines 
and attempts to develop new paradigm.48 Comparing and contrasting our  statutes and judicial 
decisions with that of other legal systems can challenge our received categorisations and shed 
light on some of our laws as inaccurate or inconsistent. For example, insights derived from 
comparing Nigeria’s TPA 2011 with UK’s  Terrorism Act could honed and then applied to 
Nigeria’s legal patterns in order to improve her own terrorism legislation. Lessons derived from 
comparing our domestic law and legal cultures with foreign law and legal cultures is also 
helpful in enhancing one’s ability to critique our domestic law. 
However comparative legal research raises a series of interesting methodological issues which 
can affect the degree and nature of the comparative enterprise itself. As Tamanaha rightly 
pointed out, laws and practices in States have histories and can change with time.49 Hence there 
must be a careful transposition of ideas with much attention paid to the cultural origins and 
social preconditions of the country that they are introduced. It is also important to bear in mind 
that applying lessons and insights derived from the comparative analysis of our own law with 
that of another State/legal system  may not always produce the same result. It could also 
produce conclusions and results that are not realistic.  This is because terrorist attacks are 
sudden and unpredictable. The Writer is mindful of this fact and will be careful in putting 
forward proposals and recommendations that are common grounds solutions to both Nigeria 
and UK, especially those that can be applied to Nigeria’s domestic legal patterns.  
4.4 Implication of linking the black-letter and socio-legal approach  
The implication of linking the black-letter and the socio-legal methodologies are that the 
research could produce a biased conclusion. While the black-letter methodology views 
conclusions and recommendations outside its scope as a compilation of opinions, the socio-
legal on its part aims to expose the failings of the law and operation of the legal system.  
According to Eser, the first step in a comparative research is to define the problem which is to 
be investigated in view of different legal orders.50 This is because legal norms need to be 
                                                          
48 Reza Benakar, Max Travers, Law Sociology and Method: Theory and Methods in Socio-legal Research. (Hart 
Publishing, 2005) Pg 10-11 
49 Brian Tamanaha, A General Jurisprudence of Law And Society (Oxford Uni Press, 2001) Pg 165 
50 Albin Eser, The Importance of Comparative Legal Research for the Development of Criminal Sciences ( 
 Sonderdrucke aus der Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg 1997) Pg 510 http://www.freidok.uni-
freiburg.de/volltexte/3759/pdf/Eser_The_importance_of_comparative_legal_research.pdf  accessed 20th July, 
2015 
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correctly understood as they do not draw their meaning from themselves but from a social 
problem to be regulated by each case.51 
 Furthermore, because the law keeps changing through amendments, the black-letter approach 
continues to produce expositions on new/different aspects of legal doctrine.52 This requires the 
researcher to exclude all references to historical, political, social, and all cultural factors as 
forces that shapes the operation of the law as a social phenomenon. This is the direct opposite 
of the socio-legal approach, which analysis has the potential of changing the status quo. It is 
not enough to simply compare the words on the pages. The law seats within a culture, hence 
there is a need to look at the structure at which a law operates within the society to understand 
what it is and how it functions53 and more importantly to have a more realistic look at the legal 
system that is investigated.54 
Adopting the black-letter and the socio-legal methodologies makes the research interesting. 
This is because once the writer has revealed the legal meaning and rules as contained in the 
Terrorism Act of both States, then it becomes possible to systematically assess these 
interpretations to what obtain in real practice.55 The black-letter and the socio-legal approach 
have distinct ideologies/normative agendas which leads to specific value judgement for the 
research, bearing in mind that the Terrorism Act 2011 is made for a particular purpose and 
therefore needs to be critically assessed not only in terms of its formalistic sense but also in the 
                                                          
51 Consequently, to satisfy the requirement of a comparative research one must first of all refer back to the 
social assumption and social integration in the use of a legal norm in a particular legal system instead of 
bothering whether a comparable term exist in another legal system with similar concepts or by means of other 
rules. The real ‘subject of comparison is not only the norm, but rather its presupposed real-life situation as a 
problem of social order to be regulated by law.’ Ibid Pg 511 
*Rodolfo Sacco reiterates this by arguing that the law cannot be applied until it is interpreted. According to 
him, there must be an interpretation between a primary source such as statute or precedent and the 
interpretation given to it. 
Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Format; A Dynamic Approach To Comparative Law (1999) The American Journal of 
Comparative Law, Vol 39, No 2 1999, Pg 345 
52 Each time an amendment is made, the researcher is required to interpret the law on the basis that it forms a 
system of interrelated-rules.  This can be very time-consuming. Salter and Mason, ‘ Writing Law Dissertation’ 
(Pearson, 2007)  pg 189 
53 Edward J. Eberle, The Method And Role of Comparative Law (2009) Global Studies Law Review, Vol 8, No 23, 
Pg 451 
54 Lirieka Meintjes-Van Derwalt, Comparative Method; Comparing Legal Systems or Legal Culture (Speculum 
Juris, 2006) Pg 58 
55 The synthesis of the doctrinal (Black-letter) approach and socio-legal is not only possible within a 
comparative legal research, but also gives birth to the ‘contemporary interdisciplinary approach which is able 
to comprehensively coincide with contemporary trends in legal methodology’.  
Vitalij Levičev, the Synthesis of Comparative and Social Legal Research as the Essential Prerequisite  to Reveal 
the Interaction of National Legal Systems’  Pg 168 
http://www.tf.vu.lt/dokumentai/Admin/Doktorant%C5%B3_konferencija/Levicev.pdf accessed 20th July, 2015  
   
27 
 
light of the success or failure in realising the specific policy goal of the Acts/policy lessons to 
be learned. 
4.4 Issues behind comparative legal research in relation to the thesis  
As Walker rightly stated, comparative law exercises are fraught with dangers because of 
explicit and sometimes subtle differences in law and practice.56 Even though Nigeria and UK 
operate the common law system, the response by the British government to terrorists attacks is 
clearly different from Nigeria’s response to Boko Haram attacks. Furthermore, there is a big 
difference in national culture, local traditions, power structures, belief in state institution, and 
difference in the degree of civil society development. More importantly, there is a difference 
in the style of legal interpretation and the application of legal issues.  There could also be a 
problem in the two statute’s logical interrelationship. But despite all these differences, 
comparative research such as this is mainly interested in developing and testing theories that 
could be applicable beyond boundaries of a single society, irrespective of cultural, historical or 
political differences.57 More than any time in history there is a demand especially in developing 
countries for cross-national comparisons of specific problems with the aim of reducing 
unexplained variance and finding patterns and relationship to solve to these problems.58 
Besides, the problem of ‘comparability’ of empirical units selected for comparison and analysis 
is eliminated in this research because the research compares and contrasts ‘like for like.’ For 
example, the definition of terrorism, arrest, pre-charge detention, and proscription of terror 
suspect under the Nigeria’s TPA 2011 is compared and contrasted with the definition of 
terrorism, arrest, pre-charge-detention and proscription under the UK’s T.A 2000. However, it 
is important to bear in mind that applying lessons and insights derived from the comparative 
analysis of our own law with that of another State/legal system  may not always produce the 
same result. It could also produce conclusions and results that are not realistic.  This is because 
terrorist attacks are sudden and unpredictable. The Writer is mindful of this fact and will be 
careful in putting forward proposals and recommendations that are common grounds solutions 
to both Nigeria and UK, especially those that can be applied to Nigeria’s domestic legal 
patterns.  
                                                          
56 C. Walker, Op cit 2011 Pg 4 
57 Else Oyen, Comparative Methodology Theory and Practice in International Social Research (Page Publisher, 
1990) Pg 1 
58 ibid 
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5 Sources and problems encountered 
The research is entirely library based. It might have helped if the Writer was able to travel to 
Northern Nigeria to obtain first-hand accounts from the victims of Boko Haram attacks as well 
as victims of government forces brutality and abuse, however getting ethical approval for this 
would be impossible. This is because of the grave risk involved in going to Northern Nigeria 
for field assessment. In lieu of this, the writer relied on primary and secondary sources of law 
such as legislations/statutes, textbooks, journal articles, online sources/materials from West 
Law and Lexis Nexis, case law/law reports, academic papers, reports, news reports and 
newspapers publications.  
Access to information, reports, commentaries, statistics, and law reports relating to the United 
Kingdom was achieved with ease, unfortunately there are few textbooks, reports, legal 
commentaries available on terrorism and law/counterterrorism in Nigeria (especially those that 
analyses the TPA 2011). Information and data were gathered from multiple sources throughout 
the course of writing this thesis. As a result there would be good reasons to be sceptical of some 
of the sources used especially on Nigeria because of the difficulty in ascertaining their 
authenticity and credibility. To address this, the writer consciously  used reports and journals 
from internationally recognised human rights organisations such as Amnesty International 
Reports, Human Rights Watch report, and other international online journals that could be 
verified (including the date published and date accessed).  
Other difficulties encountered in the course of this research is the non-availability of a record 
of the number of suspects arrested or detained, and even on court cases on terrorism in Nigeria. 
This is because there has been no controlled study on counter-terrorism by the Nigerian 
government, or a national information gathering system, or a national counterterrorism centre. 
Nevertheless, this has not in any way affected the over-all results, findings, or 
recommendations of the research.  
6 Outline of the thesis  
 
Chapter two of the thesis positions the thesis within the existing literature in the field. This is 
done by identifying academic writings on the legal measures adopted under the Nigerian and 
the U.K Terrorism Acts, their strengths, achievements, limitations, criticisms and inadequacies 
whilst also identifying areas that require further explanations. Other major theoretical academic 
arguments and counter-arguments on the topic will also be discussed. This review will also 
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shed some light on some of the questions put forward by this thesis and establish the rationale 
for doing so. In so doing the thesis’s original contribution to knowledge will be established.  
Chapters 3 and 4 focuses on the “black-letter” analysis of the key provisions under the Nigerian 
TPA 2011 (as amended) and the UK Terrorism Act 2000. These critical analysis focuses on 
the legal meaning of the definition of terrorism, arrest, detention, proscription, and 
encouragement of terrorism under the Acts. The emphasis here is on the wordings, legal 
principles, legal precedents, and technical terms used under these provisions. Several questions 
and inadequacies under the Acts will be raised in the course of the analysis. This analysis is 
limited in approach and will not assist in exposing discrepancies between law in books and law 
in action. As a result, a further socio-legal assessment of these provisions will be required in 
later chapters of the research  
Chapter 5 briefly highlight some terrorist atrocities in Nigeria and the UK as well as each states 
responses to address them. More importantly, this chapter compares and contrasts the Nigerian 
TPA 2011 (as amended) and the UK TA 2000. The aim of this comparative analysis is to 
identify the similarities, differences, as well as strengths and weaknesses of the provisions of 
the Acts of both States.  This comparative discussion takes into account the judicial 
interpretations/legal precedents as well as reasoning, deductions, translations, and the legal 
implications from these precedents. This chapter enables us to understand the variances in the 
Terrorism Acts of both states, from which Nigeria can learn to improve her law.  
Chapters 6 and 7 assesses how the Nigerian TPA 2011 (as amended) and the UK TA 2000 are 
used in practice. These chapters exposes the discrepancies between “law in books” and how 
the laws are applied in practice. The chapter will explain how the provisions under the Act are 
interpreted and applied in practice and their effects/impacts, especially on human rights in the 
country.  
Chapter 8 compares and contrasts the practical application and usage of key provisions under 
the Terrorism Acts of Nigeria and the UK, as well as their effects and impacts on human rights.  
This chapter juxtaposes the way and manner which the five key provisions under review are 
applied in practice with the aim of identifying lessons that Nigeria can learn from the UK, vice 
versa.  
Chapter 9 undertakes a further assessment of Nigeria’s TPA 2011 (as amended) by reference 
to its domestic, regional, and international constitutional obligations. This chapter will uncover 
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those legal measures adopted under the Act that that are not consistent with provisions of the 
Nigerian Constitutions 1999, the African Charter, and the ICCPR. The chapter will also set the 
tone for legal reforms that will be proposed by the writer.   
Similarly chapter 10 pursues an assessment of the U.K’s Terrorism Act 2000 by reference to 
its domestic, regional, and international constitutional obligations. In this chapter, an 
assessment of the Act will be done by reference to the Human Rights Act 1998, the ECHR, and 
the ICCPR will be done.  
Chapter 11 focuses on the lessons that Nigeria can learn from the UK’s experience in 
countering terrorism and vice versa. This chapter will be used to present proposals and 
recommendations for law and policy reforms in Nigeria and UK based on lessons learnt from 
the comparative critical analysis and socio-legal assessment of the Nigerian TPA 2011 and UK 
TA 2000.  
Chapter 12 is the final and conclusive chapter. This chapter highlights and brings together 
salient issues identified throughout the study. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Introduction 
Before reviewing the literature on Nigeria and United Kingdom’s legal responses to terrorism, 
it is important to note that “terrorism” cuts across different academic fields.  As a result, it 
might be impossible to capture the wide range of discussions on the topic under a single study. 
Equally, there are probably hundreds of definitions of terrorism spanning across different 
academic fields, hence the writer will not attempt to add to this list by trying to define the term.  
Since 9/11, States have taken various measures domestically and internationally to counter-
terrorism. These measures inevitably have an impact not only on civil liberties and human 
rights but also breach the State’s domestic and international human right laws.59 States are then 
faced with the problem of protecting national security on the one hand, and upholding the 
fundamental human rights of the citizens on the other hand.  
While countries took measures to tackle terrorism in the aftermath of the 9/11, Nigeria did not 
feel the need to enact a comprehensive anti-terrorism legislation.60 However, a series of serious 
terrorist attacks by ‘Boko Haram’ made the enactment of a comprehensive anti-terrorism 
statute in Nigeria a matter of necessity rather than choice.61 Since the enactment of the 
Terrorism (Prevention) Act in 2011, there have been arguments and counter-arguments about 
its usefulness and coherence in addressing terrorism in the country. Some of this arguments 
will be discussed later on in this chapter. This has become one of the most significant current 
discussions amongst human rights proponents in Nigeria. This disagreement by 
scholars/academics led to the research question: is the Nigerian TPA 2011 a credible and 
internally coherent response to terrorism in the country that reflects lessons learned in drafting 
such legislation elsewhere? 
Being a Nigerian, the writer’s quest for answers to the above was borne out of genuine concern, 
especially as Boko Haram attacks have become more coordinated and extensive. Over the past 
eight years (2009-2017), media reports on terrorism related atrocities by Boko Haram on one 
                                                          
59 Steve Forster, Human Rights and Civil Liberties (Longman Pearson 3rd Edition, 2011) Pg 738 
60 Ebenezer Okpokpo, ‘The Challenges Facing Nigeria’s Foreign Policy in the Next Millennium’  (1999) African 
Studies Quarterly Pg 13   
61 Isaac Terwase Sampson, Freedom C. Onuoha, ‘Forcing the Horse to Drink or Making it Realise its Thirst? 
Understanding the Enactment of the Anti-Terrorism  Legislation’ [2011] Perspective on Terrorism Vol 5, Issues 
3-4 Pg 38 http://terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/154/305%20a accessed 12th July 2014 
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hand and extra-judicial killings by government security forces on the other hand have been 
widespread in Nigeria. ‘Boko Haram’ and its splinter group, ‘Ansaru’, have engaged in 
indiscriminate killings of innocent civilians and the Police, kidnappings, bombings, suicide 
assaults and the destruction of properties worth billions of Naira.62 Government forces have 
also been accused of series of  human rights violations. These events have led to the 
intimidation of the general population and created an atmosphere of fear and general insecurity 
in Northern Nigeria. Consequently it has become imperative to subject Nigeria’s TPA 2011 to 
an appraisal in terms of how its provisions are used in practice and to challenge the 
constitutionality of some of its provisions on both human rights and other legal grounds. 
The methods currently adopted by the Nigerian Security forces in fighting terrorism have 
attracted several condemnations both domestically and internationally. It is therefore important  
to educate the Nigerian government on how terrorist suspects should be treated if domestic, 
regional and international obligations are to be respected.   
Suffice it to say at this point that while there are huge volumes of literature that addresses U.K’s 
anti-terrorism legislation, there are few literature that critically analyses or assesses the anti-
terrorism legislation in Nigeria. The majority of the literature on counter-terrorism in Nigeria 
focuses more on the terror incidents and atrocities and the inadequate responses from the 
government.  
Given that the study focuses on two states, for the sake of clarity this chapter will be divided 
into three parts. The first part will review the literature on Nigeria’s TPA 2011, while the 
second part will review the literature on UK’s TA 2000. The latter part of this chapter will be 
used to establish the significance of the research  and to illustrate the original contribution of 
the research to knowledge.  
2. NIGERIA 
 
In 2001, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1373, which obliged member 
states to make terrorism a serious crime under their domestic legislation. For about 10 years 
Nigeria did not make any concrete effort to give effect to that Resolution. Nigeria’s National 
                                                          
62 Trapped in the Cycle of Violence; Amnesty International Report on Nigeria 2012.  Pg 9 
http://www.amnesty.ca/sites/default/files/nigeriareport1november12.pdf  accessed 1st August, 2013. 
*Human Right Watch Reports shows that from 2009 to October 2012 Boko Haram has killed more than 1500 
people in Nigeria.  Human Right Watch Report October 2012 Pg 5  
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/10/11/spiraling-violence-0   accessed 5th May 2013 
   
33 
 
Assembly merely squeezed in provisions relating to terrorism in the Economic & Financial 
Crimes Commission (EFCC) Establishment Act 2004.63 As a result of this, the EFCC Act was 
criticised for being incomprehensive and inadequate to address the ramifications of terrorism 
contemplated by UNSCR 1373.64   
The concern over Nigeria’s vulnerability to terrorism assumed a worrisome international 
dimension in December 2009 when one of its citizens, Abdulmutallab, who had been trained 
in Yemen, attempted to detonate an explosive device hidden in his underwear while on board 
Northwest Airlines Flight 253 (carrying 279 passengers and 11 crew members) en route to 
Detroit’s Metropolitan Airport in the US.65   This resulted in the blacklisting of Nigeria by 
classifying it as a ‘Country of Interest’ on the US Terror Watch list.66   As a result of pressure 
from the international community, especially the United States, combined with an increase in 
terrorist activities in the country, the Nigerian government enacted the Terrorism (Prevention) 
Act 2011. It can be argued that in a bid to respond quickly and decisively to terrorist attacks, 
the Nigerian government enacted an ‘ill considered’ or ‘panic legislation’ resulting in a law 
that is ineffective, merely symbolic, or poses a potential threat to human rights. Critics/ scholars 
in Nigeria are of the view that that the 2011 Act was “hurriedly” enacted by the National 
Assembly without due considerations to its effects on human rights.   
As expected, the 2011 Act provided the legal framework for the prohibition, prevention, 
penalty and combating acts of terrorism in the country.   However, since the enactment of the 
Act in 2011 and its amendment in 2013, there have been arguments both in favour and against 
the Act.  
For instance, arguing in support of the TPA 2011, Professor Oyebode described it as a veritable 
watershed in law-making in Nigeria: 
    “Terrorism is one such reality of our time and Nigeria seems to be rising to the threat. 
     The anti-terrorism legislation recently enacted is very much a step in the right direction.  
     Despite its somewhat convoluted drafting, its stands a good chance of bringing terrorists 
     to its heel and ensure that the people live in peace and freedom, without let or  
     hindrance.”67  
                                                          
63 Isaac Terwase Sampson, Freedom C. Onuoha, ‘Forcing the Horse to Drink or Making it Realise its Thirst’? 
Understanding the Enactment of Anti-Terrorism Legislation ’ [2011]  Perspective on Terrorism, Vol 5,Issues 3-4  
Pg 38  http://terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/154/305   accessed 15th May 2013 
64 ibid 
65 Ibid Pg 39 
66 Ibid Pg 41 
67 Ibid Pg 12 
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On the other hand, Ekundayo questioned the soundness of the Act in dealing with terrorism in 
the country. According to her, there are several inadequacies therein.68 She argues that the 
Nigerian lawmakers failed to include in the Act provisions for the protection of the fundamental 
human rights of terrorist suspects and the fundamental principle of law that a person is innocent 
until declared guilty by a competent court of law.69  Ekundayo also argued that there were 
inadequate provisions on the supervisory functions of the judiciary over the activities of law 
enforcement agencies in relation to investigation and prosecution of terrorists, as well as the 
exclusive power granted the Federal High Court to handle terrorism cases.70  
While some of Ekundayo criticisms are legitimate, it is difficult to comprehend how a piece of 
legislation such as the Terrorism (Prevention) Act would cover both terrorism matters and 
provide for human rights protection at the same time. Perhaps Ekundayo is unaware that 
provisions relating to human rights in Nigeria are already provided for under the Constitution 
1999. The question should have been whether the 2011 Act is consistent with the provisions of 
the Constitution.  
Other literature have emerged that criticises the Act. Saheed referred to the Act as a “41-dose 
panacea which has yielded no meaningful effect.”71 According to him, Nigeria as a country is 
devoid of ideal democracy, rule of law, social justice, and good governance, thus making the 
Act ineffective.72 Saheed also condemned s.30 of the TPA 2011 which gives the Attorney 
General of the Federation power to institute criminal proceedings or to delegate this power to 
any agency to institute criminal proceeding against any person under the Act.73  
Although Saheed made a valid point with regards to rule of law not being respected in Nigeria, 
the main flaw with his criticism is that it sees democracy and social justice as key elements that 
must exist for a “coherent” anti-legislation to be in place. The question is, what about countries 
like Saudi Arabia, China, UAE, and Bhutan that operate a different system of government other 
than democracy? Does that suggest their anti-terror law is not coherent? Saheed’s assessment 
of s.30 of the Act is also questionable. The powers given to the A.G under s.30 to institute 
                                                          
68 Vera Ekundayo, ‘Nigerian Terrorism Act: A right step forward’, Punch Newspaper January 24, 2012 
http://www.punchng.com/opinion/nigerian-terrorism-act-a-right-step-forward/  accessed 9TH August 2013 
69 Ibid 
70 ibid 
71Saheed M. Toyin, ‘[Opinion] Is The Terrorism Act A Toothless Bulldog? (Information Nigeria, 28th Dec 2012) 
http://www.informationng.com/2012/12/is-the-terrorism-act-a-toothless-bulldog-part-i.html  accessed  9th 
August 2013 
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criminal proceedings against any person under the Act or delegate such power is not misplaced 
or out of order. This can be likened to the function of the Crown Prosecution Service in the 
U.K. The goal is to eliminate frivolous prosecutions in courts.  
Many Nigerians have accused the government of being inconsistent and ineffectual in its 
response to terrorism. In Ogbezor’s view, rather than perhaps strengthen its anti-terrorism laws, 
the Nigerian government has focused more on the Joint Military Task Force, which 
unnecessarily infringes human freedoms.74 Similarly, Omede argues that “military-oriented” 
counter-terrorism strategy will not bring an end to terrorism in Nigeria. Rather it has only 
intensified the violence and erosion of human rights values.75 Sabella in his paper stressed that 
counter-terrorism is a complex and multifaceted subject that encompasses a host of different 
strategies for dealing with violent extremism.76 To this end, he advised that Nigeria as a nation 
needs to refashion its national security policies and objectives to meet the demands of modern 
day security challenges.77 One way of doing this is perhaps to enact further legislative measures 
in preventing terrorism.78   
While the writer agrees with Sabella that Nigeria needs to re-evaluate its counter-terrorism 
polices, Ogbezor’s view about strengthening the Terrorism Act seem to suggest that the 
solution to terrorism in Nigeria lies within the law. This is a “lego-centric” fallacy. There is 
nothing that suggests that the strengthening of the law will automatically bring an end to 
terrorism in the Country. The most the law can do is to provide the legal frameworks for dealing 
with terrorism in the country.  
With regards to Omede’s criticism on the use of the military, it is difficult to fault the 
deployment of soldiers to tackle Boko Haram when people are been attacked on a daily basis. 
                                                          
74 Ernest Ogbezor, An Assessment of Preparedness and Response to Terrorism In Northern Nigeria (Ford 
Foundation International Fellowship Progress, 2011) Pg 2 
75 A.J Omede, Nigeria; Analysing the Security Challenges of the Goodluck Jonathan Administration.(Canadian 
Research and Development Centre of Science & Culture, Vol 7, No 5, 2011)   pg 98 
76 Quirine Eijkman & Bart Schuurman, ‘Preventing Counter-terrorism and Non-discrimination in the European 
Union; A call for systematic Evaluation’ (Int. Centre for Counter-terrorism-The Hague, June 2011) Pg 2 
77 Sabella O Abidde, ‘Redefining Nigeria’s National Security’ Nigeria Village Square, April 2008 Pg 1-2 
78 Arguing from a socio-legal perspective, Unuegbu observed that the scheme for 
prosecuting offenders under the current anti-terror law in Nigeria is flawed and needs 
serious overhaul. At the moment, prosecutions under the law take place only at the federal 
high courts, which are notoriously tardy and already overburdened with huge number of 
cases thereby making the prosecution of terrorist suspect slow  
Carl Unegbu, ‘Terrorism Undeterred: Nigeria's Boko Haram Failure’  (April  2012) World Policy Journal 
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Counter-terrorism in real practice demands some executive actions of which sending out 
soldiers is chief amongst this. All over the world, countries have responded directly to terrorism 
by sending troops to protect lives and properties. However, what is important is for the soldiers 
to abide by their rules of engagement and respect human rights of individuals and suspected 
terrorists.  
Previous analyses and assessments of the Nigerian TPA 2011 (as amendment) has focused 
mainly on the government’s inadequate response to terrorist attacks by Boko Haram and the 
general disregard for human rights in Nigeria. As a result, the five key provisions of the TPA 
2011 under review in this study have not been thoroughly analysed or assessed in Nigeria. This 
is a sharp contrast to previous analysis and assessment under the UK’s TA 2000 that was found 
to be more extensive.   
Acquiring a universally acceptable definition of terrorism in international law remains a 
problem. Interestingly, most definition of terrorism including that of Nigeria extends outside 
the country.79 As argued by Eikman and Schuueman, this might be due to the international 
character of contemporary terrorism.80 Nonetheless, the importance of the definition of 
terrorism in a clear and unequivocal term cannot be overemphasised. This is because the 
definition provided by the Act shows the public actions that constitutes terrorism. Inevitably, 
how we define terrorism influences how we respond to it. Unfortunately, little academic 
discourse on the definition of terrorism is available in Nigeria. Legal commentators like Prof. 
Oyebode and Adeshina (SAN) have attempted to raise some discrepancies under the definition 
of terrorism in Nigeria. Oyebode argues that in defining terrorism, the TPA 2011 captures a 
“dragnet of sundry acts” as terrorism offences.81 However this appraisal cannot be considered 
as a thorough or detailed analysis or assessment of the definition under the Act (a detailed 
analysis of this comes up in the next chapter). The writer makes clear that the objective of this 
thesis is not to analyse and assess the definition with a view to provide a better or more 
comprehensive definition, but rather to explore whether the definition under the 2011 Act is 
clear and unambiguous. In order words, does the TPA 2011 adequately define who a terrorist 
is in Nigeria? And if no, what are the effects of a vague and over- broad definition of terrorism? 
As Kalliopi, U.N Special Representative on Human Rights puts it: 
       “vague language has paved the way for the criminalisation of certain types of human 
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       right activity. In some States, this has resulted in the use of security legislation to  
       prosecute defenders who criticise the government or who have taken peaceful actions 
      in favour of democratisation, minority rights and self-determination.”82 
 
Scholars and human rights advocates have also raised concerns over the power of arrest under 
the TPA 2011 (as amended). The JTF far from conducting intelligence-driven operations that 
will lead to the arrest of the terrorists, have instead been accused of arresting innocent civilians 
and committing other human rights violation.83 According to Hussein, the JTF often cordon off 
areas and carry out house-to-house searches for Boko Haram members and at times shooting 
innocent young men in their homes. Hussein makes reference to the 9th of July 2011 incident 
at the Kaleri Ngomari Area of Maiduguri where 25 innocent Nigerians were shot dead by the 
JTF, women and children beaten, homes burnt and many other reported missing.84 According 
to him, the method adopted by the security forces was “counter-productive.”85 Amnesty 
International (A.I) and Human Right Watch (HRW) also report several similar incidents. 
Amnesty International in its 2012, 2013,86 and 2014/1587 annual reports on Nigeria portrays a 
gloomy picture of events in the country. Nigeria’s human rights situation deteriorated within 
this period with Boko Haram and the Special Military Task Force (JTF) responsible for 
hundreds of unlawful killings, arbitrary arrests and unlawful detentions, extortion and 
intimidation.88  People live in a climate of fear and insecurity, vulnerable to attacks from Boko 
Haram and on the other hand facing human rights violations at the hands of security forces.89 
In a more detailed study on the activities of the Nigerian Military against Boko Haram, A.I 
stated that the Military have extra-judicially executed more than 1,200 Nigerians and have 
arbitrarily arrested at least 20,000 innocent civilians, mostly young men.90This number of 
arrests increased significantly between 2012 and 2013 following the declaration of a state of 
emergency in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states.91 Justice Initiative argues that the arrest and 
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detention practices in Nigeria are made worse with the absence of institutional control and 
patterns of abuse.92 According to the group, ‘the Nigerian Police and other security agencies 
enjoy a stunning degree of impunity.’93The government fails to exercise due diligence in 
investigating or ensuring accountability for police abuse. Furthermore the Police do not have a 
transparent or effective mechanism of internal control. For instance, the group cited the case of 
the head of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) of Enugu State Police Command who 
boasted in December 2008 to a researcher from the group that he ordered the extrajudicial 
executions of only those persons whom he knew to be guilty.94 Ekundayo alleges that the TPA 
2011 gives sweeping powers to law enforcement agencies to arrest on reasonable suspicion.95 
In her words, she says “the act gives the Police powers to more or less do as they please in the 
course of enforcing the provisions of the Act.”96 Similarly, Brandler asserts that enormous 
powers are given to the Police under the TPA 2011 instead of the Court which makes it look 
like ‘an extension of State powers’.97 She argues further that there is no detailed information 
available from the Nigerian government on the number of Boko Haram suspects that are 
arrested, detained and put on trial. Through personal research, she reveals that the number of 
suspects arrested and brought before a Court have “been few and far between.”98 Apart from 
few high profile cases, most Boko Haram suspects are not charged.99 Yet, a lot of arrests are 
made almost on a daily basis.  
The Nigerian government and the Military have denied these allegations of human rights 
abuses.100 The government argued that the arrest and pre-charge detention of terrorist suspects 
are one of the preventive counter-terrorism measures available to state to thwart terror attacks.  
There is no denying the fact that the government responses such as the deployment of soldiers 
to restore peace and security are genuine reactions to threats posed by Boko Haram, 
nevertheless the manner which they are carried-out could arguably be considered 
                                                          
92 Justice Initiative, Criminal Force Torture, Abuse, and Extrajudicial Killings by the Nigeria Police Force (New 
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disproportionate and unnecessary. Following on from this, it becomes important to analyse and 
assess the ‘power of arrest’ under the Act to establish whether it unnecessarily infringes human 
rights provisions in Nigeria, especially in practice. 
The pre-charge detention period of terror suspects in Nigeria is another controversial aspect of 
the TPA 2011 (as amended) that has generated condemnation from lawyers, scholars, and 
human rights advocates. These condemnations are based upon the prolonged pre-charge period 
provided by the Act. This disapproval is further heightened by the slow judicial system in 
Nigeria. Amnesty International (AI) observed that the justice system in Nigeria remains 
ineffective with two thirds of all prison inmates still awaiting trial.101 The use of torture to 
extract information from Boko Haram detainees also remains widespread.102 Human Right 
Watch also alleged that Boko Haram suspects have been held for months and even years 
without charge or trial.  Some of the detainees have often been denied the right to communicate 
with their family and lawyers.103 A.I cited the example of one Sa’adatu Umar who was arrested 
in Bauchi and detained with her three children, all aged below six. She was not charged with 
any crime and was unlawfully detained for several months, reportedly because her husband 
was a suspected Boko Haram member.104 This method of arrest and detention raises the 
questions about the right to liberty and security, freedom from arbitrary detention and the right 
to fair trial.  Questions which this research will attempt to answer are; does the Act permit the 
detention of a terrorist suspect for that long a period without charge? Does the Act permit the 
arrest and detention of family members of suspected terrorist?  What is the legitimacy of the 
180days detention period under the TPA 2011 with reference to Nigeria’s domestic, regional 
and international law? And, what remedies are available for detained terror suspects?  
The internet and social media platforms provides different means through which people are 
being radicalised or encouraged into committing terrorist acts.105 The former CIA Director, 
Porter Gross, warns that ‘Africa is a rich sea bed for terrorist recruitment.’ He specifically 
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singled out Nigeria with about 65 Million Muslims as a nation of concern.106  In a similar 
development, a United Nations Report reveals that West Africa is becoming more popular as 
an intermediate destination in the trans-shipment of drugs from South America to Europe and 
elsewhere, and that terrorist group are using funds raised in this process to encourage 
terrorism.107 Analysts also argue that one quarter of the 400 foreign fighters captured in Iraq 
by America are from sub-Sahara Africa notably from Nigeria, Niger and Mali.108  To address 
this concern, the Nigerian government made encouragement of terrorism, especially on the 
internet, an offence under the Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act 2013.  However, 
Scholars like Soji have argued that fundamental liberties such as freedom of speech and the 
press, or the right to privacy may be infringed upon under this provision.109 Similarly, Onuoha 
and Terwase claim that the provision of encouragement of terrorism under the Act could be 
exploited by those in power to persecute opponents, dissents, critics, and activists.110 For 
instance, speaking out publicly in support of Sharia law could also be interpreted by the 
security agencies to mean being sympathetic to the objectives of Boko Haram and may result 
in arrest and detention. They argued further that Nigeria’s political and legal history, especially 
the effect of prolonged years of military rule which was characterised by repression and clamp 
down on the press could be factor why there are concerns about the offence of encouragement 
of terrorism.111 While Onuoha and Terwase’s concerns about the provision of the Act on 
encouragement are understandable, the writer disagrees with their argument that Nigeria’s 
prolonged military rule could have an impact on the implementation of the Act in practice. This 
argument is flawed on the ground that Nigeria has had a democratic government since 1999 
without a coup. In fact, the history of Nigeria shows that the Country has not always been under 
Military dictatorship.112 Previous military rule in Nigeria cannot be an excuse for the Terrorism 
Act’s non-compliance with Nigeria’s domestic, regional, and international human rights 
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norms. Recent events in Nigeria where the Police and the Department for State Security have 
used the Act as reference to seize and destroy Newspaper publications on the activities of the 
Military against Boko Haram,113 and the detention of two managers of the Daily Trust 
Newspaper,114 justifies the concerns raised by scholars and human rights proponents. 
Consequently, it is has become important to subject Nigeria’s provision on encouragement of 
terrorism under the Act to scrutiny to determine whether it is  constitutionally justifiable  and 
internally coherent in addressing the challenges posed by the internet and social media in 
encouraging terrorism. The following questions will be addressed: does the TPA 2011 cover 
statements that are likely to be understood by some or all members of the public as 
encouragement or inducement to them to commit terrorism? How does one infer that the public 
has been encouraged by a statement in Nigeria? What if the person who made the statements 
does not intend it to directly or indirectly encourage terrorism? What defence is available in 
the event of such under the Act? Assuming the Act fails to provide answers to these questions, 
how then does the State charge/prosecute a person who engages in encouragement of terrorism 
(directly or indirectly)?  This research will attempt to provide answers to these questions.  
The proscription of terrorist organisations informs the public both at home and abroad about 
organisations that are banned or outlawed in the country. It also diminishes the powers of 
terrorist organisations by denying them sponsorship, support or sanctuary.115 It is therefore no 
surprise that Boko Haram and its splinter, Ansaru, have been proscribed both in the Nigeria, 
the U.S and the U.K under their various laws. Two main arguments were raised by the U.S for 
designating Boko Haram as a foreign terrorist organisation. The first is that it engages in 
terrorist activity as defined under the United States Code116 and secondly, it threatens the peace 
of the U.S.117 One might ask how does Boko Haram threaten the peace of the U.S? Nees 
explained that Boko Haram has explicitly threatened the U.S and its citizens with violence for 
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aiding Nigeria in promoting religious freedom and promulgating the Terrorism (Prevention) 
Act 2011.118More directly, it was discovered through investigation that a member of Boko 
Haram was a Facebook friend to the famous Nigerian underwear Bomber, Umar Adulmuttallab 
who unsuccessfully attempted to blow up a plane in Detroit with 300 people on board. Nees 
argues that this singular act demonstrates that Boko Haram poses a threat to the U.S.   Similarly, 
the UK Home Secretary in her defence of the proscription of Boko Haram and Ansaru under 
the Terrorism Act 2000 argued the groups were motivated by an anti-Nigerian government and 
anti-western agenda and is broadly aligned with Al-Qaeda.  She argues further that the 
proscription is compatible with the European Convention of Human rights. 
While the writer agrees that proscription of terrorist organisations is a key tool in diminishing 
the activities of terrorist groups, this thesis is interested in finding out whether the power to 
proscribe under the Act unnecessarily infringes the right to freedom of assembly and 
association in Nigeria?  In other words, is proscription under the Act compatible with Nigeria’s 
domestic, regional and international human rights obligations? If not, how can Nigeria strike a 
balance without infringing human rights? What safeguards/remedy are available under the Act 
to a group or organisation that it has been wrongly proscribed?  
3.  UNITED KINGDOM 
United Kingdom is widely regarded as a global promoter of democracy, the rule of law, and 
human rights. This is evident in its strong political institutions and its adherence to the rule of 
law. Therefore certain behaviours and acts are expected of it especially with regards to 
upholding human rights values. However, with respect to counter-terrorism it is not certain 
whether its counter-terrorism legislation is fully consistent with its domestic and international   
human rights obligations.  
The U.K has battled with home grown terrorism for decades and also faces terrorist threats 
from international terrorist organisations like Al-Qaeda.119  As Brandon notes, the U.K has 
tremendous experience in dealing with the impact terrorism can have on a society.120 The 
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government developed the “Contest strategy” that pursues, prevents, prepares and protects the 
UK against terrorist attacks. The U.K has also enacted a series of anti-terrorism laws against 
terrorism. Legal measures adopted under the Terrorism Act 2000, for example, include the 
power to arrest based on reasonable suspicion and the pre-charge detention of terror suspects.  
According to Walker, there is a long history of laws responding to terrorism which have been 
utilised in the United Kingdom.121  Thus, U.K terrorism laws ‘have been amongst the most 
extensively and fiercely debated of a devised in the past decade.’ Most of the controversies that 
have arisen from debates over the UK terrorism laws involves the human rights they infringe 
or endanger.122  As Saul pointed out, the problem of terrorism touches on many areas of 
international law.  Thus, there are literature on the topic much of which is repetitive and focuses 
on national extradition law, national human rights and civil liberties.123 The primary focus of 
this thesis is to determine whether the UK Terrorism Act unnecessarily  infringes on human 
rights, both in theory and in practice.   
The definition of terrorism remains problematic in international law. Levitt compared the 
search for a universally acceptable definition of terrorism  as the ‘‘search for the holy grail.’’124 
This is because terrorism means different things to different people. It could mean a message 
of fear designed to intimidate opponents, or a message of inspiration for sympathisers, or a 
message aimed at aimed at converting non-committed bystanders.125 Walker in an extensive 
study on the UK’s Terrorism Act 2000 examined issues relating to definition of terrorism, 
arrest, detention, proscription, encouragement of terrorism. According to him, in any attempt 
to define terrorism, three key denominators must be present. This includes the purpose (which 
according to him in most cases are for political ends), the targets, and the method.126  Walker 
notes that under the U.K definition of terrorism, wider scope is given to the word “violence.” 
He goes on to identify some flaws in the definition of terrorism under the Terrorism Act 2000. 
According to him the inclusion of the word ‘religious’ in the definition of terrorism poses a 
problem as this could lead to personal disputes involving family disputes, clan disputes.127  
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Furthermore, Walker notes that the Act reflected ‘racial cause’. This is basically to give re-
assurance to minorities interests under the Act. He concludes that the Act is overbroad in its 
definition of terrorism and instead needs to focus on the key mischief of terrorism which is 
danger to political democracy.128 Staniforth strongly agrees with Walker that the definition of 
terrorism under the TA 2000 was given a wider scope, for example, it covers acts which 
themselves are not violent an example of this is disrupting with computer system.129 This view 
by Walker that the purpose of terrorism in most cases is for political ends is arguable. Some 
Authors have suggested that the motive behind terrorism could also be psychological130 or 
“irrational” behaviour amongst other motives/ends.131It is important to make clear that the aim 
of this research is not  to determine the causal theories behind terrorism but to analyse and 
assess key provisions of the UK Terrorism Act 2000. Saul disagrees with Walker’s assertion 
that three denominators must be present in any attempt to define terrorism. According to him, 
there is no medium of law to distinguish between a privately motivated violence and a 
politically motivated violence.132Saul argued further that not all attacks, serious violence, 
hostage takings or bombings are motivated for political ends. Some are done for personal or 
pecuniary reasons, thus the UK TA’s  position on terrorism this way makes it overbroad. He 
argues further that proof of motive(s) behind the act is usually not required as an element of 
the offences.133  Saul notes that under the Terrorism Act 2000, a mere intimidation of the 
population or compulsion of a government is not enough, there has to be a severe impact for 
terrorism to be implied.134 
It has been suggested that for the law to properly and legally address terrorism it must be 
defined neutrally. This is because it does not matter what ideology, philosophy or religious 
ideal is being promoted or whether the act occurred during peace time or war time as long as 
there is violence, acts that cause death, serious damage to property, grave bodily harm, or for 
the purpose of coercing or intimidating some specific groups or the government or for a 
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perceived political, military or philosophical benefit without any justification or excuse then it 
is terrorism. This neutral position recommended by Blakesley shows that the definition of 
terrorism under the Terrorism Act 2000 is not neutral after all because there are some 
qualifications to it. For example, the Act uses qualifications such as ‘serious damages to 
property’, ‘great bodily harm’ for ‘political or philosophical benefit.’ It is against this 
background that this research will look at the definition of terrorism under the TA 2000 to 
determine whether it is indeed overbroad or imprecise, amongst other things? 
The power of arrest under the TA 2000 has been described as the most controversial provision 
of the Terrorism Act 2000.135 S. 41 (1) which gives Police the power to arrest a person whom 
he reasonably suspects to commit an offence without a warrant.  Several concerns have been 
raised over the power of arrest under the Terrorism Act 2000. According to Beckman the power 
given to the Police under S. 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000 are broad and could lead to 
governmental abuses beyond the need to protect against imminent act of terrorism.136 It is 
alleged that the Terrorism Act  is being  used  to arrest some segment of the UK society such 
as Muslims and foreign nationals from certain countries which is against international non-
discrimination standards.137 This is however debateable. Proponents of the power of arrest have 
argued that since the Police are the gate keepers to the criminal justice system, mistakes made 
by them could sometimes be amplified but the concern by most critics is based on ensuring that 
the integrity and admissible of evidence by the police are based on credible facts.138 Wilkinson 
asserts that the power given to the Police under the Act is to enable them to effectively gather 
information and to disrupt dangerous activities.139  The power of arrest under the Terrorism 
Act 2000 is by no means exclusive. S.24 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 also 
empowers the Police to make arrest based on reasonable suspicion.  Code A of PACE provides 
that reasonable grounds for suspicion can be inferred from objective facts, information or 
intelligence.  The question then is, can the power of arrest under PACE be applied the same 
way as S.41 of TA 2000? Under the Terrorism Act, anyone arrested on reasonable suspicion 
of being a terrorist under S.41 is subject to a special regime of Police Powers and procedures 
prescribed in Part V and Sch 8 of the Act, instead of the regime Under PACE which applies to 
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other categories of offence. Arrest under S. 41 Terrorism Act 2000  differs from normal arrest 
powers in that no specific offence need be in mind of the arresting officer. Even though the 
arresting officer needs to state that an arrest is being imposed and the grounds for the arrest, 
the officer is not required to give a detailed reason for the arrest. The ECrtHR in 
Fox, Campbell and Hartley v The United Kingdom 140 held that though the Police may arrest 
based on reasonable suspicion, it is for the court to determine whether the ground considered 
by the arresting officer is relevant to the arrest. The Court in this case also stated that "suspicion 
justifying terrorist arrests cannot always be judged according to the same standards as are 
applied in dealing with conventional crime."141 A similar decision was reached in Brogan and 
O’Hara’s case.142 Walker asserts that a terrorist suspect arrested under PACE cannot be re-
arrested under S 41 of the TA 2000, unless further offences are disclosed.143 
The justification for S.41 of the Act has created some disagreements amongst scholars. Walker 
argues that  the power of arrest under the Act gives the Police wide discretion to carry out 
investigation.144 He stated further that terrorism demands an ‘anticipatory police intervention’ 
and to facilitate the carrying out of searches.145 Anderson on the other hand criticises S.41 of 
the Act as “notably wide.”146  This is because the arresting officer needs no specific offence in 
mind. This is even more so that the reasonable suspicion which the arrest is based need not be 
of the same level as those that are necessary to justify a conviction or even bring of a charge.147 
Walker  however argues that allowing the Police to give detail reasons for the arrest made under 
the Act could “disclose police methods or reveal the identities of informers.148 The decision of 
the court in Sher v United Kingdom149 is worth looking at here. In this case, three Pakistanis on 
student visas were arrested on the basis that they were reasonably suspected of being involved 
in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism, contrary to s.41 of the 2000 
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Act. The accused contended in particular that their rights under arts 5(2), 4 and 6(1) had been 
breached because they had not been provided with sufficient information at the time of arrest 
or detention as to the nature of the allegations against them; and because of the closed 
procedure permitted in hearing applications for warrants of further detention. They also 
complained about the execution and scope of the search warrants on them. The court in this 
case held that the requirement of fairness under art.5(4) did not impose a uniform, unvarying 
standard and would depend on the type of deprivation in question. The Court held further that 
Article 5(1)(c) expressly permitted deprivation based on reasonable suspicion of the 
commission of an offence. Terrorist crime fell into a special category, because of the attendant 
risk of loss of life and human suffering, the police were required to act with the utmost urgency 
in following up all information including information from secret sources. Further, it was 
recognised that the police may frequently have to make an arrest based on information the 
source of which could not be revealed to the suspect without putting the source in jeopardy. It 
followed that Art.5(1)(c) of the ECHR was not to be applied in such a manner as to put 
disproportionate difficulties in the way of the police in taking effective measures to protect the 
right to life and the right to bodily security of members of the public.150 Accordingly, Art.5(4) 
could not require the disclosure of confidential information or preclude closed 
hearings.151Going by this decision, a person can be arrested on suspicion of being a terrorist 
without any substantive extant evidence, and be detained in custody.  Several arguments has 
been raised against the provision of arrest under the  Act. Concerns have also been raised by 
several Human Rights Organisations about the low threshold required by Officers before they 
stop someone or make an arrest under the Act. Consequently, this  study aims to demonstrate 
the extent to which the power of arrest under the Act negatively affects the right to liberty and 
security and at the same determines the legitimacy and coherence of S.41 with human rights 
provisions in the UK. An analysis and assessment of the power of arrest under the UK 
Terrorism Act will be done in the later chapters.  
As earlier explained, after a terrorist is arrested, what comes next is detention pending when 
he/she is charged.  The question that often comes to mind with pre-charge detention is that for 
how long can a terror suspect be detained in the UK before charge? Firstly, it must be noted 
that  the period of pre-charge detention of terror suspect in the UK has been inconstant 
overtime, going from up from seven to fourteen days and then to 28 days then to fourteen days. 
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Presently, an accused can be detained for up to 48 hours if a ‘review officer does not authorise 
the continued detention’.152  This can be judicially extended for an additional period of seven 
days to up to 14 days.153 There is also a similar power of detention under S.53 and Sch.7 of the 
TA 2000 which gives the Police or customs officer at a port or border powers to stop and 
question a person in order to determine whether that person is involved in terrorism. The Police 
or Custom officer may require proof, identities, proof, and the disclosure of documents and 
may detain the person for up to nine (9) hours. The Police/Custom officer in detaining an 
accused under Sch.7 does not require reasonable suspicion of committing a terrorist act or any 
specific offence. In Miranda v Secretary of State for Home Dept,154 the applicant was detained 
by Police officer for nine hours at Heathrow Airport on 18 August 2013, purportedly under 
paragraph 2(1) of Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000. Mr Miranda brought an application 
to determine whether paragraph 2(1) of Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 gives the Police 
powers to stop and question a person at a port or border area for the purpose of determining 
whether he appears to be “concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of 
terrorism.” Secondly, whether, if it did, the use of the power was nevertheless disproportionate 
to any legitimate aim. The third is whether upon its true construction paragraph 2(1) power was 
repugnant to the right of freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The Divisional Court in this case 
decided that the power was exercised for a purpose permitted by the statute and that its use was 
not a disproportionate interference with articles 5, 8 or 10 of the Convention and that the use 
of the power was compatible with article 10 of the Convention. The Appeal Court dismissed 
the appellant appeal on the ground that the arrest was exercised for a lawful purpose and within 
the scope of Schedule 7.   
In Blum’s opinion, pre-charge detention in the United Kingdom is used to increase the time for 
investigating a terror suspect before charging him to suspect.155 This view is supported by 
Harrod who argues that one of the three most significant powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 
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is pre-charge detention.156  The others include powers of random stop and search by the Police 
and control orders. He posits that pre-charge detention is an essential counter-terrorism tool. 
This is because the Police do not have the luxury of waiting for crimes to be committed before 
making arrests and detaining a terror suspects. Pre-charge detention gives the Police time to 
collect evidence to prosecute terror suspects and also deny suspects opportunity to leave the 
country.157 The UK Government have also argued that due to the extra-ordinary nature and 
character of terrorist threat, counter-terrorism measure like pre-charge detention is a necessity 
power given to intelligent agencies in other to get evidence from suspects. Let us take the 21st 
of July 2005 Attack as an example. A total of 38,00 exhibits, 80,000 CCTV videos, 1400  finger 
prints and about 160 crime scenes were generated in the course of investigation,158and it might 
be impossible to analyse or sift these data in a few days.  
The main concern of critics of the pre-charge detention regime under the Act is that people that 
are not connected to terrorist acts might also be unlawfully detained. According to “Liberty”  
although there are existing safeguards against prolonged detention under the Act, nonetheless 
under paragraph 32 of Schedule 8, the Judge is only required to be satisfied that ‘there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that further detention is necessary to obtain relevant evidence;’ 
and that the police investigation is being conducted ‘diligently and expeditiously.’159 Liberty 
notes further that under paragraphs 33 and 34, neither the detained suspect nor his or her 
lawyers are entitled to see all the evidence that the police and prosecution may put before the 
judge in support of their application for continued detention. Liberty contends that the judicial 
scrutiny in the extension of pre-charge detention is not proper judicial scrutiny as it falls well 
short of a full adversarial hearing because under the relevant provisions of the Terrorism Act 
2000 detention can be extended in the absence of the detainee or on the basis of material not 
available to them.160 Amnesty International also criticised the 14 days pre-charge detention 
regime under the TA 2000 as ‘too long.’161 Amnesty observed that prolonged periods of pre-
charge detention create an avenue for coercive conditions or abusive practices that may be used 
to force detainees to make involuntary statements and confessions. A.I argued that the sooner 
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a terror suspect passes into the hands of a custodial authority which is functionally and 
institutionally separate from the police, the better. Consequently, this research will attempt to 
find out whether the 14 days pre-charge detention under the TA 2000 unnecessarily infringes 
a detainees’ right to liberty? Also, the pre-charge detention regime under the Act will be 
assessed with reference to the HRA, the ECHR, and ICCPR to find out whether the Act is 
consistent with these statutes. 
Other important measures adopted under the UK’s TA 2000 that requires discussion is 
proscription and encouragement of terrorism. S.1 Terrorism Act 2006 make it an offence for a 
person to make statements that are likely to be understood by some or all of the members of 
the public to whom it is published as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement 
to them to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism. The statement may  
take many format including words, sounds, images162 or through electronic service.163 The 
offence of encouragement of terrorism in the UK covers “indirect encouragement of terrorism” 
by “glorification.” This outlaws other forms of expression on the ground that the offence could 
be committed, irrespective of the intent of the author; so far some members of the public may 
‘reasonably be expected to infer from that what is being glorified as a conduct that should be 
emulated.’ The publication of a statement is the core actus reus under S 1(2)(a  of the TA 2006, 
while the mens rea for encouragement is that the  publisher must either intend members of the 
public to be directly or indirectly encouraged by the statement to commit, prepare or instigate 
an act of terrorism.164 The provision on encouragement of terrorism under the Act has raised 
many controversies. A Report by the Eminent Jurists on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and 
Human Rights have identified the opposition and criticisms of counter-terrorism measures such 
as proscription and encouragement of terrorism on the fact that they are being used to restrict 
basic freedom of speech and expression as well as freedom of association and assembly. 
Although international law standard on freedom of speech/expression recognises that there can 
be a lawful and valid limitation on these rights especially statements and expressions which 
can incite terrorism.165 The participants during the U.K hearing on this Panel Report raised 
concerns over the breadth and ambiguity of the offence of encouragement of terrorism by 
glorification. There are fears that this could create a risk of arbitrary and indiscriminate 
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application which is further exacerbated by the fact that it applies to past acts and acts occurring 
in other countries outside the U.K.166 Government representatives told the panel that targeting 
a particular community was not the intention of the Act. The justification by the government 
lies in the fact that it has a right to protect lives and prevent people from encouraging or 
glorifying terrorism. The Court in Handyside v UK held that it would be a violation of Art 10 
of the ECHR if the restriction on expression does not fall within the exceptions provided under 
Art 10 (2).167 The Court in this case noted that 
   “Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic  
     society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the development of every 
     person: Freedom of expression applies not only to "information" or "ideas" that  
     are favourably received ... but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or  
     any sector of the population. Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance  
     and broadmindedness without which there can be no "democratic society."  
     This means ... that every "formality," "condition," "restriction" or "penalty" imposed 
     in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.”168 
 It becomes important to examine whether the requirement of the law as per Art 10 (2) HRA 
1998/ECHR, as held in Handyside, are followed in theory and practice when placed side by 
side with S.1 TA 2006? In other words, is the provision of the Act on encouragement of 
terrorism consistent with the right of individuals to freedom of expression or does it 
disproportionately infringes this right? This question will be given serious analysis and 
consideration in the research with reference to domestic and  international law such as the HRA 
1998, ECHR, and the ICCPR.  
With regards to proscription, three major reasons were given by the government as to why 
proscription is important. Firstly proscription discourages people from engaging in terrorist 
activity. Secondly, it is a quick means of tackling some of the lower-level for support for 
terrorist organisation. Thirdly, proscription is a powerful signal of the rejection by the 
government and by extension the society of such organisations.169  Nonetheless, critics of the 
proscription under the Act argue that there is lack of clarity when it comes to determining 
criteria which the Home Secretary would decide whether or not to use her discretion to 
proscribe an organisation.170 Horne and Douse argues that while proscription remains a key 
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feature of the U.K’s counter-terrorism armoury, with the ability to disrupt harmful organisation 
and change their behaviour, it also portends a departure from the criminal law paradigm.171 
They contested that proscription represents the criminalization of association rather than 
culpable conduct. Horne and Douse also question why the powers to criminalize an 
organisation should be placed into the hands of the Executive.172 They warned that, even 
though this has attracted less attention than other measures such as arrest and detention, 
proscription remains an aspect of the counter-terrorism strategy that has significant 
constitutional implications.173 Citing Clayton & Tomlinson, they argue further that proscription 
is the most stringent restriction on the right of freedom of association.  
The question is does proscription have any effect in stopping people from joining terrorist 
organisation? And what practical negative effect does proscription have of human rights? In a 
recent BBC programme, it was argued that what a ban comes down to is a situation where 
government tries to make it harder for a group to organise openly. Anyone found to be a 
member of a proscribe organisation could face up to 10 years in jail. Furthermore, if the police 
identify any financial assets linked to a proscribed organisation, they will be seized - and its 
website will be shut down.  In that programme, Omar Bakri (the founder of Al-Mujajiroun, a 
proscribed organisation) argued that a ban will only increase the popularity of his group and as 
a result increase its membership. He argued further that proscription would only force them to 
go underground. Supporting Bakri’s argument, Inayat Buroglawala (of the Muslim Council of 
Britain) says the government use of proscription under the Terrorism  Act to ban groups shows 
that democracy is a charade. In his words: “democracy is actually upholding those values of 
pluralism, that we can tolerate people whose views are so outlandish and repulsive, provided 
they do not step over the line and break the law.”  On the other hand, the Joint Terrorism 
Analysis Centre (JATC) maintained that a group can be banned not only for acts of terrorism-
but also for glorifying it. The JATC countered the argument made by Al-Muhajiroun (now 
proscribed) because it fall into the category of group that glorifies terrorism and has a track 
record of celebrating acts of violence including describing the 9/11 hijackers as the 
“magnificent 19.”174 Besides the fact the proscription prevent those who plan, support, or 
commit terrorist acts it offers an alternative to deportation especially where there are concerns 
                                                          
171 Ibid Pg 16 
172 Ibd Pg 17 
173 ibid 
174 Dominic Casciani, Analysis: Does banning terror groups work? 12 January 2010 BBC 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8454479.stm accessed 20 Sept 2013 
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of torture. For instance, in Chahal v UK, the applicant settled illegally in the United Kingdom 
in 1971 but was granted indefinite leave to remain in 1974. During a visit to Punjab in 1984, 
he was detained and tortured. On his return to Britain, he became a prominent activist in favor 
of an independent Sikh homeland, Khalistan, but was subject to a deportation order in 1990. 
The European Court of Human Rights concluded that there was a risk of torture if he were to 
be deported and that it would therefore be a breach of the Convention to send him back to India. 
175 However, critics argue that the Government might be exposed to pressure to target 
organisations that it might not regard as terrorist or to take action against individuals whom it 
would not ordinarily regard as terrorists.176 Proscription could be used as a weapon for healthy 
trade relations and diplomacy between foreign governments and the UK. According to Jarvis 
and Legrand, politics plays a major factor in the proscription of terror organisations in the 
UK.177  They argue that the decision to add an organisation to the proscription list may reflect 
domestic political biases unrelated to terrorism as well as external pressure from other 
countries.178 Jarvis and Legrand argue further that proscription could be used to criminalise 
movements seeking self-determination abroad and it criminalises individuals for their status 
rather than their actions.179 Legal scholars have also expressed concerns that  proscription may 
alienate some communities from democratic process thereby making them more likely to resort 
to violence.180 In Shapiro’s view, proscription creates a ‘politicized’ process driven too 
frequently by unrelated foreign policy interests which could a negative impact on 
democracy.181 Others have argued that once a proscription  order  has been made, there is no 
requirement that it be reviewed or renewed from time to time.182 The other alternative is to 
appeal to the Proscribed Organisation Appeal Commission and a right of further appeal to the 
Court of Appeal.  Accordingly, this research aims to find out whether proscription under the 
                                                          
175 App no 22414/93, 1996-V 
176 The Legislation Against Terrorism; A consultation Paper Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State 
for the Home Department and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland by Command of Her Majesty 
December 1998  Cm 4178 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/265689/4178.pdf accessed 
18th June, 2017  
177 Lee Jarvis, Tim Legrand, ‘Enemies of the State: Proscription Powers and their Use in the United Kingdom’, 
British Politics 9 [2014] pg 450-471.  
178 ibid 
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180 John Finn, ‘Electorial regimes and the proscription of anti‐democratic parties’ Terrorism and Political 
Violence, Vol 12 (2012) Pg 57-60  
181  Julie Shapiro, ‘Politicisation of the designation of Foreign Terrorist Organisations, the Effects on separation 
of Powers’ The Cardozo Public Law Policy & Ethics Journal (2007) pg 547 
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Terrorism Act 2000 unnecessarily infringes the right to freedom of association and assembly 
under the HRA 1998, ECHR and the ICCPR.  
3. Illustrating Originality 
This research presents an objective legal analysis and assessment of the Nigerian and UK legal 
responses to terrorism under the Terrorism Act of both countries. 
Firstly, the study has the potential to advance knowledge and understanding on terrorism and 
the law in Nigeria through a detailed analysis of the nature and the impact of the TPA 2011 (as 
amended) on counter-terrorism and human rights. Recently, researchers have shown an 
increased interest in Nigeria’s counter-terrorism law and practice especially in relation to 
human rights freedoms. But as at the submission of this thesis, only few writers have been able 
to draw a structured research that analyses or assess the provisions of the Nigerian TPA 2011 
to determine its constitutionality and coherence with human rights provisions in Nigeria. The 
literature review on Nigeria shows that very few writers have attempted to establish a deeper 
contextual meaning of the provisions of the Act or provide an in-depth assessment of how these 
rules are applied in practice. Similarly, studies  have tended to focus on the Act’s failure to 
comply with the Constitution 1999, however to  date, none has undertaken a study of the TPA 
2011 (as amended) by reference to Nigeria’s regional or international obligations, for example, 
under the African Charter and the ICCPR. Thus there is a gap in the market which the research 
intends to address.  
The research questions that were raised in this thesis also demonstrate its originality. Instead 
of focusing on the practical effectiveness (success) or otherwise of the Act, the writer chose to 
address questions such as; is the Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 comprehensive enough to 
provide a coherent legal code relevant to terrorism in Nigeria? What challenges to the 
constitutionality of these provisions can be made on both human rights and other legal grounds? 
And what possible lessons can be drawn from another common law jurisdiction, in this case 
the U.K?  These questions were developed by the writer to effectively evaluate the “soundness” 
of the Terrorism Act in addressing terrorism in Nigeria and to gain a deeper level of 
understanding of the impact and effect of the TPA 2011.  
The most significant contribution of the research to knowledge is comparing the Nigerian 
Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 with the Terrorism Act of another common law jurisdiction, 
and the methodologies adopted. The thesis presents a comparative analysis of Nigeria and UK 
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legal responses to terrorism. The writer is not aware of any study that attempts to compare the 
Nigerian Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 with another common law jurisdiction. It could have 
be convenient to analyse and assess the TPA 2011 exclusively without comparing it with 
another State’s anti-terrorism Act, but instead the writer chose to compare the Act with another 
similar legislation to find out what Nigeria can learn from it to improve its terrorism law. The 
research adopts a comparative methodology that juxtaposes the Nigerian and the UK’s anti-
terrorism Acts. The combination of the black-letter, the socio-legal approach, and the 
comparative approach gives the writer an opportunity to undertake a critical, questioning 
attitude to the Nigerian Terrorism Act with a view to uncovering flaws and inadequacies under 
the Act. In so doing, the research transcends the doctrinal analysis of the legal texts into an 
empirical comprehension of how they are applied in practice, as well as their similarities and 
differences. This led to fresh insights and a deeper understanding of issues on counter-terrorism 
and human rights that are of central concern in Nigeria and the UK. Findings in the research 
will surpass national boundaries.  
Besides analysing and assessing counter-terrorism from Nigeria’s view point, the research will 
help understand the thought processes of another State (in this case, the UK). The writer 
strongly believes that this thesis will encourage further comparisons of the Terrorism Act with 
other jurisdictions, especially in Africa. This will inevitably lead to further questions about the 
fairness, justice, and constitutionality of other laws in Nigeria.  
At present, Nigeria is still searching for a “proper” response to terrorism that is consistent with 
international human rights standards. The research therefore attempts to create ideas that will 
result in a more credible and constitutionally justifiable response to political violence in 
Nigeria. This results in a number of proposals and recommendations for law and policy reforms 
in Nigeria. These reforms and policy prescriptions may not only have legal effects but also 
social and administrative consequences in Nigeria. However, it is unlikely that these reforms 
or an amendment to the Terrorism Act alone will address Nigeria’s human rights challenges. 
Hence a new and practical solution to Nigeria’s counter-terrorism and  human rights complaints 
will be suggested and put forward to the Nigerian government.  The writer’s idea of the creation 
of a Commission or a body that will serve as an ombudsman over Nigeria’s counter-terrorism 
activities is based not solely on the findings from the research, but also from the writer’s 
previous legal practice in Nigeria. The proposed “Commission,” if established, presents a 
practicable remedy to the incessant human rights abuses by the Police and the Soldiers under 
the guise of fighting terrorism. The Nigerian government particularly the Legislature should 
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find this idea and other recommendations proffered useful when making changes to counter-
terrorism law and practices in Nigeria. 
Lastly, it is hoped that the research will help contribute to the emerging literature on terrorism 
in Nigeria by giving a better understanding of the provisions of the Act and how terrorist 
suspects should be treated if regional, and international obligations are to be respected. Legal 
practitioners, Judges, and Scholars in Nigeria will find this study useful.  
7 Conclusion 
This chapter positions the thesis within previous studies that addresses Nigeria and the UK’s 
legal responses to terrorism. It is often said that research arises when there is a problem to be 
solved.  A consistent theme that emerged from the literature review, especially on Nigeria, is 
that the measures adopted by the State to counter-terrorism under the 2011 Act (as amended) 
appear to be inconsistent with acceptable human rights standards. The common conclusion is 
that the TPA 2011 (as amended) needs to be reviewed.  However, before coming to a judgement 
on Nigeria and the UK legislative reaction to terrorism, it is important to first of all analyse and 
assess the Terrorism Acts of both States to determine the extent of their coherence or 
inconsistencies with human rights provisions in their countries. 
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CHAPTER 3 
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE NIGERIAN TERRORISM (PREVENTION) ACT  
2011 (AS AMENDED) 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Prior to June 2011, the Nigerian National Assembly simply squeezed provisions relating to 
terrorism under Section 15 of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Establishment 
Act 2004. The government at that point in time considered it unnecessary to enact a single 
legislation on terrorism. But after a series of terrorist attacks which started in 2009, it became 
clear that Section 15 of the EFCC Act was inadequate in addressing terrorism in Nigeria.183 
The Nigerian government passed into law the Terrorism (Prevention) Act in June, 2011. The 
Act provided the requisite legal framework for the prevention, prohibition and combating of 
acts of terrorism, and prescribes penalties for violation of its provisions. The Act contains 41 
sections, arranged into Eight Parts and a Schedule, listing relevant statutes. Part I of the Act 
defines acts of terrorism and related offences; Part II contains provisions relating to terrorist 
funds and property; Part III contains provisions on mutual assistance and extradition while Part 
IV is on information sharing on criminal matters; Parts V focuses on investigation; Part VI 
deals with prosecution; Part VII focuses on charities and lastly, Part VIII contains 
miscellaneous provisions.  
In order to further strengthen the Act, the Nigerian government in 2013 enacted the Terrorism 
(Prevention) (Amendment) Act. This 2013 Act amends and deletes some previous provisions 
under the TPA 2011. The 2013 Act also makes provision for the encouragement of terrorism 
and strengthens terrorist financing offences.  
The primary purpose of this chapter is to analyse key provisions under the Nigerian Terrorism 
(Prevention) Act 2011 (as amended). Without a proper understanding of the legal meanings of 
provisions under the Act, further assessments or conclusions made in this study will be built 
                                                          
183 Section 15 (1)-(3)  EFCC Act provides that ‘any person who collects by any means, 
directly or indirectly, any money with the  intent that the money shall be used for any act of 
terrorism or makes funds, financial assets, or economic assistance available for use of any of 
any other person to commits a terrorist act  commits an offence.’  
Section 15(2) of the EFCC Act goes further to stipulate that: ‘any person who commits or 
attempts to commit a terrorist act or participates or facilitates the commission of a terrorist 
act is liable on conviction to imprisonment for life.”  
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upon a defective understanding of the Act. The (black-letter) analysis here will establish the 
legal meaning of rules and principles used under the Act. In other words, this chapter will 
explain in details the formal/technical terms and pure legal principles used under the TPA 2011. 
At this stage, the focus is on the words and terms used under the Act (in the books) as opposed 
to the law in action.  
As earlier explained, in analysing the TPA 2011(as amended), five crucial aspects of the 
legislation will be examined. These are the definition of terrorism, arrest, detention, 
proscription and encouragement of terrorism.  
2.1 A Critical Analysis of the Definition of Terrorism   
As stated in the introductory chapter, the justification for choosing the definition of terrorism 
as the first issue to be analysed is because of the implications it has on the scope of counter-
terrorism. The definition of terrorism serves as a platform for investigative powers to the 
Police. Without a proper understanding of the exact meaning of terms in the definition of 
terrorism under the Act it would be difficult to critically analyse other provisions of the Act.  
Nigeria’s definition of terrorism is provided under Section 1 of TPA 2011. Some changes to 
the definition of terrorism were made as per the Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act 
2013. It is important to take note of these key changes by  the Terrorism (Prevention) 
(Amendment) Act 2013  that inserts a new subsection “(1)” and renumbers the existing 
subsection (1)-(3) as subsections (2)-(4) accordingly.184 The following sub-sections will 
analyse the definition of terrorism. 
2.1.I    Acts of terrorism 
Section 1(3)(a) of the TPA 2011 (as amended) defines an “act of terrorism” in Nigeria to mean 
an act which is “deliberately done with malice, aforethought and which may seriously harm a 
country or an international organisation.”   
Going by this opening paragraph, the requisite  mens rea for an act to be regarded as an act of 
terrorism in Nigeria is that it must be done deliberately with “malice” and “aforethought.”  The 
Supreme (Court in Bakare & Ors v Ado Ibrahim defined ‘malice’ as a conscious, wicked and 
mischievous motive to cause harm.185 The term to be “aforethought” in ordinary English 
                                                          
184 S.1(2)(a)-(h)Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act 2013 
185 [1973] 6 S.C. 205 
   
59 
 
parlance suggests the act must be ‘premeditated.’  The use of the phrase ‘malice afore thought’ 
in the opening statement of the definition suggests that the definition intends to adopt a ‘formal 
and legalistic language’ in its definition of terrorism. 
The key word in the opening paragraph of the definition above is “seriously.”186  The TPA 
2011 demands a “serious” level of harm to a country or an international organisation. The 
question that needs to be asked is what the Act means by “seriously.” What is the yardstick for 
determining what is serious and what is not? Does it mean that a minor or trivial harm against 
a country or an international organisation will not be considered as an act of terrorism?   
Unfortunately, the Act fails to provide answers to these questions. Nonetheless, going by the 
wordings of the Act, not all harm done to a country or international organisation would 
constitute terrorism. The harm must be “serious”, that is, it must be ‘significant,’187 ‘grievous’ 
or ‘severe’188 for it to constitute an act of terrorism. Also, the Act fails to explain what an 
“international organisation” is? Would an organisation from another African country fall 
under this term? Again the Act does not provide an answer to this question. An international 
organisation could mean an organisation that operates outside Nigeria.  The use of the word 
‘country’ in the opening paragraph unnecessarily extends the breath of the definition of 
terrorism under the Act.  This gives the Act a broad scope in its application to include “acts of 
terrorism” committed beyond the shores of Nigeria. The  writer of the view that the inclusion 
of “a country” by the Nigerian law makers” demonstrates a flawed understanding of the notion 
of terrorism. The absence of a widely accepted definition of terrorism in international law has 
opened the term up to several definitions and interpretations by States. What is seen as terrorism 
differs amongst states. For example, while the State of Israel sees the Palestine resistance an 
act of terrorism, other States like Russia considers it as a legitimate armed struggle. Other 
problems that could arise from extending the definition of terrorism outside country is the 
difference in the ‘language’ used, meaning of ‘terms’/’phrases’ and disparity in punishments 
for terrorism offences amongst States.  
Furthermore, Section 1(3)(b)(i) of the Act provides that an act of terrorism include: 
  
“acts intended or can reasonably be regarded as having been intended to—“…unduly  
compel a government or an international organisation from performing or abstain  
                                                          
186 According to the Legal  Dictionary, ‘seriously’  means in ‘crucial’ ‘severe’ ‘fatal’ ‘dreadful’ ‘momentous’ 
‘intense’ ‘important’ amongst other meanings http://legaldictionary.thefreedictionary.com/serious accessed 
7th Oct 2013 
187 Lawlor v People, 74 111. 231,  
188 Union Muts. L. Ins. Co v. Wilkinson, 13 Wall. 230, 20 L . Ed. 617 
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from performing any act.’’ 
 
The above section reiterates  “intention” (mens rea) as a principal requirement for an act to be 
regarded as terrorism. The key words here are ‘unduly’ and ‘compel.’ The use of these phrases 
broadens the scope of the definition. For example, how do we determine if an act is undue or 
not? Would a protest or demonstration against government policy or salary increase by labour 
unions not regarded as being “unduly”? The Act does not give clarifications for these terms. 
Thankfully, the Supreme Court in Dominic Ifegbuze v Livinus Mbadugha  held the phrase 
“unduly” to mean ‘excessive or extremely.’189 The Court in Okojie Tiefere v A.G Edo State  
held that “to compel”  simply means ‘to bring pressure upon or coerce or demand to command 
or force.’190 Going by these decisions, any acts which  coerces or brings pressure on a 
government or an international organisation to do or abstain from doing an act is terrorism. 
Alternatively, the TPA 2011 states that any act which “seriously intimidates a population” is 
terrorism. 191 As earlier stated, the qualification for what would amount to “serious” under the 
Act is not clear. According to S. 366 of the Criminal Code Act, to “intimidate” means to 
“threaten another person [entity] with injury to his person, reputation, or property, or to the 
person, reputation, or property of any one in whom he is interested.’’192 
Alternatively, any act which “seriously destabilize or destroy the fundamental political, 
constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization’ is 
terrorism under the Act. 193  
 Again the key word here is ‘seriously.’ The question thus arises whether these include acts of 
violent demonstrations, protests marches, and strikes intended to force a State Governor, 
Senator or President out of office would be regarded as an act of terrorism? In the writer’s 
view, this paragraph could be used charge demonstrators in Nigeria for acts of terrorism instead 
of being charged under ordinary criminal law. The inclusion of the phrase “of a country” in 
the above paragraph means that the Act captures the destabilization or destruction of the 
fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structure that take place outside 
                                                          
189 S.C 68/1982 at 115 
190 [2009] NWLR  at 114 
Similar decisions were reached in Radicli v ilutohins, 95 U.S 213,24 l.d ed 409,  and Peyser v New York, 70 N.Y 
497 where the Court defined the phrase “to compel’’ as having to “to constrain someone to do what his free 
will would refuse.” 
191 S.1(3)(b)(ii) Ibid 
192 Cap 39 2004 
193 Section 1(3)(b)(iii)   
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Nigeria. This unnecessarily amplifies the meaning if terrorism under the Act. Several reasons 
might be adduced for the ‘destabilization of the political, constitutional, economic or social 
structures’  of a country or an international organization’ which might not necessarily be 
terrorism. In the writer’s view, extending the definition of terrorism to include acts done outside 
the state has the potential of reducing the definition to a mere diplomatic tool amongst States. 
Again, the Act states that “any act which otherwise influence a government or international 
organization by intimidation or coercion is terrorism.’194  
The key words in the above section is “influence… by intimidation or coercion.” The Act offers 
no meaning to these terms. The Court of Appeal in Kiladejo v Ondo Traditional Council  held 
the phrase “influence” to mean “to bring pressure upon or to prevail upon or to cajole.”195 
However, the Terrorism Act demands that the act which influences a government or an 
international organisation must be by intimidation or coercion.  As earlier explained, to 
intimidate means to “threaten with injury to person, reputation, or property,’’ This suggests 
that any act which brings pressure upon a government or an international organisation by 
threats to injury to a person or property is terrorism. It remains unclear how the term to 
‘influence’ would be applied or interpreted in practice. For instance, would the “pressure” by 
the U.S government (the FBI) to the tech giant, Apple, to create a “backdoor” to unlocking 
IPhones, particularly the phone used by one of the San Bernardino shooter be interpreted as to 
terrorism on the part of the U.S under the TPA 2011?  
Again, any act which “involves or causes, as the case may be— an attack upon a person's life 
which may cause serious bodily harm or death’ is terrorism under the TPA 2011.196 This 
section raises the question whether an attack upon a person’s life that does not cause “serious” 
bodily harm or death be also considered as an act of terrorism under the Act? The provision of 
this section is imprecise. It does not clearly distinguish an act of terrorism from ordinary 
criminal offence for example murder, battery or manslaughter. A person who makes an attempt 
upon another person’s life resulting to serious bodily harm or death could simply be charged 
for attempted murder, murder or even manslaughter.  
                                                          
194 S.1(3)(b)(iv) ibid 
195 [2001] 12 NWLR 1134 
196 S.1(3)(c)(i) ibid 
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‘Kidnapping of a person’197 and ‘hostage taking’ is also considered as an act of terrorism under 
the Act. The Act provides that “any person who knowing- seizes, detains or attempt to seize or 
detain198 or threatens to kill, injure or continue to detain another person in order to compel a 
third party to do or abstain from doing any act,199or gives explicit or implicit condition for the 
release of the person held hostage commits an offence under the Act.”200  “Third party” under 
this section means a State, an international organisation, a natural person or group of person.201 
Although this section clearly distinguish “kidnapping” and “hostage taking” under the Act to 
mean “kidnapping with the intention of compelling a State, an international organisation, or a 
group of person. The inclusion of ‘a natural person’ in the meaning of “third party” under the 
above section is rather confusing. For example, would kidnapping rich and wealthy individuals 
in the society in order to get ransom be regarded as an act of terrorism? In the writer’s opinion, 
if the definition is only intended to cover acts of terrorism, then the inclusion of “a natural 
person or a group of person” needs to be removed from the meaning to “third party.”  
Equally, “Any person to intentionally- murder, kidnap or commit other attacks on the person 
or liberty of an internationally protected person commits an offence under the Act.”202  
The key word in the above provision is “intention.” The Terrorism Act does not define or 
clarify who an internationally protected is, however this can be found in  Art.1 of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected 
Persons 1973. An "internationally protected person"  under this Convention refers explicitly to 
“a Head of State, including any member of a collegial body performing the functions of a Head 
of State under the constitution of the State concerned, a Head of Government or a Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, whenever any such person is in a foreign State, as well as members of his 
family who accompany him; or any representative or official of a State or any official or other 
agent of an international organization of an intergovernmental character…”203  
                                                          
197 S.1(3)(c)(ii) ibid 
198 S.15(1) (a)Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act 2013 
199 S 15 (1) (b) ibid 
200 S.15(1) (c)ibid 
201 S.15(2) Ibid 
202 S.3(a) ibid 
203 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, 1035 
U.N.T.S. 167, 13 I.L.M. 41, entered into force Feb. 20, 1977.  
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/inprotectedpersons.html accessed 8th Oct, 2013. 
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Additionally, ‘any person who intentionally carries out a violent attack on the official premises, 
private accommodation or means of transport of an internationally protected person in a manner 
likely to endanger his person or liberty,204 or threatens to commit any such attack’ commits an 
offence under the Act.205 
Again, the “destruction of a government or public facility, a transport system, an infrastructure 
facility, including an information system, a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, a 
public place or private property, likely to endanger human life or result in major economic 
loss” is terrorism under the Act.206  
The above provision is nebulous. The Act is not clear as to what would be regarded as major 
or minor economic loss. The question is, would it constitute an act of terrorism if the destruction 
is minor? The Act suggests that the destruction of a public infrastructure, transport system or 
public or private property in whatever mode that is ‘likely’ (that is reasonably prospect or 
expected)207 to endanger human life or brings a ‘major’ loss to economy would amount to 
terrorism.  
An act of terrorism under the TPA 2011 can also include the ‘seizure of an aircraft, ship or any 
other means of public or goods transport or diversion or use of such means of transportation 
for the purpose of influencing a government or an international organisation by intimidation or 
coercion.’208 
Also, the manufacture, possession, acquisition, supply, transport or use of weapons, explosives 
or of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons as well as research into, and development of 
these weapons  without lawful authority amounts to an act of terrorism.209 Unlike preceding 
provisions, this section is clear. It will not be regarded as an act of terrorism where acts listed 
in this section is done with a lawful authority or a valid licence.  
                                                          
204 S.3 (b) Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 as amended 
205 S.3(c)ibid 
206 S.1(3)(c)(iii) TPA 2011 (as amended) 
207 In Wallis v Bristol Water Plc [2009] EWHC 3432 the Court held that "likely", in the context of a danger to 
public health, meant "a real risk, a risk that should not be ignored" and "a real possibility" 
*In Dunning v Board of Governors of the United Liverpool Hospitals [1973] 2 All ER 454 Lord Denning MR said: 
"I think that we should construe 'likely to’  as meaning 'may' or 'may well be made' dependent on the outcome 
of the discovery". In that case James LJ construed 'likely'  as meaning a 'reasonable prospect'" 
208 S.1(3)(c)(iv) Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 (as amended) 
209 S.1(3)(c)(v) ibid 
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Additionally, the “release of dangerous substance, causing fire, explosion or floods”210 or the 
“interference with the supply of water, power or any natural resources, the effect of which is 
to endanger human life”211 is terrorism under the Act.  
The key word in the above provision is ‘to endanger human life.’ Clearly, the commission of 
the acts listed above would not constitute a terrorism offence under the TPA 2011 as long as 
the effect is not to endanger human lives.  
It is important to note that the Act recognises ‘any act or omission done in or outside Nigeria 
which constitute an offence within the scope of  a counter terrorism Protocols or Convention 
duly ratified by Nigeria.’212  
The position of the Nigerian law under Section 12 (1) of the Constitution 1999 is that “no treaty 
between the federation and other country shall have the force of law except to the extent to 
which any such treaty has been enacted into the law by the National Assembly”. This position 
was affirmed in Abacha v Fawehinmi213 where their Lordships, considering section 12 (1)10, 
of the Constitution held as follows:   
     “It is therefore manifest that no matter how beneficial to the country or the citizenry,  
      an   international treaty to which Nigeria has become a signatory may be,  
      it remains unenforceable, if it is not enacted into the law of the country by the  
     National Assembly.”214   
 
The Supreme Court ruling in this case clearly says that the recognition of Treaties and 
Conventions (including those that outlaw terrorism outside Nigeria) are not enforceable in 
Nigeria even if it is duly ratified. Accordingly, ratification does not by itself alone give a treaty 
the status of a law in Nigeria; an Act of the National Assembly is required to give it effect 
locally. 
Finally, the Act is instructive that the disruption of services done pursuant to a protest which 
does not result in harm would not constitute a terrorist act.  In a way, this proviso draws a line 
on the need to preserve the constitutional rights of citizens to assemble and protest.215 
                                                          
210 S.1(3)(c)(vi) ibid 
211 S.1(3)(c)(vii) ibid 
212 S.1(3)(d) ibid 
213 [2001] WRN vol. 51, 29 
214 Ibid  Pg 165-166 
215 S.1(3) TPA 2011 (as amended) 
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It is noteworthy to mention that the Act recognises international terrorism and how to declare 
a person as an international terrorist. A person or group may be declared as an international 
terrorist if the person or group is a member of an international terrorist group recognised under 
the Act or listed in ‘any resolution of the United Nations Security Council or instrument of 
African Union and Economic Community of West African States as a person involved in 
terrorist act,’216 or “considered to be a terrorist by a competent authority of a foreign state.”217   
Going by this provision, the Act would recognise resolutions and international instrument from 
United Nations Security Council, the African Union (AU) and regional bodies like the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). However, the Supreme Court 
decision in Abacha v Fawehinmi218 merely makes these resolutions and international 
instruments “persuasive” and not “binding” on the Country, unless it they are enacted into the 
law by the National Assembly.  
The inclusion of the phrase “considered by a competent authority of a foreign state” as act 
terrorist under the Act is ambiguous. Would the late Nelson Mandela be regarded as a terrorist 
just because the Botha regime at that time considers him as one? Would those who fought 
against the regime of Saddam Hussein in Libya be regarded as terrorist just because the 
government of Gaddafi call them “terrorists?” Which of the parties in Egypt unrest would be 
considered a terrorist? Is it the Islamic Brotherhood led by the ousted President Morsi or the 
protesters? The Act does not offer an explanation as per the meaning of “a competent authority 
of a foreign state.” Similarly, would those who come to power through a coup detat like 
General Al Sisi in Egypt who declared the Islamic Brotherhood member as terrorist  be 
considered as a competent authority of a foreign State? The TPA 2011 does not take into 
account differences in State’s interpretation of a terrorist group. For example, the Russian 
government believes that those fighting against the Assad regime are terrorists, while the U.S 
is of the opinion the Assad regime is the terrorist. This leaves the definition wide open to several 
interpretations.  
Additionally, S.40 Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 (as amended) provides that a “terrorist 
act” means an act which constitutes an offence according to the following agreement which is 
listed in “Appendix 1” of this paper. 
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2.1.II   Targets 
Going by the definition of terrorism under the TPA 2011(as amended), the targets of an ‘act of 
terrorism’ includes a government or an international organisation,219 population of a country,220 
a person’s life,221 the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a 
country or an international organisation222, a transport system, an infrastructural facility 
including an information system, a fixed platform on the continental shelf, a public or private 
property.223  
2.1.III  Motives 
The motives for committing an act of terrorism under the Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 are 
to ‘unduly compel’ a government or international organisation,224 to ‘seriously intimidate’ a 
population,225 seriously destabilize or destroy a country or an international organisation,226 and 
to ‘influence’ a government or an international organisation by intimidation or coercion.227 In 
addition to that, other motives for committing an act of terrorism are to cause major economic 
loss or to endanger human lives,228 cause serious bodily harm or death,229 or to ‘compel’ a 
third party to do or abstain from doing any act.230 
Following this analysis of the definition of terrorism, the next provision of the Act that will be 
analysed in the power of arrest.  
2.2 Power of Arrest  
To arrest means to take a person into legal custody either under a valid warrant or on reasonable 
suspicion that a person has committed an offence.231  
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S.25(1)(e)TPA 2011 (as amended) gives an officer of any law enforcement or security agency 
the power to arrest ‘any person whom he  reasonably suspects of having committed or likely to 
commit an offence under the Act.’232 
From the above provision, the legal standard to arrest under the Act is based on ‘reasonable 
suspicion’ that an offence under the act is committed or is about to be committed. The key 
word is “reasonable suspicion.” Reasonable suspicion to arrest’ means that the officer has 
sufficient knowledge to believe that criminal activity is at hand.233 To possess reasonable 
suspicion, an officer must be able to cite specific articulable facts to warrant the intrusion.234 
The term “reasonable suspicion” has generated much controversy under the Nigerian legal 
system. In Chukwurah v C.O.P235 the Court held that ‘reasonable suspicion’ to arrest and detain 
a suspect must be exercised with discretion and that discretion must be objective and judicious. 
To justify arrest and detention on ‘reasonable suspicion’, the prosecution must adduce evidence 
on the grounds of such arrest and the test must be an objective one.236 The Court stated further 
that objectivity here means that there must be a substantial standard or parameter to reasonably 
suspect a person to enable the Police to exercise their power to arrest as provided by law.237 
In a similar ruling, a Benin High Court presided by Justice Esther Edgin ruled that “reasonable 
suspicion” to arrest and detain a suspect must be exercised with discretion and that discretion 
must be objective.238 The Police in this case cited “reasonable suspicion” of committing  an 
offence as a basis for the arrest of the accused, but the court found this to be false as he was 
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arrested up for his activism in revenue transparency and bringing reforms to bear on the 
Nigerian Oil and Gas industry.239  
The Court took a different opinion from the above in Dokubo-Asari v. Federal Republic of 
Nigeria240 where the appellant was arrested and put under detention upon “reasonable 
suspicion” of having committed a felony. The court held that; 
    “A person's liberty, as in this case, can also be curtailed in order to prevent him  
     from committing further offence(s). It is my belief that every person accused  
    of a felony can hide under the canopy of Section 35 of the Constitution to escape  
    lawful arrest and detention then an escape route to freedom is readily and richly  
    made available to persons suspected to have committed serious crimes and that  
    will not augur well for the peace, progress, prosperity and tranquillity of the society’.241  
 
It is clear that the decision in Asari’s case was due to the concern for security agencies to be 
able to exercise their duties of arrest effectively. If properly applied, the power to arrest based 
on reasonable suspicion gives the Police some form of discretion to detect, apprehend, and 
prevent an act of terrorism.242 If a Police officer believes that a person has committed or is 
committing a crime, he should be able to make an arrest. This argument is supported by S. 
35(7)(a) Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which gives the Police power to arrest 
or detain upon ‘reasonable suspicion’ of having committed a criminal offence.  
Nevertheless, arrest based on “reasonable suspicion” under the Act has been criticised by some 
scholars.  According to Udogwu, the Police could hide under “reasonable suspicion” to make 
arbitrary arrests without a clear articulation of the facts that inform the decision to arrest.243 He 
argues further that this will give the Police an “open ground” for deprivation of the right to 
liberty and security. But while Udogwu’s fears are understandable, there are precautions 
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against these under the law in Nigeria. For instance, the Constitution requires an arresting 
officer to inform an accused of charges at the time of arrest and to take the accused to a police 
station for processing within a reasonable amount of time.244 The law also requires the police 
to provide suspects with the opportunity to engage counsel and post bail (depending on the 
offence).245 In addition, as stated earlier, the Courts have held that “reasonable suspicion” to 
arrest and detain a suspect must be exercised with discretion and that discretion must be 
objective, judicial and judicious. But the question is, are these Constitutional guarantees obeyed 
by the Police in Nigeria? Does the Police allow suspects to engage the services of counsel after 
arrest? And more importantly, is the power to arrest based on reasonable suspicion exercised 
objectively and judiciously by the Police/JFT in counter-terrorism activities in Nigeria? In 
order to answer these and other related questions, there is a need for a socio-legal· assessment 
of the power of arrest under the Act in Nigeria.  This assessment will be done in a later chapter 
of the research.   
 2.3 Pre-charge detention 
The next stage after the arrest of a terror suspect is detention pending formal charge. Under the 
Nigerian Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act 2013, the power for the pre-charge 
detention of a terror suspect is governed by Sections 25 (1)(e) and S.27(1). 
 S. 25(1)(e)  provides that: 
    “where in a case of verifiable urgency, or a life is threatened, or to prevent the  
     commission of an offence provided under this Act, and an application to the court or  
     to a Judge in Chambers to obtain a warrant would cause delay that may be prejudicial  
    to the maintenance of public safety or order, an officer of any law enforcement or 
    security agency may,…-arrest and  detain any person whom the officer reasonably suspects  
    to have  committed or likely to commit an offence under this Act.’ 
   
According to S. 25 of the Act, the legal standard for the detention of a terror suspect is based 
on “reasonable suspicion” to have committed or likely to commit an offence under this Act.’ 
An analysis of the term “reasonable suspicion” has earlier been done under the power of arrest.   
Before an accused can be detained based on s.25(1)((e) certain requirements must be met.  
Firstly, it must be  a case of “verifiable urgency” where a person’s ‘life must is threatened or 
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‘to prevent a person from committing of an offence under the Act,’ or  where applying to a 
Judge for “warrant” may be detrimental to safety of the public safety or order.  
Going by the above provision, S. 25(1)(e) can only be applied in ‘urgent’ cases. The Act does 
not provide a meaning as to what is “urgent” or how this can be “verified.” It is left for the 
Court to decide what is urgent and how this should be verified. In the writer’s view, this 
statement is irrelevant as it adds nothing to the section. It is common knowledge that terrorism 
cases are always ‘urgent’ and cannot wait for judicial approval.  
Furthermore, S. 27(1) TPA 2011 (as amended) provides that: 
   “the court may, pursuant to an exparte application grant an order for the detention  
     of a suspect under the Act for a period not exceeding 90days subject to renewal for  
     a similar period until the conclusion of the investigation and prosecution of the  
     matter that led to the arrest and detention is dispensed with.”246  
 
Going by the above, a terrorist suspect in Nigeria can be detained by the Court based on an 
‘exparte application’ for a period not exceeding 90days. This 90 days pre-charge detention 
period is subject to renewal for an additional 90 days, therefore making it legal for an accused 
to be detained for a combined total period “180 days” until the conclusion of the case. However, 
the Act does not say what happens after the 180 days if investigation in the matter is not 
concluded with.  
An ‘ex parte application’ means only one side needs to apply for the pre-charge detention of 
the suspect.247 In most cases it is the prosecution that makes the application.  Ex parte judicial 
proceedings are usually reserved for urgent matters where requiring notice would subject one 
party to irreparable harm.248  A court order from an ‘ex parte hearing’ is swiftly followed by a 
full hearing between the interested parties to the dispute.   
In Leedo Presidential Motel Ltd v. Bank of the North,249 the Supreme Court held that before an 
‘exparte application’ can be made, it has to fulfil two conditions. Firstly, the nature of the 
application must be in a way that the interest of the adverse party will not be affected. Secondly, 
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the application must be made in a timely manner. In any of these situations, a court may rightly 
exercise its discretion by granting a motion ex-parte.250   
In the writer’s view, and going by the Nigerian Supreme Court decision in Leedo, it would be 
difficult to see how the interest of the other party would not be adversely affected by detaining 
him/her for 90 days. Unless, it is for another reason not expressly stated in the Act, but if the 
purpose of S.27 is to prevent a suspected terrorist from committing acts of terrorism or to enable 
the detained suspect to appear before a full hearing or to allow the Police gather evidence, then 
the 90 days period is “excessive.” It is unthinkable how a Court of Justice would detain an 
accused for 90 days based on the allegation by one party without listening to the other. Perhaps, 
the Nigerian law makers were unaware of the principle of audi alterem paterm (listen to the 
other side" or "let the other side be heard as well." It also seems that the law makers did not 
take into account the right to fair hearing, liberty and security and right to be tried within a 
reasonable time.  
Furthermore, Section 28 (1) TPA 2011(as amended) permits the detention of a terror suspect 
by security agencies for a period of 24 hours without access to any other person (including his 
lawyer) other than the suspect’s medical doctor. In addition to that, Section 28(4) provides that;  
 ‘where a person arrested under the Act is granted bail by a Court within the 90  
   days detention period stipulated by the Act, the person may on the approval of the head  
   of the relevant law enforcement agency be placed under a house arrest and shall- 
   be monitored by its officers,251 have no access to phones or communication gadgets,252  
   and speak only to his counsel until the conclusion of the investigation.253  
 
In an attempt to tackle terrorism, the Nigerian law-maker failed to take into account some 
important constitutional questions. For example, a careful examination of the Act shows that it 
does not make provision for the detention of under-age terrorist suspects. What happens if an 
under-age Boko Haram suspect is arrested? What remedy is available to the detained terror 
suspect? The Act does not provide any judicial remedy that could be available for the detained 
suspect.  
The Act provides that all prosecutions must take place at the Federal High Court. This is 
contrary to the child justice provision of the Child Right Act (applicable in the Federal Capital 
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Territory) 2003254 which provides that children under the age of 18 must be tried only in the 
family court. 
Observably, the application of S.25 and 27 of the TPA 2011 in practice has been fraught with 
many human rights abuse and complaints. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch 
argue that these provisions makes it possible to “lawfully” detain terrorist suspects indefinitely 
with widespread torture and inhuman degrading treatments. Other writers have also argued that 
pre-charge detention regime under the TPA 2011 is a blueprint for torture of Boko Haram 
detainees whilst under custody. In order to get a clearer picture of how the provision of the Act 
on the pre-charge detention is applied and enforced in Nigeria, a socio-legal assessment of this 
provision will be required. This socio-legal assessment will be done in later chapter of the 
research.  
 
2.4 Encouragement of terrorism 
Websites controlled or operated by terrorist groups have multiplied dramatically over the past 
decade.255 The Nigerian terror group Boko Haram have also embraced the internet as a means 
of encouraging terrorism in Nigeria. According to Blanquart, there has been an increase in the 
use of the internet by Boko Haram to inform, indoctrinate and radicalise individuals.256 
Encouragement of terrorism in Nigeria can be inferred from S.5 (1) - (2) of Terrorism 
(Prevention) (Amendment) Act 2013. Section 5(1) reads: 
   “Any person who knowingly, in any manner, directly or indirectly, solicits or  
    renders support-(a) for the commission of an act of terrorism, or 
    (b) to a terrorist group, commits an offence under this Act..”257  
 
                                                          
254 S.18 
255Barbara Mantel, ‘Terrorism and the Internet; Should Web Sites that Promote Terrorism Be Shut Down?  Ibid 
Pg 130 
256 Gabrielle Blanquart, ‘Boko Haram: Terrorist Organization, Freedom Fighters or Religious Fanatics? An 
Analysis of Boko Haram within Nigeria, an Australian Perspective and the Need for Counter Terrorism 
Responses that Involves prescribing them as a Terrorist Organization.’ (2012) Edith Cowan University Research 
OnlinePg 32 http://ro.ecu.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1019&context=act&sei-
redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.co.uk%2Furl%3Fsa%3Dt%26rct%3Dj%26q%3DUnited%2BStates
%2Bproscribes%2Bboko%2Bharam%26source%3Dweb%26cd%3D9%26ved%3D0CE4QFjAI%26url%3Dhttp%253
A%252F%252Fro.ecu.edu.au%252Fcgi%252Fviewcontent.cgi%253Farticle%253D1019%2526context%253Dact
%26ei%3DuE6uUYaqOoz40gXQ9oDgDQ%26usg%3DAFQjCNFjWF9V3tVEgHsRUs2iTiVrzx0UcA#search=%22Unit
ed%20States%20proscribes%20boko%20haram%22  accessed 20 May 2013 
257 S.5(1)(a)&(b) TPAA 2013 
   
73 
 
The Act goes further to say that encouragement of terrorism includes; 
(a) incitement to commit a terrorist act through the internet, or any electronic means  
or through the use of printed materials or through the dissemination of  
terrorist information; 
(b) receipt or provision of material assistance, weapons including biological,  
chemical or nuclear weapons, explosives, training, transportation,  
false documentation or identification to terrorists or terrorist groups;  
(c) receipt or provision of information or moral assistance, including  
invitation to adhere to a terrorist or terrorist group; 
(d) entering or remaining in a country for the benefit of, or at the direction 
 of or in association with a terrorist group; or 
(e) the provision of, or making available, such financial or other related services  
prohibited under this Act or as may be prescribed by regulations made  
pursuant to this Act.”258 
 
The opening sentence in S.5 (1) TPAA 2013 above shows the Act’s intention to capture direct 
and indirect encouragement of terrorism. However, the provision of S.5(1) is broad. It merely 
provides that a person who knowing directly or indirectly, solicits or renders support for the 
commission of an act of terrorism in any manner commits an offence without properly 
explaining what constitutes direct or indirect encouragement or support for terrorism. Section 
5 (2) does attempt to remedy this defect, instead it merely provide a list of acts that are 
considered as encouragement of terrorism. 
The main flaw with s.5 of the TPAA 2013 is that it fails to properly explain the category of 
statements which are likely to be understood by members of the public as inciting or 
encouraging terrorism (directly or indirectly). Another flaw under this provision is that it fails 
to clearly provide a yardstick for determining how a statement on the internet, electronic means 
or printed material, and those listed under S.5(2)(B) are likely to be understood as encouraging 
terrorism? The Act also fails to take into consideration circumstances and manner of the 
publication of the statement that would constitute encouragement of terrorism. Other questions 
which the Act fails to address includes; how does a person know if he has committed the 
offence of encouragement of terrorism under the Act?  What defences are available to a person 
to prove that he did not intend the statement to directly or indirectly encourage terrorism? 
Unfortunately the law makers did not take these questions into consideration when enacting 
the Act.  
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With about 40 million computers users in Nigeria,259 and taking into account the impact this 
could have on freedom of expression, it is expected that the provision on encouragement of 
terrorism under the Act will be comprehensive. Unfortunately only one section of the TPAA 
2013 was dedicated to encouragement of terrorism and the provision itself is inadequate. 
Bearing in mind these inadequacies, the question that comes to mind is, what standards or 
yardstick is used in Nigeria to determine whether or not a statement encourages terrorism? And 
more importantly, how is this provision applied in practice in Nigeria? In order to effectively 
answer these questions, a socio-legal assessment of the provision of the Act will be required.  
2.5 Proscription 
“Proscription” means to ‘forbid by law.’260 According to S.19(d)(i)-(ii) Terrorism (Prevention) 
(Amendment) Act 2013 a ‘proscribed organisation’ is a group involved in terrorism and is 
prohibited by law from operating in Nigeria and declared to be a “proscribed organisation” 
under S.2 of the Act.  It also includes a group which has been declared to be an international 
terrorist group under Section 9 of the Act.   
Under S.2 (1) TPA 2011 (as amended) for a group or organisation to be proscribed ‘two or 
more persons must associate for the purpose engaging in-‘ participating or collaborating in 
an act of terrorism’;261 ‘promoting, encouraging, or exhorting other to commit an act of 
terrorism’;262 or ‘setting up or pursuing acts of terrorism.’263  
Since no meaning was given to the phrase “participating,” “collaborating,” “promoting” or 
“exhorting” under the Act, it is left for the Court to choose the most appropriate definition to 
these terms. However, in ordinary English parlance,  to “participate” means to ‘take active 
part,’264 To “collaborate” means to ‘to work together,’265 while to “promote” means to ‘help 
                                                          
259 Emeka Thaddues Njoku, ‘Globalization and Terrorism in Nigeria’ (August 13, 2011) Foreign Policy Journal 
http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/08/13/globalization-and-terrorism-in-nigeria/3/  accessed 20th 
May 2013 
260  Legal Dictionary http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/proscription accessed 10th October 2013. 
261 S.2(1)(a) Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 
262 S.2(1)(b) ibid 
263 S.2 (1)(C)ibid 
264 Y. Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press 2004) P. 152. 
265 Steve Dale, ‘The Art off Collaboration (Collaborative Behaviours)’ July 12, 2012  http://steve-
dale.net/2012/07/12/the-art-of-collaboration-collaborative-behaviours/ accessed 12th October, 2013 
   
75 
 
forward’ or ‘support actively’.266 To “encourage” means to ‘give courage, confidence, advice, 
assist, urge, advice’.267 To “exhort” means to ‘urge or advice strongly or earnestly.’268 
In addition to the fore-going, an application based on the elements listed above, is then made 
to a Judge in Chambers by the Attorney General, National Security Adviser or the Inspector 
General of Police on the approval of the President to declare any entity to be a proscribed 
organisation.269 After that, a notice of the proscription has to be published in the official gazette, 
two national newspapers or any other place determined by the Judge.270 Consequently, it 
becomes an offence for a person to belong or professes to belong to the proscribed 
organisation.271  
Remarkably, the Act provides a defence for a person accused of being a member of a proscribed 
organisation. It is a defence for anyone charged to prove that the organisation had not been 
declared a proscribed organisation at the time the person charged became or began to profess 
to be a member of the organisation and that he has not taken part in the activities of the 
organisation at any time after it had been declared to be a proscribed organisation.272 
It is instructive to note that under the Act, political parties are not regarded as proscribed 
organisation.  S.2(3)(ii) provides that  ‘for the avoidance of doubts, political parties should not 
be regarded as proscribed organizations and nobody should be treated as such because of his 
or her political beliefs.’273 Meaning of the term “political parties” is not provided under the 
Act. According to Hawkesworth and Kogan, a political party is ‘any political group, in 
possession of an official label and a formal organization that links centre to locality, that 
presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections (free or non-free) candidates 
for public offices.’274  
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Nonetheless, the Act is silent on pressure groups and non-political organizations who mobilize 
against the government or a government policy leading to riots, insurrection or destruction of 
government properties. Such groups or organisations could be regarded as a terrorist group 
under section 2 of the Act.   
Furthermore, S. 9(5) provides that ‘a reference in this Act to a proscribed organisation includes 
a reference to an international terrorist group, and, whenever applicable, to a suspected 
international terrorist.’  
It is unclear what the Act means by ‘reference to an international group’ without including the 
international terrorist organisations in its list of proscribed organisation. This general statement 
leaves the Act wide open to outlaws all terrorist organisations anywhere without considering 
why they were outlawed. For example, the U.S and UK’s Terrorism Acts provide a list of all 
the organisations (both domestic and international) that are proscribed and the reason why they 
were proscribed.  
S.9 (4) gives the President power to declare a group to be an international terrorist group on 
the recommendation of the National Security Adviser or Inspector General of Police if the 
President “reasonably suspects” that it is involved in the commission, preparation or instigation 
of acts of international terrorism.  
The President may also declare a group to be an international terrorist group if the group is 
listed as a group or entity involved in terrorist acts in any resolution of the United Nations 
Security Council or in any instrument of the African Union and Economic Community of West 
African States275 or considered as a group or entity involved in terrorist acts by the competent 
authority of a foreign State.276  
There are associated offences related to proscription under Sections 4(c), and 5(1)(b) Terrorism 
(Prevention) (Amendment) Act 2013.  
Section 4(c) of the Act provides that “any person who attends a meeting, which in his 
knowledge is to support a proscribed organization, or to further the objectives of a proscribed 
organization, commits an offence under this Act.” However, a person is exculpated from a 
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criminal charge under this section if he denies that he does not know that the meeting he attends 
is to support or further the objectives of a proscribed organisation  
Section 5(1)(b) of the Act provides that ‘a person who knowingly, in any manner, directly or 
indirectly, solicits or renders support to a terrorist group commits an offence under this Act’ 
It is worth mentioning that the Nigerian government’s implementation of the provision of 
“proscription” of terrorist organisation has been slow. The Terrorism (Prevention) Act was 
enacted in June 2011 and since then, Boko Haram and its splinter, Ansaru, have carried out 
numerous attacks which have led to death of thousands of people and the destruction of 
properties. Yet, it took the Nigerian government more than two years before it proscribed both 
groups.277 For two years the government turned a blind eye to Section 2 of the Act. One is 
forced to ask whether the Act is just a mere fulfilment of an international obligation or it is 
aimed at tacking terrorism headlong in Nigeria? 
2.5.A   List of Proscribed  Organisation Under the TPA 2011 (as amended). 
Two terrorist groups namely Boko Haram otherwise known as (Jamaatu Ahlis-Sunna 
Liddaawati Wal Jihad) and Ansaru otherwise (Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan) 
have been formally proscribed under the Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011.  
The Order, which has been gazetted as the Terrorism (Prevention) (Proscription Order) Notice 
2013, was approved by President Jonathan pursuant to s.2 of the Terrorism Prevention Act, 
2011.278 
Conclusion 
This chapter undertook a doctrinal analysis of the Nigerian TPA 2011(as amended) using the 
black-letter approach to describe in detail the legal meaning of the terms used under the Act. 
This analysis raised several questions as well as some inadequacies under the Act. For instance 
in defining terrorism,  phrases/wordings such as “unduly,” “seriously,” were used without a 
detailed explanation as to what they mean.  Also, the definition does not clearly distinguish an 
act of terrorism from an ordinary criminal offence in Nigeria. The Act further created problems 
                                                          
277 President Jonathan officially proscribed ‘Boko Haram’ and ‘Ansaru’ pursuant to S. 2 Terrorism (Prevention) 
Act 2011 Vanguard Newspaper 3rd June 2013. http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/06/jonathan-clamps-down-
on-terrorist-groups-proscribes-boko-haram-ansaru/ accessed 3rd July 2013 
278 Talatu Usman, Premium Times, ‘Jonathan officially declares Boko Haram a terrorist organisation’ June 4, 
2013 http://premiumtimesng.com/news/137586-jonathan-officially-declares-boko-haram-a-terrorist-
organisation.html accessed 1 July 2013 
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as per its application/scope by including acts done outside the country to include terrorism 
without a provision as to how this would be achieved in practice. The analysis appears to 
suggest that the definition of terrorism under the Act is ambiguous. However, these criticisms 
are limited in nature and in scope in exposing ambiguities within the law. In order to relate the 
definition of terrorism under the Act to what obtains in practice, a further examination (socio-
legal appraisal) of the definition is necessary.  
In analysing the provision of arrest and pre-charge detention under the Act, it was established 
that the legal standard for arrest and pre-charge detention of terror suspects is based on 
“reasonable suspicion.” The analysis reveals that terror suspects in Nigeria can be detained 
pending charge, for up to 180 days. Nonetheless, several questions were raised. For instance, 
as required by the Courts, is “reasonable suspicion” to arrest and detain a terror suspect 
exercised with discretion in Nigeria? Does the Police and JTF exercise this “discretion” 
objectively and judiciously? What is the implication of the 90 days pre-charge detention of 
suspect on Nigeria’s domestic, regional and international human right obligations? Is the 
90/180 days pre-charge detention consistent with Nigeria’s constitutional provisions on liberty 
and security and the right to fair trial?  To answer these questions and other related queries, a 
further socio-legal assessment of “arrest” and “pre-charge detention” is necessary. This will be 
done in a later chapters of the research.  
Extremists and radicals have taken advantage of the easy access to information technology to 
spread hate messages, radicalise young individuals, and to encourage terrorism. A 
comprehensive provision of encouragement of terrorism under the TPA 2011 was therefore 
expected to adequately address this. Unfortunately, the analysis reveals that the Act does not 
properly explain the category of statements which are likely to be understood by members of 
the public as inciting/supporting or encouraging terrorism. Several other lacunas were 
identified under the provision on encouragement of terrorism. This also will require further 
assessment. Perhaps this could be an important area which Nigeria Legislation can learn from 
the U.K Terrorism Act.  
The legal requirement for proscribing a group or organisation in Nigeria is to participate, 
encourage, or exhort others to commit an act of terrorism. The Act also recognises international 
terrorist organisations are proscribed under the Act. Yet, only Boko Haram and Ansaru, both 
of whom are domestic terrorist organisations are proscribed under the Act. This raises question 
about the international scope of the provisions of the Act particularly S. 9(5) which says that 
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‘a reference in this Act to a proscribed organisation includes a reference to an international 
terrorist group..’ In analysing the provision on proscription, there were concerns that this could 
be used to proscribe non-violent groups. This is because of the broad powers given to the 
President under the Act. Consequently, an assessment of how Proscription is used in practice 
is necessary. This also will be done in a later chapter of the research.    
Having analysed the crucial sections under the Nigerian TPA 2011 (as amended), a similar 
analysis of the U.K’s Terrorism Act 2000 will be done in the next chapter.  This is to establish 
legal principles and the meaning of technical terms used under the Act. Perhaps this analysis 
will reveal any short-comings or flaws under the UK Terrorism Act.  
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CHAPTER 4 
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM’S TERRORISM ACT 2000  
 
1. Introduction 
The United Kingdom has witnessed more than three centuries of intermediate campaigns of 
terrorism in Ireland against its establishment with the British State by the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA).279 The UK has also faced threats and attacks from international terrorist 
organisations. An example of this was the July 5 2005 London bombings by four members of 
Al-Qaeda in which 56 people were killed and around 700 people injured. This attack came a 
day after London was selected to host the 2012 summer Olympics.280 One of the most 
significant legal measures adopted by the UK government is the enactment of the Terrorism 
Act 2000. The Terrorism Act 2000 replaced the PTA (Temporary Provision Act) 1984. The 
Terrorism Act 2000 amended other previous legislation on terrorism and provided a permanent 
code for responding to terrorism threats in the UK. The Act is divided into 8 parts and 16 
Schedules.281  The Terrorism Act 2006 created new offences including the offence of 
encouragement of terrorism, preparation of terrorist acts, dissemination of terrorist 
publications, and offences relating to making and use of radioactive materials. It also amended 
the definition of terrorism and increased the period for the detention of terrorist suspects to 28 
days.282  This has now been reduced to 14 days by the Protection of Freedom Act 2012.283  
The aim of this chapter is to critically analyse key provisions of the UK’s Terrorism Act 2000 
and the Terrorism Act 2006. This analysis will explain in detail, the formal/technical terms and 
                                                          
279 C. Walker, Blackstone’s Guide to the Anti-Terrorism Legislation(3rd Edition 2014) Pg 2 
280 The Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th of July 2005 http://www.official-
documents.gov.uk/document/hc0506/hc10/1087/1087.pdf  accessed 6th May, 2013 
281 Also, influenced by the UN Security Council Resolution 1373, the UK adopted the 
CONTEST strategy in protecting its interest. “CONTEST” has four stands; Pursue-that is to 
stop terrorist attacks; Prevent- that is to stop people from becoming terrorists; Protect- that is 
to strengthen UK’s protection against terrorist attack; and, Prepare- that is prepare to mitigate 
where it cannot be stopped. 
CONTEST; The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism: Presented to Parliament by the Secretary 
for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty July 2011 CM 8123 Pg 10-14 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97995/strategy-contest.pdf 
accessed 5th April of 2013 
282 Report On the Operation in 2010 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and Part 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006 by David 
Anderson, QC July 2011 Presented to Parliament Pursuant to Section 36 of Terrorism Act 2006. 
http://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/publications/terrorism-act-2000?view=Binary  
accessed 5th April, 2013. 
283 S.57 PFA 2013 
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pure legal principles used under the Terrorism Act 2000 and S.1 Terrorism Act 2006. In other 
words, the focus is on the word “in the law book”, as opposed to the law in action.  
As stated in the preceding chapter, an analysis under the UK TA 2000 will be limited to five 
key aspects of the legislation. These include the definition of terrorism, arrest, detention, 
proscription and encouragement of terrorism. 
 
2.1 A Critical Analysis of the Definition of terrorism  
Suffice it to say that there is no single definition of terrorism that commands full international 
approval.284  According to David Anderson, “the problem of defining terrorism is a notoriously 
tricky one, made more complex by its intractable international dimension.”285 
The definition of terrorism in the UK is provided for under S.1 Terrorism Act 2000. 
Section 1(1)(a) Terrorism Act 2000 (as amended by Terrorism Act 2006) defines terrorism as 
including any “action” which falls under subsection (2).  
Thus, S.1 (2) provides that any action which;- 
‘(a) involves serious violence against a person’.  
(b)  involves serious damage to property, 
 (c) endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the action, 
(d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or 
(e) is designed to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system’ 
 
From the fore-going, the Act demands a ‘serious’ level of violence against a person for an act 
to amount to terrorism. The Court of Appeal in R v Atkinson held that ‘a significant risk had to 
be shown for an offence to be “serious.” 286 A similar decision was reached in R v Lang where 
the Court also held that a “significant” risk had to be shown” for an offence to be regarded as 
“serious.”287 Going by these decisions, the violent act against a person and damages to property 
as per S1(2)(a) and (b) must be “significant” for it to amount to terrorism under the Act.288  
                                                          
284 A Report by Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C, Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation March 2007 Pg 47 
http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm70/7052/7052.pdf  accessed 5th April, 2013. 
285 Anderson, ‘Shielding the Compass: How to Fight Terrorism Without Defeating the Law’ (June 13, 2013) Brick 
Court Chambers, London Pg 11 
286 [2006] All ER (D) 236 (Jan)  
287 [2005] All ER (D) 54 (Nov) 
288 ibid 
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Strictly speaking, the use of the phrase “serious” in qualifying a terrorist act is rather nebulous. 
It suggests that an offence has to be of a large scale for it to be regarded as terrorism. But in 
reality, this is not always  the case. The inclusion of the phrase “serious violence or damage” 
to property as an act of terrorism amplifies the definition of terrorism under the Act. Does it 
mean that an act of violence against a person or minor damages to property is not regarded as 
terrorism under the Act? In the writer’ opinion, the inclusion of these phrase adds nothing to 
the section.  
Furthermore, any action that “endangers a person’s life other than the person committing it is 
terrorism under the Act.”289   
The phrase “serious” was again used, as per S1(2)(d) and (e),  to qualify “risk to the health or 
safety of the public or a section of the public” or interference an electronic system” before it 
can be seen as an act of  terrorism. Again this provision is unclear. Does the Act mean that a 
minor risk to the health of the public or interference with an electronic system is not terrorism? 
The inclusion of “serious” to qualify these offences is unnecessary. For example, both serious 
and minor interference with an electronic system could have serious impact on the safety of 
the public, including an attempt to do same.  
In addition to the foregoing, “terrorism” under the Act also requires the ‘use or threat of action 
designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to 
intimidate the public or a section of the public.”290  
The key words under this section are “influence” and (to a lesser extent) “intimidate.” Going 
by the above provision, any threat of action that is not aimed at influencing the government or 
an international organisation or aimed at intimidating the public will not be regarded as 
terrorism. 
In Sanders and Another v Buckley291the Court in explaining the term “to influence” held it to 
mean “not done with free will” or “to bring pressure upon.” According to the Black’s Law 
Dictionary, to “intimidate” means to “put in fear” or “to be placed in a position of being afraid.”  
                                                          
289 S.1(2)(c) 
290 S. 1(1) (b) 
291 [2006] All ER (D) 307 (Dec) 
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 Also, terrorism under the Act means the “use or threat made for the purpose of advancing a 
political, religious, racial or ideological cause.”292 This suggests that any action made with 
the aim of giving active support to political, religious, racial or ideological cause is terrorism. 
This section leaves the definition of terrorism under the Act wide open.  
The former Independent Reviewer of the Terrorism Act, Anderson QC, queries whether the 
underlying purpose of terrorism should be for advancing a political, religious, racial or 
ideological cause. He argued that these conditions were irrelevant and unnecessary in the 
definition of terrorism.293 In his words “…. the ability to defend further up the field is justified, 
if at all, by the potentially lethal effects of terrorism rather than by the mental element behind 
it.’’294 He argued further that if a terrorist incident like mass hostage-taking occurs, what 
matters is what the terrorist plan to do, and what is needed to stop an attack. According to him, 
whether the terrorist motives are personal, financial or political, or whether they seek to 
influence the government or to intimidate people whom they have not captured are questions 
which may be of significance to their ultimate sentence, but which scarcely seem to have much 
bearing on the availability of precursor offences, or the Terrorism Act arrest power.’  
On the other hand, the non-inclusion of the “target and purpose (motive) requirement” under 
the definition of terrorism has its negative impacts. Anderson says that this could restrict the 
definition of terrorism thereby putting the Courts in a difficult situation currently experienced 
by the New York Court of Appeals. He stated that the NYCA is struggling to avoid attaching 
the terrorism label to a gang shooting targeted at Mexican-Americans in the Bronx.295  
 Lastly, Section 1(3) of the Act provides that the “use or threat of action falling within 
subsection (2) which involves the use of firearms or explosives is terrorism.”  
It must be noted that “action” under the Act includes those done outside the United 
Kingdom.296 This extends the definition of terrorism under the Act to all jurisdictions. 
Likewise, ‘government’ under the Act means the government of the UK, of a part of the UK, 
                                                          
292 S.1(1)(c) 
293 Anderson, ‘Shielding the Compass’ op cit  Pg 14 
294 ibid Pg 14 
295 The People v Edgar Morales, No 186, 11 December 2012, 
296 S. 1(4) (a)  
*Also s. 1(4)(b) provides that reference to ‘any person’ or ‘property’ is reference to any person or property 
wherever situated. This gives the Act universal application.  
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or of a country other than the UK.297 The Court in R v F298 held that “government” under the 
Terrorism Act 2000 is not limited to countries governed by democratic or representation 
principle, but also includes a tyranny, dictatorship, junta or those usurping power.299  This 
ruling further expands the scope of the definition of terrorism under the Act. Going by this 
ruling, it could be argued that any individual that  support the forces against the Assad regime 
in Syria is tantamount to committing acts of terrorism as per S. 1(1)(b) of the Act.   
S.1(1)(b)  of the Act have also been criticised on the basis that it requires proof that a terrorist 
acted for a political, racial,  or religious motive. In his view, terrorism laws must have means 
of distinguishing terrorism from ordinary crime, but relying on political and religious motive 
is not necessary.300 
As a final point, it is important to note that the definition of terrorism under the Act makes no 
reference to any exception for armed conflict, whether for international or non- international 
conflicts which are recognised as such within international law.301 This issue was addressed by 
the Supreme Court in R v Gul.302 In that case, the Supreme Court held that the definition of 
terrorism extends to military or quasi-military activity aimed at bringing down a foreign 
government, even where that is approved (official or unofficial) by the UK government and 
even when perpetrated by the victims of the oppression abroad.303   
2.2 Arrest 
S. 41(1) of the Terrorism Act 2000 provides that a “constable may arrest without warrant a 
person whom he reasonably suspects to be a terrorist.” 
A “terrorist” as per s.41  means a person “who-(a)has committed an offence under any of 
sections 11, 12, 15 to 18, 54 and 56 to 63, or (b) is or has been concerned in the commission, 
preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism.”304 This also includes “a reference to a person 
                                                          
297 S.1(4) (d) 
298 [2007] ECWA Crim 243 
299 Ibid  
300 Kent Roach, ‘The Case of Defining Terrorism with Restraint and Without Reference to Political or Religious 
Motives’ ed in Andrew Lynch, Edwina McDonald & George William, Law & Liberty in the War on Terror (the 
Federation Press, 2007) Pg 287 
301 Clive Walker, Case Comment.  R V Gul; Trial-terrorism-disseminating terrorist publication (Criminal Law 
Review 2012) Pg 648 
302 [2013] UKSC 64 
303 Ibid 
304 S.40 (1)(a)-(b) TA 2000 
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who has been, whether before or after the passing of this Act, concerned in the commission, 
preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism within the meaning given by section 40 (1)(b.”305 
The power to arrest given to the Police under the Act is based on ‘reasonable suspicion.’ The 
European Court of Human Right in Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. United Kingdom held that 
“reasonable suspicion” to arrest presupposes the existence of facts or information which would 
satisfy an objective observer that the person concerned may have committed the offence.”306 
However, the Court added that the ‘reasonableness’ of the suspicion justifying such arrests 
cannot always be judged according to the same standards as are applied in dealing with 
conventional crime.307 The Court held that; 
    “In view of the difficulties inherent in the investigation and prosecution of terrorist-type  
    offences, ….the ‘reasonableness’ of the suspicion justifying such arrests cannot  
    always be judged according to the same standards as are applied in dealing  
    with conventional crime. Nevertheless, the exigencies of dealing with terrorist  
    crime cannot justify stretching the notion of ‘reasonableness’ to the point where  
    the essence of the safeguard secured by Article 5  (1)  (c) is impaired…. ”308 
The court also made this explicitly clear in Sher v U.K that terrorist crime falls into a special 
category and because of the attendant risk of loss of life and human suffering, the police are 
obliged to act with utmost urgency in following up all information, including information from 
secret sources. Furthermore, the police may frequently have to arrest a suspected terrorist on 
the basis of information which is reliable but without having to disclose the source of the 
information leading to the arrest.309  
 
This suggests that although the test for determining what amounts to ‘reasonable suspicion’ is 
an objective one, nonetheless, these may depend upon the circumstances.310 This case suggests 
that the Courts will be willing to give an elastic interpretation to the meaning of “reasonable 
                                                          
305 S.40(2) 
306 30 August  1990, Series A, No. 182, p. 16, Para. 32 
307 Ibid pp. 16-17, para. 32. 
308 Ibid para 32 
309 Application no 5201/11 Para 148  
310 The ECHR Held further that although “the Contracting States cannot be asked to establish the 
reasonableness of the suspicion grounding the arrest of a suspected terrorist by disclosing the confidential 
sources of supporting information or even facts which would be susceptible of indicating such sources of  their 
identity”, the Court must never the less “be enabled to ascertain whether the essence of the safeguard 
afforded by Article 5 (1 )(c) has been secured”; this means that “the respondent Government have 
to furnish at least some facts or information capable of satisfying the Court that the arrested person was 
reasonably suspected of having committed the alleged offence”.  Ibid., pp. 17-18, para. 34. 
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suspicion” as per arrests made under S.41 of the Terrorism Act 2000.  Similar decisions were 
reached in Brogan v UK311and Murray v UK.312 
As explained in a preceding chapter (literature review), strictly speaking arrest under S.41 
differs from normal arrest powers in the sense that no specific offence need be in mind of the 
arresting officer. Even though the arresting officer needs to state that an arrest is being imposed 
and the grounds for the arrest, the officer is not required to give a detailed reason for the 
arrest.313  
For the purpose of arresting a person under the Act, a constable may enter and search any 
premises where the person is or where the constable reasonably suspects him to be.314 
Furthermore, S.83 Terrorism Act 2000  permits a member of the Armed forces (Her Majesty’s 
forces) on duty to arrest without warrant,315 and detain for a period not more than 4hours,316 
any person he reasonably suspects of committing, has committed or is about to commit any 
offence under the Act. From the wording of this section, for a member of the armed forces to 
make an arrest under the Act, he must be on “duty,”317 that is, the arrest must be related to the 
officer’s work circumstances.318 It is unclear if a member of the armed offices can still make 
an arrest if he is not duty?  
It must however be noted that although power to arrest based on reasonable suspicion is an 
important power given to the Police in the fight against terrorism, it does not justify an 
indefinite detention of a suspected terrorist (Magee v UK).  
 
 
 
                                                          
311 [1989] 11 EHRR 117  
312 [1996] 22 EHRR 29  
313 Murray v UK, supra para 61 
314 S.81 (2) Terrorism Act 2000 
315 S.83(1)(a) ibid 
316 S.83 (1)(b) Ibid 
317 The Court in R (Stunt) v Mallet [2001] EWCA Civ 265 and Huddersfield Police Authority v Watson [1947] KB 
842 held that “'Duty' relates to a person's work circumstances.” 
(A look at meaning of an ‘officer’ under S. 90 (2)  says ‘a member of Her Majesty’s Forces on duty’) 
318 However, S. 83(2) provides that ‘ a person making an arrest under this section complies with any rule of law 
requiring him to state the ground of arrest if he states that he is making the arrest as a member of Her 
Majesty’s forces’. Thus, this section gives member of the armed forces power to arrest a suspected terrorist by 
just stating that he is making the arrest as a member of Her Majesty’s forces. 
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2.3 Pre-charge detention 
The next stage after the arrest of a terror suspect is detention pending when he/she is formally 
charged to Court (pre-charge detention).319 This is contained under sections 40 and 41 of the 
T.A 2000 (as amended by S. 23 of Terrorism Act 2006). 
S.41(3) reads;      
   ‘subject to subsection (4) to (7), a person detained under this section shall (unless 
    detained under any other power) be released not later than the end of the period of 
    48 hours beginning- (a) with the time of his arrest under this section, or 
   (b) if he was being detained under schedule 7 when he was arrested under this section 
    with the time when his examination under that Schedule began.’ 
 
This section permits the police to arrest and detain a terror suspect for up to 48 hours if a 
‘review officer does not authorise the continued detention’.320  A review can only begin after 
forty-eight hours. The review officer must be at least superintendent or above.321  The 
additional period of extension for seven days may be granted by a judicial authority up to 14 
days322 if satisfied that— 
(a)’there are reasonable grounds for believing that the further detention of the person to whom 
the application relates is necessary’ and 
(b)’the investigation in connection with which the person is detained is being conducted 
diligently and expeditiously’, or it is 
 (1A)(a) ’to obtain relevant evidence whether by questioning him or otherwise’ 
(b)’to preserve relevant evidence;’ or 
                                                          
319 According to Liberty, Pre-charge detention refers to the length of time an accused can be locked-up and 
questioned before facing a charge. During this time, the accused might never be told what he is accused of, or 
be able to challenge the evidence against him.  
LIBERTY; ‘An end to lengthy pre-charge detention and control orders?’ 24th June 2010 https://www.liberty-
human-rights.org.uk/media/press/2010/an-end-to-lengthy-pre-charge-detention-and-control-orders-.php  
accessed 2nd June 2013 
320 S. 41(4) Terrorism Act 2000 
321 S.23(2) Terrorism Act 2006 
322 S.57 Protection of Freedom Act 2012 
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(c)’pending the result of an examination or analysis of any relevant evidence or of anything the 
examination or analysis of which is to be or is being carried out with a view to obtaining 
relevant evidence’.323 
The definition of a ‘judicial authority’ means a District Judge (Magistrate Court) in England, 
In Scotland (the Sheriff), and a County Judge in Northern Ireland.  
Schedule 8 Part III of the Act provides no meaning to the term “reasonable grounds,” 
“necessary,” “diligently’’ and “expeditiously” as it relates to grounds for extending detention.  
In Redmon  v U.S 324 ‘reasonable grounds’  was held to mean the existence of facts and 
circumstances known to police officers (in this context a judicial authority) as would warrant 
a prudent and cautious man in believing that the person arrested is guilty of an offence. Relating 
this to Sch 8 means that a judicial authority may extend the period of detention based on the 
existence of facts and circumstances as would warrant a prudent and cautious man in believing 
that the person arrested is guilty of an offense and it is “compelling”325 to do so.  
Another requirement for the extension of the period for detention under Sch.8 is that an 
investigation in connection to the detained suspect is conducted “expeditiously” and 
“diligently’’ that is, the investigation is “done with speed”326 and “efficiently.”327 
Furthermore, the Secretary of State can extend the period of detention of terror suspects in UK 
under the emergency power for temporary extension and review of extensions by virtue of S. 
58(1) of the Protection of Freedom Act 2012. However this can only be used under exceptional 
circumstances where Parliament is dissolved. S.38(1) Sch 8 Part 4 of the TA 2000 reads: 
                   “(1)The Secretary of State may make a temporary extension order if— 
   
                     (a)either— 
                                                          
323 C.11 Sch. 8 Part III S. Para 32 Terrorism Act as amended. 
324 C.A 355 F.2d 407R, The Court however cautions that the meaning of the term depends upon the Context 
and the Statute in which it is used. 
In R (on the application of Hooverspeed Ltd v Customs and Exercise Comrs,  [2002] 2 All ER 553 The Court held 
that this could in some circumstances mean information derived from by the Police by way of e.g “profiles or 
trends” 
325 The Court in The Victor [1865] 13 LT 21, held that it is impossible to give an exact and concise definition of 
the term “compelling”,-for it will depend upon the circumstances of the case.  
It connotes Necessary’ means ‘compelling, compelling, critical, crucial, demanded, essential, expedient, 
fundamental, imperative, important, incumbent,  
326 Meaning of ‘expeditiously’ Free legal Dictionary  
327 The term “diligently” was held to mean “efficiently, industriously, continuously” in West Faulker Associates 
v Newham London Borough Council 71 BLR, CA Hounslow London Borough Council v Twickenham Garden 
Development Ltd [1971] Ch 233 at 269  
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                     (i)Parliament is dissolved, or 
                     (ii)Parliament has met after a dissolution but the first Queen's Speech of the    
                      Parliament has not yet taken place, and 
                    (b)the Secretary of State considers that it is necessary by reason of urgency to 
                     make such an order.” 
 
2.4 Encouragement of terrorism  
Extremist websites in the U.K have grown from 12 to over 4000 between 1998 and 2008.328 
This has further increased to several thousands in 2016. In fact, according to the Commissioner 
of London Metropolitan Police, more than 1,000 extremist websites are taken down every week 
in the UK.329 In order to tackle this, the Terrorism Act 2006 creates a number of offences 
including encouragement of terrorism. This criminalizes both direct and indirect 
encouragement of terrorist acts. This gives the Government power to prosecute an individual 
for encouraging terrorism. 
According to S. 1 Terrorism Act 2006, encouragement of terrorism applies to a 
   “statement that is likely to be understood by some or all of the members of the public 
    to whom it is published as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to  
   them to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism or  
   Convention offences”. 
 
It also includes other inducements that could lead to committing, preparing or instigating acts 
of terrorism or Convention offences. Convention offences are offences listed under Schedule 
1 of the Act. 
Section 1(2) provides that, for a person to commit an offence of encouragement of terrorism, 
two requirements must be met. Firstly, a person must publish a statement, or cause another to 
publish a statement.330  Secondly, at the time the person publishes it or causes it to be 
published— he “intends” members of the public to directly or indirectly encouraged or induced 
by the statement to commit, prepare or instigate acts of terrorism or Convention offences;331 or 
                                                          
328 Clive Walker ‘Blackstone Guide op cit  2009 pg 63 
329 Caroline Mortimer, ‘More than 1,000 Extremist Websites Taken down Every week, London Police Chief, Sir 
Bernard Hogan-Howe say’ Independent 17th Dec, 2015 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/more-
than-1000-extremist-websites-taken-down-every-week-london-police-chief-sir-bernard-hogan-howe-
a6776961.html accessed 20th Dec, 2015 
330 S. 1(2)(a)  Terrorism Act 2006 
331 S. 1(2)(b) (i) ibid 
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is “reckless” as to whether members of the public will be directly or indirectly encouraged or 
induced by the statement to commit, prepare or instigate acts of terrorism.332   
From the above provision, when publishing the statement or causing another to publish it, the 
defendant must “intend” members of the public to be encouraged to commit a terrorist offences. 
This offence can be committed “intentionally,” that is, the defendant must have the necessary 
state of mind, or “recklessly.”333 
The necessary “intention” required for the offence is that the defendant must intend members 
of the public to be encouraged to commit, prepare or instigate acts of terrorism or Convention 
offences. The Court in R v G334 held that a person acts “recklessly” when he is aware of a risk 
that it exists or will exist and in the circumstances known to him, and reasonable to takes the 
risk.  Therefore the onus is on the state to show that the defendant is aware that his/her statement 
would encourage terrorism or Convention offences, in the circumstances known to him, and he 
took that risk. 
Another element of the offence of encouragement of terrorism is “statements that are likely to 
be understood by some335 or all of the members of the public.’’336  
S 1(4) Terrorism Act 2006 provides;  
   “for the purposes of this section the questions how a statement is likely to be  
   understood and what members of the public could reasonably be expected to infer 
    from it must be determined having regard both—(a)to the contents of the statement  
   as a whole; and (b)to the circumstances and manner of its publication.” 
 
It must be noted that a person could still be prosecuted even if no member of the public is 
encouraged or induced to commit acts of terrorism.337  This statement could be under any 
format, ‘including communication without words consisting of sounds or images or both’338 
                                                          
332 S.1(2)(b)(ii)ibid 
333 Correspondence to  The Terrorism Act 2006 11th April 2006 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-terrorism-act-2006  accessed 5th  June 2013 
334 [2003] UKHL 50 The Court  held that a “person acts “recklessly” in the circumstances (i) when he is aware of 
a risk that it exists or will exist (ii)a result when he is aware of a risk that will occur (iii) and in the circumstances 
known to him, reasonable to take the risk. 
335meaning  ‘Being an unspecified number’ ‘Unknown or unspecified’  The Legal Dictionary  
336 S.1(1) Terrorism Act 2006 
337 S.1(5)(a)(b) 
338 S. 20 (6) Terrorism Act 2006 
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 S. 1(3) Terrorism Act 2006 explains further that statement likely to be understood by members 
of the public as ‘indirectly encouraging’ the commission339 or preparation340 of acts of terrorism 
or Convention offences includes;  
    “every statement which glorifies the commission or preparation (whether in the past, in  
    the future or generally) of such acts or offence’341and is  ‘a statement from which  
    those members of the public could reasonably be expected to infer that what is 
    being glorified  is being glorified as conduct that should be emulated by them in  
   existing circumstances.”342  
 
The wording of this section suggests that this is a statement which members of the public would 
reasonably, that is, ‘rationally, appropriately, or ordinarily343’ be expected to conclude as 
conduct that should be emulated under the existing circumstances.  
This section has two limbs.  Firstly, the audience must reasonably understand that they should 
emulate the conduct i.e. that they should act in a similar manner. Secondly, the concept of “in 
existing circumstances” means that it must be possible to emulate the conduct glorified in this 
day and age. This suggests that the glorification of distant historical events is unlikely to be 
caught.344 
Clarke argues that the drafters of the Act intended indirect encouragement to “capture the 
expression of sentiments which do not amount to direct incitement to perpetrate acts of 
violence, but which are uttered with the intent that they should encourage others to commit 
terrorist acts.”345 As previously stated a person may be charged for encouraging terrorism even 
if no member of the public was actually induced to commit acts of terrorism by the statement.346 
However, it is a defence for an accused charged under this section to show that the statement 
                                                          
339 In R v Miller [1983] 2 A.C 161 the court made reference to “commission” to mean ‘to cause to happen’.  
The ‘act of perpetrating an offence’ Legal Dictionary  
340 There is no precise definition for the terminology “preparation”- it is indicative of ‘the state of having been 
made ready beforehand; readiness’ 
341 S.1(3)(a) T.A 2006 
342 S.1(3)(b) ibid 
343 The term “reasonable” is a generic and relative one and applies to that which is appropriate for a particular 
situation or a question of fact. Wershof v Metropolitan Police Comr [1978] 3 All ER 540 
In Paxton v Courtnay [1860] 2 F & F 131 per Keating J; cited with approval in Produce Brokers Co Ltd v Olympia 
Oil and Cake Co Ltd [1916] 2 KB 296 at 298 per Horridge J. held the term reasonable to mean what a  “honest, 
and right-minded men would adopt.” 
It connotes “rational, appropriate, ordinary or usual in the circumstances. “ 
344 Correspondence The Terrorism Act 2006 Op Cit 
345 Letter from  Charles Clarke, U.K. Home Secretary, to Rt. Hon David Davis MP and Mark Oaten MP,  
members of the House of Commons (July 15, 2005), http://www.parliament/lib/research/rp2005/rp05-066.pdf  
accessed 10th July 2013 
346 S.1(5)(a)(b) TA 2006 
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neither expressed his views nor had his endorsement and it was clear, in all circumstances of 
the statement publication that it did not express his view and did not have his endorsement.347 
Section 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006 provides for associated offences to encouragement of 
terrorism. This section creates the offence of dissemination of terrorist publication.  
Under S.2, it is an offence for a person to distribute or circulate a terrorist publication;348 give, 
sells or lend such a publication;349 offer such a publication for sale or loan;350 provide a service 
to others that enables them to obtain, read, listen to or look at such a publication, or to acquire 
it by means of a gift, sale or loan;351 transmit the contents of such a publication electronically;352 
or to have such a publication in his possession with a view to its becoming the subject of 
conducting falling to those earlier listed.353 At the time of committing the offence, the 
defendant must “intend” an effect of his conduct to be a ‘direct or indirect encouragement 
terrorism’ or other inducement to commit, prepare or instigate acts of terrorism, or with the 
“intention” of assisting in the commission or preparation of such acts, or done “recklessly” 
with the intent of having effect both or any of the afore-mentioned.354  
Going further, S.3 of the Terrorism Act 2006 makes provision for the application of 
encouragement of terrorism and the dissemination of terrorist publication to internet activity 
etc. This covers statements published or caused to be published with the provision of services 
provided electronically, or conducts under s 2(2) carried out with the provision or use of an 
electronic service. 355 
2.5 Proscription 
Section 3 Terrorism Act 2000 (as amended) provides for the proscription of a terrorist 
organisation. The Terrorism Act 2006 also expands the government’s ability to proscribe a 
terrorist organisation that promotes or encourages terrorism as per section 21(5)(a).   
                                                          
347 S.1(6) ibid 
348 S.2(2)(a) Terrorism Act 2006 
349 S.2(2)(b) 
350 S.2(2)(c) 
351 S.2(2)(d) 
352 S.2(2)(e) 
353 S.2(2)(d) 
354 S.2(1)(a)-(c) 
355 S.3(1)(a)-(b) 
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An organisation is proscribed if ‘it is listed in Schedule 2’356 of the Act’ or ‘operates under the 
same name as an organisation listed in that Schedule.’357 Thus, it becomes a crime for any 
individual to belong to the organisation listed under the Schedule as per s.11. 
Section 3(4) Terrorism Act 2000 gives the Secretary of State powers to proscribe an 
organisation if he believes it is concerned in terrorism. 
The key word in the above provision is “concerned.” Under S.3(5)  ‘an organisation is 
concerned in terrorism if it- (a) commits or participate in acts of terrorism, (b) prepares for 
terrorism, (c) promotes or encourages terrorism, or (d) is otherwise concerned in terrorism.’  
The Court in  SSHD v Lord Alton of Liverpool, held the term “concerned in terrorism” as 
meaning “current, active steps are required.”358 
A clear meaning of the term ‘prepares for terrorism’ can be found under S. 5 Terrorism Act 
2006.   Preparation of terrorist act under S. 5(1) means that that there must be an intention to 
commit acts of terrorism359 or assist another person to commit such acts or engages in any 
conduct for giving effect to his intention.360 
 ‘Promotes or encourages terrorism’ as per S.3.(5) includes ‘the unlawful glorification of the 
commission or preparation (whether in the past, future or generally) of acts of terrorism’361 or 
‘activities of the organisation carried out in a manner that ensures that the organisation is 
associated  with statements  containing such glorification.’362 Glorification of conduct is 
unlawful if there are persons who may become aware of it who could reasonably be expected 
to infer that what is glorified is being glorified as conduct that should be emulated in existing 
circumstances.363 
“Glorification” in this section includes ‘any form of praise or celebration, and cognate 
expressions are to be construed accordingly’.364 “statement” includes a communication without 
                                                          
356 S.3(1)(a) T.A 2000 
357 S. 3(1)(b) ibid 
358 [2008] EWCA Civ 443, 31 
359 S.5(1)(a) Terrorism Act 2006 
360 S.5(1)(b) ibid 
361 S.5A(a) Terrorism Act 2000 as amended 
362 S.5A(B) Terrorism Act 2000 as amended 
363 S.5B Ibid 
364 S.5C ibid 
   
94 
 
words consisting sounds or images or both.365 The Act provides that the glorification of any 
conduct is unlawful as per S.5A  
Other factors which the Secretary of State will take into account when deciding whether or not 
to exercise discretion are the nature and scale of the organisation’s activities; the specific threat 
that it poses to the UK; the specific threat it poses to British Nationals overseas; the extent of 
the organisation presence in the UK; and the need to support international partners in the fight 
against terrorism.366   
It is however a defence, in the case of a private meeting, if a person can prove that he had no 
reasonable cause to believe that the address by the members of the proscribed organisation 
would support the proscribed organisation or advance its terrorist activities.367 Meeting” here 
means a meeting of three or more persons, whether or not the public are admitted, and a meeting 
is “private” if the public are not admitted.368 The defence in Section 12(4) is intended to permit 
the arrangement of ‘genuinely benign’ meetings.369 
Once the order for proscription comes into force, it becomes a criminal offence for a person to 
belong or to invite support for the proscribed organisation.370 It is also a crime to arrange a 
meeting or wear clothes or carry articles in the public which arouses reasonable suspicion that 
an individual is a member of a proscribed organisation.371 “ 
Furthermore, S. 3 (6) Terrorism Act 2000 as amended by S. 22(2) (a)-(b) Terrorism Act 2006 
ensures that proscribed organisations do not avoid proscription by simply changing their 
name.372 Thus, if the Secretary of State believes that an organisation that is listed in Schedule 
2 is operating under a name that is not specified in Schedule 2, or that an organisation is 
operating under a different name but is the same as a listed organisation, he can make an order 
                                                          
365 ibid 
366 7(2) Explanatory Memorandum to the Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisation) (Amendment Order) 
2011 No 108 
367 S.12 (4) T.A 2000   
368 S.12(5)(a)-(b) TA 2000 
369 A ‘genuinely benign’ meeting is interpreted as a meeting at which the terrorist activities of the group are 
not promoted or encouraged, for example, a meeting designed to encourage a designated group to engage in 
a peace process or facilitate delivery of humanitarian aid where this does not involve knowingly transferring 
assets to a designated organisation.  
Home Office: Proscribed Terrorist Organisation  Pg 2 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/472956/Proscription-
update-20151030.pdf  accessed 12th Dec, 2015 
370 S.12 (1)-(4) TA 2000 
371 S.13(a)-(b) TA 2000 
372  Home Office: Proscribed Terrorist Organisation  Pg 2  
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to the effect that the name that does not appear in Schedule 2, is another name for the listed 
organisation.373 Consequently, the organisation will be treated as the same as one listed as 
proscribed. In R v Z374the CA held that a person committed an offence contrary to s 11(1) of 
the 2000 Act if he belonged or professed to belong to the “real IRA.” The Court explained that 
Section 3 of the 2000 Act provided for two mutually exclusive ways in which an organisation 
might be regarded as proscribed. What was meant by the term ‘the Irish Republican Army’ in 
Sch 2  fell on s 3(1)(a). Once the original IRA had begun to fracture into other organisations 
incorporating the name, the term ‘the IRA’ would most naturally apply to each and all of 
them.375 
There are checks and balances under the provision on proscription under the Act. Section 4 of 
the Terrorism Act 2000 provides for an appeal to the Secretary to remove an organisation from 
the list of proscribed organisation. If the appeal to the Secretary fails, another appeal can be 
made to the Proscribed Organisation Appeal Committee (POAC) as per S. 5 T 2000.  If this 
appeal is refused, the POAC judgement may be appealed to the Higher Courts in UK (for 
example, the Court of Appeal in England and Wales, the Court of Session in Scotland and the 
Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland) as per S. 6 TA 2000. 
A list of proscribed organisation under the Act is attached as “Appendix I.” It is noteworthy 
thatAnsarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan (Vanguard for the protection of Muslims in Black 
Africa) otherwise known as “Ansaru” and   Jama’atu Ahli Sunna Lidda Awati Wal Jihad 
otherwise known as “Boko Haram,” the two Islamist terrorist organisations based in Nigeria 
are amongst the international terrorist organisations proscribed under the Terrorism Act 
2000.376 
Conclusion  
This chapter established that several qualifications were used in defining terrorism under the 
TA 2000. For instance the Act demands a “serious” level of violence against a person or 
property to amount to terrorism. Other terms used to qualify terrorism include ‘action designed 
to ‘influence’…or ‘intimidate….’  The inclusion of these terms makes the definition 
                                                          
373 S. 3(6) (a) (b) T.A 2000 
374 [2005] 2 AC 645 
375 Ibid Para 66 
376 Proscribed Terrorist Organisation Home Office Sept 29, 2017 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/648405/Proscription_websit
e.pdf accessed 12th October 2017 
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ambiguous, as it is not clear whether a minor damage to property will also be regarded as an 
act of terrorism. The UK Terrorism Act also suggests that the underlying purpose of terrorism 
are for political, religious, racial, and ideological cause. This conclusion is questionable. 
Interestingly, the definition of terrorism under the TA 2000 extends to acts done outside the 
UK.  
One of the most significant findings under the analysis of the definition of terrorism is that the 
Act failed to provide whether acts that relate to armed conflicts or acts aimed at bringing down 
repressive regimes would be regarded as terrorism. This gap was however filled by the 
Supreme Court in R v Gul where the Court held that the definition extends to quasi-military 
activity and armed conflict aimed at bringing down a foreign government even if the 
perpetrators (actors) are oppressed by the government.  
This chapter also established that the legal basis for an arrest on terrorism charges in the UK is 
based “on reasonable suspicion.” The Court in Fox, Campbell, and Heartley’s made it clear 
that the reasonable suspicion justifying arrest for terrorism offences cannot be judged as the 
same standards that are applied in conventional offences.377  Having analysed the provision on 
arrest under the Act, this research is interested in finding out whether arrests of terror suspects 
in practice are based on “reasonable suspicion” and whether this power unnecessarily infringes 
human rights in the UK. This enquiry will require further assessment of the power of arrest. 
This will be done in a later chapter.  
With regards to the pre-charge detention of terror suspect, it was established here that the TA 
2000 allows for the pre-charge detention of a suspect for up to 14 days. The analysis of the pre-
charge detention in the UK threw up further questions such as is 14 days pre-charge detention 
consistent with the right to freedom of liberty and security under the HRA 1998 and the ECHR? 
Is this consistent with the right to tried within a reasonable time? How does the UK fair when 
compared to other State’s in the E.U? And more importantly do the Police obey this provision?  
These questions require further assessment into the pre-charge detention in the UK. This 
assessment will be done in a later chapter of the research.  
The introduction of the offence of encouragement of terrorism under the TA 20006 opens up a 
new field of offences under the UK terrorism law. This covers statements that are likely to be 
understood by some or all members of the public to whom it is published as a direct or indirect 
                                                          
377 30 August  1990, Series A, No. 182, p. 16, Para. 32 
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encouragement of terrorism. Like other provisions of the Act, there are concerns that this could 
be used against dissent/opposition.  
Having analysed the provisions of the definition of terrorism, power of arrest, pre-charge 
detention, proscription and encouragement of terrorism under the UK Terrorism Act 2000, 
several questions that require further answers were raised. Most of the questions and issues that 
arose from the analysis of the UK TA 2000 and the Nigerian TPA 2011 will require a further 
assessment of the Terrorism Act in action. This necessitates a transition from the doctrinal 
analysis of legal texts into an empirical understanding of how the Act is used in practice.  This 
is because the critical analysis as done in this chapter and the previous chapter merely explains 
the “law in books,” however an assessment of these provisions in practice will explain the “law 
in action.” Having analysed key provisions under the Nigerian and the UK Terrorism Acts, the 
next chapter will be dedicated to a comparison between these provisions.  
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CHAPTER 5 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE NIGERIAN TERRORISM (PREVENTION) 
ACT 2011 (AS AMENDED) & THE UNITED KINGDOM’S TERRORISM ACT 2000 
 
Following on from the critical analysis of key provisions under the Nigerian Terrorism 
(Prevention) Act 2011 (as amended) and the UK Terrorism Act 2000, this chapter takes the 
discussion forward by juxtaposing the Terrorism Acts of both States. This chapter compares 
and contrasts the definition of terrorism, power of arrest, pre-charge detention of terrorist, 
proscription and encouragement of terrorism under the Terrorism Acts of Nigeria and the U.K. 
The aim is to identify the similarities, differences, as well as strengths and weaknesses of the 
provisions of the Acts in both States.   
This comparative discussion takes into account each nation’s legal interpretation of the five 
key provisions under review. The result of this comparative evaluation will also be used to 
determine whether the legal measures adopted under the Act in each States are commensurate 
with the terror incidents and atrocities. There are many reasons why this comparative 
discussion is important.  This has been discussed earlier in the introductory chapter. The most 
important reason is that the central aim of this thesis is to compare the Nigerian Terrorism 
(Prevention) Act 2011 in light of the experiences of the UK in dealing with terrorism.  
Inevitably, the comparison would enhance mutual understanding of the Terrorism Act of both 
states and would provide richer contextualisation of the issues in the study as well as lessons 
for Nigeria to improve her anti-terrorism legislation, vice-versa. . 
Before going into the comparative analysis of the Acts, it is important to briefly highlight some 
terrorist incidents in Nigeria and the UK and compare each state response to address it. Since 
2009 there has been an increase in violence and terror attacks by Boko Haram and ‘Ansaru’, 
resulting in the death of thousands of people in Nigeria.378 It is difficult to give an exact figure 
on the number of casualties or terror incidents in Nigeria. Most of the information on terror 
incidents reported in Nigeria and indeed this research are gathered from journals, newspaper 
reports, press reports and archives. The absence of comprehensive reports could be attributed 
                                                          
378 Yvonne Ndege, Azad Essa, ‘The rise of Nigeria's Boko Haram; an in-depth look at the shadowy group as 
violence continues to wrack the West African country's northeast.’ Aljazeera 30th Sept, 2013. 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/09/201397155225146644.html  accessed 7th Nov 2013.   
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to the fear of being attacked by Boko Haram, unsafe environments for journalists/reporters, and 
intimidation by the Police/JTF except for the monthly crime returns by the Police.379  
The demands of Boko Haram and Ansaru suggest that terror attacks in Nigeria are “religiously” 
motivated. Boko Haram whose official Arabic name translates as "People Committed to the 
Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad" – says it is fighting to overthrow Nigeria's 
government and establish an Islamic state.380 On the other hand, the majority of the terror 
incidents in the UK were perpetrated by the IRA, a nationalist organisation devoted to the 
integration of Ireland as a complete and independent unit.381 Consequently, most of terrorist 
attacks in the UK were “politically” motivated (though the IRA cannot be compared directly 
with Boko Haram). It must be noted that terrorists linked to or inspired by Al-Qaida also pose 
a significant threat to the UK.382 An example is the 7th of July 2005 London bombings which 
killed  52 people and injured about 700 civilians383 and the Pan AM Flight 103 heading from 
London to New York that exploded en route over Lockerbie, Scotland killing all the 259 
passenger  and crew, as well as 11 residents of Lockerbie. Two Libyans suspects were 
convicted in 2003 for the bombing.384  Recently, a terror attack in Manchester left 19 people 
dead and about 50 others injured.385 
Over the past thirty years, the U.K has adopted a multifaceted strategy in tackling terrorism in 
the country. One of these is the CONTEST Strategy whose goal is to reduce the risk of terrorism 
in the UK and its interests overseas.386 The strategy is organised around four work streams, 
                                                          
379 Kemi Olowu, ‘Everyday like 9/11;Terrorism Timeline in Nigeria’ [2014]   Journal of Law, Policy and 
globalisation, Vol 30, Pg 71 http://www.iiste.org/Journals/index.php/JLPG/article/viewFile/16338/16856   
accessed 21st August 2015 
380 Afua Hirsch, ‘Nigerian sect Boko Haram demands Islamic state’ The Guardian,  May 2013 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/may/09/boko-haram-nigeria-islamist-state accessed 12th May 2013 
381 Gary LaFree, The Global Terrorism Database: Accomplishments and Challenges. (2010) Perspectives on 
Terrorism Vol 4, No 1  http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/89/html accessed 
13th Nov 2013 
382 Security Service M15, International Terrorism in the UK, https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/the-
threats/terrorism/international-terrorism/international-terrorism-and-the-uk.html accessed 12th Nov 2013 
383 Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005 HC 1087 http://www.official-
documents.gov.uk/document/hc0506/hc10/1087/1087.pdf   accessed 13th Nov, 2013 
384 Amy  Zalman, ‘1988; Pan AM Flight 103 Bombings over Lockerbie, Scotland’ (About.com Terrorism Issues) 
http://terrorism.about.com/od/originshistory/p/PanAmBombing.htm accessed on 13th Nov 2013 
385 Chiara Palazzo, Emily Allen, ‘Manchester Terror Attacks, Everything we Know So Far’ The Telegraph, 26 May 
2017 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/manchester-terror-attack-everything-know-far/ accessed July 18 
2017 
386 CONTEST; The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, CM 8123 Pg. 10 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97995/strategy-contest.pdf 
accessed 18th Nov, 2013. 
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namely; Pursue; Prevent; Protect; and Prepare.387 Intelligence-led policing also plays a key role 
in tackling terrorism in the U.K. This is reflected in the expenditure on the intelligence 
community and the establishment of bodies such as the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre 
(JTAC) within the Security Service.388 In addition to that, there have been developments of 
regional offices by the security services, regionalisation of Police Special Branches, 
establishment of a Police International Counter Terror Unit (PICTU) within the Metropolitan 
Police and National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) within M15 and port 
policing.389 The PICTU serves as an advisory and interpretative medium between the security 
service and the police on matters relating to terrorism.390  
On the other hand, Nigeria does not have a holistic strategy like the UK that ‘pursues’, 
‘prevents’, ‘protects’ or ‘prepares’ for terrorist attack. Terror victims are left at the mercy of 
the National Emergency Management Authority, Red Cross, Police, Air Force or the Military 
Joint Task Force JTF. The Nigerian government in June 2011 created the Joint Task Force 
(JTF) as a special military task force, with an aim to restore order in the northern region of 
Nigeria. Although the JTF have successfully arrested or killed a large number of terrorists in 
the country, members of the JTF have been accused of adding to the plight of terror victims. 
According to Amnesty International, Nigeria’s security forces have repeatedly used firearms 
against people when there is no imminent threat of death or serious injury, and have 
intentionally used lethal force in circumstances other than when it was strictly necessary to 
protect life. As a result of these allegations, the counter-terrorism effort of the Nigerian 
                                                          
387 The purpose of ‘Pursue’ is to stop terrorist attacks from happening. Consequently, this 
strategy involves detecting and investigating threats at the earliest possible stage and 
disrupting terrorist activity before it can endanger the public. The purpose of ‘Prevent’ is to 
stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. The strategy addresses radicalisation 
of all forms of terrorism, including far right extremism. The ‘Protect’ strategy under 
CONTEST aims to strengthen the UK’s protection against terrorist attacks or an attack 
against its interests overseas. The strategy also involves reducing the UK’s vulnerability to 
terrorist attacks by understanding where and how the country is vulnerable and reducing 
those vulnerabilities to an acceptable and a proportionate level. Lastly, the purpose of the 
‘Prepare’ strategy under CONTEST is to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack where it 
cannot be stopped. It also includes an effective and efficient response to save lives, reduce 
harm and aid recovery after an attack. 
388 Clive Walker, ‘Intelligence and Anti-terrorism Legislation in the United Kingdom’ [2005] Crime, Law and 
Social Change, Vol 44  Pg 387 
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government is being challenged by the National Human Rights Commission, Human rights 
organisations, international organisation and some western countries.391  
It is important to note that the U.K has experienced far fewer terror incidents within the last 
seven years392 in comparison with Nigeria. Boko Haram attacks have been more extensive, 
sophisticated and coordinated since 2009 to date.393 For instance, between 2000 -2013 about 
17 terrorist incidents were reported in the UK,394 on the other hand there were more than 814 
Boko Haram attacks between January 2011 and April 2016.395 Boko Haram killed at least 2, 
053 people in the first half of 2014 alone in an estimated 97 attacks.396 Within this period, the 
worst “kidnapping incident” in Nigeria happened. 276 School girls were kidnapped from a 
Government Secondary School in Chibok, Borno State in April 2014. 397To date, they are all 
yet to be rescued. It is believed that some of these School girls have been brainwashed by Boko 
Haram and are now killing for them.398 The following month, 5th May, 2014 more than 300 
civilians were killed by Boko Haram at Ngoru Ngala, in Borno State.399 The following year, 
                                                          
391 For instance, the U.S government in May, 2013 withdrew military assistance to Nigeria 
citing various human rights violations by Nigerian security forces particularly the killing of 
over 180 innocent civilians and the destruction of hundreds of residences in Baga, Borno 
State during a clash with members of the Boko Haram. 
US Withdraws Military Assistance To Nigeria Over Baga, Human Rights Violations, The Nigerian Voice May 2, 
2013 http://www.thenigerianvoice.com/nvnews/112917/1/us-withdraws-military-assistance-to-nigeria-over-
b.html accessed 18th Nov, 2013.  
392 CONTEST; The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism Annual Report March 2013 Pg 12 
Cm 8583 http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm85/8583/8583.pdf accessed on 8th Nov, 2013.  
The Report also reveals that the Nigerian militant Islamist group, Boko Haram and it splinter Ansaru has 
conducted almost daily attack on Nigeria causing a large number of casualties. Ibid Pg 8 
393  
394 David Anderson QC, The Terrorism Act in 2012; Report of the Independent Reviewer On the Terrorism Act 
2000 and Part 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006, July 2013 
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Post 3 April 2016 https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/nigeria-boko-haram/ accessed 4th Aug 
2016 
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august 2015 
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on the 7th January 2015, the deadliest attack by Boko Haram so far happened with about 2000 
civilians massacred by Boko Haram.400 Recently, more than 50 people were killed in a Boko 
Haram ambush on an oil exploration team on the 28th  of July 2017,401 and another suicide 
bomb attack by Boko Haram  on the 17th of August 2017 on a market in Konduga resulted in 
the death of 16 people, with more than 80 others sustaining injuries.402 Other several attacks 
have followed this incident, without an end in sight to these attacks. In fact, Boko Haram 
attacks occur almost on a weekly basis. Admittedly, the level of terror threats and attacks in 
Nigeria cannot be compared with UK. The UK have also experienced some terror attacks 
recently. These include the Manchester Arena Attack in 2017, the London Bridge Attack 2017, 
and the  Westminster Attack in 2017. However the government has managed to address its own 
terrorism threats and attacks. In 2017 alone, more than seven terror attacks were foiled by the 
security services.403 Perhaps, this could be due to the country’s experience in preventing such 
attacks. Nigeria on the other hand is relatively new to terrorism, hence the country is struggling 
to cope with the challenges. 
Both Nigeria and the United Kingdom have enacted legislation to tackle terrorism within their 
jurisdiction. The most significant of these laws in the UK is the Terrorism Act 2000. The Act 
repealed other temporary Acts and provided permanent legislation on terrorism in the U.K. 
Key provisions of the Terrorism Act 2000 include the “comprehensive” definition of terrorism, 
powers to detain terrorist suspects, proscription of terrorist organisations, arrest based on 
reasonable suspicion given to the Police, stop and search vehicles, provisions for offences 
associated with financing and support for terrorism, and penalties for terrorism offences.  
After the 7th of July London bombings, the UK Parliament enacted the Terrorism Act 2006 to 
further strengthen its anti-terrorism law. The Act created new offences and amended existing 
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ones. Some of the new offences created under the 2006 Act include encouragement of terrorism 
(directly or indirectly inciting or encouraging others to commit acts of terrorism), dissemination 
of terrorist publications (including its application to the internet), glorification of terrorism, 
convention.  
More recently, the Protection of Freedom Act 2012 was enacted to also amend/strengthen 
existing legislations on terrorism in the UK. The Act safeguards civil liberties and reduces the 
burden of government intrusion into the lives of individuals.404 Key features of the Act include 
the regulation of biometric date (destruction, retention and use of fingerprints), regulation of 
surveillance, powers of entry, reduction of the period for the pre-charge detention of a terror 
suspect, emergency power for temporary extension and review of extensions for the detention 
of a terror suspect, repeal and replacement of powers to stop and search persons and vehicles, 
safeguarding of vulnerable groups, and provisions on freedom of information and data 
protection. The proportionality of some of these laws in the UK has generated heated criticism 
from several human rights/international organisations who argued that some sections infringed 
on international law and humanitarian laws that protect human rights. This will be addressed 
in chapter 6 and 7 of the research. Notably, S. 36 Terrorism Act 2006 provides for an annual 
review of the operation of the Terrorism Act 2000 and Part 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006. This 
annual review by the independent reviewer is devoid of government interference, coupled with 
access to secret and sensitive national security information.405 Perhaps this is an area which the 
Nigerian government can learn from the UK.  
Nigeria’s National Assembly in 2011 enacted the Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 and the 
Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2011 to address terrorism in the country. These statutes 
provide the requisite legal framework for the prevention, prohibition and combating of acts of 
terrorism and the financing of terrorism in the country.  
Nigeria has also made significant efforts in improving its terrorism law by enacting the 
Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act 2013 and the Money Laundering (Prohibition) 
(Amendment) Act 2011 which amends the Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 and the Money 
Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2011 respectively. The TPAA 2013 amongst other things 
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prescribes the death penalty for all terrorism related offences under its section 1, makes the 
office the National Security Adviser the coordinating body for all security and enforcement 
agencies under the Act, increased the period for the pre-charge detention of terror suspect from 
30 days to a period of up to 180 days, and increased power given to law enforcement agencies 
in carrying out their duties under the Act.  Though the enactment of the Acts are laudable, and 
shows a significant indication that the Nigerian government is taking its anti-terrorism fight 
seriously, nevertheless there are concerns over the coherence of the provisions of the TPA 2011 
with some human rights provisions in the country.  
1. A COMPARISON BETWEEN NIGERIA AND UK’S TERRORISM ACTS 
 
Having previously analysed Nigeria and the UK’s Terrorism Acts in Chapters 3 and 4, this sub-
section will compare and contrast the five key provisions under the Acts of both States.   
2.1 Definition of terrorism   
As provided under the Terrorism Act 2000, terrorism in the UK means the use or threat of 
either a serious violence against a person or property, endangering of a person’s life, creating 
a serious risk to the health and safety of the public or any action which interferes with or 
seriously disrupts an electronic system.406 In addition an act of terrorism include either  the use 
or threat to use an action to “influence” the government or an international organisation or to 
intimidate the public or a section of the public for the purpose of either advancing a religious, 
racial, political or ideological cause.407 The UK definition of terrorism extends to terrorist 
activities abroad and terrorist actions against foreign government.408 Conversely, in Nigeria, 
the Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 defines terrorism as any act deliberately done with malice 
aforethought which “seriously” harms or damages  a country or an international organisation,409 
or an act which “unduly” compels a government or an international organisation to do or 
abstain from doing an act,410  or an act which “seriously”  intimidate a population,411 or 
“seriously” destabilize the political, constitutional, economic or social structure of a country or 
international organisation.412 The Nigerian definition also includes either an attack upon a 
person’s life which may cause “serious” bodily harm or death, kidnapping of a person/hostage 
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taking, the destruction of public or private property, or the destruction of government or public 
transport system as acts of terrorism. In addition, the destruction of a fixed platform which  
endangers human lives or result in major economic loss,  seizure of an aircraft or other means 
of transportation,  unlawful manufacture of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, the 
release of dangerous substances or causing fire, explosions or flood, the effect of which is to 
endanger human life, and interference with or distribution of the supply of water, power or any 
other fundamental natural resources to endanger human life are regarded as  terrorism under 
Nigeria’s TPA 2011 (as amended) .413  
There are similarities in the definition of both states.  Both the Nigerian and the UK definition 
demands a “serious” level of violence, harm, damages for an act to amount to terrorism. 
Equally, the definition of terrorism in both states recognises acts of terrorism done outside the 
country. The Nigerian definition explicitly makes provision for declaring a person or a group 
as a suspected international terrorist or an international terrorist group where the group is 
involved in terrorist acts in any resolution of the UN Security Council or any instrument of the 
African Union and ECOWAS or considered as such by a the competent authority of a foreign 
State.414 In so doing, the Nigerian definition goes a step further by recognising not only 
international resolutions on terrorism but also regional and sub-regional resolutions under the 
auspices of the African Union (AU) and ECOWAS.  
The “targets” and “motives” for committing acts of terrorism in Nigeria and the UK are also 
similar.  
The “targets” of an act of terrorism, as suggested under the TPA 2011 and the TA 2000 are the 
government or an international organisation, the public or “a section of the public,” a person, 
a public or private property, health or safety of the public, an electronic system (UK) and an 
infrastructural facility including an information system (Nigeria). 
The inclusion of “……or a section of the public” is exclusive to the UK definition of terrorism. 
According to Lord Carlile, the inclusion of this may serve to protect minorities groups in the 
UK.415  
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The “motives” for committing acts of terrorism in both States are to “influence” the 
government or an international organisation (UK), or to ‘unduly compel’ a government or an 
international organisation or a third party to do abstain from doing any act (Nigeria) or to 
‘intimidate’ the public or a section of the public (UK)/ to ‘seriously intimidate’ a population or 
seriously destabilize or destroy a country or an international organisation (Nigeria). In addition 
to these, the UK tend to link terrorist attacks and atrocities to political,” “religious,” “racial” or 
“ideological” cause. The public, a person, the government, or international organisations are 
the targets.  
The inclusion of a “political,” “religious,” “racial” or “ideological cause” as motives for 
committing an act of terrorism is distinct to the UK definition of terrorism. Even though the 
demands of Boko Haram suggests that is their agenda is for a “religious” cause, the Nigerian 
definition does not include “religion,” “racial,” “ideological” or “political”  cause as a motive 
for terrorism in the country.  
The Nigerian definition also included other motives for committing acts of terrorism to include 
‘influencing’ a government by way of ‘intimidation’ or ‘coercion’; the destruction of a 
transport, communication fixed platform….. with the aim of  “causing major economic loss or 
to endanger human lives.” 
On a comparative note, the writer found the definition of terrorism in Nigeria to be relatively 
more extensive (in breadth and scope) than that of the U.K even though the definition of 
terrorism in Nigeria has not given rise to litigation with regards to its meaning or validity. 
Accordingly, there are no judicial precedents to draw analysis from in Nigeria. The Courts in 
the UK on their part have expressly recognised the “broadness” of the definition of terrorism 
under the TA 2000. In a landmark judgement, the Supreme Court in R v Gul416held that the 
definition of terrorism under the UK TA 2000 is indeed too broad to encompass the ever 
changing nature of terrorism. The Court in this case also clarified the international reach of the 
definition of terrorism in the UK, as not limited to countries governed by democratic or 
representation principle, but also includes tyranny, dictatorship, junta or those usurping 
power.417 The Court decision in this case clearly gave considerations for the UK’s definition to 
cover political circumstances at any time or events.  
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The decision in R v Gul presents a significant difference in the definition of terrorism in the 
UK and Nigeria. While the Nigerian definition extends to suspected international terrorist or 
an international terrorist listed in any resolution of the UN Security Council or any instrument 
of the African Union and ECOWAS or considered as such by a the competent authority of a 
foreign State,418 it is unclear whether the definition extends to armed struggle against 
oppressive regime or military juntas. On the other hand, the UK’s definition through R v F, and 
R v Gul419 clearly makes no exception for freedom fighters. Also the UK Terrorism Act creates 
a separate regime of powers under the Act that allows a person to be arrested and detained at 
ports, airports or border areas. Schedule 7 of the TA 2000 gives an examining officer at a port 
or in the border area the powers to question a person who is in the border area for the purpose 
of determining whether he is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or 
instigation of acts of terrorism. In determining whether the exercise of this power (Under Sch 
7) was lawful, the Court in Miranda v UK held that an examining officer may exercise this 
power “whether or not he has grounds for suspecting that a person is a terrorist.”420 Although 
the Court averred that the UK ‘Parliament has set the bar for the exercise of the Schedule 7 
power at quite a low level. Sch 7 of the Act gives the examining officer an opportunity to 
determine whether a traveller at a port may be concerned in the commission, preparation or 
instigation of an act of terrorism.’421 It remains unclear if similar powers that allows the Police 
to question a person who is in the border area for the purpose of determining whether he is or 
has been concerned in the commission of terrorism offences applies at border post/ports in 
Nigeria.   
Finally, although the definition of terrorism in Nigeria and the UK differs slightly in meaning 
and context, the targets and motives overlap in several areas.  
2.2 Arrest 
The power of arrest under the Nigerian Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 is based on 
‘reasonable suspicion’ that an offence is committed or is about to be committed.422 Similarly, 
S.41(1) of UK’s Terrorism Act 2000 gives a Constable power to arrest without warrant a person 
whom he ‘reasonably suspects’ to be a terrorist. 
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From a theoretical standpoint, the legal basis for arrest in both States is “reasonable suspicion.” 
Remarkably, the courts in both States have given a similar judgement regarding the meaning 
of the term “reasonable suspicion.” The Nigerian Court in Chukwurah v C.O.P423 held that 
‘reasonable suspicion’ to arrest and detain a suspect must be exercised with discretion and that 
discretion must be objective, judicial and judicious. To justify arrest and detention on 
‘reasonable suspicion’, the prosecution must adduce evidence on the grounds of such arrest 
and the test must be an objective one.424 A similar decision was reached in O’Hara v Chief 
Constable of the RUC where the Court held that the component of what amounts to 
“reasonableness” to arrest a suspect for terrorism must be a “genuine suspicion” in the mind 
of the arrestor that the arrestee has been concerned in the acts of terrorism and there are 
objectively reasonable grounds for forming that suspicion.425Although, the court held further 
that the test to justify an arrest is also partly subjective, in that the arresting officer must have 
formed a genuine suspicion that the person being arrested was guilty of an offence.426 Lord 
Hope of Craighead in this case expressly clarified that ‘the application of the objective test 
does not require the court to look beyond what was in the mind of the arresting officer. It is the 
grounds which were in his mind at the time which must be found to be reasonable grounds for 
the suspicion which he has formed. “All that the objective test requires is that these grounds be 
examined objectively and that they be judged at the time when the power was exercised.”427 
 The Courts in the UK have gone a step further to clarify that it is inconsequential if the 
suspicion turns out to be ill-founded does not in itself necessarily establish that the police 
officer's suspicion was unfounded. The Court in Dryburgh v. Galt expressly stated that  
         “Suffice it to say that the fact that the information on which the police officer  
        formed his suspicion turns out to be ill-founded does not in itself necessarily establish 
        that the police officer's suspicion was unfounded. The circumstances known to  
       the police officer at the time he formed his suspicion constitute the criterion, not the  
       facts as subsequently ascertained. The circumstances may be either what the  
        police officer has himself observed or the information which he has received”428 
 
Furthermore, the European Court of Human Rights in Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. United 
Kingdom429 have gone a step further to clarify that the ‘reasonableness’ of the suspicion 
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justifying such arrests for terrorism offences cannot always be judged according to the same 
standards as are applied in dealing with conventional crime. Nevertheless, the exigencies of 
dealing with terrorist crime cannot justify stretching the notion of "reasonableness" to the point 
where the essence of the safeguard secured by Article 5 (1 )(c) is impaired.430 The Court held 
further that what amounts to ‘reasonable suspicion’ may depend upon all the circumstances 
(the objective test and subjective test).431  
Going by the decision in Fox’s case, although arrest under the UK Terrorism Act is based on 
reasonable suspicion, the “Contracting States cannot be asked to establish the reasonableness 
of the suspicion grounding the arrest of a suspected terrorist by disclosing the confidential 
sources of supporting information or even facts which would be susceptible of indicating such 
sources of their identity.” The ECrtHR have also held that for terrorism related arrest, the 
suspect might not be charged after an arrest.432  
While the UK court have clarified the provision of the Act on arrest, there are no clear judicial 
rulings relating to terrorism arrests in Nigeria. The Nigerian Courts (Judiciary) seem 
unwillingly to provide further guidance on the interpretation of reasonable suspicion regarding 
terrorism arrests.  It is unclear whether the Courts in Nigeria will be willing to give an elastic 
meaning to the meaning of “reasonable suspicion” in relation to terrorism arrests.  It is also 
uncertain whether the arresting officer needs to have the necessary objective facts in all cases 
before making an arrest. We await precedents where the scope of this standard will be dealt 
with by the Nigerian Courts.   
2.3 Pre-charge detention of terrorist suspects 
The period and method of detaining a terrorist suspect pending when he is charged to Court 
differs in both States. In the UK, the Police can detain a terrorist suspect for up to 48 hours.433 
An additional period of extension for 7 days may be granted by a judicial authority for up to 
14 days434 if satisfied that – there are reasonable grounds that the further detention is necessary; 
investigation to the crime which the person is detained is being conducted diligently and 
expeditiously; and, to obtain or preserve relevant evidence.  
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On the other hand, a suspected terrorist in Nigeria can be detained pursuant to an exparte 
application granting the detention of the suspect for a period not exceeding 90days subject to 
renewal for a similar period. This means that a suspected terrorist can be lawfully detained for 
up 180 days pending when he is charged to court.  In this case, the detention has to be ordered 
by the Court.435  
The Nigerian TPA 2011 provides another basis for the detention of a terrorist pending charge 
under S 25(1).  In this case, the Police have powers to detain a terror suspect where an 
application to the court (for an exparte order for detention) would cause delays and may be 
prejudicial to the maintenance of public safety or order. However the Act does not provide how 
long this form of pre-charge detention should last for. The writer presumes that it should last 
for as long as it is practicable to apply to the Court for detention of the suspect.  
Besides the procedure for the detention of an accused, the most noticeable difference under the 
pre-charge detention regime in Nigeria and the UK is the period permitted under the Acts. 
While the maximum period a suspect can be detained for in the UK is 14 days (except for 
special circumstances),436the Nigerian TPA 2011 allows the pre-charge detention for a 
combined period of 180 days. From the above, it is obvious that the period of pre-charge 
detention in Nigeria far outweighs that of the UK.  
Going by the TPA 2011, after an arrest is made, the Police in Nigeria are expected to make an 
exparte application for the initial detention of 90 days. However, it is unclear how long the 
Police will have to wait before making the application before the detention will be deemed 
illegal. S. 25 (1) simply says where an application to the court will cause delays. This is 
different form the UK regime where a Police sanctioned detention must not exceed 48 hours.  
The Nigerian Terrorism Act does not set out who should make an application for exparte 
application for the detention of suspect, whereas the authorisation rules for the detention of a 
suspect under the UK terrorism Act are set out Pt III of Sch 8 of the Act and the process for 
further detention (after 48 hours) can only be made by the a Police officer of at least the rank 
of Superintendent or Crown Prosecutor in England.437  
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Another difference in the detention regime under the Acts of both States is that while the pre-
charge detention in Nigeria is subject to an application to the Court, the Police in UK can detain 
for 48 days hours without judicial authorisation. The Secretary of State is also given the power 
to introduce orders, at the request of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), to extend pre-
charge detention from 14 days to 28 days by virtue of section 58 of the PFA.438 However, the 
Secretary of State can only exercise this power if Parliament is dissolved, or the Parliament has 
met after dissolution but the first Queen's Speech of the Parliament has not yet taken place. 
This power is only exercised in times of emergency.  
The biggest concern under the detention regime in Nigeria is that the 90 days (or 180 days) 
pre-charge detention is based on an exparte application which means that only the 
prosecution/Police needs to apply and be present in court whilst the application is made.439 This 
might arguably engage the right to be tried within a reasonable time and the right to fair 
hearing? Presently there are no precedents where the courts in Nigeria have directly addressed 
the legality of the exparte application for the pre-charge detention under the Act or the 
lawfulness or otherwise of the 180 days period of pre-charge detention permitted under the 
Act.  The situation is different in the UK where there are a plethora of cases relating to terrorism 
detention. No specific arguments or recommendation will be made at this stage of the research, 
a socio-legal assessment (assessment in practice) of these provisions in Nigeria and UK, will 
be done in later chapters of the research.  
2.4 Encouragement of Terrorism  
Under the UK’s Terrorism Act 2006, a number of new offences were created including 
‘encouragement of terrorism.’ This offence covers statements that are likely to be understood 
by some or all of the members of the public to whom it is published as a direct or indirect 
encouragement or the inducement to them to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts 
of terrorism or convention offences.440 The TA 2006 clearly distinguished between direct and 
indirect encouragement of terrorism. The UK’s T.A 2006, as per S.2, goes further to enumerate 
ways and means whereby terrorist publications could be disseminated to constitute an offence. 
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The Act also makes provision for the application of the offence of encouragement of terrorism 
to internet activity.  
On the other hand, the Nigeria TPAA 2013 does not have the same “holistic” provision on 
encouragement of terrorism. This is rather disappointing especially when much justification 
for committing acts of terrorism comes from the internet. Unlike the UK’s T.A 2006, the 
Nigerian Terrorism Act fails to explain, in detail, the category of statements which are likely 
to be understood by members of the public as inciting terrorism or directly or indirectly 
encouraging terrorism; the yardstick for determining how a statement on the internet, electronic 
means or printed material is likely to be understood as encouraging/inciting terrorism; and 
measures to be taken by the law enforcements agencies such as giving notice to the effect of 
such breach. Restrictions on the right to freedom of expression require a degree of explicitness, 
especially with statements that encourage terrorism. Unfortunately the Nigerian Terrorism Act 
fails to cover these categories of statements that will encourage terrorism or behaviours that 
will encourage terrorism. This raises a big question about the coherence, consistence, and 
constitutionality of the Nigerian Act under its provision on encouragement of terrorism.  
As a caveat, the writer is not trying to portray the provision of the UK on encouragement of 
terrorism as faultless. It is important to note that the scope of encouragement of terrorism in 
the UK is not easy to define in its entirety. Nevertheless, the Nigerian provision on 
encouragement of terrorism is in direct contrast to the UK provision. The only criterion 
mentioned under the S.5(1)(2)(c)  of the Nigerian TPAA 2013 is “…..knowingly, in any 
manner, directly or indirectly renders support to encourage commission of a terrorist act 
through the internet, or any electronic means or through the use of printed materials or through 
the dissemination of terrorist information.” Without doubt, this criterion is nebulous and will 
affect its scope and how this provision is implemented and applied especially in practice. On 
the other hand, S.1 of the Terrorism Act 2006 requires either specific intent or recklessness for 
the prosecution for the offence of encouraging terrorism. S.1 (4) TA 2000 expressly provide 
that for the purposes of how a statement is likely to be understood and what members of the 
public could reasonably be expected to infer from it must be determined having regard both—
to the contents of the statement as a whole; and to the circumstances and manner of its 
publication. Section 1 (3) -(5) gave further clarifications and yardstick for the sort of statements 
or acts that will constitute encouragement of terrorism. 
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Another obvious difference in the provision on encouragement of terrorism in both States is 
that the UK provision is retroactive. S.(1)(3) TA 2006 “…. include every statement which—
glorifies the commission or preparation whether in the past, in the future or generally.”   
It  is universally acknowledged that  the  right  to freedom of expression is a 
fundamental  human right that is of greatest importance, hence the UK Terrorism Act makes 
it a defence for an accused charged with encouragement of terrorism to prove that the statement 
neither expressed his views nor had his endorsement (whether by virtue of section 3 or 
otherwise); and that it was clear, in all the circumstances of the statement's publication, that it 
did not express his views and (apart from the possibility of his having been given and failed to 
comply with a notice under subsection (3) of that section) did not have his endorsement.  The 
Nigerian provision does not have these safeguards. Significantly, the Nigerian provision also 
fails to differentiate between direct and indirect encouragement of terrorism. S.1(3)(b) of the 
UK Terrorism Act 2006 clarifies that a statement indirectly encourages terrorism if it “is a 
statement from which those members of the public could reasonably be expected to infer that 
what is being glorified is being glorified as conduct that should be emulated by them in existing 
circumstances.” 
Due to the limited scope and interpretation of the provision of encouragement of terrorism in 
Nigeria, it does not come as a surprise then that the provision is being misinterpreted and 
abused by the security agencies. The Nigerian Police and the Department for State Security 
have taken advantage of the lacuna created by the provision on encouragement of terrorism 
and have used the Act as reference to seize and destroy Newspaper publications on the activities 
of the Military against Boko Haram,441 and detain two managers at the Daily Trust 
Newspaper.442 Since the main focus of this research is the Nigerian Terrorism Act, this 
comparative discussion on encouragement of terrorism clearly shows that the Nigerian TPAA 
2013 is poorly drafted and will require an urgent amendment.  
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2.5 Proscription 
The grounds for the proscription of a terrorist organisation in Nigeria and the UK are similar. 
What differs is the procedure for the proscription and de-proscription process.   
In the UK, S.3(4) T.A 2000 gives the Secretary of State the power to proscribe an organisation 
if he/she believes it is concerned in terrorism.443 In Nigeria, an application for the proscription 
of an organisation is made to a judge in chambers by the Attorney General, the National 
Security Adviser or the Inspector General of Police on the approval of the President on the 
grounds that two or more persons associate for the purpose of or an organisation ‘participates’ 
or ‘collaborates’ in an act of terrorism; ‘promotes’, ‘encourages’, or ‘exhort’ others to commit 
an act of terrorism; or ‘set up’ or  ‘pursue’ acts of terrorism.444 
Remarkably, both the Nigerian and the UK Terrorism Acts provides exactly the same defence 
(verbatim) for a person accused of being a member of a proscribed organisation. It is a defence 
for anyone charged in both States to prove that the organisation had not been declared a 
proscribed organisation at the time the person charged became or began to profess to be a 
member of the organisation and that he has not taken part in the activities of the organisation 
at any time after it had been declared to be a proscribed organisation.445 
Theoretically speaking, Section 11 (2) of the UK TA 2000 and S. 2(4) of the Nigerian TPA 
2011(as amended) would suggest that in order for the prosecution of a member of a proscribed 
organisation to succeed, the accused must participate in the activities of the organisation. The 
activities referred to in this section are enumerated under Sections 12446 and 15 of UK’s 
Terrorism Act 2000. But the question is, would being a member (membership) alone constitute 
an offence under the Acts of both state or can an accused be exculpated on the ground that 
he/she did not take part in any activities of the proscribed organisation?  
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This question was resolved by the UK court in Sheldrake v DPP.447 The court held that the 
legislature has made it a crime for people to simply belong to terrorist organisations. The Court 
held further that ‘not only do people by their mere membership give credence to the claims of 
the organisation. Criminalising membership serves a legitimate purpose by making it difficult 
for members of the organisation to demonstrate publicly in a manner that affronts law-abiding 
members of the public.’ Moreover, not only do people by their mere membership give credence 
to the claims of the organisation but, in addition, members are a potential network of people 
who may be called on to act for the organisation at some time in the future, even if they have 
not yet done so. It follows that it is no defence for most members of the organisation to show 
that they have never taken an active part in the activities of the organisation. The crime is being 
a member, not being an active member.’ 
The Court held further that; 
       “I take it to be clear, however, that a person can be convicted of professing 
       to belong to a proscribed organisation, even if he is not a member or the  
       prosecution cannot prove that he is.”…… It follows that, in order to achieve  
       a    conviction under section 11(1), the Crown must lead evidence that    
       satisfies the magistrate or jury beyond a reasonable doubt either that the  
       defendant is a member of the proscribed organisation or that he professes - in  
       the sense of claiming to other people and in a manner that is capable of belief – 
       that he belongs to the organisation.”448 …It is important to notice that the  
       burden of proving these facts lies entirely on the Crown. 
 
Going by this ruling, it has become clear that in the UK, an accused can be liable for simply 
being a member, not just an active member. It however remains unclear if this is the same under 
the Nigerian law, as there are currently no precedents to draw analysis from.  
Crucially, it is fair to say that the international scope of the UK definition of terrorism is 
reflected in the list of terrorists’ organisations that are proscribed under the UK TA 2000. A 
cursory look at the organisations in the UK shows that majority of them are international 
terrorist organisations.  On the other hand, although the Nigerian Act made a reference to 
proscribed organisation to include international terrorist groups and suspected international 
terrorist as listed in any resolution of the United Nations Security Council or in any instrument 
of the African Union and Economic Community of West African States, 449 however only Boko 
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Haram and Ansaru are officially proscribed under the Act.450 It is unclear what the Act means 
by ‘reference to an international group’ without including the international terrorist 
organisations or at least regional terrorist organisations like Al-shabab and Lord’s Resistance 
Army in its list of proscribed organisation.  
The de-proscription processes in both states are also similar. In Nigeria, the Attorney General 
upon the approval of the President may withdraw the order for the proscription of a group if he 
is satisfied that such proscribed organization has ceased to engage in an act of terrorism. 
Similarly, an application may be made to the Secretary of State for an order to remove an 
organisation from Schedule 2.451 But while the Nigerian de-proscription process starts and ends 
with A.G upon the President’s approval, there is an option for appeal in the United Kingdom 
to the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission.452 If this fails, there is a further appeal 
option to the Court of Appeal in England and Wales, the Court of Session in Scotland, and the 
Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland.453 It remains unclear if an appeal can be taken to the Court 
in Nigeria if the A.G refuses to de-proscribe an organisation.  
2. Conclusion.  
The brief comparison of terror incidents and atrocities in Nigeria and the UK at the beginning 
of this chapter clearly shows that terrorism threats in Nigeria outweigh that of the UK.  
Logically, it would be expected that the Nigeria Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011(as amended) 
would be more comprehensive and thorough (both in principle and in interpretation) than the 
UK’s Terrorism Act 2000. But on the basis of the comparative analysis done in this chapter, 
that is not the case. While the provisions of the Acts in both states overlap in several regards, 
there seems to be more clarity on the UK side. The UK TA 2000 appears to be more detailed 
in meaning and interpretations (such as the provision on encouragement of terrorism and 
proscription of terrorist organisations) and where the legislation fails to clear up the meaning 
of a provision, the Court have stepped up to fill the lacuna. On the other hand, the Nigerian 
Courts (Judiciary) seem unwilling to provide further guidance on the interpretation of the 
terrorism legislation. Or perhaps, the reason for the consideration of these provisions does not 
arise or come up during the trial of terrorist suspects in Nigeria. Whatever the case, there is a 
noticeable high degree in the level of judicial involvment and   interpretation of the definition 
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of terrorism, application of the power of terrorism arrests, period and procedure for the pre-
charge  of a terror suspect, provision and explanation of encouragement of terrorism, as well 
as the international  range of proscription in the UK in comparison to Nigeria. This is evident 
in the number of cases that are available in the UK on  issues discussed in this research. For 
instance, the UK Courts have expressly recognised the “broadness” of the definition of 
terrorism under the TA 2000 to include not only countries governed by democratic or 
representation principle, but also includes a tyranny, dictatorship, junta or those usurping 
power. The UK Court also clearly clarified that although the components of what amounts to 
“reasonableness” justifying an arrest is in part a subjective test, because the arresting officer 
must have formed a genuine suspicion in his own mind that the person has been concerned in 
acts of terrorism and in part an objective one, because there must also be reasonable grounds 
for the suspicion which he has formed, nonetheless the ‘reasonableness’ of the suspicion 
justifying such arrests for terrorism offences cannot always be judged according to the same 
standards as are applied in dealing with conventional crime. 
Admittedly no two systems are the same, nonetheless the writer is of the view that a vibrant 
judicial involvement in the interpretation of provisions of the Nigerian terrorism Act would go 
a long way in guiding how the counter-terrorism measures under the Act is interpreted in 
practice and how these counter-terrorism measures evolve. This is even more so as enforcement 
actions and the interpretation of the provisions of the Act by the Nigerian security forces have 
become extensive due to high incidents of terrorist attacks by Boko Haram. The Writer 
observed that in reality, the application and interpretation of the Act runs deeper and is much 
more contested.  The Nigerian TPA 2011 (as amended) has generated much controversy in 
practice, especially about the need to balance security with human rights. Critics and 
commentators of the terrorism Acts in both States have also argued that some of the provisions 
under review in this study do not comply with the State’s human rights obligations. 
Accordingly, it is has become important to subject the Nigerian and UK Terrorism Acts to an 
appraisal in terms of how their provisions are applied in practice.   
Consequently, the next two chapters will be dedicated to a socio-legal assessment of key 
provisions under the Nigerian and the UK terrorism Acts.  These assessments will prepare the 
ground for a further as to whether the Terrorism legislations in both states are human right 
compliant and whether justifications based on human right for the measures adopted under the 
Acts exists.                        
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CHAPTER 6 
A SOCIO-LEGAL ASSESSMENT OF THE NIGERIAN TERRORISM  
(PREVENTION) ACT 2011 (AS AMENDED) 
 
1. Introduction 
Having critically analysed key provisions of the Nigerian and the UK Terrorism Acts and 
compared same, this chapter investigates and assesses how the provisions of the Nigerian TPA 
2011 (as amended) are applied in principle and in practice. The previous analysis focused 
mainly on the technical and pure legal meaning of rules and principles under the Terrorism 
Acts of both States. Conversely, this chapter will assesses the Nigerian TPA 2011 (as amended) 
with a view to exposing discrepancies between “law in books” and “law in action.” Rather than 
understanding the terrorism regime of Nigeria on “black and white,” this chapter will provide 
the reader with a clear picture of how the Terrorism Act is applied. The outcome of this 
assessment will inevitably shape the sort of proposals and recommendations that will proffered 
at the end of this research.  
The following sections of the TPA 2011 (as amended) will be assessed: the definition of 
terrorism; arrest; pre-charge detention; proscription; and encouragement of terrorism. 
1.1 A Socio-legal Assessment of the Definition of terrorism in Nigeria 
Many academics and analysts in Nigeria have been critical of the definition of terrorism under 
the TPA 2011 (as amended). These criticisms mostly rest on the wide scope of the definition 
of terrorism in Nigeria. According to Professor Oyebode, the Nigerian definition of terrorism 
under the TPA 2011 captures ‘sundry acts’ and creates a dragnet of offences thereby making it 
unnecessarily broad.454 Oyebode argues that offences such as kidnapping or committing 
grievous bodily harm to a person could easily be categorised under ordinary criminal laws and 
should not be included in the definition of terrorism.455  
Similarly Awon posits that the Terrorism Act was not far-reaching enough as to capture crimes 
that constitute acts of terrorism.456 Awon however failed to give examples of “crimes that would 
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constitute act of terrorism.” Related to Oyebode’s criticism, Adesina, a Senior Advocate of 
Nigeria, in a lecture titled “understanding anti-terror laws in Nigeria,” criticised the definition 
of terrorism under the Act as a duplication of existing criminal offences in Nigeria.457 He argued 
that most of the offences that are classified as terrorist acts  under the TPA 2011 were already 
covered by the Criminal Code of the Federation(C.C), 2004 and the criminal laws of the States. 
For example, Adesina cited Arson-which is covered by Section 443 of the C.C, sending letters 
threatening to burn or destroy property – Sec. 461 of C.C, destroying or damaging an inhabited 
house or a vessel with explosions – Sec. 451 of C.C, attempts at extortion by threats – Sec. 407 
of C.C, kidnapping – Sec. 364 of C.C and disturbing religious worship – Sec. 206 of the C.C. 
He concluded that the Act was incomprehensive in addressing terrorism in the country.458  
Ngboawaji in explaining the policy behind the inclusion of some offences such as kidnapping 
and hostage taking as an ‘act of terrorism’ under the Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011(as 
amended) was as a result of a high increase in kidnapping incidents in the Country. According 
to him, kidnapping has become a prominent tactic of terrorists for fund raising in Nigeria.459  
Terrorists use kidnapping for ransom as a means to sustain their activities and to enhance their 
global stature given the media publicity accorded to such kidnapping incidents. The spate of 
hostage taking in Nigeria has placed the country into the number four position in the global 
ranking in hostage taking.460   
The question then is, are the ‘terms’ and ‘wordings’ used in defining terrorism under the Act 
precise? The Courts in Nigeria are yet to make any ruling or given a decision on this. Hence, 
there is no precedent in Nigeria where the writer can directly draw analogy or conclusion from.  
Nevertheless, a thorough look at the Act shows that the Nigerian definition adopted an all-
encompassing approach. As earlier stated, offences that are present under Nigeria’s Criminal 
Code/Penal Code were duplicated into the definition of terrorism under the Act without 
repealing or amending the provisions under the Penal Code  or the  Criminal Code. This 
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situation could create confusion as to which of the laws would be applicable in the event of 
trial of an accused where the offence has the same or similar characteristics or elements (mens 
rea and actus reus) under the Criminal Code and the 2011 Act. An example is the inclusion of 
“an attack upon a person’s life which causes serious bodily harm or death’’ as a terrorism 
offence under the Act.461 The wording of this provision is imprecise. It does not clearly 
distinguish an act of terrorism from ordinary criminal offence for example murder, battery or 
manslaughter. A suspect who attacks a person causing him serious bodily harm or death in 
Nigeria could be charged simply for attempted murder, murder, manslaughter or for terrorism. 
Other example of acts which are defined as terrorism under the Act but which are present under 
ordinary Criminal Code/Penal Code with the same actus reus and mens rea include ‘kidnapping 
of a person.462 The consequence of the duplication of offences under the Act is that the 
defendant could plead for a lighter punishment and get away with it instead being punished for 
a terrorism offence. This is because where the law has provided for a lighter punishment or 
penalty for the same offence, the accused must be given the benefit of the lighter punishment. 
According to the former UN Special Rapporteur on Countering Terrorism, Martin Scheinin, 
the adoption of an overly broad definition of terrorism carries the potential for deliberate 
misuse of the term as well as unintended human right abuses.463 He argued that a failure to 
restrict counter-terrorism laws to conducts that are truly “terrorist” in nature poses a risk where 
such laws or measure restrict the enjoyment of right and freedom and as result also offend the 
principle of necessity and proportionality.464 Another risk that can result from an over-broad 
definition is that, it will leave much discretion to the Nigerian Police. As expected the broad 
definition of terrorism under Nigerian Terrorism Act on the one hand gives the security forces 
a broad scope to operate, but on the other hand it gives them a wide justification for abuse and 
misuse.   
Despite the concern raised by Scheinin, most scholars would agree that the problem associated 
with the definition of terrorism is universal. This is because terrorism means different things to 
different people in different contexts. The absence of an acceptable definition of terrorism in 
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international law leaves the term open to different interpretation by the States. As a result, it 
might be impossible for a State to arrive at an exhaustive definition of terrorism that will be 
acceptable to all. The implication of this is that it might not be possible to assess the definition 
on strict grounds of human rights. With the apparent absence of a widely accepted yardstick or 
universally acceptable model for emulation in internationals law, the challenge for States, 
including Nigeria, is to define terrorism in clear and unequivocal terms so as not to infringe the 
principle of legality and proportionality.  
 2.2 A Socio-legal Assessment of Arrest and Pre-charge Detention in Nigeria 
The legal basis for an arrest and the pre-charge detention under the TPA 2011 are the same. 
The Act gives an officer of any law enforcement agency the power to arrest and detain any 
person whom he reasonably suspects of having committed or likely to commit an offence. 
Since what follows an arrest is the pre-charge detention of the suspect, a joint assessment of 
both provisions will suffice.  
 
The right to liberty and security under the Nigerian law is not absolute. There are circumstances 
where this right can be curtailed. However the manner which the Nigeria security forces make 
arrest and detain a terror suspect arguably does not fall within these exceptions. The Nigerian 
Military Joint Task forces in their attempt to tackle Boko Haram have adopted measures 
beyond their scope of arrest and detention under the Act. These measures/methods raise serious 
concerns for human rights. For instance in May 2013, a military patrol vehicle was attacked by 
Boko Haram which resulted in the death of a soldier. The JTF in “retaliation” burnt down over 
2,000 houses resulting in the death of about 183 innocent civilians.465 Reacting to this incident, 
Daniel Bekele, the Africa Director at Human Rights Watch, says “the Nigerian military has a 
duty to protect itself and the population from Boko Haram attacks, but the evidence indicates 
that it engaged more in destruction than in protection.”466 
In practice, the Nigerian police and the Military (JTF) generally do not adhere to the legal basis 
for making arrests and the pre-charge detention under the TPA 2011. Suspects are arbitrarily 
arrested and detained without being informed of the charges against them.467 Terror suspects 
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are also denied access to legal counsel, visitation from family members, and the opportunity to 
apply for bail.  
Cases of arbitrary arrests, prolonged pre-charge detention and un-investigated extra judicial 
killings among others atrocities have dominated news headlines in Nigeria since Boko Haram 
attacks began in 2009. According to Agbigboa, since the beginning of Boko Haram attacks, 
the Military Joint Task Force (JTF) has resorted to dragnet arrests, intimidation of residents, 
house-to-house searches and indiscriminate arrest without suspicion of committing any 
offence. Sometimes young men who question the mode of operation of the soldiers are shot 
publicly, all in the name of counter-terrorism.468 One of the most shocking mass executions by 
the Nigerian Military happened on the 14th of March, 2014 in Maiduguri where the soldiers 
killed at least 640 detainees who were recaptured in the aftermath of Boko Haram attack on the 
Military detention facility at Giwa Military Barracks.469None of those killed were armed.470 
Although cases of “arbitrary arrest relating to terrorism” are rarely reported in law reports 
except the media, the case of Sa’adatu Umar v Federal Republic of Nigeria471 is worth 
discussing here. In that case, Saadatu, an alleged wife of a Boko Haram member, was arrested 
and detained for months alongside her children, including a 10 months old in March 2011. The 
court held that her arrest was arbitrary and awarded her 1 million Naira as damages.  
Another case that exemplifies the current practice of arbitrary arrests by the Police and JTF is 
the case of case Alhaji Bukar Yaganami.  According to Amnesty International, Alhaji 
Yaganami, a Police Contractor, was arrested on the 19th of January 2013, in his home in 
Maiduguri by Soldiers (Operation Restore Order I), and was taken to Giwa Military 
Barracks.472 His health deteriorated whilst in detention as he has hypertension and diabetes. 
Amnesty International wrote to the Commander of the JTF (Operation Restore Order I) on 10th 
of June, 2013 that Alhaji Yaganami be charged or released.473 AI also copied the Chief of 
Defence Staff. His lawyer requested for a bail on the 18th of November, 2013, but was refused. 
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His lawyer thereafter filed a case in Court challenging his arrest and detention. The case was 
filed the Federal High Court of Nigeria, Maiduguri Judicial Division. Suit number: 
FHC/MG/CS/2/2014. Alhaji Yaganami escaped from from Giwa Military Barracks when it 
was attacked by Boko Haram on the 14th of March, 2014 and all the detainees there were freed. 
He immediately reported himself at the DSS office in Maiduguri and was detained again. On 
10 July 2014, a Judge of the Federal High Court ordered that Yaganami arrest and detention 
was illegal and  unconstitutional and that he should be released on bail. The Judge also signed 
a warrant requesting the DSS to produce Yaganami at the FHC on the 11th of July, 2014. In a 
letter dated 25 July 2014 and sent to the DSS in Maiduguri, the solicitors to the Attorney 
General of the Federation and Minister of Justice stated they had no objection to his release but 
still he was not released. Instead he was handed over to the Military again. His family continued 
to challenge his detention in court. When the Military representative appeared in court, they 
denied any knowledge that he was in their custody. To date (Sept 2017), Yaganami’s family is 
still seeking an enforcement of the court order. 474  
According to information available, these arbitrary arrests and illegal detentions by the Military 
appear to be widespread.475 The chairman of the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), 
Professor Chidi Odinkalu, observed that many people are on a daily basis “arbitrarily arrested 
and detained for months without charge”476 Amnesty International (A.I) in its 2015 Report 
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raised concerns that Nigerian security forces had committed grave human rights violations and 
acts which constituted war crimes and crimes against humanity under international law.477 On 
their part, the JTF claims that they are making a breakthrough in the fight against terrorism in 
the country by killing some of the terrorists and have arrested sponsors of Boko Haram and 
close relatives of people linked to Boko Haram.478 The government have also refuted these 
criticisms by arguing that dealing with the prevention of terrorism requires spontaneous and 
instantaneous measures and that the power to arrest on reasonable suspicion to commit a 
terrorist offence gives the police an opportunity to deal with terrorist attacks before they 
happen.479 
In August 2014, 17 women and 13 children believed to be the mothers or wives of Boko Haram 
members were detained in Giwa Military Barracks.480 A 16-year old girl was also detained at 
the same Barracks because her father is a member of Boko Haram.481 The question is how does 
the arrest of close family relatives of a suspected terrorist amount to fighting terror?  
Human Rights Watch also reports that many alleged Boko Haram suspects have been arrested 
and held for months and even years without charge or trial.482 These detainees are denied the 
right to communicate with their family and lawyers and most have had no charges publicly 
brought against them.483 The situation has now reached an alarming proportion with the mass 
arrests of innocent civilians totalling about 10,000 within 2013-2014 alone.484 Information 
collected by Amnesty International reveals that majority of those arrested are held in Giwa 
Military Barracks, Mai Mailari Military Barracks, 23 Brigade Barracks, or Sector 4 Military 
Base.”485 As of 2012, over 200 terrorist suspect are believed to be detained in at Giwa Military 
Barracks; over 100 at SARS Police Station in Abuja (commonly known as Abattoir), over 100 
more at SSS office in Abuja; and several others in smaller detention facilities around Nigeria.486 
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Only a handful of these detainees have faced trial.487 One of the detainees is Mohammed Yari 
Abba, a 36 years old Medical Doctor and Consultant to the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
who was arrested on the 20th of October, 2012 in Yobe State at a Police check-point. Initially 
he was allowed to go home without his Car after the Police took his statement, but Abba went 
back to the Station when he realised he had left his wallet in the Car.  At this point he was 
detained and accused of being a Boko Haram sympathiser. He was later transferred to the 
Military Detention Site in Yobe State. On 30th of April 2013, Abba’s lawyer filed a case at the 
FHC Abuja on the basis that his detention was illegal and neither was he allowed access to his 
lawyer. As of March, 2015 Dr. Abba is still been detained by the Military.488 Other detainees 
that were neither charged nor released include Modu Abubakar,489 and Abu Bakr.490 A.I stated 
that not only are these Military detention sites in violation of Nigeria’s international human 
rights law and standards including the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the 
treatment of Prisoners but they are damaging to the physical and mental well-being of the 
detainees.491  
In their 2016/2017 Report on Nigeria, A.I reports that the Nigerian security forces within these 
period have continued to commit serious human rights violations including extrajudicial 
executions, arbitrary arrests and detentions, ill-treatment and extrajudicial executions of people 
suspected of being Boko Haram fighters - acts which amounted to war crimes and possible 
crimes against humanity.492 The police and military continues to commit torture and other ill-
treatment of terror detainees in military detention sites.493 Udegbe likened the present situation 
in Nigeria to Guantanamo Bay.494  
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While there are constitutional safeguards against arbitrary arrests under the 1999 Constitution, 
the Nigerian Police/JTF violates these provisions with impunity (an assessment of the Act by 
reference to the Constitution will be carried out later). For instance in May 2012, a trader in 
Bula Birin recounted how he and scores of others were rounded up while selling their good in 
the market by the Military Joint Task force.495They were forced to enter one single armoured 
vehicle and taken to Special Anti-Robbery Squad Headquarters (SARS) in Maiduguri. They 
were detained for days and later released without charge. During the course of arrest, there was 
no point in time where they were informed of the reason of their arrest. In fact of the 160 that 
were arrested, a few died before they got to the Station. They died of exhaustion as there was 
no ventilation in the vehicle.496 Several people who have been arrested in the North East of 
Nigeria have told similar experiences of being arrested   and not informed at the time of their 
arrest of the reason for their arrest.497 
The situation has now degenerated to a level   whereby the Nigerian Police and the Military 
Joint Task Force storm an area and make indiscriminate arrests without “reasonable suspicion” 
of committing an offence. In a damning  Report that chronicles serious human rights abuses in 
Nigeria, HRW reveals that in the aftermath of any Boko Haram attack, members of the JTF 
storm the affected communities without conducting intelligence-driven operations and make 
arbitrary arrests. In the course of doing that, members of the communities are beaten, houses, 
cars and shops are burned down, money stolen whilst houses are being searched and worst of 
all young men are shot dead in their homes in front of family members.498 HRW has also 
documented the case of a woman raped by the soldiers during this arrest.499To further 
corroborate these allegations, a gruesome video showing arbitrary arrest and executions by the 
members of JTF was obtained by Aljazeera. A link is attached.500 Heavy criticisms from local 
and international media followed the release of the video. However, to date (Sept 2017) nothing 
has been done to the officers implicated in the video. This has gradually become the practice 
in Nigeria whereby the government fails to address human right abuse committed by the 
security forces. It is therefore not a surprise to see that this method of arrest has become a 
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regular routine for the JTF in their counter-terrorism operation. Brandler succinctly described 
the power of arrest under the Act as ‘a licence to kill.’501 Similarly, in her visit to Nigeria in 
2014, the UN Human Rights Commissioner, Navi Pillay, told reporters that “many people I 
have met with during this visit openly acknowledged that human rights violations have been 
committed  by the security forces.’’502 The human rights abuse by the Police is further 
heightened by a practice where the Police increasingly wear plain clothes or uniforms without 
identification making it much harder for people to complain about individual officers.503 
Unfortunately, the Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act 2013 which amends/delete some 
sections of the 2011 Act further gives the Police power to use ‘such force as may be reasonably 
necessary’ to effect an arrest and detention of a suspect.504 A critical look at the Act could show 
that it fails to explain what would amount to ‘such force as may be necessary’? In the writer’s 
opinion, it could arguably be used as a defence by the Police/JTF to further infringe on the right 
of individuals under the guise of effecting arrest. A more narrow power subject to judicial 
supervision would have been appropriate. 
Nigeria undoubtedly has one of the longest pre-charge detention periods known. The TPA 2011 
allows for up to 180 days pre-charge detention period.505 The reality on the ground is that 
hundreds of terror suspects are held for several months and years without charge in Nigeria. 
This leaves detainees completely vulnerable to torture and abuse whilst in detention.506 Some 
terror suspects are held in underground cells without adequate food, water or ventilation 
especially at Giwa Military Barracks.507 Two former detainees at the Barracks narrated their 
experiences to Human Right Watch. During their incarceration, they were handcuffed and 
chained to the ground, this prevented them from moving. There were about eight suspects in a 
cell and there was no light. They were only released to eat or use the toilet once a day.508In 
fact, detainees die daily in this cells.509  It is difficult to dissociate the prolonged pre-charge 
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detention under the Act from torture and inhuman degrading treatments. In the words of 
Amnesty International “intimidation, torture and extortion are entrenched practices under the 
Nigerian criminal justice system.”510 The Nigerian National Human Rights Commission 
(NHRC) has also  raised an alarm that torture is now used as the official means of investigation 
of offences and most cases in court are prosecuted by the Police based on confessional 
statements obtained under torture.511 These allegations were corroborated by the U.S 
Department of State Country Report.512 The Report revealed the existence of unofficial 
detention sites including Sector Alpha (aka Guantanamo) in Yobe State, Giwa Barracks in 
Borno, Presidential lodge detention facility (aka the Guardroom) also in Yobe State, and the 
Special anti-robbery squad in Abuja (aka Abattoir). Terror suspects are detained indefinitely in 
these sites till they either make “confessional statements” that could be used against them in 
Court, or till their captors deems it fit to release them  or until  they are executed.513 It is an 
irony that Soldiers/Police that are supposed to protect human rights are themselves major 
violators of human rights.  
2.3 Encouragement of terrorism  
 
The Nigerian government made encouragement to commit terror activities an offence under 
the Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act 2013. Understandably, this measure is for the 
protection of national security, public order and more importantly to deter people from making 
statements that encourage terrorism.  
However in practice, Nigeria’s security agencies have capitalised on S.5 (1) of the TPAA 2013 
as an excuse for the arrest of journalists, human rights activists and pro-democracy movements 
citing encouragement of terrorism as a basis for the arrests. This situation is further 
compounded by the broad phrasing of S. 5 Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act 2013. 
This apparently gives the Police a wide margin of discretion to decide what statements, 
opinions, writings or expressions constitute encouragement of terrorism. Increased use of 
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modern technology and communication inter-face by Nigerians makes the effect of the offence 
of encouragement of terrorism even greater.  
Human Rights Watch reports how 30 members of a group known as the “Concerned Youth 
Alliance of Nigeria” were arrested following a letter they wrote, through the America Embassy 
in Abuja, to the President of the U.S. In their letter, they expressed their disappointment at the 
widespread fraud during the general elections, human rights violations by the police, and 
appealed to President to reconsider his visit to Nigeria.514 Some of them were detained, tortured 
and abused for weeks.515 
On the 6th of June 2014, the Nigerian Military and Police detained journalist and confiscated 
newspaper publications meant for the public. Publications from four leading newspapers – The 
Nation, Leadership, Daily Trust and The Punch –were completely destroyed.516 This was 
because these newspapers were critical of the way the going was fighting terrorism and 
government felt irritated these by coverage.  The Nigerian government through the Minister of 
Justice, Mohammed Bello Adoke, in defence of their action argued that the freedom of 
expression guaranteed by the Nigerian constitution has become a political weapon used to 
promote hatred. Hence, the government is constitutionally empowered to provide security and 
welfare to the people.517 Since then government forces have clamped down on media house by 
government forces under the guise of protecting the State.518 Again on 5 September 2016, 
Ahmed Salkida, a Nigerian journalist based in the United Arab Emirates, was declared wanted 
by the military and later arrested by the state security services upon his arrival in Nigeria. He 
was arrested and detained for publishing a report including a video about the Chibok school 
girls that were  abducted  Boko Haram. He was later released without charges.519 Although it 
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is important to note that Boko Haram have also attacked media houses in Nigeria,520the focus 
of this paper is to assess the effects of the law in practice.  
In its 2013 impunity Index, the “Committee to Protect Journalists” CPJ reveals that Nigeria is 
now one the “worst nations in the world for deadly, unpunished violence against the press.”521 
The report reveals that 79% of the attacks on the press were committed by government security 
agencies, Boko Haram accounts for 16% while attack from other sources takes the rest of the 
index.522 Olorunyomi523 on his part argued that in about 265 murder cases documented in the 
last five years, 30% out of this number are journalist/reporters.524 The President of Nigeria 
Guild of Editors, Femi Adesina, cautioned that if care is not taken, “Nigeria could slide back 
to the dark days.”525  The Nigerian Government have solely blame Boko Haram for this, turning 
away from the atrocities committed by the security agencies.526 While the enactment of the 
offence of encouragement of terrorism in Nigeria a welcome development, there is a tendency 
of it been used by the security forces to impose unjustifiable limit on the freedom of expression. 
Without doubt, the intimidation, seizure of newspaper publications, arrest and killing of 
journalists under the guise of fighting terrorism threatens the right to freedom of expression 
and the press in Nigeria.  
2.4 Proscription  
Nigeria is home to a wide number of organisations including civil society groups, NGO’s, 
political parties, trade unions, student unions, religious organisations, pressure groups, and 
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even terrorist groups. As previously explained, the Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act 
2013 gives the President power to ‘proscribe’ an organisation if the group is involved in 
terrorism and also gives the President power to declare a group to be an international terrorist 
group. This gives enormous powers to the executive to proscribe an organisation without any 
judicial oversight or input from the National Assembly. Usually, the decision to proscribe an 
organisation in Nigeria is taken by the Executive arm of the government. The Nigerian 
government have in the past outlawed groups that are not involved in terrorism mainly because 
they oppose their policies.  For example, the National Association of Nigerian Students 
(NANS), the Academic Staff Union (ASUU), and the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni 
People (Mosop), were banned by the government between 1994 and 2008.527 S.9 could easily 
be used by the Nigerian government to proscribe protest and non-violent actions. This comes 
with devastating consequences as the organization’s bank accounts and assets are frozen or 
seized and travel bans are placed on members of the group.  
Although the Act gives the President power to ‘proscribe’ an organisation and to declare a 
group as an international terrorist group if the group is listed as a group or entity involved in 
terrorist acts in any resolution of the United Nations Security Council or in any instrument of 
the African Union and Economic Community of West African States,528however to date, only 
Boko Haram and Ansaru have been officially proscribed and listed as proscribed organisations 
under the Act. The non-declaration of terrorist organisations like Al-shabaab, Lord Resistance 
Army, Isil and Al-Qeada in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) as terrorist groups under the Act by 
the Nigerian government in spite of their declaration as terrorist organisations by the regional 
bodies such as the Africa Union and United Nations shows the reluctance of the Nigerian 
government to fully apply provision of proscription. One wonders if proscription under the Act 
only applies to domestic terrorist organisations.   Remarkably, Boko Haram and Ansaru are 
proscribed under the UK and U.S anti-terrorism laws. 
2. Conclusion  
The assessment of the Nigerian Terrorism Act in practice revealed several discrepancies 
between the law in the book and the law in the streets (law in action). Without doubts, this 
chapter has revealed that  the provisions of the Terrorism Act are interpreted differently from 
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what the law demands by the state actors (Police and the Soldiers). The conclusion that can be 
drawn from this assessment is that the Nigerian government have in the last seven years 
responded to terrorism in a way that unnecessarily infringes on human rights in the country. 
This assessment also revealed that Nigeria is yet to find a proper response to terrorism that is 
in consistent with human rights norms.  
In addition to the revelation that the Nigerian security forces generally do not adhere or follow 
the provisions of the Act, the assessment shows a lack of accountability for terrorist arrests, 
prolonged pre-charge detention, and even the extra-judicial killing of suspects. As 
demonstrated in the assessment, terror suspects in Nigeria are considered guilty even before 
arraignment or trial.  Hence terror suspects are denied access to court without any judicial 
oversight and there is “secrecy” about the location of their detention. The writer also notes that 
there are no conscious policies in place by the government to check these atrocities. The 
absence of a  comprehensive strategy in combating terrorism as well as punishment for  human 
rights infringements committed by the Security forces demands urgent action. The Writer is of 
the opinion that the solution to these predicament lies in an independent body that will oversee 
the counter-terrorism activities in Nigeria.  
The argument may be made however that these draconian measures adopted under the Act and 
in practice could be due to the nature of terrorist of terrorist attacks in Nigeria and are necessary 
in dealing with terrorism situation in the country. The writer’s answer to the question is that 
while Nigeria has a positive obligation to protect its citizens against terrorism, it also has a 
positive obligation to investigate and punish those that infringe human rights, even whilst 
fighting terrorism.  International law imposes on obligation on the State to investigate and 
prosecute alleged perpetration of crimes under international law as well as abuses of human 
rights. .  In the words of Abdurrahman,  
    “Terrorists are human beings, notwithstanding the repugnant aversion their  
    actions   provoke. The modern international human rights system is premised on the  
    belief in a set of inalienable rights due to all human beings, simply by virtue of their  
    being human beings. The uncontrolled war against terrorism has given governments  
    across the world power to be repressive and dictators without regards to human  
    rights provision. Unless the international community reacts strongly and decisively,  
    this may as well sound a death knell for the credibility of the international human  
    rights system.’’529 
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The question that comes to mind is what are the constitutional safeguards available to terror 
suspects in Nigeria? Is the provision of the Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 consistent with 
Nigeria’s domestic, regional and constitutional obligations? And more importantly, what 
challenges can be made to the constitutionality of the provisions of the TPA 2011 on human 
rights grounds and other legal grounds? These questions will require further assessment of the 
TPA 2011 by reference to Nigeria’s domestic, regional and international human rights 
obligations under the Constitution 1999, the African Charter and the ICCPR. But before then, 
a similar assessment of the provision of the UK’s Terrorism Act 2000 and 2006 will be done 
in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
A SOCIO-LEGAL ASSESSMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM’S TERRORISM  
ACT 2000 & SECTION 1 TERRORISM ACT 2006 
 
1. Introduction 
Having assessed the social effects and practical impact of the TPA 2011(as amended) on human 
rights freedoms in Nigeria, a similar assessment of the UK’s Terrorism Act 2000 and s.1 of the 
Terrorism Act 2006 will be done in this chapter. The aim is to expose whether there are 
discrepancies between law in books (the Terrorism Act 2000) and the law in action. The 
assessment will also reveal the policy behind the legal measures adopted under the TA 2000 as 
well as the practical impact of the law in action. This assessment will assist the writer in 
determining the kind of proposals and recommendations that will be proffered later in the 
research.  
The following provisions of the UK TA 2000 will be assessed; the definition of terrorism, 
arrest, pre-charge detention, proscription, and encouragement of terrorism  
2.1 A Socio-legal Assessment of the Definition of Terrorism in the UK   
Over the years, the definition of terrorism under the UK Terrorism Act 2000 has received a lot 
of criticism especially with regards to its application in practice. According to ‘Liberty’, the 
current definition of terrorism under the T.A 2000 is too broad, covering actions which fall 
short of the public’s perception of terrorism.530 Liberty raised concerns over the provisions of 
S.1(2)(b) which covers action “involving serious damages to property’ and S.1(2)(e) which 
covers action ‘designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.” 
The group argued that, for example, if a person damages an uninhabited building, their action 
should not be considered that of a terrorist. The inclusion of this undermines the seriousness of 
the label of terrorism.531 The group argued further that it would be appropriate if S.1(2)(b) and 
S.1(2)(e) covers damage to property or disruption of electronic system where this could 
endanger a person’s life. Liberty is also of the view that damages to property or disruption of 
electronic system should not, in and of itself, constitute a terrorist act.532  
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Similar to Liberty’s concerns, “Article 19,” a body involved in “Global Campaign for Freedom 
of Expression,” criticised the definition as too broad.533 The group argue that the Terrorism Act 
2000 criminalises some actions that cannot be regarded as terrorism. According to the group, 
an action that creates ‘serious risk or safety to the health of the public’ should not always 
warrant a public order response instead of an anti-terrorism response. Article 19 cited the 
example of ‘critical mass’ bike rides, where for several years a groups of cyclists took to the 
streets in cities around the world  with the so-called aim of “reclaiming the streets.” Due to the 
number of participants involved, these rides seriously disrupt traffic and could pose ‘serious 
risk to safety’ of road users as well as the cyclist. Given that the aim of the rides is to “reclaim 
the streets (“ideological”), this could easily fall within the definition of terrorism under the 
Terrorism Act 2000.534 
The concern about the emphasis on property damage in the definition of terrorism was also 
raised by the Independent Reviewer of the Act, Anderson. He argued that one might question 
why “an act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury” which the world understand as 
terrorism was not used to cover damage to property. Anderson claimed that countries like 
Canada and New Zealand only include property damage in their definition to terrorism when 
it is likely to result in serious harm or risk to person.535 He however reasoned that this concern 
is of “little significance” as it is rare to encounter a plot which is solely aimed at damaging 
property without resulting in harm or risk to people.536  The writer however disagrees with 
Anderson on his latter view. Terrorist have been known to destroy archaeological sites, 
historical monuments or holy sites without necessarily resulting in harm to people. For 
example, ISIL Fighters destroyed a 2000 year old “Arch of Triumph” in Palmyra, Syria. To the 
Islamic State fighter’s, it symbolises the destruction of culture that does not represent their 
ideas.537 
Other controversial features of the definition of terrorism as identified by Anderson (though he 
says they are not necessarily wrong) includes: the relatively low threshold of “serious violence 
against a person” which could be thought insufficient to defend the invocation of special 
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powers designed to deal with a plot to kill civilians; the inclusion of “serious damages to 
property” as acts of terrorism without even requiring the likelihood that serious harm or risk to 
persons will result from the damages: the inclusion of the use of threat of action to “influence” 
the government as a terrorist act rather to “intimidate” the government; the non-application of 
the target test to actions or threats involving the use of firearms or explosives; and lastly, the 
non-inclusion in the Act of countries whose government are included or excluded from the 
application of the Act.538 
Despite these criticisms, the Supreme Court in R v Gul recently upheld the definition of 
terrorism under the T.A 2000. The Court ruled that; 
    “It is difficult to see how the natural, very wide, meaning of the definition can  
     properly be cut down as it had been clearly deliberately drafted in wide terms to  
     take into   account  various forms of terrorism.”539  
 
The Court based its submission on the fact that there is no universally accepted definition of 
terrorism in international law. As highlighted in the analysis of the TA 2000, the Supreme 
Court in this case also held that that the definition of terrorism extends to military or quasi-
military activity aimed at bringing down a foreign government, even where that is approved 
(official or unofficial) by the UK government and even when perpetrated by the victims of the 
oppression abroad.540  The effect of this decision in practice is that, for instance, the political 
violence against the previous government of Col. Gaddafi in Libya would be regarded as 
terrorism under the UK Terrorism Act. In Walker’s view, it would be irrelevant whether the 
violence happened when Gaddafi was out of favour with the international community.541 This 
S.C decision also raises question about the UK’s tacit support for forces against the Assad 
Regime in Syria. Would this not amount terrorism on the part of the U.K and U.S? One also 
wonders whether the UK and US’s invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan leading to the bringing of 
the Saddam government is not terrorism. The Supreme Court in Gul clarified that this would 
not be classed as terrorism. The Court held that; 
    “… the use of force by Coalition forces is not terrorism. They do enjoy combat immunity,  
        they are ordered there by our government and the American government, unless they  
        commit crimes such as torture or war crimes …”.542 
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Anderson strongly disagreed with this decision of the Supreme Court in R v Gul. He argued 
that the Supreme Court “(as befits its function as a judicial rather than a policy-making body) 
did not express a view on whether the legislature should exclude such acts from a definition 
that it described as very far-reaching indeed.”543 He argued further that such acts do not 
constitute terrorism in the laws of some other Commonwealth and European Countries like 
Australia.544  Reacting to Anderson’s concerns, the Supreme Court in R v Gul, although as an 
obiter dicta, agrees that his suggestions “merit serious consideration” and that “any legislative 
narrowing of the definition of ‘terrorism’, with its concomitant reduction in the need for the 
exercise of discretion under section 117 of the 2000 Act, is to be welcomed provided that it is 
consistent with the public protection to which the legislation is directed.”545 The Supreme Court 
went further to acknowledge that the definition of terrorism under the Act was broad and its 
consequence include ‘a grant of unusually wide discretions to all those concerned with the 
application of the counter-terrorism law, from Ministers exercising their power to impose 
executive orders to police officers deciding whom to arrest or to stop at a port and prosecutors 
deciding whom to charge.’546 The SC rightly concludes that these could leave the citizens in 
the dark and risk undermining the rule of law.547  
Going by the Supreme Court decision in R v Gul, the most significant effect of the broad 
definition of terrorism under the TA is the duties it imposes on the Police to criminalise, 
investigate, and prosecute those acts listed as acts of terrorism as terrorist offences. The 
consequence of these is a definition that is open to misuse and unduly wide application. If 
unchecked or controlled, this could lead to arbitrary arrests.  Broad or vague definitions of 
terrorism also make it impossible to satisfy the clarity required by criminal law and gives the 
definition too much discretion in its application. Anderson argued further that this discretion 
even become wider when conducts ancillary only in the broadest sense to terrorism is 
criminalised for example, “acts preparatory to terrorism” used under Section 5 of the Terrorism 
Act 2006.548 The broad definition of terrorism also has the potential of disproportionately 
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interfering in the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, freedom of association and the 
right to assembly. An example of this was the detention of more than 600 people549 during the 
Labour party Conference in 2005 even though none of them was suspected of terrorist links.550  
In reality, there seems to be a huge degree of discretion within the UK terrorism Act. Section 
117 (2) of the Act clearly stipulates that proceeding for terrorism offence cannot “not be 
instituted in England and Wales without the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions, and 
shall not be instituted in Northern Ireland without the consent of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions for Northern Ireland.” The implication of this provision is that even with the legal 
definition of terrorism under the Act, it still remains subjective.   
The Supreme Court in Gul frowned at this. The Court stated that; 
    “The Crown’s reliance on prosecutorial discretion is intrinsically unattractive, as 
     It amounts to saying that the legislature, whose primary duty is to make the law, and to do 
     so in public, has in effect delegated to an appointee of the executive, albeit a respected and  
    independent lawyer, the decision whether an activity should be treated as criminal for the  
    purposes of prosecution. Such a statutory device, unless deployed very rarely indeed and  
    only when there is no alternative, risks undermining the rule of law. It involves Parliament  
    abdicating a significant part of its legislative function to an unelected DPP, or to the  
    Attorney General, who, though he is accountable to Parliament, does not make open,  
    democratically accountable decisions in the same way as Parliament. Further, such a  
    device leaves citizens unclear as to whether or not their actions or projected actions  
    are liable to be treated by the prosecution authorities as effectively innocent or criminal - in     
    this case seriously criminal.”551 
 
Despite these fears and concerns, the Supreme Court stated that it “does not regard it as an 
appropriate reason for giving “terrorism” a wide meaning.”552 The Court stated further that, 
“unless the appellant’s argument based on international law dictates a different conclusion, the 
definition of terrorism as in section 1 of the 2000 Act is indeed as wide as it appears to be.” 
 On the basis of this assessment, the study concludes that it might impossible to assess the 
definition of terrorism in the UK on strict grounds of human rights. This is because deciding 
what amounts to terrorism is a highly contested subject without a universal consensus. Quoting 
the decision in Al-Sirri v Secretary of State for the Home Department,553  the Supreme Court 
in Gul emphasized further that “there is as yet no internationally agreed definition of terrorism” 
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and “no comprehensive international Convention binding Member States to take action against 
it.”554 More importantly, the Supreme Court put the problem relating to the definition of 
terrorism in the UK to rest by holding that the definition was deliberately drafted in wide terms 
to take into account various forms of terrorism and it that it would be wrong for any court to 
cut it down by implying some sort of restriction into the wide words used by the legislature.555 
The Court emphasised that “it is clear that it is very hard to define “terrorism”.……there are 
great difficulties in finding a satisfactory definition of “terrorism”, and suspected that “none of 
us will succeed.”556 
    2.2 Arrest  
 
The power of arrest under section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000 has been described as one of 
the most important powers available to the police in the fight against terrorism.557The 
Government argues that this power allows the Police to make ‘preventive arrest’ before the 
commission of a terrorist act as the Police have a duty to do so where it is necessary. Jack Straw 
(during the passage of the 2000 Terrorism Act) emphasized the value of arrest powers given to 
the Police under the Act with reference to the gas attack on the Japanese Underground.558 Straw 
argued that if the security forces obtain information that an organisation was plotting an outrage 
in the United Kingdom, the security forces would need the powers to prevent the outrage from 
occurring.559 
In spite of the justifications given by the government, the power of arrest under the Act has 
come under intense criticisms especially its application in practice. It is therefore no surprise 
that the courts have shown interest and has in a number of cases decided on the lawfulness of 
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arrest based on reasonable suspicion. Crucially, the Court in Campbell and Hartley case560 
have held that the ‘reasonableness’ of the suspicion justifying such arrests cannot always be 
judged according to the same standards as are applied in dealing with conventional crime.561  
S. 1 of Code A of the Revised Code of Practice for police Officers also stipulates that when 
Police are carrying out their functions, they have a due regard to eliminate unlawful 
discrimination, harassment, and victimization. The Court in Magee and Ors v UK562 gave 
credence to this provision. The accused in this case were arrested based on “suspicion” of 
involvement in the murder of a Police officer in 2009. The High Court of Northern Ireland 
found that the first review by the County Court was wrong and that the Court should have 
allowed a review of the “lawfulness of their arrest.” the High Court quashed the decision to 
extend their arrest and the applicants were released without charge  (after 12 days). However, 
the ECrtHR in Sher v UK has expressly stated that the law (Art 5) does not impose a uniform, 
unvarying standard to be applied irrespective of the context, facts and circumstances. The Court 
held further that the police may frequently have to arrest a suspected terrorist on the basis of 
information which is reliable but which cannot, without putting in jeopardy the source of the 
information, be revealed to the suspect or produced in court and Contracting States cannot be 
asked to establish the reasonableness of the suspicion grounding the arrest of a suspected 
terrorist by disclosing the confidential sources of supporting information or even facts which 
would be susceptible of indicating such sources or their identity.563  
 But despite the Court decisions in O’Hara case, Campbell and Hartley case, Brogan v UK 
case, and Sher’s case, critics argue that the wording of S. 41 makes it potentially wide in its 
application. According to Blick, arrest should be based on the commission, imminent or actual 
commission of the offence.564 In the same way, Anderson argued that the power of arrest given 
to the Police empowers the arresting officer to arrest an individual with no specific offence in 
mind. 565 Although the Courts have held that the reasonable suspicion to arrest must be 
‘subjective and genuine,’566 nevertheless in practice the Police seemingly enjoy a complete 
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discretion in deciding against whom to use this arrest power. This is evident in the huge gap 
between number of those arrested and the number of convictions secured under the T.A 2000. 
Arun was of the opinion that the low conviction rate for those arrested simply points to the 
excessive and discriminatory use of arrest powers.567 Anderson argued that every year, a 
significant number of people arrested under section 41 of Terrorism Act 2000 are charged with 
offences under the ordinary criminal law which ranges from conspiracy to murder to possession 
of dangerous weapon.568 Anderson contends that this power may be lawfully used to arrest 
people that are not involved in terrorism.”569 For instance in 2012, only 43% of those arrested 
under S. 41 were eventually charged for terrorism related offences.570Anderson concludes that 
‘Britain needs to rebalance some aspect of its terrorism legislation in favour of liberty without 
harming its security needs as elements of it have been conceived and applied with excessive 
enthusiasm.’571 Supporting this view, Walker points out that most arrestees are released without 
charge, suggesting that perhaps ‘the criterion for “terrorism” is not a sufficiently stiff test for 
the deprivation of liberty or that intelligence-gathering and disruption rather than prosecution 
are the main purpose of arrest.’572Report shows that from September 11 2001 to 31st December 
2004, 701 people were arrested under S. 41(1) and only 234 were charged with criminal 
offences.573  
According to a Memorandum from the British Irish Watch (BIRW), an independent non-
governmental organisation on human rights and conflicts, it appears that the Terrorism Act 
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(especially on arrest) focuses heavily on the Muslims community.574 This suggests ‘the use of 
racial or religious profiling in the legislative arena.’ This has created an atmosphere of racial 
mistrust and suspicion contributing to an increase in the number of alienated and angry people, 
playing straight into the hands of the terrorists.’ This is reminiscent of the stigmatisation of the 
Irish community in Britain in the 70’s and 80’s.575  
However, Anderson cautioned that anyone seeking to place weight on the figures for the “so-
called terrorism-related arrests” needs to be aware that they have been made under ordinary 
PACE powers and in recent years the great majority of arrests that have been made resulted in 
the suspect being charged with offences unrelated to terrorism.576Anderson maintained that the 
problem is not with the power used to arrest under PACE, but the subjective basis on which 
the term “terrorism related” is used.577 
It is important to note that since 2014 more people have been charged after arrest on terrorism 
related offences. In the year ending of 31st of March 2015 for instance, of the 299 arrests made, 
85% of these were charged with terrorism offences.578 This is the highest proportion of arrest 
and charge in record, even though there is an incongruity in the number of “stops and searches” 
and the number of arrests made within the same period. Out of the 411 stops and searches made 
in the year ending 31 March 2015, only 7% of these numbers were subsequently arrested.579 
The significant changes in the number of those arrested almost corresponding with the number 
of those charged was confirmed by Anderson. His 2014 Report reveals that 86% of those 
arrested on “terrorism-related offences” were charged with offences considered to be linked to 
                                                          
574 House of Lords House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights The Council of Europe Convention on 
the Prevention of Terrorism First Report of Session 2006–07 Pg 22 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2007/jan/coe-conv-on-terr-jhrc-report.pdf accessed 23rd Dec, 2015 
575 Ibid  
It is reported by the Government that there are up to 500 UK linked individuals that have to 
travelled to Syria and Iraq to join the terrorist  
House of Lords House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights: Second Report of Session 2014–15 Pg 
22 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201415/jtselect/jtrights/49/49.pdf accessed 22  Dec, 2015 
 
576 David Anderson QC, Report on the Terrorism Act in 2012, Pg 78-79 
577 David Anderson QC, Report on the Terrorism Act in 2013, pg 58 
578 Home Office: Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation: Arrests, 
outcomes, and stop and search, Great Britain, financial year ending 31 March 2015 Statistical Bulletin 04/15 
September 2015 Pg 2-3 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/458710/police-powers-
terrorism-1415.pdf    accessed 23 Dec, 2015 
579 ibid 
   
143 
 
terrorism. This figure shows a substantial increase over the equivalent figure of 56% in 2013.580 
This suggests that individuals are involved in terrorism related offences more than ever before.    
In spite of the high figures in the number of those arrested corresponding with those charged 
for terrorism related-offences, critics still maintain that the power of arrest under the Act poses 
a significant threat to liberty and security in the UK. In the view of Lord Bingham, there is a 
‘threat’ in giving the Police power to arrest based on reasonable suspicion. He argues that 
‘suspicion, even if reasonably entertained, may prove to be misplaced, as a series of tragic 
miscarriage of justice has shown that even Police officers can be wrong.’581This conclusion is 
further heightened by government statistics and reports which suggest that S.41 is used by the 
Police in the U.K against certain ethnic and religious backgrounds.582  Records show ethnic 
and racial disproportionality in the arrests made under the Terrorism Act. For example Blacks 
and Asian people are potentially likely to be stopped, searched and arrested even though they 
make up only 8.7% of the population.583  
A study conducted in 2004 (although this is over 10 years ago, but still relevant) by the Institute 
of Race Relations statistics showed a huge gap in the number of arrest and the number of 
convictions under the Terrorism Act. The study criticised the media “fanfare”  that heralds the 
Police arrest of terrorist suspects and only for the case to be quietly dropped few days, weeks, 
or months later for lack of evidence or thrown out by the Judge but not after damaging the 
reputation of the innocent individuals.584 Examples of such arrest documented in the study 
include: the arrest of Lofti Raissi, his wife Sonia Raissi, and his brother Mohammed Raissi (all 
Algerians) in London in 2001 in connection with the World Trade Centre attack. Lofti spent 
five months in Prison before an extradition process to the U.S was rejected by the Court for 
lack of evidence; the arrest of British Muslim Sulaiman Zain-ul-abidin in London in October 
2001 and subsequent charge for being a fund raiser for Islamic Jihad in the U.K (a proscribed 
organisation). Sulaiman was acquitted by an old Bailey jury the following year; the arrest of 
seven British and Turkish men in London and Cheshire in December 2002 on suspicion of 
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raising funds for the DHKP-C (a Turkish political party). The trial collapsed after the defence 
counsel produced a letter by the Home Office which showed that the organisation was not 
proscribed under the T.A; Six British Muslim men were arrested in Darlington, Redcar, 
Middlesbrough, and Hartley on ‘’suspicion’’ of raising funds for an Islamic terrorist group. All 
the charges were dropped after one year for lack of sufficient evidence; the arrest of Noureddine 
Mouleff and four others (all Algerians) in November 2003 and charges for possession of items 
in connection with terrorism. The Court however dismissed the charge after evidence showed 
that the device in their possession were just batteries and wires; the arrest of British Muslim 
Shazad Ashraf in London in June 2003 for allegedly being in possession of combat books and 
tactical planning material. The allegations were later withdrawn when the CPS failed to provide 
evidence; The arrest of four British Muslims in Dudley, Walsall and Luton in December 2003 
who were subsequently charged with making of chemical and biological weapons amongst 
other allegations. The Police recovered some money in the course of their arrest. Only for the 
charges to be dropped four months after and the money returned; the arrest in 2004 of ten Iraqis 
and North Africans on the suspicion of their involvement in a plot to bomb Old Trafford 
football ground. The men were held and questioned for eight days only for them to be released 
without being charged.  It later emerged that they were just Manchester United fans.585 
Critics, academics, and observers of the UK’s counter-terrorism measures attest to the 
discriminatory nature in arrests made under the Act. An in-depth study conducted by Tufyal 
and Helen across four cities (London, Leicester, Birmingham, and Glasgow) to explore the 
perceptions and experiences of the people about the UK’s counter-terrorism measures shows 
that even though the U.K still faces real and serious threats from domestic and international 
terrorism, many individuals interviewed felt that the power of arrest makes it easier to arrest 
Muslims.586 In fact some referred to the T.A 2000 as “being for Muslims and specifically 
targeted at them.”587 Others questioned the criteria used by the Police to identify a person as 
extremist.588 
According to one interviewee:  
    “The police knocked on the door at 7 in the morning, they arrested my son. He was 15  
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     and they took him away for 36 hours. We called the lawyer and everything. They let  
    him go. They said they made a mistake. I was 36 hours crying and praying... they take 
    all his stuff, they couldn’t find anything.’’ (Muslim, Female, Birmingham).589 
 
Other interviewees reveal that a terrorism arrest is usually preceded by a raid on the property 
where suspects live, followed by a thorough search on the belongings in the house including 
those of neighbours. During this process the Police ‘thrash’ everything with terrified family 
members watching helplessly. This leaves a negative impact on family members of the suspect 
and this can be sometimes overwhelming. Most times the Police never find anything 
incriminating leaving the innocent suspects and their family members with a feeling of being 
branded. Neighbours, friends, and those related to those whom houses have been searched and 
arrested have a feeling of being the next target. The writer must not fail to add that some 
interviewees accept and recognise the fact that innocent people would inevitably be caught in 
this process.590 Choudhury and Fenwick also argued that the decision to make an arrest rests 
solely with the Police, but unfortunately information on which the reasonable suspicion for an 
arrest is based is not the same as the admissible ‘evidence’ that can be put before the court.591 
Although the decision to charge a terror suspect to Court is done by the Crown Prosecution 
Service (CPS), they act based on evidence provided to them by the Police. In their conclusion, 
they reveal that Muslim participants in the focus group had greater knowledge and concerns on 
arrests under the Act than other non-Muslim focus group participants living in the same area. 
592 In other words, arrests under the T.A 2000 were mostly targeted towards Muslims than non-
Muslims in the focus area. This is in spite of the 2001 Census which showed that Muslims 
make up only 3% of the UK population.593 Choudhury was of the view that failure of the UK 
government to address the discriminatory arrests was not only damaging to community police 
relations but also undermining the willingness of people to talk to the police.594 This could also 
have a damaging disconnect between the State and communities and also raise the level of 
anxiety and vulnerability of the group where arrests are frequently made.  
In a similar context, Awan argues that the manner with which the Police make arrests is not 
only alienating Muslims but has led to poor relationship between Muslims and the wider civic 
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society.595 This has fuelled dissent amongst many Muslims communities who feel that they are 
being unfairly targeted and has also increase the tension between the Police and the local 
communities.596 It must be noted that this scenario is not peculiar to the U.K alone. Similar 
lack of trust and suspicion exist in other countries for example the U.S where tension exists 
between the Muslim communities and the Police.597  
While the power of arrest under S. 41 of the Act may be justified as a quick means of preventing 
terrorist attack, one of the very important counter-terrorism strategies under “Contest” is 
engagement with the local communities to discourage individuals from getting involved in 
terrorism.598However, a loss of perceived Police legitimacy and cooperation from the 
communities where people are frequently arrested and released without charge poses a 
significant set-back to the U.K counter-terrorism strategy.  Besides, the perceived likelihood 
of a particular community to engage in acts of terrorism does not warrant generalised arrest 
under the guise of ‘reasonable suspicion.’ 
 Looking at it from another angle, data from the Prison Service shows that 87% of the terrorism 
related prisoners in the U.K in 2010 identified themselves as Muslims.599 Perhaps, this might 
explain why the Police focus their counter-terrorism search-light on Muslim communities. The 
writer believes that this situation might not be “entirely” intentional on the part of the Police. 
As David Cameron rightly puts it, ‘terrorist threats in the U.K are directly associated with 
Islamic extremism, but it is not synonymous with Islam as a peaceful religion.’600 He argued 
further that Islam is a religion, observed peacefully and devoutly by over a billion people. 
Islamist extremism is a political ideology, supported by a minority.601 In a similar observation, 
Pantazis and Pemberton stated that Islamic fanaticism has resulted in the Muslim community 
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replacing the Irish as the principal suspects for terrorism atrocities the UK.602 The challenge 
before the Police is how to identify and deal with these extremists without focusing on the 
Muslim communities or directly encroaching on individual rights. The core argument in the 
research is that arrest must not be used randomly and without adequate justification especially 
against minority groups. 
The writer notes that there has been a significant change in the number of minorities arrested 
for terrorism offences since 2013. For instance, according to statistics provided by the 
Independent Reviewer, 40 suspects were arrested in 2013. Of this figure, 27% were whites, 
18% were blacks, 41% were Asians, and 6% from other nationalities. Of this same figure, 49% 
of whites were charged, 15% of blacks charged, 33% Asians were charged, and 4% of other 
nationalities were charged.603 These figures seem to suggest that the government is doing 
something about criticism relating to arrest under S.41. As Parpworth stated, though the 
threshold for establishing reasonable suspicion is a necessarily low one, it would be contrary 
to the public interest if police officers investigating the commission of a criminal offence were 
required to establish a prima facie case against an accused before that person could be arrested. 
If such were the case, the law would have set the bar too high.604 
2.3 Pre-charge detention  
 
Several justifications have been given by the UK government for the 14 days pre-charge 
detention under the Act.  The government argues that “the threat from international terrorism 
is now completely different, particularly in the magnitude of the potential harm and 
indiscriminate nature of their targets.”605 This means that in some complex cases “evidence 
gathering effectively begins post arrest,” thereby justifying the long pre-charge detention 
period.606 This period also gives the government the time to obtain necessary evidence by 
questioning the accused or otherwise and to preserve relevant evidence. In addition to that, the 
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government argued that the international nature of modern day terrorism requires enquiries to 
be undertaken in different countries. There is also the problem of false identities from suspects, 
need to employ interpreters, time to decrypt evidence obtains from computers hard 
drives/phones and the time to analyse this, the need to obtain and analyse communication data 
from services providers, the need to allow time for religious observance of detainees, the need 
to make safe a location or premises where hazardous substances are found, and the delay in 
filing process on the part on the detainees solicitors.607 
Despite the justifications from the government, concerns have been raised over the 14 days 
pre-charge detention period under the Act. According to Banakar, the 14 days pre-charged 
detention period in the U.K is ‘excessive and draconian in character and can lead to a gradual 
erosion of the foundation of the western democratic system.’608 Similarly, Amnesty 
International (AI) criticised the 14 days pre-charge detention period under the Act as “too long 
a period to detain individuals without charging them.”609  Amnesty argues that from its 
monitoring of the right of fair trial over several years, prolonged periods of pre-charge 
detention can create an avenue for coercive or abusive practices which may force detainees to 
make involuntary statements, such as confession. Amnesty argued further that the likelihood 
of taking advantage of a detained person for the purpose of compelling him to confess to 
incriminate himself or testify against another person increases with the length of time people 
are held in custody.610A.I’s Director in the UK, Kate Allen, maintained that people have a right 
to be charged promptly or to be released. According to her, “it is shocking that the law in the 
UK is moving further and further away from this basic principle.”611 She posited that the idea 
that countering terrorism requires removing or eroding basic guarantees of individual liberty 
and physical safety is a discredited one and the government should reject it once and for all.612 
In fact, during the debate to extend the pre-charge detention of suspect in the UK, the Police 
accepted in their oral evidence that the facilities available to them are not suitable for a period 
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beyond 14 days and recommends that any pre-charge detention beyond this should be in 
prison.613  
In the opinion of the writer, although the justifications given by the government seem 
“reasonable,” other countries in Europe facing similar threats of terrorism have fewer days pre-
charge detention regimes under their Terrorism Acts and have managed to resolve their 
terrorism cases within a few days. A comparison of the length of pre-charge detention in the 
UK with other E.U countries shows that in France it is for a period of 48 hours, 614but no longer 
than 144 hours (6 days)615 in Germany pre-charge detention may extend only up to 48 hours at 
which point a criminal charge must be entered,616 in Spain it is for period of 13days617 subject 
to an extension for a period of 8days,618 and in Australia it is for a maximum period of 
14days.619 In fact the U.S, the global front-runner in the fight against terrorism, has two days 
as its pre-charge detention period. 620 
The question that comes to mind is how are the other EU countries facing the same terrorism 
challenges able to manage a shorter pre-charge detention period? What makes the U.K situation 
different? Or is the nature of terrorism threats faced by the U.K different from other EU 
countries?  
The government of the U.K have not given a clear and convincing reason as to why her pre-
charge detention should be one of the longest in Europe. As Liberty rightly argued, no two 
legal systems are exactly the same and comparisons are not always simple. But this does not 
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mean that the UK should shut its eyes to overseas experiences.621 Critics of the U.K’s 14 days 
detention period argues that many European countries have successfully managed their pre-
charged detention period of less than a week. The shortness of the pre-charge detention period 
in Spain (5days) did not impact the successful investigation that led to the conviction of the 
suspects arrested in Spain for the attacks of March 2004.622 Penas and Rodriguez were of the 
view that the current 14 days period in the U.K has taken legislative reaction to counter 
terrorism too far.623   
Interestingly, a 2011 statistic shows that of the 54 that were detained only three people were 
detained for longer than six days, each between 10 and 12days. 624 Similarly in 2013, of all the 
terror suspects   arrested and detained, 13 suspects were held for less than a day, 16 suspects 
were held for 48 hours, 38 suspects were held for less than a week, while two suspects were 
held for less than eight days.625 This statistic suggests that the U.K can do without the 14days 
pre-charge detention for a shorter pre-charged detention period. The figure released by the 
Independent Reviewer showed that on the occasion where the 14day period was used, it has 
not always led to convictions of the suspects.  The House of Commons Committee on counter-
terrorism (during the debate for a longer pre-charge detention period) underscored the point 
that the 14 days pre-charge detention is rarely used and does not get the point of even extending 
it for a longer period.626 Although, the 14 pre-charge detention period is subject to judicial 
review, it still has the potential of creating conditions conductive for torture and ill-treatment 
of detainees.627 A White Paper Report suggested that if France despite its experience with 
terrorism can manage six days pre-charge detention period, then there is no justification for the 
14day period in the UK.628 The Paper concludes that the 14 period in the UK is flawed as matter 
of law and policy.629 In the writer’s opinion, caution must be exercised when comparing the 
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pre-charge detention period in the U.K with other European countries. For example, though 
France has a six days pre-charge detention of suspects, the U.K pre-charge detention process 
is less cumbersome than that of France. Terrorist suspects in France have a severely limited 
access to a counsel and may be interrogated at will within the 6 days pre-charge detention 
period and at the end of this period, the accused is brought before a Magistrate and represented 
by a counsel.630 At this stage the examining Magistrate decides whether to remand the accused 
in a pre-trial detention based on the case file including the prosecutor’s preliminary findings 
(réquisitoire introductive). In some cases weeks, months, or years may go by before the 
examining Magistrate concludes the investigation and for the prosecution to draw up an official 
indictment (requisitoire définitif) and the case is passed to a trial Judge. This is different from 
the U.K procedure where an accused can have access to a counsel immediately after arrest and 
trial begins as soon as the accused is charged.631  
The Conclusion of the White Paper Report earlier mentioned could perhaps be premised on the 
significant effect a 14 days detention could have on the mental and physical well-being of those 
detained. Records have shown that some detainees have manifested high symptoms of anxiety, 
depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder after release, and suicide attempts.632 In fact the 
government pays a lot in form of legal compensation and damages to innocent detainees. 
Baroness Neville Jones, a previous Minister of State Home Office, stated that about 15Million 
Pounds was awarded by the Court as compensation either in court or out of court settlements 
following  claims of unlawful detention as well as other legal compensations cost between 2008 
and 2010 alone.633 Critics of the U.K pre-charge policy have argued strongly that it is 
reminiscent of the Executive power that dominated Northern Ireland in the 1970’s. However, 
as Morgan advised, the remedy for prolonged pre-charge detention in the UK lies in the 
Parliament.634 Only the Parliament can overturn the statute by revision or amendment. 
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2.4 Encouragement of Terrorism  
Freedom of expression upholds the rights of all to express their views and opinions freely. It 
also guarantees the right to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas without fear or 
interference. Freedom of expression is a right that reinforces all other rights and allows them 
to flourish. This is because the ability to express one’s ideas, hold opinions, and impact 
information is important for the accomplishment of other rights and also crucial in the healthy 
development of the society.  Information and ideas help to inform political debate and are 
essential to public accountability and transparency in government.635 Nevertheless, since much 
justifications to commit terror activities comes from the internet, mass media, and religious 
teachings, the UK government made encouragement/incitement to commit terror activities an 
offence under the TA 2000.  
Like other provisions of the Terrorism Act under review in this research, the offence of 
encouragement of terrorism has equally come under criticisms by scholars, lawyer, and 
academics. Their major concern is the negative effects/impact this could have on freedom of 
expression.   
According to Report by a Panel of Jurist, the breadth and the ambiguity of the offence of 
encouragement of terrorism under the 2006 Act creates a risk of arbitrary and discriminatory 
application.636 This is further exacerbated by the fact that it covers past statements and terror 
acts committed in other countries. The panel expressed serious concerns that certain statements 
made by Muslims to a Muslim audience could be regarded as encouraging terrorism, and 
similar statements made to other religious might will not be held on the same standards.637 
Likewise, there are concerns that a perfectly ‘lawful statement’ might be criminalised under 
the offence of encouragement of terrorism. More worrisome is the fact that within this current 
climate, statements that seek to initiate debate around issues on suicide bombers, Jihad, 
insulting or offensive statements by Muslim leaders critical of western ways of life in Mosques 
could be termed as encouraging terrorism.638 “Liberty” also argues that a person’s passionate 
expression might be interpreted as “recklessness” under Section 1 of the Act. The group cited 
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the example of the Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, who invited Yusuf Al-Qaradawi to 
speak in the UK. His speech was interpreted by some section of the press as encouraging 
terrorism. The Sun referred to him as “a ranting Islamic rabble-rouser who supports suicide 
bombings by children and brutal punishment of gays.” “Liberty” was of the view that when 
speech offences are linked to terrorism, then there should be a tighter definition to what 
constitutes terrorism than that contained under the Terrorism Act 2000.639  According to the 
group, the offence of encouragement of terrorism is fundamentally flawed.640 “Liberty” pointed 
out that the offence criminalises people not only for what they intend but also for ‘reckless’ 
speech. Although recklessness can be a legitimate element in offences involving action (for 
example, if I assault someone and they die as a consequence, it is reasonable to consider the 
recklessness of my action) but same is not true of speech, where there is no link between words 
and others interpretation of them.641 Similar concerns were expressed by the Muslim Council 
of Britain. According to Mr Ballali;  
    “Would saying that you understand the frustration of a Palestinian would-be suicide   
    bomber, who has seen his father being killed, had his house demolished and is  
    regularly subjected to humiliating searches at a check point on his way to work,  
    be encouragement of terrorism? Are the Iraqis who believe that their country  
    has been illegally invaded by a foreign force, terrorists? With this in mind, a law  
    abiding citizen would be stuck in a dilemma regarding the above and asking him/herself,  
   is it an offence to say  what I am thinking or is it my civil right to   express my views  
    in a    free society?”642 
 
Similarly, Walker argues that the offence of encouragement of terrorism runs the danger of 
penalising people for their views or their “stupid curiosity” to the point that the conviction of 
a person might not be seen as a “legitimate ascription to criminality.”643 He questions the failure 
of the law-makers to understand that offensive speech is the hallmark of free speech.644  Blick, 
Tufyal, and Staurt also contend that that there are raft of criminal laws which covers direct and 
indirect encouragement of terrorism and there was no need to create this new offence under the 
Terrorism Act.645 In the same way, Ekaratne criticised the offence of encouragement of 
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terrorism as “unnecessary” and that narrower offences linked to specific crimes can protect 
against terrorism.646He argued that Section 1(2) Terrorism Act 2006 covers a broad range of 
generalized statements and the scope of the provision is extremely broad and vague in its 
definition, leaving it to the discretion of Judges and Prosecutors to interpret. He argued further 
that the use vague terms which include “praise’’ and “celebration” are problematic as it covers 
expression that need not be criminalised, the existence of which may lead to the unwarranted 
scrutiny into expressions that should be protected in a democratic society, however repulsive 
it may be. In his conclusion Ekaratne suggested that the offence of glorification of terrorism 
should be targeted to statements that provide practical information or incite specific crimes as 
this would create a balance in safeguarding both life and liberty.647 
In his assessment of the offence of encouragement of terrorism, Hunt claims that some of the 
“conducts” defined as constituting “dissemination” of terrorist publication are capable of 
attracting criminal liability as long as the dissemination is to influence those to whom it is 
published to commit an offence under the Act.648 He however added that “much of these are 
likely to be considered as too remote from the impugned material to constitute “encouragement 
in and of itself” and therefore it is unlikely to have been caught applying traditional principles 
of incitement law.”649 Hunt argued that the mere possession of such impugned material, even 
with a view to using it to incite others, would not be behaviour caught by the actus reus of 
common law or statutory incitement offences. He maintains that it is “difficult to discern what 
the government’s view was of the exact scope or the nature of the concept indirect 
encouragement or whether it was “thought about in a systematic way.”650 
On the positive side, Hunt stated that the ‘prosecution’ would still have to prove that a 
defendant's statement is likely to be understood as a direct or indirect encouragement either to 
engage in one of the forms of behaviour set out in s.1 of the Terrorism Act 2000 along with the 
relevant terrorist motives, or alternatively to commit a specific “Convention offence.”651 He 
argued that this requirement of “specificity” would even be greater in proving the commission 
of Convention offence because the prosecution must prove that the statement was likely to be 
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understood by those it was published as encouragement to them to (directly or indirectly) 
engage in specific behaviour constituting the actus reus of a specific Convention offence, along 
with the requisite mens rea of that offence.652 Hunt acknowledged the objection on indirect 
encouragement of terrorism as per its vagueness and uncertainty in the human right sense.653 
Citing the HRC, he argued that terms such as “glorification”, “praise”, and “celebration” are 
too vague to form part of a criminal offence which can be committed by speaking.654He 
questions what sorts of statements or publications are capable of ‘being an encouragement of 
terrorism in that sense, even though they would not constitute encouragement for the purposes 
of common law incitement. 655 The breadth of the offence of encouragement of terrorism under 
the T.A makes it difficult to predict with certainty, the actions that would constitute such 
offences.  The case of Roshonara Choudhry presents a practical example of this difficulty.  
Roshonara, a 21-year-old student, stabbed the MP for East Ham twice in the stomach, in May, 
2010. According to her she wanted to be a martyr and revenge for Iraq because the UK voted 
for the war in Iraq.656 During her sentence, a group of Islamist protesters from the public gallery 
in the Court room at the Old Bailey shouted “British go to hell’ and “Curse the judge.” Some 
of her supporters outside the court  carried placards and were shouting “Timms go to hell”, 
“Islam will rule the World”, “British government watch your back Salaudis coming back.”657 
Would these rants and the carrying of placards by her supporters’ not encourage terrorism as 
they made these statements in support/to glorify of the stabbing of the MP? As far as the writer 
is concerned these words were not different from the words by Saleem, Muhid and Javed who 
were jailed for 4 years for their chants that “democracy is hypocrisy”, “UK you will pay”, “with 
your blood” and “7/7 on its way” during a demonstration held in central London to protest 
about the re-publication in a number of countries of cartoons depicting the prophet Mohammed 
which had originally been published in Denmark.658  
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2.5 Proscription 
The objectives of proscription as explained by Lord Carlile are to deter international terrorism 
organisations from coming to the UK, to disrupt the ability of any organisation to operate in 
the UK, to support foreign governments in disrupting terrorist organisation activity and to send 
a strong signal to the world that the UK rejects such organisation and their claims to 
legitimacy.659Carlile argued further that proscribing terrorist organisations protects the public 
from terrorism including sympathises of the organisation that the organisation is banned and it 
is a crime to join such organisations. It also gives the government the power to deal with 
organisations which shows early signs of involvement in terrorism.660 He argued that the power 
to proscribe an organisation “is at best a fairly blunt instrument, especially when compared 
with the menace that can emerge from the internet.”661  
Nevertheless, critics have questioned the inclusion of terrorist organisations that have no 
presence in the UK or pose an immediate or remote threat to the UK.  Sofia and Cain are of the 
opinion that proscription of terrorist organisation under the Act is merely a tool of diplomacy, 
as majority of the organisation proscribed are based overseas and most of them do not pose 
apparent threat to the UK’s national security.662 They argued that the Home Secretary may just 
proscribe a group just in furtherance of the need to support other members of the International 
community in the global fight against terrorism.663 This criticism raises some question about 
the huge number of foreign terrorist organisations under the Act. If this the aim of proscription 
under the Act is merely to support foreign governments in disrupting terrorist organisations in 
their territory,  then this reduces proscription to an official badge of disapproval by the 
government and a political tool in the hands of government which can be used against dissents.  
There are concerns that the State can also use this power to restrict and criminalise opposition 
groups including organisation with peaceful motives. In the words of Lord Avebury, ‘an 
organisation or group that supports an armed opposition group, including those fighting 
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repressive regimes, could ipso facto be proscribed as a terrorist organisation.664 Likewise, Lord 
Rea condemned the inclusion of PKK under the list of proscribed organisation when it has 
maintained a cease fire for two and half years in spite of continued attacks from the Turkish 
army. While the proscription of violent, extremists and terrorists’ organisation might be 
unavoidable, caution must be exercised against using it as a diplomatic tool in the hands of the 
government to show support to the international community in the global fight against 
terrorism. Otherwise, as Anderson right points out, this would merely render it as a “cheap and 
straightforward way of achieving foreign policy objectives.”665 
According to David Anderson, it is difficult to obtain de-proscription because of its 
cumbersome nature, lengthy legal proceedings, and expensive cost running into hundreds of 
thousands of pounds.666 Anderson expressed reservations over what he termed “extra-ordinary 
wide discretion of the home Secretary in the de-proscription process.”667 There are 70 
proscribed organisations in the U.K in addition to 14 proscribed organisations in relation to 
Northern Ireland.668 Out of this figure only one has been de-proscribed since 2000. This goes 
to show the cumbersomeness of the de-proscription process. Supporting this argument, the 
House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, stated the de-proscription process in the U.K 
needs urgent review.669 The Chairperson of the Committee cited the case of The Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Ealem which is banned in the U.K despite not appearing to be banned anymore 
in Sri Lanka where it is based or anywhere else. The committee was of the view that most 
proscriptions in the U.K were at the behest of foreign governments. On the other hand, the 
Committee stated that the difficulty in the de-proscription process could send a signal to other 
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groups or organisations for them to move away from support of terrorism.670 Critics argue that 
proscription appears to be a readily available tool for the government in combating terrorism 
and it is often dependent on intelligence that is not released to this organisation. Additionally, 
a broad scope exists for the Home Secretary to exercise proscription. These goals are both 
symbolic and strategic. The Home Secretary may take an action to proscribe a group in 
furtherance of the need to support an international organisation or member of the international 
community in the global fight against terrorism. This reduces the whole proscription process 
into a tool of diplomacy. The Home Secretary might also be reluctant to de-proscribe a group 
in order not to offend its allies or country and on foreign policy grounds.  Based on the fore-
going, the determination as to whether or not to proscribe a group could only be seen to turn 
political rather than legal considerations.  
Between Year 2000 and 2010, the Home Secretary received ten applications for de-proscription 
they were all refused.671 One particular theme that can be drawn from this is that once a group 
is proscribed, that almost signifies the “death” of it.  In the words of Gearty, ‘once an 
organisation is banned, it would take almost an eccentric courage on the part of a mainstream 
political leader to take risk inherent in making a de-proscription order.’672  
Sofia and Murphy were of the view that it would be a fallacy to equate a failure by the 
administrative review process to delist an organisation to which the conclusion that such 
process is incapable of providing a fair outcome. However in principle, there is nothing to show 
that the POAC are also ready to delist a group.673 Supporting the Home Affairs Committee on 
the huge cost involved in the de-proscription process, Sofia and Murphy argued that the issue 
of cost is further exacerbated by the fact that an attempt to raise funds for the legal action is 
unlawful and could be regarded as an offence under the Terrorism Act. In fact immediately 
after proscription of a group its asset and funds is frozen.674  Another concern is the system of 
closed material which allows for the use of secret evidence.675 The POAC may hold a closed 
door proceeding to consider evidence which the Home Secretary might be unwillingly to 
disclose to the applicants. Even though a special advocate by the applicant is present whilst 
this evidence is given, he is not allowed to disclose the evidence to the applicant. This closed 
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door proceeding has been criticised to be against the right to a fair trial. The government is 
however quick to defend this by arguing that disclosing this to applicants will reveal its 
intelligence gathering techniques.  
Furthermore, the cost involved in bringing an appeal to the Proscribed Organisation Appeal 
Commission or Court of Appeal is another negative factor. This could deter some potential 
applicant from pursuing an appeal to the POAC. This because the “proscribed” organisation 
might not be able to raise funds for legal action as it is may constitute an offence under the 
Terrorism Act 2000.  
Conclusion 
Having assessed the social effects and practical impacts of the measures under the TA 2000, 
this chapter reveals some discrepancies in the law in books from the law in action.  Firstly, the 
problem associated with the definition of terrorism is universal and it is not limited to the U.K’s 
definition. As the Supreme Court said in R v F, the definition of terrorism under the Act was 
‘indeed intended to be very wide.’  The only conclusion the writer could reach is that maybe 
the breadth of the definition is a deliberate policy, rather than oversight, to cover the ever 
changing nature of terrorism. Until there is a universally acceptable definition of terrorism in 
international law, States will continue to interpret it the way it suits their needs.   
Judging from Anderson’s assessment, S.41 is open to abuse by the Police. Likewise, the 
assessment here suggests that the power of arrest under the Act is selectively used in practice, 
especially against the Muslim Communities. Although, compared to Nigeria, abuse of the 
power of arrest in the UK did not lead to excessive human right infringements like “prolonged” 
pre-charge, detention, torture and other inhuman degrading treatment currently experienced by 
terror suspects in Nigeria.  
An assessment of the 14 days pre-charge detention period under the TA 2000 shows that this 
is rarely used in practice. A comparison of the UK’s pre-charge detention period with some 
other countries also shows that the UK has one of the longest pre-charge detention periods in 
the EU region.  
As we have seen, the majority of the terrorist organisations proscribed under the UK TA 20000 
are foreign terrorist organisations. This apparently suggests that proscription is a tool used in 
furtherance of the need to support other members of the International community in the global 
fight against terrorism in the UK. In the writer’s view, the major problem with proscription of 
foreign terrorist organisation is that a group proscribed in one country, could suddenly find 
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themselves in the list of proscribed organisation from different countries. This global sense of 
isolation could discourage some groups (that are no longer involved in terrorism) from seeking 
de-proscriptions as this would see the organisation fighting de-proscription on different fronts.  
Having seen the effects of the UK TA 2000 in practice, the next chapter will compare the 
practical application of the provision of the terrorism Act in Nigeria and UK.  
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CHAPTER 8 
 
A COMPARATIVE SOCIO-LEGAL ASSESSMENT OF THE NIGERIAN  
TERRORISM (PREVENTION)   ACT 2011 & THE UK TERRORISM ACT 2000/2006 
 
Following on from the socio-legal assessment of the Nigerian Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 
(as amended) and UK’s Terrorism Act 2000, this chapter takes the discussion forward by 
comparing the application of the provisions of the Terrorism Acts in both States. The aim of 
this chapter is to identify the similarities and differences in the practical usage and application 
of the provisions of the Terrorism Acts by the legal actors in both States. This comparative 
discussion is based on the socio-legal investigations and findings done in the two previous 
chapters.  This chapter will also be used to prepare the ground for a further assessment of the 
Terrorism Acts of Nigeria and UK by reference to the countries domestic, regional and 
constitutional obligations under the 1999 Constitution/Human Rights Act 1998, the African 
Charter/ECHR, and the ICCPR respectively.   
In Chapters Six and Seven of this research, it was concluded that the controversy surrounding 
the definition of terrorism in international law remains unresolved and that it will be almost 
impossible to assess the definition of terrorism on strict grounds of human rights. Without a 
universal definition of terrorism, States would continue to create broad, overreaching 
definitions of terrorism that inadvertently criminalise some acts outside the realm of terrorism 
as terrorist offences. Consequently, the comparative discussion in this chapter will be limited 
to arrest, pre-charge detention, proscription, and encouragement of terrorism in Nigeria and 
U.K 
 8.1 A Comparative Socio-legal Assessment of Terrorism Arrests in Nigeria and UK  
The Nigerian and UK terrorism Acts both require reasonable suspicion as the legal basis for 
making an arrest for terrorism offences. However there are fundamental differences on how 
the power of arrest is applied and used in practice in both countries.  
The general overview of the socio-legal assessment of the Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 
suggests that the Nigerian government favours a “sledge-hammer approach” to fighting 
terrorism rather than follow due process of the law or the provisions of the Act.  This is clearly 
reflected in the manner the security agencies make arrests. The security forces generally do not 
follow the procedure prescribed by the law (TPA 2011). Rather than arrests on reasonable 
suspicion, the Nigerian security forces engage in indiscriminate arrests, house-to-house 
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searches, intimidation of residents, shooting sporadically in the air to assert their presence, and 
mass arbitrary arrests of relatives of suspected Boko Haram members including children. Over 
the past eight years (since 2009), this has become the practice in Nigeria. While the study 
admits that the right to liberty and security is not absolute, the method of arrest in Nigeria 
reveals a pattern of inadequate criminal investigation by the security forces and a total disregard 
for due process. The Nigerian security forces in effecting terrorism arrests display little  value 
or respect for the human rights of the suspects and the rule of law. Without doubt, the methods 
employed by the Soldiers in effecting arrest in Nigeria are clearly not proportionate to the 
objectives they seek to achieve.  The writer is of the view that the examples given in chapter 6 
are indications of what could be taking place on a wider scale and on a more regular basis in 
areas affected by Boko Haram. Hundreds, if not thousands, of Nigerians have become victims 
of enforced disappearance or have been extra-judicially executed in military detention sites 
without condemnation by the government officials. Presently, the power of arrest under the 
Nigerian Terrorism Act symbolises a “licence to act with impunity” “licence to kill” or a 
“licence to arrest without question.” This is because the authorities have rarely prosecuted any 
member of the Police/Military implicated in abuses. To date, the Nigerian government is yet 
to open any credible investigations into allegations of heavy-handed, excessive use of force, 
and human rights violations by the security forces despite credible evidence that are happening. 
This arguably makes the Nigerian government complicit in the atrocities committed by the 
security forces.  
From a comparative standpoint, the writer finds that (to a large extent)  the application of the 
terrorism Act in U.K follows due process of the law. The method and patterns of arrest for 
terrorism offences in the UK show a stark contrast from the current practice in Nigeria. Despite 
the UK Court ruling in Fox, Campbell and Hartley676 that the ‘reasonableness’ of the suspicion 
justifying such arrests cannot always be judged according to the same standards in dealing with 
conventional crime, arrests in the UK for terrorism offences are generally consistent with the 
provision of the Act. Unlike Nigeria, the Police in the UK do not engage in the “mass arrest” 
of innocent civilians (suspects), widespread house-to-house search/hunt for terror suspects, or 
engage in the burning down of houses, the destruction of properties, or involve in the extra-
judicial execution of terror suspects.   
                                                          
676 Supra Para 32 
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Another notable difference in the UK approach to terrorism arrest is the level of judicial 
involvement after a terrorist is arrested. The Nigerian judiciary are generally reluctant and not 
enthusiastic in holding the Executive/Police accountable for their actions. Unlike Nigeria, 
terrorists arrested in the UK are either charged or released after investigations are concluded. 
Terror suspects in the UK are not held beyond the period provided by the law.  Furthermore, 
there exists a level of accountability and a comprehensive record of terror suspects arrested by 
the Police in the UK. In addition to the comprehensive record of arrest by the Police, the 
Independent Reviewer of the Terrorism Act in the UK also reviews and submits the operation 
of the Terrorism Acts including a detailed statistics on arrests to the Parliament to inform public 
and political debate. This standard of accountability on the part of the security agencies 
combined with the annual review by an independent watch dog is practically non-existent in 
Nigeria. The total number of terror suspects arrested by the security forces is not officially 
available in Nigeria. Likewise, there are no official data by any government agency in Nigeria 
that records or reports the number of terror attacks committed by Boko Haram, the number of 
arrests made, statistics on civilian casualties or the number of terrorists killed every year. The 
absence of an official data on Nigeria’s counter-terrorism activities is clearly reflected in this 
study. The research has drawn considerable information and statistics on terrorism in Nigeria 
from open sources mostly newspaper reports. This is primarily due to the security risks 
involved in acquiring such data in the north-eastern part of Nigeria. Nonetheless, the writer has 
attempted to complement these secondary sources with some internationally recognised 
reports. In order to address the absence of an official statistics/data, the writer will put forward 
a recommendation for the establishment of the office of the “independent” reviewer of the 
Terrorism Act or an independent body that will oversee terrorism related activities in Nigeria.  
It is important to note that arrests made under the UK’s Terrorism Act 20000 are not without 
some criticisms. The socio-legal assessment of arrests in the UK (done in chapter 7) suggests 
that terrorism arrests in the UK are concentrated on a particular religious sect and particular 
ethnic group (Muslims and Black/Asian communities). On the opposite, arrests in Nigeria are 
indiscriminate, arbitrary and widespread. Every person in Nigeria-old or young, male or female 
is a potential Boko Haram suspect in the eyes of the security forces irrespective of his tribal or 
religious affiliation. Admittedly, the security forces in Nigeria work under much more 
dangerous conditions in comparison to the level of terrorist attacks experienced in UK. 
Nonetheless this should  not be an excuse for making arbitrary arrests or engaging in cruel and 
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inhumane and  degrading treatments of suspects.  Even a Boko Haram suspected terrorist 
deserves to be brought to justice in accordance with the right to fair trial and rule of law. 
8.2 A Comparative Socio-legal Assessment of Pre-charge Detention in Nigeria and UK  
 
As seen in chapters 6 and 7, the pre-charge detention regime in Nigeria and UK differ in 
practice. The pre-charge detention regime in Nigeria appears to be determined by the Executive 
(security agencies). On the opposite, the pre-charge detention regime in the UK is generally 
determined by the Police at the initial stage (48 hours) and then further detention is determined 
by the Judiciary (Courts).  
On a comparative note, while the pre-charge detention of terror suspects in UK are as provided 
by the TA 2000, the Nigerian pre-charge detention regime does not follow the provisions of 
the Act. The Nigerian security forces are the accuser, the prosecutor and the judge (all at same 
time) and can detain a terror suspect for years without judicial approval contrary to the 
provisions of the terrorism Act. This is in contrast to the practice in the UK where the maximum 
period which terror suspects can be detained pending charge is 14 days and this has to be 
judicially authorised. The Nigerian security forces enjoy a stunning degree of impunity in their 
counter-terrorism actions to the point that they sometimes flout Court judgements that order 
the release of detainees. The case of Alhaji Yaganami discussed in Chapter 6 is good example 
of this.  
Besides the vague application of the Terrorism Act and the systemic violations of human rights 
by Nigeria security forces, another notable difference in the detention regimes of both countries 
is the remedies that are available to terror detainees. In spite of the legal safeguards that are 
available against unlawful and prolonged detention of suspects in the country, challenging pre-
charge detention in Nigeria are usually met with a brick wall and often resisted by the security 
agencies.  As revealed in the socio-legal assessment of arrest in Nigeria, not all suspects that 
are arrested are produced before the Court after 90 days (or 180 days) as instructed by the 
Terrorism Act. The situation is further compounded with congestion of cases in the Federal 
High Courts. The TPA 2011 (as amended) gives the Federal High Court, exclusive jurisdiction 
to hear terrorism cases. It could take weeks, months, or even a year before the Court can 
adjudicate on a case. Unfortunately, Nigerian Judges have shown less enthusiasm toward the 
constitutionality or otherwise of the 90/180 pre-charge detention under the Act. The situation 
is different in the UK.  There are number of cases where the UK Courts/EctHR have dealt with 
the 14 days pre-charge under the UK Terrorism Act. It is almost certain that an accused in the 
UK will have his/her time in court within the period stipulated under the Act. To address this 
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concern, the writer will recommend the creation of “Terrorism courts” in Nigeria to speed up 
the adjudication of terrorism cases.  
While it seems that the pre-charge detention regime in the UK is one of the longest within the 
EU region, the Nigerian pre-charge detention regime is arguably one of the longest in the world. 
This is because terror detainees are charged at mercy of the detaining authorities without a 
specific period in mind. It is not a surprise that the pre-charge detention regime in Nigeria is 
likened to Guantanamo by lawyers and human rights advocates in Nigeria. Although this is 
contrary to the provision of the TPA 2011 and incompatible with the Constitution of Nigeria, 
this practice is favoured by the Nigerian security agencies.  
In the writer’s view, the justifications given by the UK government for the 14 days pre-charge 
detention of suspects are ‘arguably’ tenable and justified. This includes inter-alia time to gather 
intelligence, time to find interpreters, time to uncover admissible evidence that will be used in 
Court, the complexity of investigating terrorism cases, and the time to conducts searches and 
analyse encrypted data on electronic devices. It is difficult to see how Nigeria’s pre-charge 
detention practices can fit into any of these justifications. Without doubt, the current practice 
of indefinite detention of terror suspects in Nigeria opens the door for more serious 
infringements such as torture, inhumane degrading treatment, and the extra-judicial execution 
of suspects. Remarkably, the UK does not torture or engage in the inhumane degrading 
treatment of terror suspects.  
 
8.4 A Comparative Socio-legal Assessment of Encouragement on Terrorism in Nigeria  
      and UK  
 
There is a fundamental difference in how the scope of encouragement of terrorism is defined 
in Nigeria and the UK. Inevitably, this difference is reflected in the enforcement of this offence 
in both countries. In comparison with the UK, the Nigerian provision on encouragement of 
terrorism is vague and nebulous. The security agencies in Nigeria often take advantage of the 
failure of the Act to properly explain the category of statements which are likely to be 
understood by members of the public as inciting or encouraging terrorism (directly or 
indirectly)  to stifle freedom of speech and press in the country. This flexibility enables the 
authorities to selectively arrest and prosecute dissenting views as terrorism cases or act of 
criminality. This lacuna also makes it easy to for free speech and religious censorship. The 
offence of encouragement of terrorism has become a ‘readily available defence’ against 
perceived political opponent and expressions critical of the state. The arrest of Nmandi Kanu 
and his supporters for terrorism charges for calling for the cessation of Biafra from Nigeria 
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presents a good example.677 Generally speaking, encouragement of terrorism is used as an 
excuse to arrest and silence any language of dissent and those considered as a threat to the 
tranquillity of the existing political and economic order.    
 
In contrast, the application of the offence of terrorism in practice in the UK ‘tries’ to balance 
the content of expression with the medium used and the intention of the speaker. The UK 
regime requires specific intent or recklessness for the prosecution of the offence of 
encouragement of terrorism. There is also delineation between direct and indirect 
encouragement of terrorism in the UK. Although it is important to add that what would be 
considered as indirect encouragement of terrorism is not easy to understand, this problem is 
further compounded by the fact that indirect encouragement of terrorism permits criminalising 
expressions that pose only an abstract and remote risk of violence. However what stands out in 
the UK use of encouragement of terrorism is that the prosecution will still need to prove that 
the statement was likely to be understood by those it was published as encouragement to them 
to (directly or indirectly) engage in specific behaviour constituting the actus reus of a specific 
Convention offence, along with the requisite mens rea of that offence. It is unclear whether the 
prosecution in Nigeria  will need to prove that the statement was likely to be understood by 
those it was published as encouragement to them to (directly or indirectly) engage acts of 
terrorism. The courts in Nigeria are yet to interpret or give their opinion on the offence of 
encouragement of terrorism or establish what would amount to direct or indirect 
encouragement of terrorism. As will be established in the next chapter, the level of judicial 
scrutiny towards the offence of encouragement of terrorism in the UK and by ECrtHR is 
feasibly absent in Nigeria. Going by the socio-legal assessment of the offence in Nigeria, no 
consideration is given to the “context of expression” or “the content of expression” before an 
arrest for encouragement of terrorism is made. The Nigerian security forces generally do not 
first of all establish whether not a statement or expression is within the remit of legitimate 
expression. It is argued here that culpability should be reserved for those expressions where 
the speaker intends to encourage terrorism.  
The main concern regarding the offence of encouragement of terrorism in both countries  is its 
threat to the right to freedom of expression regardless of whether such expression will actually 
encourage terrorism. The likelihood of abuse or  misuse is however higher in Nigeria.  
                                                          
677 Itunu Ojobaro,’Police unleash terror on Biafra Agitators in Enugu, arrest 25’  
http://whirlwindnews.com/news/4115-Police-unleash-terror-on-Biafran-agitators-in-Enugu-arrest-25- 
accessed 12th feb, 2017  
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In the light of these inadequacies, the conclusion of this thesis is that the Nigerian law on 
encouragement of terrorism is poorly drafted and broadly implemented. Hence there is an 
urgent need for Nigeria to amend its provisions on encouragement on terrorism or  enact a new 
provision to address encouragement of terrorism.  
 
8.5 A Comparative Socio-legal Assessment of Proscription in Nigeria and UK  
 
The main difference in the proscription regime of Nigeria and the UK is the failure of Nigeria 
to recognise regional and international terrorist groups under its list of proscribed organisations. 
The TPA2011 clearly recognises groups involved in terrorist acts in any resolution of the 
United Nations Security Council or in any instrument of the African Union and Economic 
Community of West African States,678 unfortunately only Boko Haram and Ansaru have been 
officially proscribed and listed as proscribed organisations under the Act. This is different from 
the UK proscription regime where both domestic, regional, and international terrorist groups 
are proscribed.  This begs the question why the Nigerian law makers extend  the definition of 
terrorism to include a person or group as an international terrorist if the person or group is a 
member of an international terrorist group recognised under the Act or listed in ‘any resolution 
of the United Nations Security Council or instrument of African Union and Economic 
Community of West African States as a person involved in terrorist act,’679 or “considered to 
be a terrorist by a competent authority of a foreign state.”680  Or is international terrorism is not 
a threat to Nigeria?  
Conversely, a related point arises from the fact that the proscription regime in the UK today is 
arguably subjective and contentious. Attaching a terrorism label to an organisation appears to 
be political rather than judicial.  This is because most of the terrorist organisations proscribed 
in the UK pose no direct threat to the country. It is hard not to agree with the criticism that 
proscription in the UK is mainly a diplomatic tool to show support to other countries fighting 
terrorism.  
 
 
                                                          
678 S.9(4)(b) 
679 S.9(1)(b) ibid 
680 S.9(4)(c) 
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8.6   Conclusion 
Overall there are fundamental differences in how the Terrorism Acts  are used/applied in 
practice in both countries. The comparative discussion clearly shows that the application of the 
provision of the Act in Nigeria is largely determined by the authorities as against the clearly 
defined provision of the Act. The situation in the UK is largely as provided by the Act. The 
general disregard for the provisions of the Terrorism Act and the rule of law in Nigeria has 
resulted in devastating consequences for the fulfilment  of human rights in the country. A 
conclusion that can be drawn from the comparison in the application legal measures under the 
Act in both counties is that counter-terrorism tools that do not comply with human rights are 
most likely not be effective and counter-productive.  
Having juxtaposed the application in practice of the provision of the terrorism Act in Nigeria 
and UK, the question that will be asked is what are the human rights safeguards available to 
terror suspects in both countries? The research will be incomplete without determining whether 
the provisions of the Act in both countries are consistent with their domestic, regional and 
constitutional obligations? And what challenges can be made to the constitutionality of the 
provisions of the Act on human rights grounds? 
In discussing the constitutional and human rights safeguards available to terror suspects in the 
Nigeria and the UK, a further assessment of Nigeria’s TPA 2011 and the UK’s TA 2000 by 
reference to their domestic, regional and international human rights obligations is necessary.  
This is to first of all determine whether the Terrorism Acts of Nigeria and the UK are consistent 
with their domestic, regional, and international human rights obligations, more importantly 
explore the remedies that are available to a terrorist suspects under these statutes.  
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CHAPTER 9 
 
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE TPA 2011 (AS AMENDED) BY REFERENCE TO  
NIGERIA’S DOMESTIC, REGIONAL & INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL  
OBLIGATIONS 
 
1. Introduction  
As we have seen from the preceding chapters that in countering terrorism States often adopt 
measures that unnecessarily infringe human rights, especially in practice. This thesis will be 
incomplete without a detailed assessment of Nigeria’s TPA 2011 (as amended) by reference to 
the country’s domestic, regional, and constitutional obligations. The aim is to assess whether 
the provisions of the TPA 2011 (as amended) are consistent with Nigeria’s domestic, regional 
and constitutional obligations under the Constitution 1999, the African Charter on Human and 
People’s Right (ACHPR), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR). In so doing, questions relating to the constitutionality of the provisions of the TPA 
2011 on human rights grounds by reference to these statutes will be addressed.  
The assessment here will be done by juxtaposing the definition of terrorism, the power of arrest, 
the pre-charge detention of terror suspects, the encouragement of terrorism and the proscription 
of terrorist organisations under the TPA 2011 side by side with similar provisions under the 
Constitution, the African Charter, and the ICCPR. Inevitably, the assessment will focus on the 
human rights that could be affected by these legal measures under the Act. For sake of clarity, 
the assessment will be divided into two sub-headings. First, there will be an exploration of 
Nigeria’s obligations under the Constitution FRN 1999, the African Charter, and the ICCPR. 
This will be followed by an assessment of the TPA 2011 by reference to the Constitution FRN 
1999, the ACHPR and the ICCPR.   
2. An exploration of Nigeria’s obligations under the Constitution 1999, the African 
Charter on Human and People’s Right and the ICCPR. 
 
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 is the final and supreme law in 
Nigeria. This is clearly spelt out under its supremacy clause which provides that “this 
Constitution is supreme and its provisions shall have binding force on all authorities and 
persons throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria.”681Section 1(3) of the Constitution 
                                                          
681 S. 1 CFRN 1999 
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clarifies that “if any law is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution, the constitution 
shall prevail, and that law shall to the extent of the inconsistency be void.” 
This position was reiterated by Justice Kabiri Whyte in Musa v Hamza,682 where his Lordship 
held that: 
        “The Constitution is a document containing the fons et origo (i.e. the source and  
      origin) of the laws and rights of its people. It is in a sense what in Kelsenian terminology 
      may be regarded as the grundnorm of the State. The Constitution is therefore  
      aptly described as the supreme law of the land. This is because it is a law, which  
      does not depend upon any other for its validity.” 
 
Similar decisions were reached in Adigun v A.G Oyo State683 and Labiyi v Anreti684 where the 
Courts upheld the supremacy of the Constitution 1999 over every other law in the country.  
Chapter 4 of the Constitution 1999 (ss. 33 - 46) guarantees the fundamental human rights of 
every person in Nigeria. Any law that fails to recognise these rights, by virtue of Section 1(3) 
of the Constitution, will be null and void and of no effect. However, it is important to note that 
these rights, with the exception of freedom from torture and inhumane degrading treatment, 
slavery or servitude and forced or compulsory labour,685are subject to limitations. Some of 
these limitations/restrictions will be discussed in the second section of this chapter.  
Despite the supremacy of the Constitution, Nigeria has explicitly accepted human rights 
obligations through regional and international human rights treaties which it has ratified. These 
treaties are “legally” binding on Nigeria, imposing obligations to respect, protect and fulfil 
human rights.  Following the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), now 
African Union (AU), on 25th of May 1963 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, it became necessary for 
a regional African instrument for the protection of human rights.  In 1979, the United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA) adopted Resolution 34/171 on regional arrangements for the 
promotion and protection of human rights including developing regions like Africa.686 As a 
result of this, the ACHPR was adopted in June 1981 and came into force on 21st October 1986. 
The Act is alternatively referred to as the “Banjul Charter.” The African Charter was enacted 
                                                          
682 [1982] 2 NCLR 229 at 250 
683 [1987] 4 SC 272 at 344 
684 [1992] 8NWLR at 139 
685 S.34(1) CFRN 1999 
686 Roland Adjovi, ‘Understanding the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights; How does the African 
Charter interact with or enrich the international law project?  Think Press Africa 5th November, 2012 
http://thinkafricapress.com/international-law-africa/african-charter-human-peoples-rights Accessed 5th 
January, 2014. 
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to protect the human rights and freedom of the people living in African. This is similar to other 
regional provisions on human rights like the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Nigeria became a signatory to the African Charter on 31st August 1982 and ratified the Charter 
on the 22nd June, 1983.687 Following the requirement of S. 12(1) of the Constitution which 
provides that “no treaty between the Federation and any other country shall have the force of 
law except to the extent to which any such treaty has been enacted into law by the National 
Assembly.” The National Assembly incorporated the African Charter into the domestic law of 
Nigeria through the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Enforcement and 
Ratification) Act 2 of 1983 and is now contained in Cap 10, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 
1990.688 As a result of this, the African Charter is now part of the laws of Nigeria and the Courts 
must uphold it.689 This position was upheld by the Supreme Court in Sani Abacha v Gani 
Fawehinmi690 where the Court held that 
  “the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights shall, subject as 
   there under provided, have force of law in Nigeria and shall be given full recognition  
  and effect and be applied by all authorities and persons exercising legislative,   
  executive or judicial powers in Nigeria."691  
 
For the avoidance of doubt, the Supreme Court held that where there is a conflict between the 
Charter and any domestic law, with exception to the Constitution, the Charter should 
prevail.692In other words, only the Constitution shall supersede the African Charter. 
                                                          
687 African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights; Ratification Table: African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/ratification/ accessed 5th January, 2014 
688 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act Chapter A9 (Chapter 10 
LFN 1990) (No 2 of 1983) Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990 
689 The Supreme Court in Ogugu v The State held that ‘the enforcement of provisions of the African Charter like 
all other laws falls within the judicial powers of the courts as provided by the Constitution and all other laws 
relating thereto by the several High Courts depending on the circumstances of each and in accordance with 
the rules, practice and procedure of such courts’. [1994] 9 NWLR pt 366  
690 S.C. 45/1997 
691 ibid 
692 Ibid “No doubt Cap. 10 is a statue with international flavour. Being so, therefore, I would  
   think that if there is a conflict between it and another statue, its provisions will prevail  
   over those of that other statue for the reason that it is presumed that the legislature  
   does not intend to breach an international obligation. To this extent I agree with  
  their Lordships of the Court below that the Charter possesses "a greater vigour  
  and strength" than any other domestic statue. But that is not to say that the Charter  
  is superior to the Constitution…’’ 
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The Supreme Court however noted that the rights and obligations contained in the Charter are 
not new to Nigeria as most of these rights and obligations are already enshrined in our 
Constitution.693  
Art 1 of the African Charter provides that “parties to the present Charter shall recognise the 
rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in the Charter and shall undertake to adopt legislative 
or other measures to give effect to them.”  
Going by Art 1, Nigeria been a party to the Charter and having incorporated the Charter into 
law domestically is bound it.  
Nigeria is also a party to a number of international human rights treaties which binds her to 
respect and ensure the human rights of all individuals within its territory. For the purposes of 
this study, the assessment will be limited to the ICCPR. 
After the horrors of the World War II, it became necessary to translate the Universal 
Declaration into a hard legal form of an international treaty.694 The United Nation General 
Assembly reaffirmed the necessity of complementing the UDHR with traditional civil and 
political rights. Accordingly, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was 
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 
1966. It entered into force on 23 March 1976.695 The ICCPR in its preamble considers the 
obligation of States under the Charter of the United Nations to promote universal respect for, 
and observance of, human rights and freedoms. The ICCPR comprises most of the traditional 
human rights as they are known from historic documents such as the First Ten Amendments to 
the Constitution of the United States (1789/1791) and the French Déclaration des droits de 
l’homme et du citoyen (1789).696  
Nigeria acceded to the ICCPR on October 1993 but it is yet to ratify the first Optional Protocol 
(on establishing an individual complaints mechanism) and the Second Optional Protocol (on 
abolition of the death penalty).697 Even though Nigeria is yet to incorporate the ICCPR into its 
                                                          
693 ibid 
694 Christian Tomuschat, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights New York, 16 December 1966 
(Audiovisual Library of Int Law http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/iccpr/iccpr.html Accessed 8th January, 2014 
695 ibid 
696 ibid 
697 The ICCPR Participant, Signature, Accession, Succession, Ratification 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no=iv-4&chapter=4&lang=en Accessed 8th 
January 2014 
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domestic law, as a State party to the Covenant, it is obliged to guarantee the protection of rights 
under the ICCPR which includes right to life, right to liberty and security of person, freedom 
of association and assembly. 
Explicitly, Art 2(2) ICCPR provides that: 
   “where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State  
   Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with  
   its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt  
   such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized 
  in the present Covenant.’  
 
Going by Art 2(2) ICCPR above, Nigeria, being a State Party to the Covenant is obliged to take 
necessary steps, in line with its Constitution, to makes laws that will protect human rights as 
recognised under the ICCPR.  
Having highlighted the implication of the Constitution FRN 1999, the ACHPR, and the ICCPR 
on Nigeria’s domestic, regional and international obligation, the rest of the chapter will 
juxtapose the definition of terrorism, the arrest and detention of a terror suspect, the 
proscription of terrorist organisation, and the encouragement of terrorism under the TPA 2011 
by reference to these statutes. This will be done by paying particular attention to the rights that 
are much more relevant to these five provisions, for example, the right of liberty and security, 
freedom of assembly, association and freedom of expression.  
3. An assessment of the key provisions of the TPA 2011(as amended) by reference to 
Nigeria’s Constitution 1999, the ACHPR and the ICCPR 
 
3.1 Definition of terrorism 
In previous chapters that analyse and assess the definition of terrorism under the TPA 2011 
(chapter 3 & 6), the writer raised many questions especially relating to the precision and 
certainty of the Act in the criminalisation of certain offences as acts of terrorism. These 
questions will now be addressed by juxtaposing the definition of terrorism under the Act with 
related provisions under the Constitution, the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, 
and under the ICCPR. As a reminder, the writer also emphasized in Chapter 3 that the definition 
of terrorism in Nigeria extends to acts and omissions done outside the country.698 This provide 
a basis for comparing the Act with related provisions under the African Charter and ICCPR.  
                                                          
698 S.1(3)(d) TPA 2011 as amended. 
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Firstly, it is important to note that the Nigerian Constitution 1999 does not expressly define 
terrorism. However s.45(1) of the Constitution empowers the Nigerian  National Assembly to 
make laws in the “interest of defence or public safety or for the purpose of protecting the rights 
and freedom or other persons.” The National Assembly in exercising this constitutional duty 
enacted the Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 which  provided inter alia the definition of 
terrorism in Nigeria.  
 The constitutional prerequisite for any law enacted under S.45(1)(a)-(b) of the Constitution is 
that it must be “reasonably justifiable.” The Constitution does not give a meaning to the phrase 
“reasonably justifiable.” However, the Court in State v. Ivory Trumpet699 held that the test for 
reasonable justifiability depends on historical circumstances as well as a factual mischief which 
required the enactment of the law.  The Court held further that the test for determining this is 
an objective one which requires the state to show that there is grave risk of harm to a large 
section of the state/community, and that the risk of harm is imminent demanding grave 
urgency.700 Clearly, Nigeria’s national security and the safety of its citizens were at risk in 2011 
when the Act was enacted.  Consequently, the “reasonable justifiability” test by the authority 
that made the TPA 2011 was fulfilled. This settles question about the constitutionality or 
otherwise of enacting the TPA 2011.  
In addition  to that, S. 45(1) of the Constitution expressly provides that the right to privacy, 
freedom of thoughts, freedom of expression, freedom of association and assembly, and 
‘freedom of movement’ can be restricted under  ‘such law that is reasonably justifiable’ in the 
interests of  defence and public safety.’ Generally speaking, going by S.45(1) of the 
Constitution,  since the Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 is a law that was enacted in the 
‘interest of defence and public safety’ to tackle terrorism, the restrictions of these rights against 
any person who commits acts of terrorism under the TPA 2011 will be constitutional in Nigeria.   
A juxtaposition of S.9 TPA 2011(as amended) which recognises resolutions and international 
instruments from the United Nations Security Council, the African Union (AU) and resolutions 
from other regional bodies like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
with  S.19 of the Constitution shows consistency in both statutes.  
Section 19 of the Constitution provides: 
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   ‘The foreign policy objectives shall be promotion and protection of the national  
    interest; promotion of African integration and support for African unity; promotion  
    of international co-operation for the consolidation of universal peace and mutual  
    respect among all nations and elimination of discrimination in all its  
    manifestations; respect for international law and treaty obligations as well as the  
    seeking of settlement of international disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation,  
    arbitration and adjudication.’ 
 
It is important to note that while S.19 of the Constitution provides a legal basis for the 
international scope of the TPA 2011(as amended), it does not settle the question of differences 
in the meaning of what States define as terrorism.  
As at the submission of this thesis in 2017, the ‘wordings’ and ‘terms’ used in defining 
terrorism under the Act have not been challenged in Court or posed a problem to the Courts in 
Nigeria. Hence, there is no case law (judicial decision) from which the writer can directly draw 
reference. However, there are a plethora of cases where the courts have settled the issue of the 
interpretation of statutes in Nigeria. For example, the Supreme Court in Africa Newspaper of 
Nigeria v Federal Republic of Nigeria701 held that where the words used in a statute are direct, 
straight forward and unambiguous, the construction of those words must be based on the 
ordinary plain meaning of the words. The Supreme Court in AG Abia State v. AG Federation702 
warned that the Courts “cannot embark on an unguarded voyage of discovery” in interpreting 
statutes, as texts of the law must be adhered to, except where the strict construction would lead 
absurdity. Also, the Supreme Court in A.G Federation v Atiku Abubakar703held that where the 
words used in a Statute are ambiguous,  the courts have a discretion to choose the meaning 
which they consider most appropriate having regard to the context and other surrounding 
circumstances.  
The implication of these judgments by the Supreme Court is that where a problem regarding 
terms/phrases used in the definition of terrorism under the TPA 2011 arises, the Court must 
adopt the ordinary plain meaning of the words used in the Act, and where the word used is 
ambiguous, the courts have a discretion to choose the meaning which they consider most 
appropriate. 
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Having assessed the definition of terrorism under the TPA 2011 by reference to Nigeria’s 
constitution and case law, the definition will now be assessed by reference to the African 
Charter on Human and People’s rights (ACHPR).  
The ACHPR does not define terrorism.  The definition of terrorism in Africa is provided for 
by the African Union Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (Algiers 
Convention).704 Nonetheless, Art 23 of the ACHPR mandates States Parties to adopt legitimate 
measures aimed at preventing and combating terrorist acts in accordance with the provisions 
of this Convention and their respective national legislation. Without doubt, one of this measures 
will include the definition of terrorism, since there can be no law on terrorism without it first 
of all defining acts that will constitute terrorism. Hence, it will be safe to conclude that Art 23 
of the ACHPR provides the legality for enacting the terrorism Act in Nigeria, including the 
definition of terrorism.  However, it remains unclear whether the definition of terrorism under 
the TPA 2011 (as amended) is consistent or inconsistent with any provision of the ACHPR. 
This is because the Nigerian Courts (Judiciary) has made no reference to the ACHPR or even 
the Algiers Convention in any of the Nigerian terrorism cases decided to date.  
At the international level, the ICCPR does define terrorism. The ICCPR is a Covenant of the 
UN General Assembly agreed to by member states to respect and uphold the rights of all 
individuals. However, the U.N General Assembly in its Resolution A/RES/63/185 Para 18 of 
Dec 2008 called on States to ensure that their counter-terrorism laws are accessible, formulated 
with precision, non-discrimination, and non-retroactive.705 The Resolution also urged States to 
ensure full compliance with their international human rights obligations as well as adequate 
human rights guarantees in their national law.706 Elements of this  resolution are consistent with 
Art 15 of the ICCPR which provides that “no one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence 
                                                          
704 The Organisation of African Union Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism 1999. This 
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on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national 
or international law, at the time when it was committed.” 
The question is does Nigeria’s definition of terrorism, as provided by the TPA 2011, comply 
with the requirements of accessibility, precision, non-discrimination, and non-retroactivity as 
required by the ICCPR?  
The answer to this question can either be in the affirmative or negative. With regards to 
“accessibility” and “non-discrimination,” the 2011 Act (as amended) is easily accessible and 
non-discriminatory. The definition of terrorism in Nigeria does not discriminate on the ground 
of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.  This is also consistent with Art 4(1) 
ICCPR which provides that ‘in time of public emergency, States Parties may take measures 
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not 
inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not involve 
discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.’   
With regards to “precision”, critics like Prof. Oyebode have argued that the definition of 
terrorism under the Act is unnecessarily broad.707 The writer agrees that the Nigerian definition 
adopts an all-encompassing approach. As previously discussed, offences that are present under 
Nigeria’s Criminal Code/Penal Code were incorporated into the definition of terrorism under 
the Act without repealing or amending the provisions under the PC and CC. On that basis, it 
will be safe to conclude that the Act is not precise is defining who a terrorist is in Nigeria, 
thereby failing to meet the requirement of ‘precision’ under the UN resolution A/RES/63/185 
of 2008 and incompatible with the Art 15 ICCPR. However, it is important to note that the 
broad definition given to terrorism is not peculiar to Nigeria, acquiring a universally accepted 
definition of terrorism remains a problem in international law. This situation could be attributed 
to the ever changing nature of terrorism. Until there is a universally acceptable definition of 
terrorism in international law, States like Nigeria will continue to define the term to 
accommodate offences it considers as terrorism.   
3.2 Arrest 
Nigeria’s TPA 2011(as amended) gives an officer of any law enforcement or security agency 
the  power to arrest and detain any person whom he reasonably suspects of having committed 
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or likely to commit an offence.708 This has generated heated controversy in Nigeria especially 
when placed side by side with S. 35(1) of the Constitution 1999 which guarantees the right to 
liberty and security of person. Critics of the power of arrest have argued that ‘arrest based on 
reasonable suspicion’ allows the police free rein to arrest whomsoever they wish to arrest and 
in most cases without having good reasons for the arrest.709  
The Constitution FRN 1999 guarantees the right to personal liberty. Section 35 provides that 
every person shall be entitled to his personal liberty and no person shall be deprived of such 
liberty. This section comes with several exceptions. One of the exceptions under S.35(c) is “for 
the purpose of bringing an accused before a court upon reasonable suspicion of having 
committed a criminal offence, or to such extent as may be reasonably necessary to prevent his 
committing a criminal offence.”  
The Court in Nigeria upheld the exceptions under S.35 of the Constitution in Onyirioha v. 
Inspector-General of Police.710 The Court ruled that: 
  “It is now settled beyond peradventure that a Nigerian citizen is entitled to his God’s  
   given natural right free from incarceration as guaranteed under S.35 of the 
   Constitution, except in accordance with the laws of the land for the  
   prevention of a criminal offence.” 
 
Going by the exception under S. 35 (c) of the Constitution and the decision of the Court in 
Onyirioha’s (cited above), the power to arrest based on ‘reasonable suspicion of having 
committed or likely to commit an offence’ as provided under the TPA 2011 is consistent with 
the Constitution.   
Furthermore, the Police are constitutionally empowered to make the arrest as per section 214(1) 
Constitution 1999. S.214(2)(b) provides that the members of the Nigeria Police shall have such 
powers and duties as maybe conferred upon them by law. One of such laws is the Police Act 
1990 which gives the Police powers for the prevention and detection of crime and the “arrest” 
of offenders.  
Also, Section 45(2) of the Constitution provides that: 
   “An act of the National Assembly shall not be invalidated by reason only that it  
    provides for the taking, during periods of emergency, of measures that derogate  
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    from ‘right to life’ and ‘personal liberty’ but no such measures shall be taken in  
   pursuance of any such act during any period of emergency save to the extent that  
   those measures are reasonably justifiable for the purpose of dealing with the situation   
   that exists during that period of emergency.” 
 
This suggests that during periods of emergency, the Constitution allows for the derogation from 
the right to personal liberty but only where it is reasonably justifiable for addressing existing 
situations within the period of the emergency. As a safeguard against abuse, the Constitution 
provides that any person who is arrested shall have the right to remain silent or avoid answering 
any question until after consultation with a legal practitioner or any other person of his 
choice.711 In addition to that, any person who is arrested or detained shall be informed in writing 
within twenty-four hours and in a language which he understands of the facts and grounds of 
his arrest or detention.712  
At the regional level, Art.6 of the ACHPR permits an arrest for reasons laid down by the law. 
Article 6 of the Charter goes on to state that no one may be arbitrarily arrested or detained. The 
African Commission on Human Rights, a body officially charged with the interpretation of the 
ACHPR, in Amnesty International v Sudan713 stated that Art.6 must be interpreted in such a 
way to permit arrest only in the exercise of powers granted to the security forces in a democratic 
society.  
Based on the foregoing, since the power of arrest under the TPA 2011 (as amended) is based 
on a reason laid down by law, that is, ‘reasonable suspicion to have committed or likely to 
commit an offence under the Act,’ it is safe to conclude that the power of arrest under the Act 
is compatible with the African Charter. However, the Charter forbids arbitrary arrest as 
currently being practiced by the Police and Soldiers in Nigeria. It is not enough for a law to 
permit an arrest; the law must comply with the acceptable standards.714One of the standards is 
for the Police to inform the accused of the reason for his arrest. The African Commission on 
Human Rights in Huri laws v Nigeria715held that failure of the Police to ‘promptly’ inform a 
person arrested of the reason of his arrest violated the right to fair trial. In that case, the accused 
persons were arrested and detained without informing them of the charges against them neither 
were they charged.716 Relating this to arrest of terrorists in Nigeria, it is obvious that while S.6 
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of the African Charter is consistent with the power of Arrest under the Act, the Nigerian 
Police/JTF have on several occasions violated the human rights guarantees under the African 
Charter. Arrests in Nigeria, especially those made under the TPA 2011, are done arbitrarily and 
indiscriminately. Also, the Police in Nigeria generally do not inform a suspect of the reasons 
for their arrest. This is inconsistent with Art 4, 5, and 7 of the African Charter which guarantees 
the right to life and the integrity of his person, prohibition of torture, right to the respect of the 
dignity inherent in a human being  particularly cruel inhuman or degrading punishment and 
other ill-treatment, and the right to fair trial respectively.  
Under Art 9 of the ICCPR arrest can only be made on “such grounds and in accordance with 
such procedure as are established by law.” This in effect means that the deprivation of the right 
to liberty such as arrest of terror suspects must be carried out in accordance with an established 
law. The UN Human Right Committee, a body of independent experts that monitors 
implementation of the ICCPR by its State parties, in McLawrence v Jamaica717 held that the 
legality of arrest is violated if an individual is arrested or detained on grounds which are not 
clearly established in domestic legislation.   
Going by Art 9 of the ICCPR and the decision in McLawrence, it can be argued that since the 
power to arrest a terror suspect in Nigeria is clearly established under the TPA 2011, arrest 
under the Act is consistent with the ICCPR.  
With regards to meaning of the word “arbitrary arrest,” the UN Human Right Committee 
explained that “arbitrariness” is not to be equated with “against the law” but must be interpreted  
more broadly to include the elements of appropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and 
due process of the law.’718 
Rights that are available to anyone arrested and detained under the ICCPR include the right to 
be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest,719 and the right to be brought 
‘promptly’ before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and 
shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release.720 In Campbell v Jamaica,721 the 
UN Human Right Committee held that Art. 9(2) of the Covenant was violated where the 
accused was arrested and detained and was not informed of the reason behind his arrest until 
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after seven days. A similar decision was reached by the UN Human Right Committee in 
Leehong v Jamaica.722 
Other rights available to an accused person under the ICCPR are as contained in Art 14(2). It 
provides that ‘everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty according to law’ and ‘in the determination of any criminal charge 
be entitled to- be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he understands of the 
nature and cause of the charge against him; adequate time and facilities for the preparation of 
his defence; to be tried without undue delay; to be tried in his presence, and to defend himself 
in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing; To examine, or have examined, the 
witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf 
under the same conditions as witnesses against him; free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot 
understand or speak the language used in court; not to be compelled to testify against himself 
or to confess guilt.’723 
 Relating this to Nigeria, as previously discussed, terrorist suspects are arrested without 
informing them of the reason for the arrest. Following the arrest of a terror suspect, the  
Police/JTF allegedly use different means of torture including intimidation, coercion and use of 
electric baton in order to compel terror suspects to make incriminating statements against 
themselves.724 These are contrary to Articles 7 and 14 of the ICCPR which provides that ‘no 
one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ 
and that ‘in the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and 
obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a 
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.’ Art. 14(2) goes further to 
state that “everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty according to law.’’ More importantly, Art.9(5) expressly provides 
that ‘anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable 
right to compensation.’ 
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3.3 Pre-charge Detention of Terror Suspects 
The provision of the Constitution relating to the pre-charge detention of a suspect is clear. 
Section 35(1)(c) of the Constitution expressly provides that the right to liberty can be restricted 
“in accordance with a procedure permitted by law  for the purpose of bringing a suspect before 
a court in execution of the order of a court or upon reasonable suspicion of his having 
committed a criminal offence, or to such extent as may be reasonably necessary to prevent his 
committing a criminal offence.”  
Going by S.35 above, one of the bases for the pre-charge detention of a suspect under the 
Constitution is “reasonable suspicion his having committed a criminal offence.” In the same 
way, detention under the TPA 2011 (as amended) is based on ‘reasonable suspicion’ to have 
committed or likely to commit an offence.’ This undoubtedly shows that the power to detain a 
suspect based on ‘reasonable suspicion’ to have committed or likely to commit an offence’ 
under the TPA 2011 is in agreement with the Constitution.  
Supporting this position, the Court in Ekwenugo v Federal Republic of Nigeria held that ‘if 
there is a reasonable suspicion that a suspect has committed an offence his right to liberty may 
be suspended temporarily.725’ The Courts in Nigeria have held that “reasonable suspicion” to 
arrest and detain a suspect must be exercised with discretion and that discretion must be 
objective, judicial, and judicious.726 The prosecution must also adduce evidence on the grounds 
of such arrest/detention and the test must be an objective one.727  
Nevertheless, S.35(4) of the Constitution provides that any person detained for the purpose of 
bringing him before a Court, or upon reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence, or 
for the purpose of preventing his committing a criminal offence must be brought before a court 
within a “reasonable time” and if he is not tried within a period of “two months” from the date 
of his arrest or detention ‘in the case of a person who is in custody or is not entitled to bail; 728 
or  “three months” from the date of his arrest or detention in the case of a person who has been 
released on bail, he shall (without prejudice to any further proceedings that may be brought 
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against him)729-be released unconditionally or on the condition that is reasonably necessary 
that he appears for trial at a later date.730  
The Constitution clarifies the expression "a reasonable time" under 35(5)(a)-(b) to mean ‘one 
day- where there is a court of competent jurisdiction within a radius of 40 kilometre; Or in any 
other case two days or  a longer period as may be considered by the court to be reasonable’.731  
This in effect means that pre-charge detention of a terror suspect under the Nigerian 
Constitution could be for ‘one day’ where a court is within 40 meters radius, or for ‘two days 
in other cases,’ or for ‘a longer period’ which the Court considers reasonable. The proviso “as 
may be considered by the Court to be reasonable”  leaves the determination of “reasonability” 
and “legality” of period of pre-charge detention of a terror suspect for the Court/Judge to 
decide.  
Going by S.35(4) of the Constitution, the maximum period for which an accused may be 
detained before he/she is charged to court under the Constitution is “two months.” By 
mathematical calculation, the highest total number of days within two months in any calendar 
year is 62 days. This suggests that a pre-charge detention period that exceeds 62 days (such as 
the power to detain to for 90/180 days as per the TPA 2011) in Nigeria is illegal/illegitimate 
and “unconstitutional.” The Constitution goes further to say that   where a suspect who is in 
custody is not brought to Court within 2 months, or 3 months, in the case of a suspect that has 
been granted bail, he must be released unconditionally or on the condition that is reasonably 
necessary that he appears for trial at a later date (although this is without prejudice to any 
further proceedings that may be brought against him.) 
Furthermore, the Constitution provides safeguards for suspects held in custody pending charge. 
Any person who is detained shall have the right to remain silent or avoid answering any 
question until after consultation with a legal practitioner or any other person of his choice.732 
Also, any person who is arrested or detained shall be informed in writing within twenty-four 
hours and in a language which he understands of the facts and grounds of his arrest or 
detention.733 This provides for the right against self-incrimination for the person arrested.  
                                                          
729 S.35(4)(a) ibid 
730 ibid 
731 S.35(5)(b) 
732 S. 35(2) CFRN 1999 
733 S.35(3) CFRN 1999 
   
184 
 
Juxtaposing the position of the Constitution on the period of pre-charge detention with the 
provision of TPA 2011(as amended) shows a disagreement. While the Constitution says that 
the maximum period which a suspect can be detained without charge is 2 months after which 
they must be released, the TPA 2011 allows for a total period of period of 180days (pursuant 
to an exparte application to the Court for a pre-charge detention  period of 90days subject to a 
renewal for another 90days).734   
In Ariori & Ors .v. Elemo & Ors735Obaseki Justice Supreme Court (as he then was) in 
explaining “reasonable time,” described it as “the period of time which in the search for justice, 
does not wear out the parties and their witnesses and which is required to ensure that justice is 
not only done but appears to reasonable person to be done.” In the writer’s view, detaining an 
accused for 90 days, or worse still 180 days, would certainly frustrate the accused and does not 
appear reasonable.  
Also, the Supreme Court in Dominic Onuorah Ifezue v Livinus Mbadugha held that reasonable 
time” must be left at the discretion of the court.”736 Equally, the Court in Durwin v Benek 
warned that ‘exercising a judicial discretion properly in matters relating to detention ought to 
be founded on facts and circumstances presented to the court from which a conclusion 
governed by the law will have to be drawn.’737  
However, in Asari Dokubo v Federal Republic of Nigeria,738 the Supreme Court held that the 
pre-detention of the accused for up to a year on charges of taking arms against the State was 
consistent with S. 35 of the Constitution. Katsina Alu JSC in that case said 
   “It is my belief as well that if every person accused of a felony can hide under the canopy  
   of section 35 of the Constitution to escape lawful detention then an escape route  to 
   freedom is easily and richly made available to persons suspected to have committed serious  
 crimes and that will not augur well for the peace, progress, prosperity and tranquillity    
 of the society” 
 
The Court held further that,  
 “where national security is threatened or there is the real likelihood of it being  
  threatened, human rights or the individual right of those responsible take second place. 
  Human rights or individual rights must be suspended until national security can  
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 be protected or well taken care of’’739   
 
The decision in Asari Dokubo raises questions about the role of the Judiciary in interpreting 
the law. Although it follows S.35 (5)(b) of the Constitution which gives the Courts power to 
determine whether or not the period of detention is ‘reasonable.’ The decision in Asari’s case, 
for example, suggests that once approved by the Court, a pre-charge detention for up to a year 
can be lawful. The imprecise wording of S. 35(5)(b) “as may be considered by the court to be 
reasonable”  makes leaves the pre-charge detention period open and uncertain. It leaves the 
period of pre-charge detent at the mercy of the Court/Judge.  
As we have seen, the Constitution says that where a suspect that is detained is not tried within 
a period of two months, the pre-charge detention becomes illegal and the detainee must be must 
be released unconditionally.740 This same Constitution as per Section 35(5)(b) also provides  
that the Court may consider a period that exceeds 2months (or even more) as reasonable. The 
latter constitutes a draw back in safeguarding the 2months earlier prescribed by the 
Constitution. The writer is of the view that this section should be reviewed as it poses a grave 
danger to liberty and security of detainees under the Constitution. 
Drawing a conclusion from the fore-going, a pre-charge detention period in Nigeria which 
exceeds 2 months is “unconstitutional” and as such unnecessarily infringes on the right to 
personal liberty of the suspect, except the Court says otherwise.741 It is clear that where there 
is a conflict in the period of pre-charge detention of suspects under the Act and the Constitution, 
the Constitution will prevail by virtue of Section 1(1).742 
At the regional level, Art 6 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) 
guarantees the right to liberty and security of person. Art 6 provides that; 
  “Every individual shall the right to liberty and the right to the security of his person.  
   No one    may be deprived of his freedom except for reasons and conditions previously  
   laid down by law. In particular, no one may be arbitrarily arrested or detained.” 
 
Art 6 above suggests that the right to liberty under the ACHPR can be restricted based on 
reasons laid down by any law. Also, Art 27(2) of which can be regarded as the general 
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limitation clause provides that “the rights and freedoms of each individual shall be exercised 
with due regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest.”  
Going by Art 27 of the ACHPR, the State can restricts/limit rights and freedoms under the 
Charter where it concerns the rights of others, collective security and common interest. 
Certainly, counter-terrorism cases would fall under the “collective security.” Since the pre-
charge detention of a suspect under the Act is based on reasonable suspicion of having 
committed or likely to commit a terror offence, it would be safe to conclude that the “pre-
charge detention” of a terror suspect under the TPA 2011 is compatible with Art 6 and 27 of 
the ACHPR.  
However, the African Charter goes on to provide that where the right to liberty and security of 
a person is restricted, that is where a person has been detained,  the “individual shall the right 
to have his cause heard.’743 Furthermore, the ACHPR clarifies that the right to be heard shall 
also include the right to an appeal to competent national organs against acts of violating his 
fundamental rights as recognized and guaranteed by conventions, laws, regulations and 
customs in force; the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty by a competent court 
or tribunal; the right to defence, including the right to be defended by counsel of his choice; 
and the right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial court or tribunal.744 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in its ‘Resolution on the Right to 
Recourse and Fair Trial’ did not give an explanation for what would amount to reasonable time.  
The resolution merely stipulates that that persons arrested or detained shall be brought promptly 
before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled 
to trial within a reasonable time or be released.745  
Similarly, the African Court of Human Rights has failed to give a clarification of the law on 
what amounts to ‘reasonable time.’746 Considering the number of cases brought before it, one 
                                                          
743 Art 7(1) African Charter  
744 Art 7(1)(a)-(d) Ibid 
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http://www.academia.edu/430215/The_African_Commission_on_Human_and_Peoples_Rights_and_the_Inter
American_Commission_on_Human_Rights_Addressing_the_Right_to_an_Impartial_Hearing_on_Detention_an
d_Trial_Within_a_Reasonable_Time_and_the_Presumption_of_Innocence  accessed 7th January 2014 
   
187 
 
would have expected the Commission or the African Court on Human rights to have provided 
in clear terms what amounts to the term ‘reasonable time.’  
Thankfully the African Commission on Human Rights has in a number of cases attempted to 
elaborate on Art 6 and Art 7(1)(d).   
In Huri-laws v Nigeria,747 the Commission found that detaining two applicants for five months 
and two months respectively without being charged violated their right to be tried with a 
reasonable time by an independent court.748 The Commission stressed that the indefinite or 
extended detention without charge or trial is a violation of the right to liberty and security.749 
Also in Alhassan Abubakar v Ghana,750 the accused was arrested for allegedly cooperating 
with political dissidents and detained without charge or trial for ‘seven years’ until his escape 
from a prison hospital on 19th February 1992. The Commission held that even though the 
accused was arrested ‘in the interest of national security,’ his detention without charge for 
seven years was a clear violation of his right to be tried within a “reasonable time” as stipulated 
under the Charter.  
Similarly in International Pen and Others v. Nigeria751 the Commission found a decree which 
allows the government to hold suspects for up to three months without charge as a violation of 
the right to be tried within a reasonable time. Likewise, in Law Office of Ghazi Suleiman v. 
Sudan,752 the Commission found Sudan in violation of Art 7(1) of the African Charter for 
detaining the appellants without charge for close to four months. The suspects had earlier been 
arrested for offences relating to destabilizing the constitutional system, inciting people to war 
or engaging in the war against the State, inciting opposition against the Government and 
abetting criminal or terrorist organisation under the law of Sudan.  
In the writer’s view, though the pre-charge detention of a terror suspect for 90 days under S.27 
(1) TPA 2011 would be compatible with ACHPR by virtue of Art. 6 and Art 27 of the Charter, 
the rulings of the African Commission on Human Rights suggests that the practice in Nigeria 
whereby the Police/JFT would detain  terror suspects “without charge” for months and even 
                                                          
747 Communication No. 225/98 (2000) 
748 ACHPR 2000 a, Para 5, 7, 10 
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years undeniably contravenes the  right to be tried within a ‘reasonable time’ as envisaged 
under  Art 7 of the Charter.  It is hoped that the Commission will in the nearest future give its 
opinion on the 90/180 pre-charge detention period allowed under the Act. 
The provision of the ICCPR relating to arrest goes hand in hand with detention. Art 9 of the 
ICCPR provides that “no one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in 
accordance with such procedure as are established by law.” This means that an accused can 
be arrested and detained based on the provision of the law, but not arbitrary laws.  
The UN Human Right Committee in Mukong v Cameroon in explaining  the term 
‘arbitrariness’ under Art 9(1) stated that ‘the term is not to be equated with being against the 
law, but must be interpreted more broadly to include element of appropriateness, injustice, and 
predictability.’753 
Art.9(3) goes on to provide that “anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be 
brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power 
and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release.”  
Although Art.9(3) guarantees the right to be brought ‘promptly’ before a judge or officer 
authorised by law to exercise judicial duties within a ‘reasonable time’, the Covenant does not 
give a meaning as the term ‘reasonable time.’ 
The UN Human Rights Committee754 has noted that the word “promptly’’ under Art. 9 “must 
not exceed a few days.” The Human Rights Committee found in the case of Freemantle v 
Jamaica755 that  a detention incommunicado for four days without being brought before a judge  
violates Art.9(3) ICCPR. On the other hand, the UN Human Right Committee in Kone v 
Senegal found that what would constitute “reasonable time must be assessed on a case-by-case 
basis.”756  
Art.9(4) further provides that ‘anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall 
be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay 
on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful’. This 
suggests that where an accused is arrested and detained and he is not charged to court, such an 
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755 Communication No 625/95 Un Doc/CCPR/68/D/625 [28 April 2000] 
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accused has the right to take proceedings to the court to decide the lawfulness of his detention 
and order his release where the detention is not lawful.  
In Van Alphen v. The Netherlands757 the UN Human Rights Committee stated that detention 
which may be initially legal may become arbitrary if it unduly prolonged and not subject to 
periodic review. The Committee clarified further that remand in custody pursuant to lawful 
arrest must not only be lawful but reasonable in all the circumstances.758 On the basis of Van 
Alphen, the arrest of a terror suspect in Nigeria which is initially legal would become arbitrary 
where the detention is unduly prolonged or where the detention not subjected to a review by 
the courts.  
Furthermore, the UN HRC in its General Comment No.8 concerning Art 9 of the Covenant759 
stated that ‘Paragraph 3 of Art  9 requires that in criminal cases any person arrested or detained 
has to be brought "promptly" before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise 
judicial power. More precise time limits are fixed by law in most States parties and, in the view 
of the Committee, delays must not exceed a few days.’ The Committee made clarifications on 
“preventive detention” used for reasons of public security, for example, for counter-terrorism 
purposes. It stated that this – “must be controlled by these same provisions, that is, it must not 
be arbitrary, and must be based on grounds and procedures established by law, information of 
the reasons must be given, and court control of the detention must be available, as well as 
compensation in the case of a breach. And if, in addition, criminal charges are brought in such 
cases, the full protection of article 9 (2) and (3), as well as article 14, must also be granted.760 
It is important to note that the rights set forth in the Covenant apply to everyone, irrespective 
of reciprocity, and irrespective of his or her nationality or statelessness.761  
Art 4 of the ICCPR also allows for a temporary derogation of the right to liberty ‘in times of 
public emergency which threatens the life of a nation’ and ‘to the extent strictly required by 
the exigencies of the situation.’ This means that the derogation must comply with the principle 
of proportionality and must exist in times of public emergency. But the ICCPR does not allow 
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for derogation from the right to life, freedom from torture cruel inhuman degrading treatment, 
slavery or servitude, imprisonment on the ground of inability to fulfil contractual obligation, 
no punishment without the law and freedom of conscience, thought and religion even in times 
of public emergencies such as terrorist attacks. 
On the basis of the fore-going analysis, especially when compared with Art.9 of the ICCPR,  
the pre-charge detention of a terror suspect under S.27(1) TPA 2011(as amended) would be 
incompatible with the ICCPR. However, with regards to the 90/180 days period, the decision 
of the HRC in Kone v Senegal leaves it matter for the Court to decide on a case by case basis. 
It is the belief of the writer that with the number of arrest and prolonged pre-charge detention 
of terrorist suspects in Nigeria, hopefully soon there will be jurisprudence to draw analysis 
from as per S.27(1)   as it relates to Art 9 of the ICCPR. 
3.4 Encouragement of terrorism 
Section 38 of the Nigerian Constitution guarantees every person the right to freedom of 
thoughts, conscience and religion, including freedom to propagate and manifest his religion or 
belief in worship, teaching, practice, and observance.  
S.39 (1) of the Constitution provides that “every person shall be entitled to freedom of 
expression, including freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and 
information without interference.” This right can be exercised either orally, in writing as well 
as through the electronic media. However this right is qualified by State interests. 
S. 45(1)(a)&(b) of the Constitution provides that “nothing in sections 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41 of 
this Constitution shall invalidate any law that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society  
in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health; Or for 
the purpose of protecting the rights and freedom or other persons.” 
Fundamentally, Section 45 constitutionally empowers the state to make law(s) that restricts the 
right to freedom of expression in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public 
morality, public health, or for the purpose of protecting the right and freedom of others. The 
requirement of such law(s) is that it must be ‘reasonably justifiable.’  
In determining whether a law is “reasonably justifiable,” the Nigerian Supreme Court in 
Olawoyin v A.G Northern Nigeria held that before a law or a restriction upon a fundamental 
human right may be considered justifiable, it must be necessary and must not be excessive or 
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out of proportion to the object which it sought to achieve.762  Also, the term “reasonably 
justifiable law” came up in Chike Obi v Director of Public Prosecution.763 In this case, the 
Court held that its role was not to rubber stamp laws made by the legislature or the executive, 
but the Court must be the arbiter whether or not any particular law is reasonably justifiable. 
The court through this decision highlighted the position of the principle of separation of 
powers.  
From the above analysis, it can be established that the Nigerian Constitution supports “any 
law” that restricts expressions, opinions, or statements in the ‘interest of public defence’ or 
‘public safety’ including for counter-terrorism purposes. 
Looking at Sections 38, 39 and especially 45(a)(b) of the Constitution side by side with S.5 
(1)(2)(a) TPAA 2013 which criminalises encouragement of terrorism, it is clear that the Police 
are constitutionally empowered to prevent anyone from expressing himself/herself in the 
‘interest of the defence of the State’ or for ‘public order and morality,’ however this must  be 
reasonably justifiable (that is, necessary and not excessive). Thus, the offence of 
encouragement of terrorism under the Act is consistent with the Constitution.  
According to Welch, one of the most disputed areas in contemporary human rights law is 
freedom of expression.764 This was why the negotiators of the ACHPR drafted the provision 
on freedom of expression in a general term and not in precise terms.765 
Art. 9 of the ACHPR provide that “every individual shall have the right to receive information. 
Every individual shall also have the right to express and disseminate his opinion within the 
law.”766  
This suggests that the individual’s right to receive information can be considered as a function 
of the exercise of the freedom to express and disseminate ideas. However, freedom of 
expression under Art.9 must be done ‘within the law.’ The ACHPR gives no clarifications for 
what  acts would fall within the law. Since no qualification was given to this, it would mean 
that the exercise of the right must comply with the requirement of the law, whatever they are.  
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Just like the Constitution, freedom of expression under the ACHPR is a qualified right. Art 
27(1) provides that ‘the rights and freedoms of each individual shall be exercised with due 
regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest.’ This implies 
that rights under the Charter including the right to freedom of expression must be exercised 
with due regards to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest. 
Recognising the importance of freedom of expression, the African Commission on Human 
Rights in Constitutional Rights Projects, Civil Libeties Orgainsations, and Media Rights 
Agenda v Nigeria767 stated that  ‘the right to freedom of expression is a fundamental individual 
right which is the cornerstone of democracy and a means of ensuring the respect for all human 
rights and freedom.’ 
Concerned by the incessant harassment, threats, and intimidation of media practitioners, undue 
political interference with the media, and the adoption of repressive laws or amendment to 
existing legislation that limit freedom of expression, the African Commission adopted the 
‘Resolution on the Situation of Freedom of Expression in Africa’ at its 40th Ordinary Session, 
held in Banjul, The Gambia, from 15 - 29 November 2006. This Resolution called on member 
States to take all necessary measures in order to uphold their obligations under the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other international instruments, including the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights providing for the right to freedom of expression.768  
Furthermore, the African Commission in Law Offices of Ghazi Sulieman v Sudan (II), 769 held 
that restraint on the right of expression must not go beyond the limits necessary for that purpose 
and must be consistent with the States obligation under the African Charter. Citing the Inter 
American Court, the ACHR held further that when an individual's freedom of expression is 
unlawfully restricted, it is not only the right of that individual that is being violated, but also 
the right of all others to 'receive' information and ideas.770  
Clearly encouragement of terrorism is an offence under the Nigerian Terrorism Act and the 
TPAA 2013 is a ‘reasonably justifiable law’ which aims to protect the rights of other.’ 
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Thus, since Art 27(1) of the ACHPR provides that the rights and freedoms of each individual 
shall be exercised with due regard to the rights of others and collective security, it is safe to 
infer that S.5(2)(a) of the Nigerian TPAA 2013 which criminalises encouragement of terrorism 
in any manner will be consistent with the ACHPR.  
Going by the above conclusion, any person who knowingly, in any manner, directly or 
indirectly, solicit or encourage the commission of a terrorist act  commits an offence under 
S.5(2)(a) of the Nigerian TPAA 2013 and also infringes Art. 9 and Art. 27  of the ACHPR.  
The right to freedom of expression under the ICCPR is similar to that of the ACHPR. Article 
19 (1) ICCPR provides that ‘everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without 
interference’.  
Art. 19(2) provides; 
  “everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include  
   freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless  
  of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any   
 other media of his choice.” 
  
According to the UN Human Rights Committee,771 this right includes expressions and receipt 
of communications of every form of idea and opinion capable of transmission to others, subject 
to the provisions in article 19, paragraph 3, and article 20.772 It includes political discourse,773 
commentary on one’s own774 and on public affairs,775 canvassing,776 discussion of human 
rights,777 journalism,778 cultural and artistic expression,779teaching,780 and religious 
discourse.781It may also include commercial advertising. The scope of paragraph 2 embraces 
even expression that may be regarded as deeply offensive, although such expression may be 
restricted in accordance with the provisions of Art. 19, paragraph 3 and Art 20.782 Furthermore, 
Art 19(2) protects all forms of expression and the means of their dissemination. Such forms 
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include spoken, written and sign language and such non-verbal expression as images and 
objects of Art.783Means of expression include books, newspapers,784 pamphlets,785 posters, 
banners,786 dress and legal submissions.787 They include all forms of audio-visual as well as 
electronic and internet-based modes of expression. 
However, freedom of expression under the ICCPR is subject to some restrictions. Art 19(3) 
provides that the:  
  “ exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it  
   special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions,  
  but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect  
  of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national security or 
  of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.” 
 
As noted above, the main requirement for restricting of freedom expression is that it must be 
‘provided by law’ meaning that there must be a legal basis for the restriction. The limitation to 
this right must also be ‘necessary,’ meaning that the restriction must conform to the principle 
of proportionality.788 “Proportionality” means that restrictions must be applied only for those 
purposes for which they were prescribed and must be directly related to the specific need on 
which they are predicated and proportionate. 789 
Other requirements for the restriction of the right of freedom of expression under the ICCPR 
is that ‘the law must be for the protection of the right/reputation of others, or for the protection 
of national security/public order of the State or for the protection of the health/morals of others.’ 
It is important to note that the term “reputation of others” is excluded from the Nigerian 
Constitution and the ACHPR. According to the UN HRC General Comments No 34, the term 
“rights” includes human rights as recognized in the Covenant and more generally in 
international human rights law.790 The term “others” relates to other persons individually or as 
members of a community.791  
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The HRC further re-echoed these in Robert Faurisson v. France,792 where it stated that any 
restriction on the right to freedom of expression must cumulatively meet the following 
conditions: it must be provided by law, it must address one of the aims set out in paragraph 3 
(a) and (b) of article 19, and must be necessary to achieve a legitimate purpose. This was also 
restated in Womah Mukong v. Cameroon.793794 
In Vladimir Petrovich Laptsevich v. Belarus,795 the UN HRC gave further clarifications that 
‘even if the sanctions imposed on the freedom of expression were permitted under domestic 
law, the State party must show that they were necessary for one of the legitimate aims set out 
in article 19, paragraph 3.796 
In Tae Hoon Park v. Republic of Korea,797 the author was convicted of 'siding with an enemy-
benefiting organization' a crime under Korean National Security Law for expressing support 
and sympathy for the opinions of a student organisation and taking part in their peaceful 
demonstrations, while in the USA. The State party maintained that the author's conviction had 
been necessary to protect national security and was provided for by law. However, the UN HR 
Committee noted that it had failed to specify the precise nature of the threat to national security, 
referring merely to the 'general situation in the country' and 'the threat posed by "North Korean 
communists." Such a vague justification could not suffice to render the restriction a necessary 
or proportionate restriction. Therefore, the author's right to freedom of expression had been 
violated. 
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The UN HRC in General Comment No 34, Art 19 freedoms of opinion and expression stated 
that freedom of expression is integral to the enjoyment of the rights to freedom of assembly 
and association.798 Consequently, restrictions on this right must be applied only for those 
purposes for which they were prescribed and must be directly related to the specific need on 
which they are predicated and they must conform to the strict tests of necessity and 
proportionality.799Furthermore the committee stated that although freedom of thought was not 
listed among those rights that may not be derogated Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Covenant, 
there are elements that in the Committee’s opinion cannot be made subject to lawful derogation 
under article 4”-Freedom of opinion is one of such element, since it can never become 
necessary to derogate from it during a state of emergency.800  
Based on the above analyses, it is safe to conclude that S.5 (1)(2)(a) TPAA 2013 will be 
consistent with  Art 19(3) of the ICCPR, especially   using ‘national security’ as a yardstick for 
criminalising direct and indirect encouragement of terrorism.  However going by the decision 
in Tae Hoon Park v Republic of Korea,801 the State must state precisely the nature of threat 
posed that warrants the restriction of freedom of expression and this must comply with strict 
tests of necessity and proportionality.  
Relating this to Nigeria, the videos and publications by Boko Haram which encourage killing 
of non-Muslims, security forces, innocent civilians as well as their extremist teachings clearly 
shows the precise nature of the threats posed that warrants restricting freedom of expression 
under the TPAA 2013.802 This clearly fulfils the requirement set by the UN HRC in General 
Comment No 34 as well as Art 19(3) of the ICCPR. However, the confiscation of newspaper 
publications meant for the public and the arrest of  journalists by the Nigerian security forces 
on the grounds of being critical of the government policies803 does not appear to be 
proportionate or necessary to achieve a legitimate purpose as required by the ICCPR. 
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In chapters  3,  6, and 8 of this thesis, the writer submits that the provision of the Nigerian 
TPAA 2013 on encouragement of terrorism is vague. In addressing “vague and broad” laws 
that restricts freedom of expression like S.5(1)(2)(a) of the Act, the UN HRC notes that  for the 
purpose of restricting freedom of expression “a law must be formulated with sufficient 
precision to enable an individual to regulate his or her conduct accordingly and it must be made 
accessible to the public. A law may not confer unfettered discretion for the restriction of 
freedom of expression on those charged with its execution Laws must provide sufficient 
guidance to those charged with their execution to enable them to ascertain what sorts of 
expression are properly restricted and what sorts are not.804In the same vein, Principle 1.1(a) 
of the Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to 
Information provides that “any restriction on expression or information must be prescribed by 
law. The law must be accessible, unambiguous, drawn narrowly and with precision so as to 
enable individuals to foresee whether a particular action is unlawful.”805Looking at these by 
reference to the TPAA 2013, although the Act is easily accessible, it Act  fails to properly 
explain the category of statements which are likely to be understood by members of the public 
as encouraging terrorism or under S.5(2)(B). The writer submits that for provision of the Act 
on the offence of encouragement of terrorism to be consistent with ICCPR (as explained by 
Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 34), there is an urgent need to review Section 
5 of the TPAA 2013 to properly explain statements which are likely to be understood by 
members of the public as directly or indirectly encouraging terrorism and a yardstick for 
determining this.  
    3.5 Proscription 
The Nigerian Constitution guarantees the right to “peaceful assembly” and freedom of 
association.  
S.40 provides that “every person shall be entitled to assembly freely and associate with other 
persons, and in particular he may form or belong to any political party, trade union or any 
other association for the protection of his interest.”    
The Constitution does not expressly provide for ‘proscription’ of an organisation. However, 
like other rights under the Constitution, the right to assemble freely and associate with other 
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persons is subject to limitations. Section 45(1)(a)-(b)  allows for the limitation of this right ‘in 
the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health; or for the 
purpose of protecting the rights and freedom or other persons. 
By qualification, the Constitution implicitly provides for the ‘proscription of terrorist 
organisation’ by limiting the right to assembly and freedom of association in the interest of 
defence and public safety.  More explicitly, Section 2(3)(I) TPA 2011(as amended) makes it a 
crime in Nigeria to belong to a proscribed organisation. It provides that ‘a person who belong 
or professes to belong to a proscribed organisation commit an offence under this Act and shall 
on conviction be liable to an imprisonment of 20 years’.  
As earlier explained, in determining a law that is ‘reasonably justifiable’ as per S. 45(1)(a)-(b)  
of the Constitution, the Court in State v Ivory Trumpet806 stated that the test for this is an 
objective one, requiring the state to show that there is a grave risk of harm to a large section of 
the State and that the risk is imminent demanding urgent action.  
The Nigerian government have often cited ‘defence and public safety’ especially the rise in 
terror attacks by ‘Boko Haram’ and its splinter -‘Ansaru’ for the enactment of the TPA 2011 
and subsequent banning of groups that engages in terrorism under the Terrorism (Prevention) 
(Amendment) Act 2013.807 Following the decision in Trumpet’s case,808 Boko Haram terror 
attacks and killings clearly shows that there is a grave risk of harm to a large section of the 
State and that the risk is imminent demanding urgent action thereby fulfilling the “reasonably 
justifiable” test.  
Based on the fore-going, it is safe to conclude that since the Terrorism (Prevention) 
(Amendment) Act 2013 which proscribes ‘Boko Haram’ is in the interest of defence, public 
safety and for the purpose of protecting the rights of others, it will be compatible with the 
Constitution of Nigeria 1999.  
There are a plethora of Court decisions relating to the right to freedom of association in Nigeria. 
Unfortunately, none of them is terrorism related.  In  All Nigeria’s People Party v IGP809 the 
Court held that the right to assembly, rally and demonstrate especially on matters that of public 
                                                          
806 [1984] 5 NCLR at 750 
807 Davidson Iriekpen and Muhammad Bello, ‘Jonathan Proscribes Boko Haram, Ansaru, Declares them 
Terrorist Groups’ Thisday Newspaper 5th June 2013 http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/jonathan-proscribes-
boko-haram-ansaru-declares-them-terrorist-groups/149455/ Accessed 30 June 2014 
808 [1984] 5 NCLR at 750 
809 [2007] 18 NWLR (Pt.1066) 457 C.A. 2 3 
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concern are rights which are in the interest of the public and that which the individual should 
possess without impediment as long as no wrongful act is done. The Court of Appeal (CA) in 
this case,810 held further that ‘certainly in a democracy, it is the right of citizens to conduct 
“peaceful assembly, processions, rallies or demonstrations” without seeking and obtaining 
permission from anybody. ‘It is a right guaranteed by the 1999 Constitution and any law that 
attempts to curtail such right are null and void and of no consequence.’ 
The Court decision in this case suggests that every person in Nigeria has the right to freedom 
of assembly so far the assembly or association is for a peaceful purpose. This in effect makes 
the proscription of terrorist groups under the Act consistent with the Constitution.  
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights also recognises the right to freedom of 
association and the right to assembly freely under Art 10 and 11.  
Art. 10(1) provides that ‘every individual shall have the right to free association provided that 
he abides by the law.’  
The ACHPR is silent on the forms of associations that are allowed under the Charter. The 
African Commission have explained that examples could be political parties, medical 
association, bar association, workers/trade union, student union or the coming together of a 
group of people to pursue their common purpose.811 This suggests that any person can join any 
association but what the person does must be within the law. 
Art.11 provides that ‘every individual shall have the right to assemble freely with others.’ 
The African Commission emphasised the close relationship between the right to freedom of 
association and the right to assembly.812 Malcolm and Evans argue that although both freedom 
of association and freedom of assembly are of paramount importance to a person effective 
participation and contribution to the society neither has generated much African Charter 
Jurisprudence.813  
The ACHPR does not expressly provide for the proscription of terrorists organisation. 
However, the right to freedom of association and the right to assembly freely are not absolute 
                                                          
810 [2008] 12 WRN 65 
811 Communications 137/94, 139/94, 154/96   
812 International PEN, Constitutional Rights Project, Civil Liberties Organisation and Interights (on behalf of Ken 
Saro-Wiwa Jnr.) v Nigeria, Communications 137/94, 139/94, 154/96   
813 Malcolm Evans, Rachel Murray, The African Charter on Human and Peoples Right; The System in Practice, 
1986-2006 (2nd Edition, Cambridge University Press, 2008) pg  226 
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rights under the Charter. Art 10(2) goes further to provide that the right to free association is 
‘subject to the obligation of solidarity provided for in Article 29.’  
Some of the duties imposed on the individual under Art 29(3) and (5) is ‘a duty not to 
compromise the security of the State whose national or resident he is’  and a duty ‘to preserve 
and strengthen the national independence and the territorial integrity of his country and to 
contribute to his defence in accordance with the law.’ 
This implies that the right to freedom of association is subject to a duty not to compromise the 
national security of the state and a duty to strengthen the national independence and territorial 
integrity of the State in accordance to the provision of the law.  
Also, the second paragraph of Art. 11 provides that ‘the exercise of this right shall be subject 
only to necessary restriction provided by the law, in particular those enacted in the interest of 
national security, the safety, health, ethics and right and freedom of others’.  
The African Commission on Human Rights affirmed that the restriction on the exercise of the 
freedom of association has to be in conformity with the essence of the right as guaranteed by 
national constitutions and international standards.814 
Thus looking at Articles 10 and 11 of the Charter, it will be safe to conclude that a member 
state can make laws to proscribe a terrorist organisation on the grounds of national security, 
safety, and for the protection of the freedom of others. However, such laws must be “necessary” 
that is, the restriction must conform to the principle of proportionality.815 Also, In Lawyers for 
Human Rights v Swaziland, the African Commission held that the Kings proclamation 
outlawing political parties and other similar structure seriously undermines the right of 
Swaziland people to participate in the government of their country thus violated Art 13 of the 
Charter.816 
In International Pen and Others v. Nigeria, African Commission on Human and Peoples' 
Rights817, the Commission found the trial and conviction of the accused for belonging to the 
                                                          
814 Resolution on the Right to Freedom of Association of 1992 and Civil Liberties Organisation (in  
N.B.A v Nigeria para 14-15. 
815 In Dawuda Jawara v The Gambia, the African Commission on Human Rights held that the ban on political 
parties is a violation of the complainants right to freedom of association guaranteed under Art.10(1) of the 
Charter. Communication 147/95 and 149/96, 
816 Communication 251/2002 
817 Communication Nos. 137/94, 139/94, 154/96 and 161/97 (1998). Para 108 
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Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) as a violation of Art.10(1) of the 
African Charter.   
Furthermore, the African Commission on Human Rights gave more clarifications on freedom 
of association in its Resolution on the Right to Freedom of Association that stated that any law 
or provision which would limit freedom of expression must be consistent with State’s 
obligations under Charter.818 
Based on the above assessment, it is safe to conclude that banning of a group or an organisation 
that associate for the purpose of engaging or collaborating, or exhorting, or promoting other to 
commit an act of terrorism as per S. 2(1) TPA 2011 does not infringe on the individual right to 
freedom of association and assembly under the ACHPR, since Art. 11of the Charter expressly 
provides that the State can impose “necessary restrictions” as provided by the law, particularly 
those enacted in the interest of national security.  
The ICCPR also guarantees the right of peaceful assembly and the right to freedom of 
association.  
Art. 21 provide that ‘the right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized.’  
 Art. 22 stipulate that ‘everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, 
including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interest.’ 
Freedom of association and the right to peaceful assembly are not absolute rights under the 
ICCPR. Both of them are qualified by Para 2 Art 2I and Art. 22(2). 
Art 22(2) provides: 
  “No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those which are 
    prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests   
   of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of  
   public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This  
  article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on members of the 
  armed forces and of the police in their exercise of this right.” 
 
This means that the restrictions on right of assembly and association must not only be in 
conformity with the law but must also be ‘necessary’ for that purpose (proportionate). 
                                                          
818 Eleventh Ordinary Session, 9th March 1992 http://www.achpr.org/sessions/11th/resolutions/5/ Accessed 
30th July 2014 
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The UN Human Rights Committee in M.A. v. Italy819upheld the conviction of accused for 
involvement in reorganization the dissolved fascist party which were justifiably prohibited by 
Italian law having regard to the limitations and restrictions applicable under Article  22 (2) of 
the Covenant. Also in J. B. et al. v. Canada,820 the UN Human Rights Committee held that the 
Alberta Public Service Employee Relations Act of 1977 which prohibits the Alberta Union of 
Provincial Employees, Canada from going on strike to be compatible with Art.22 of the ICCPR. 
From the fore-going, it is safe to conclude that the proscription of terrorist groups under S.2 
TPA 2011 is compatible with Articles 21 and 22 of the ICCPR because they are ‘necessary,’ 
‘proportionate,’  ‘prescribed’ by law and for the purposes of ‘national security.’  
4. Conclusion 
One of the findings from the assessment of the TPA 2011 (as amended) by reference to 
Nigeria’s domestic, regional, and international obligation established is that the Nigerian 
Constitution 1999 is the final and supreme law in Nigeria and any law that is inconsistent with 
the CFRN will be void to the point of its inconsistency. This chapter also reveals that the 
ACHPR having been domesticated into law is now part of the laws of Nigeria and the Courts 
are bound by it.  
A juxtaposition of the power of arrest under the TPA 2011 with the Constitution FRN, the 
ACHPR, and the ICCPR shows no conflict or contradiction with these statutes.  However the 
application of the power of arrest under the Act by the Nigerian security agents has created 
several inconsistencies under the Constitution FRN, the ACHPR, and the ICCPR. In the 
writer’s opinion, the power of arrest under the TPA 2011 is ‘lawful,’ it is only used arbitrarily 
by the Nigerian Police/Soldiers.  
On the pre-charge detention of terror suspects, the Constitution FRN, the ACHPR, and the 
ICCPR all have provisos limiting the right to liberty and security thereby making the “pre-
charge detention” of a terror suspect under the TPA 2011 consistent with the three statutes. 
However, there appears to be a contradiction with the 90/180 days pre-charge detention 
“period” prescribed by the Act when juxtaposed with period acceptable under the CFRN, 
ACHPR, and the ICCPR. While the Constitution allows for the pre-charge detention period not 
exceeding 2 months, the UN Human Rights Committee noted that the word anyone arrested 
                                                          
819 Communication No. 117/1981, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2 at 31 (1984) 
820 Communication No. 118/1982, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/41/40) at 151 (198 
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must be charged “promptly’’ and the pre-charge detention must not exceed a few days. 
Interestingly, judicial decisions by the Courts in Nigeria and decisions of the Human Rights 
Committee suggests that what would amount to reasonable time must be decided by the Court 
on a case by case basis. The implication of this is that, although the 90 days pre-charge 
detention period  (subject to renewal for another 90 days) permitted under the TPA 2011 is 
inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution and the ICCPR, this is a matter for the for 
the Court to decide, on a case by case basis.  
Unfortunately, unlike the Constitution and the ICCPR, the ACHPR on its part fails to give a 
precise period for the pre-charge detention of suspects. Nonetheless, if the decision in 
International Pen and Others v. Nigeria is anything to go by, it will be safe to conclude that 
the period permitted under the Act is inconsistent with the right to liberty and security under 
the ACHPR.  
Notably The CFRN, the ACHPR and the ICCPR all have sections that limit the right to freedom 
of expression, particularly in the interest of defence, collective security, and national security, 
and for the protection of reputation of others. This makes encouragement of terrorism under 
the TPA 2011(as amended) consistent with the Constitution, the ACHPR and the ICCPR. 
However, their requirement for the legality of law that limits the right to freedom of expression 
differs. While the Constitution provides that any law limiting freedom of expression must be 
reasonably justifiable, the African Commission in the case of Ghazi Sulieman demands that a 
restraint on the right of expression must not go beyond the limits necessary for that purpose 
and must be consistent with the States obligation under the African Charter. The requirement 
of the ICCPR is that the restrictions/limitations on freedom of expression must be provided by 
law and must be necessary. The HRC have explained further that the law must be formulated 
with sufficient precision to enable an individual regulate his or her misconduct. Generally 
speaking, the couching of the provision of encouragement of terrorism under S.5 TPAA 2013 
is not precise. It will be recalled that the writer highlighted this as an area that requires urgent 
review and amendment. The writer is of the view that although the encouragement of terrorism 
under the Act is consistent with the Constitution, the African and the ICCPR, the ways and 
manners which the Police apply these in practice in Nigeria is questionable.  The writer’s also 
notes from the assessment that the ICCPR (the Human Right Committee) are generally more 
exacting than the ACHPR and the African Commission’s decisions.  
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Generally speaking, the assessment of the Act by reference to Nigeria’s Constitution, the 
African Charter and the ICCPR shows that most of the legal measures adopted against terrorism 
under the Act are consistent with the Nigeria’ obligations under these statutes. The problem is 
that they are flouted and misused in practice by those in power. It can be argued that the TPA 
2011 is not primarily the problem, but the application of the counter-terrorism measures under 
the TPA in practice. For example the indiscriminate/arbitrary arrest of terror suspects, 
prolonged pre-charge detention of suspected terrorists beyond the time permitted by law, and 
the imprecise phrasing of definition of terrorism and encouragement of terrorism under the Act.  
This is unacceptable and cannot continue especially when it goes against Nigeria’s domestic, 
regional, and international constitutional obligation. The growing concern in Nigeria is how do 
we stop or at least reduce the human rights infringements committed by government forces 
under the name of fighting terrorism? In the writers view, what Nigeria needs to make her 
counter-terrorism actions human right compliant is a practical strategy that checks the excesses 
of government agencies like the Police/Military. This strategy and other 
recommendations/proposals will be put forward in the later chapters of this thesis.  But before 
then an assessment of the UK’s existing legal measures in preventing terrorism by reference to 
its domestic, regional, and international constitutional obligations will equally be discussed in 
the next chapter.                                        
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CHAPTER 10 
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE TERRORISM ACT 2000 BY REFERENCE TO THE  
UNITED KINDGOM’S DOMESTIC, REGIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL  
CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATIONS 
 
1. Introduction 
In the preceding chapter, the  writer analysed and assessed Nigeria’s existing legal measures in 
preventing terrorism by reference to its domestic, regional, and international constitutional 
obligations. In the same way, this chapter will undertake a similar analysis and assessment of 
the UK’s legal measures in preventing terrorism under the Terrorism Acts 2000/2006 by 
reference to the Human Rights Act 1998, the European Convention on Human Right (ECHR) 
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Right (ICCPR). The aim is to determine 
whether the Terrorism Acts 2000/2006 unnecessarily infringe human rights provisions under 
any of these statutes, and what challenges can be made to the constitutionality of the Act on 
both human rights and other legal `grounds? In addition, this chapter will explore legal 
measures adopted under the UK Terrorism Act which Nigeria can learn from.   
The assessment has become imperative because measures adopted by the State to counter-
terrorism have themselves often posed serious challenges and sometimes devastating 
consequences to human rights and the rule of law. These measures also threaten the primary 
kernel of the international human rights framework and perhaps represent one of the most 
serious challenges ever posed to the integrity of international human rights after the Second 
World War.821 In juxtaposing the UK’s TA 2000 by reference to the Human Rights Act 1998, 
ECHR and the ICCPR, five key provisions of the Act will be considered. These are the 
definition of terrorism, arrest, pre-charge detention, proscription, and encouragement of 
terrorism.  
This chapter is divided into two main sub-sections. The first part discusses the UK’s domestic, 
regional and international obligations under the Human Rights Act 1998, the ECHR, and the 
ICCPR while the second part assesses the UK’s anti-terror measures under the Terrorism Act 
of 2000 and 2006 by reference to the Human Rights Act, the ECHR and the ICCPR.   
                                                          
821  Assessing Damage, Urging Action, Report of the Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, and 
Human Rights (2009) An Initiative of International Commission of Jurist, Geneva Pg V                
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/16_02_09_ejp_report.pdf Accessed 14th October, 2014 
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2. An exploration of the United Kingdom’s domestic, regional, & international 
obligations under the Human Rights Act 1998, the ECHR, and the ICCPR 
 
States have a  positive obligation to protect its citizens from terror attacks and human rights 
violations. The government of United Kingdom has fulfilled this obligation by enacting several 
anti-terrorism statutes that criminalizes acts of terror.822The UK does not have a single written 
Constitution that spells out its citizens’ rights. Much of what can be regarded as the UK’s 
Constitution can be found in Statutes, Acts of Parliament, Court judgements, Treaties, 
protocols, Covenants, and European Union (EU) law. Nonetheless, the UK Parliament enacted 
the Human Rights Act 1998, which incorporates the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR) into domestic law. The Act came into force on 2nd October 2000. This is the closest 
the UK has to what looks like a Constitution aside from the Bill of Rights 1689. The Human 
Rights Act 1998 gives further effect to the rights and freedoms guaranteed under the ECHR.   
S.3 (1) HRA   stipulates that;  “so far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and 
subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the 
Convention rights.”823 This section of the HRA 1998 imposes an obligation on the  Courts in 
the UK to read and give effect to primary and secondary legislation in a manner that that is  
compatible with the convention  rights- so far as it possible to do so.   
Furthermore, S.2 of the HRA provides that a court or tribunal determining a question which 
has arisen in connection with a Convention right must take into account a judgment, decision, 
declaration or advisory opinion of the European Court of Human Rights, opinion of the 
Commission given in a report adopted under Article 31 of the Convention, decision of the 
Commission in connection with Article 26 or 27(2) of the Convention, or the decision of the 
Committee of Ministers taken under Article 46 of the Convention so far as, in the opinion of 
the court or tribunal, it is relevant to the proceedings in which that question has arisen.824 
Interestingly, the UK courts have departed from judgements of the ECrtHR on a number of 
occasions.825  
                                                          
822 Terrorism Act 2000, Anti-terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001, Terrorism Act 2006, Protection of Freedom 
Act 2012 etc 
823 HRA 1998 
824 S. 2(1)(a)-(d) 
825Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (Appellant)ex parte Limbuela (FC) (Respondent) [2005] 
UKHL 56; EM (Lebanon) v Secretary of State for Home Department [2008] UKHL 64; R v Spears [2002] UKHL 31;  
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The Supreme Court in Manchester City Council v Pinnock,826 as per Lord Neuberger held that: 
“the Court is not bound to follow every decision of the European Court of Human Rights. Not 
only will it be impracticable to do so, but it would sometimes be inappropriate, as would 
destroy the ability to the Court to engage in the constructive dialogue with the ECrtHR.” 
Similarly, the Supreme Court in R v Horncastle & Ors827 refused to follow the decision of the 
ECrtHR in Al-Khawaja and Tahery v UK828 concerning the use of hearsay material in criminal 
cases on the basis that the Court failed to appreciate the English Court procedure.  
Section 4 of the Human Rights Act provides that if a higher court (such as the High Court, 
Court of Appeal or Supreme Court) considers that a provision in an Act of Parliament is 
incompatible with human rights, it can make a declaration of incompatibility. And if a court 
finds the UK legislation to be incompatible with human rights, it does not affect the validity of 
the legislation. It is up to Parliament to decide whether or not to amend the relevant legislation. 
No judicial authority has the right to nullify an Act of Parliament or to treat it as void or 
unconstitutional because it violates the HRA/ECHR. 
Thus, the UK’s obligation under the Human Rights Act is that all statutes are to be interpreted 
as far as possible compatible with the Convention rights. This in effect means that that they 
must develop a common law compatible with the Convention rights, taking account of 
Strasbourg case law.829  Secondly, with the enactment of the HRA it has become unlawful for 
a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right. This alone 
has changed the face of the UK law as more concrete protection is available to offenders’ for 
example, terrorist suspects, asylum-seekers and gays. But as earlier stated, the Parliament is 
not subject to any legal obligation to respond to a declaration of incompatibility under the HRA. 
But despite its achievements, the HRA has attracted many criticisms. Critics describe the HRA 
as “a barmy law which the undeserving have used to gain perks and pay-outs,” “a charter for 
the chancers that makes mockery of Justice,” “a wretched Act” and a “villains charter.”830 
                                                          
Lord Mence in Doherty v Birmingham City Council said ‘S.2 of the HRA requires the Court to take into account 
decisions of the ECrtHR not to necessarily follow them.’ [2008] UK HL 57 
826 [2010] UKSC 45 Para 46 
827 [2009] UKSC 14 
828 [2009] 49 EHRR 1 
829 Ministry of Justice, Human Right Act 1998 https://www.justice.gov.uk/human-rights accessed 8th October, 
2014 
830 Hugh Tomlinson QC, ‘Human Rights Act; The Ugly, the Bad and the Good,’ Matrix Chambers (2000) Griffin 
Buildings Gray’s Inn London WC1R 5LN 
http://www.adminlaw.org.uk/docs/SC%202010%20by%20Hugh%20Tomlinson.pdf Accessed 20th Sept 2014 
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Others have argued that the government have not offered a convincing reason for its 
continuation.831 
Prior to the enactment and coming into force of the HRA 1998, the Courts in the UK often 
relied on the European Convention of Human Rights for provisions relating to the protection 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The European Convention on Human Rights is a 
treaty signed in 1950 by the then members of the Council of Europe. The Council of Europe 
prepared the ECHR for two main reasons. The first was to prevent the repetition of the horrors 
of the Second World War. The second was to protect States from Communist subversion.832 
The ECHR was signed by twelve States on 4 November 1950. The UK was one of the first 
members of the Council of Europe to ratify the Convention when it passed through Parliament 
in 1951. The Convention entered into force on 3rd September 1953. However, it is important to 
note that it was not until 1966 that the UK granted what is known as “individual petition,” that 
is the right of individuals to petition the European Commission of Human Rights in respect of 
alleged breaches of their Convention rights by the UK government.   
Art 1 of the Convention imposes a positive and negative obligation on the Contracting Parties 
to the convention. It provides that ‘the High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within 
their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of the Convention.’ What this 
means in effect is that Contracting Parties are under an obligation not to infringe the rights 
protected in the Convention and to apply the Convention rights within its jurisdiction. Some of 
the rights and freedoms protected under the Convention include the right to life, prohibition of 
torture, right to liberty and security, freedom of expression, freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion, freedom of assembly and association amongst others. The EcrHr in X & Y v 
Netherlands833 held that the State has a general duty to protect human rights including putting 
into place a proper legal framework for criminalising certain acts that violates human rights. 
Similarly, the EcrHR in Osman v UK834 held that ‘the States obligation with respect to Article 
2(1) of the Convention extends beyond its primary duty to secure the right to life by putting in 
place effective criminal law to deter the commission of criminal offence but may also imply in 
certain well-defined circumstances a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive 
operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk from criminal act from 
                                                          
831 ibid 
832 Bernadette Rainey, Elizabeth Wicks, and Clare Ovey, The European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford 
6th edn, 2014) Pg 3 
833 Application no, 8978/80 March 1985 Para 24-30 
834 Case no 87/1997/871/1083 28TH OCT, 1998 Para 115. 
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another individual. The substantive guarantee in the Convention has been supplemented by the 
addition of further rights by the First, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth Protocols to 
the Convention. These Protocols are binding upon those states that have ratified them.835 As 
earlier stated, the enactment of the HRA 1998 has increased the power of the Courts in the UK 
to provide a remedy for the breach of the Convention. It is however important to note that even 
though the European Court’s jurisprudence has a considerable effect upon the national law of 
the contracting parties as per the protection of human rights, the UK retains its Parliament’s 
sovereignty. Thus, the declaration of incompatibility of a Statue with the Convention right by 
a Court of competent jurisdiction does not affect the validity of the law. Furthermore,  
It should be noted that the domestic law on human rights in the UK is primarily the HRA 1998. It 
incorporates into UK law the ECHR. So substantively the law on the right to liberty i.e. Article 5 of the 
ECHR at regional, European level will be the same as the domestic law of the UK. Procedurally, the 
application of the ECHR law to UK law may be slightly different. For example, section 2 of the HRA 
1998 does not oblige the UK courts to take the law at European level into account – only ‘to have regard 
to’ it. In practice the UK courts do take it account, but technically it’s only persuasive, not binding. And 
there is the issue of the relevance of ECHR law to existing UK domestic law. Which takes priority, if 
at all? The weight attached to each – one might be a decision of the ECtHR, another might be a decision 
of the UK Supreme Court – is a matter for the court. That said, the applicant may ‘appeal’ from the UK 
Supreme Court to the ECtHR, where of course the UK domestic law does not apply. The court will only 
consider its own law. 
The United Kingdom is also a signatory to the ICCPR which was adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly in 1966 in reaction to the violation of human rights during the Second World War. The UK 
signed and ratified the Covenant on 16th September 1968 and 20th May 1976 respectively.836 The UK 
is yet to ratify the First Optional Protocol which gives an individual the right to make a complaint to 
the UN Human Rights Committee on the violation of their rights under the Covenant. However, as a 
                                                          
835 David Harris, Michael O'Boyle, Edward Bates, and Carla Buckley, Law of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (Oxford 3rd edn,  2014 ) Pg 3 
836 United Nation Treaty Collection UNTC  
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights New York, 16 December 1966 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?chapter=4&src=treaty&mtdsg_no=iv-4&lang=en Accessed 10TH 
August 2014 
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State party to the Covenant, the UK is obliged under Art 2 (1)837 to guarantee the protection of rights 
under ICCPR.838  
Furthermore, Art.2 (2)-(3) of the ICCPR obliges State Parties to adopt legislative, judicial, 
administrative, educative, and other appropriate measures in order to fulfil their legal 
obligations under the Covenant. According to the UN Human Rights Committee, it is important 
to raise levels of awareness about the Covenant not only among public officials and State agents 
but also among the population at large.839 
 Having highlighted the implication and significance of the UK’s constitutional obligations 
under the HRA 1998, the ECHR, and the ICCPR, the next part will examine the rights that 
could be affected by the arrest and detention of terrorist suspects, proscription of terrorist 
organisation, and encouragement of terrorism. The assessment will be done by paying 
particular attention to the following rights; liberty and security, assembly, association, and 
freedom of expression. 
3. An assessment of key provisions under the TA 2000 & 2006 by reference to the 
HRA 1998, the ECHR, and the ICCPR 
 
3.1 Definition of terrorism  
In assessing the definition of terrorism under the TA 2000 by reference to the HRA 1998, the 
ECHR and the ICCPR, the writer is interested in finding out whether the definition of terrorism 
is consistent with the provisions of these statutes. 
Firstly, it should be noted that the Human Rights Act does not define terrorism. The definition 
of terrorism in the UK is as contained under the S.1 of the T.A 2000.  However, the Human 
Rights Acts expressly provides that so far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and 
subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the 
Convention rights. This suggests that in interpreting the provisions of the T.A 2000, including 
the definition of terrorism, it must be read in such a way to be compatible with the Convention 
                                                          
837 Art 2 (1) reads “Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, 
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, property, birth or other status.” 
838 The UK has no plans to incorporate the Convention into its domestic legislation. Human  Rights Committee 
Relies To the List of Issues  (CCPR/C/GBR/Q/6) 
To be Taken Up In  Consideration of the Sixth Periodic Report Of The Government of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland (CCPR/C/GBR/6 [13 June 2008] 
839 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, Nature of the General Legal Obligation on States Parties to 
the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004). Para 7  
   
211 
 
Rights (ECHR). Failure to do this does not affect the validity, continuing operation or 
enforcement of any incompatible primary or subordinate legislation840 
Furthermore, S.4 of the HRA provides that if a court finds the provisions of primary legislation, 
for example the Terrorism Act, incompatible with the HRA, it can only make a declaration of 
compatibility. This declaration of incompatibility does not affect the validity, continuing 
operation or enforcement of the provision in respect of which it is given and is not binding on 
the parties to the proceedings in which it is made.841 It is left to the Parliament to change it. 
Several reasons could be adduced behind S.4(6) of the HRA. Chief among these are that it is 
necessary for preserving the sovereignty of the Parliament and for the prevention of abuse from 
Judges. This is understandable, as no nation will want to leave it sovereignty in the hands of 
external forces. 
Furthermore, Art. 7 of the HRA clearly  provides that “no one shall be held guilty of any 
criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence 
under national or international law at the time when it was committed.” This in effect means 
that no-one can be found guilty of a crime that was not a crime under the law at the time it was 
committed. 
Going by the above analysis, the definition of terrorism under the TA 2000 will be compatible 
with the HRA as long it is read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the ECHR.  
The European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) does not provide a definition for terrorism 
either. The definition of terrorism within the European Union (EU) is as provided by the 
European Council Framework Decision Combating Terrorism842 It is worth noting that the 
                                                          
840 S.3(2)(b) and (c) HRA 1998 
841 S.4(6)(a)-(b) HRA 1998 
842 Art 1 (1) of the Framework Decision directs each Member State  to take necessary measures that will 
ensure that the intentional acts such as offences under national law, which, given their nature or context, may 
seriously damage a country or an international organisation where committed with the aim of: seriously 
intimidating a population, or unduly compelling a government or international organisation to perform or 
abstain from performing any act, or seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, 
constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation, shall be deemed to 
be terrorist offences.” 
Under  Art 1(a)-(i) – this include; (a)attacks upon a person's life which may cause death;(b) attacks upon the 
physical integrity of a person;(c) kidnapping or hostage taking;(d) causing extensive destruction to a 
Government or public facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system, a 
fixed platform located on the continental shelf, a public place or private property likely to endanger human life 
or result in major economic loss;(e) seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport;(f) 
manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, explosives or of nuclear, biological 
or chemical weapons, as well as research into, and development of, biological and chemical weapons;(g) 
release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods or explosions the effect of which is to endanger 
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definition of terrorism under the TA 2000 captures acts that are regarded as terrorism under the 
EU Framework. It is important to make clear that the aim of this thesis is not to compare the 
definition of terrorism under the TA 2000 with the definition provided by the European Council 
Framework Decision Combating Terrorism but rather it is to determine whether the definition 
provided by the Terrorism Act is consistent with provision(s) of the ECHR.  
Art 7 (1) of the ECHR provides that before any person can be held for a criminal offence on 
account of any act or omission under the HRA, such offence must constitute a criminal offence 
under national or international law at the time when it was committed. This simply means that 
before the State can hold anyone liable for a crime, the offence must be expressly provided for 
under its national law or international law. Since the definition of terrorism is expressly 
provided under the Terrorism Act 2000, it becomes legal to arrest anyone that commits an 
offence within the scope of its definition of terrorism. Based on this analysis, it will be right to 
say that definition of terrorism under the T.A 2000 satisfies the requirement the legality under 
the ECHR.   
Another fundamental requirement of national or international penal law is that it must be 
accessible and precise.  The question is; is the definition of terrorism under the TA 2000 
precise?  
In interpreting statutes, the Court in  A v Secretary for Home Department843 held that where 
fundamental human rights is directly an issue, the Court must be prepared to take a strict view 
of proportionality and justification in interpreting the law.  
The Supreme Court in R v Gul put to rest the issue of “broadness and ambiguity” of the 
definition of terrorism under the Act. Citing the case of R v F,844  the Supreme Court admitted 
that the definition under the Act is wide but that ‘it was ‘indeed intended to be very wide.’845 
The Court held that unless it is established that the natural meaning of the legislation conflicts 
with the European Convention on Human Rights or any international obligation, the Court will 
                                                          
human life;(h) interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural 
resource the effect of which is to endanger human life;(i) threatening to commit any of the acts listed in (a) to 
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Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism Official Journal L 164 , 22/06/2002 P. 
0003 – 0007 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32002F0475&from=EN 
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844 [2000]QB 960, Para 27-28 
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interpret the meaning of the definition of terrorism in its statutory legal and practical context.846 
In the writers view, this judgement raises some questions about the principle of legality in 
criminal law under Nuella poena Sine lehe Certa (there is no punishment without a definite 
law). The S.C emphasized that there was no rule in international law that requires it to read 
down S. 1 of the 2000 Act.847 The rationale behind this decision is because of the ‘protean 
nature’ of terrorism. Having a broad definition of terrorism gives the State ability to 
accommodate the ever changing nature of the offence.  
Equally, the ICCPR does not define terrorism. Nevertheless, Art 2(2) of the Covenant which 
provides that; 
     “Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each  
      State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in  
      accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the  
     present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give  
     effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.” 
 
Since terrorism directly affects the enjoyment of the rights under the ICCPR, going by Art.2 of 
the Covenant, States are arguably authorized to enact terrorism law in order to guarantees the 
rights under the Covenant. The main requirement of such a law apart from being in accordance 
with the provisions of the Covenant is that it must be “necessary” (necessity). As earlier stated, 
in international law the doctrine of necessity requires that the law must respond to a pressing 
social need and must be proportionate to the aim pursued. There must be a rational link between 
the law and the objective it seeks to limit. The IRA terrorist attacks and other terrorist attacks 
in the UK justify the enactment of the T.A 2000 thereby fulfilling the doctrine of necessity 
required of it.  
Having fulfilled the doctrine of necessity, the next question will be to find out whether the 
definition of terrorism under the Act is in agreement with Art.15 of the ICCPR. Art 15 ICCPR 
provides that no one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or 
omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the 
time when it was committed.848 The U.N gave further amplifications to Art.15 in its Resolution 
A/RES/63/185 2008 that all states must ensure that their laws criminalising acts of terrorism 
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847 Ibid Para 45 
848 Art 15(2) further provides that “Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person 
for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general 
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are accessible, formulated with precision, non-discriminatory, non-retroactive and in 
accordance with international law, including human rights law.849   
Juxtaposing the definition of terrorism under the TA 2000 with Art 15 of the ICCPR and the 
yardstick specified by the UN Resolution A/RES/63/185 2008, the writer found that the 
definition of terrorism under the Act does not discriminate on the ground of race, colour, sex, 
language, religion or social origin and it does not apply retroactively therefore making it 
consistent with the ICCPR.   
With regards to precision, the UN HRC has not given a ruling or its opinion on the definition 
of terrorism in the U.K.  Nevertheless in its 3176th and 3177th sessions, the UN Human Rights 
Committee expressed concerns about the wide definition of terrorism under the Canadian Anti-
terrorism Act.850 The Committee criticised the Act for conferring a broad mandate and powers 
on the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) to act domestically and abroad, thus 
potentially resulting in mass surveillance and targeting activities that are protected under the 
Covenant without sufficient and clear legal safeguards. The UN HRC further clarifies that any 
measures adopted by member states to counter-terrorism must comply with their obligation 
under international law, in particular human rights and humanitarian law.851 Going by the 
decision of the UN HRC on the Canadian definition of terrorism, a wide definition of terrorism 
without sufficient and clear legal safeguards would be incompatible with Art 15 of the ICCPR.  
According to Bates, international law obliges States to prevent terrorism but fails to define the 
concept itself.852 States are left alone to define terrorism in their domestic anti-terrorism laws. 
This has created a lot of problems for states in criminalising some acts as terrorist offences. 
Much of this has been discussed under the analysis and assessment of the definition of terrorism 
in previous chapters of the research. The decision of the Supreme Court in R v Gul put to rest 
questions regarding the preciseness of the definition of terrorism in the U.K. Nonetheless, the 
writer is of the view that whatever definition given by the state must be consistent with the 
state’s domestic, regional and international constitutional obligations and must also conform 
to human rights provisions and international law. Equally, rules of interpretation plays a 
fundamental role in the administration of justice, as they govern the primary activity of the 
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850 Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Canada  at its 3176th and 3177th meetings 
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judge and the construction of the law, and ultimately help determine the result.853 
Consequently, the role of domestic courts in the application and interpretation of international 
law needs to be done in such a way that the human rights of suspects are not put in jeopardy 
whilst defining terrorism.  
3.2 Arrest 
The T.A 2000 gives the Police powers to arrest based on ‘reasonable suspicion.’854 This allows 
the police to act quickly in countering terrorist threat.  However critics have argued that this 
power leaves too much discretion to the arresting officer. The question is does the power of 
arrest under the Act engage any provision under the HRA, ECHR, or the ICCPR, especially 
the right to liberty and security of persons?  
Art 5 of the ECHR guarantees the right to liberty and security. Article 5 (1) provides that; 
“everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his 
liberty….”  However this right is not absolute and is subject to six limitations.   
Art 5 (1) goes further to provide that the right to liberty and security could be limited “in 
accordance with a procedure prescribed by law- based on reasonable suspicion of having 
committed an offence.”855  
The fundamental principle underlying the obligation to act in accordance with a procedure 
prescribed by law is legal certainty856 that is, the law interfering with rights must be sufficiently 
precise to enable an individual to regulate his conduct.857 Any interference with a right 
prescribed by law requires that the law justifies the interference by providing a discerning legal 
basis for the interference,858 the law must be adequately accessible, and must be formulated in 
a way which is sufficiently foreseeable.859 
Since the ECHR permits an  accused to be arrested based on “reasonable suspicion” under a 
procedure prescribed by law, it is safe to conclude that an arrest under the 2000 Act is consistent 
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with the power of arrest under the ECHR because the power of arrest given to the police under 
the TA 2000 is expressly prescribed by the law.  
The European Court of HR in in Fox, Campbell and Hartley v U.K860 clarified the 
reasonableness of the suspicion justifying terrorism arrest cannot always be judged according 
to the same standards as are applied in dealing with Conventional crimes.’ The Court however 
held that the exigencies of dealing with terrorism crimes cannot justify stretching the notion of 
“reasonableness” to the point where the essence of the safeguard secured by Art 5(1)(c) is 
impaired. The Court observed that: 
    “Terrorism crime falls into a special category, because of its attendant risk to life  
     and human suffering, the Police are obliged to act with outmost urgency in following up  
    all information, including information from secret sources. The Police may frequently  
   have to arrest suspected terrorists on the basis of the information which is reliable 
   but which cannot be revealed to the suspect or produced in open Court to support 
   a charge.”861 
    
The Court ruling in the above case suggests that with regards to counter-terrorism, an arresting 
officer does not senso stricto have to reveal to the suspect or the Court the information used in 
making an arrest. Nonetheless, the court warned that care must be taken as not to abuse the 
“reasonableness” under Art 5(1)(c). The Court based its decision on the ground that the 
Convention should not be applied in such a manner as to put “disproportionate difficulties” in 
the way of the Police officer of the Contracting State in taking necessary measures to counter-
terrorism.862 And although the Contracting Party cannot be asked to establish the 
reasonableness of suspicion for an arrest, the Court must be enabled to know whether the 
essence of the safeguards under Art 5(1)(c) has been impaired. This could be done by the 
respondent government simply furnishing the Court some fact or information capable of 
satisfying the Court that the accused was reasonably suspected of committing the alleged 
offence. The Court added that this is more necessary where the domestic law does not require 
reasonable suspicion.863  
In addition, the ECrtHR in Court in Winterp v Netherlands864held that ascertaining the 
lawfulness of an arrest is a matter for the national Court to determine whether the law has been 
complied with in making the arrest. 
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From the above assessment, it is clear that the ECHR permits the lawful arrest of a terror 
suspect based on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence, however Art 5 (3) 
provides that the accused must be brought ‘promptly’ before a judge or other officer authorised 
by law to exercise judicial power865 and tried within a ‘reasonable time.’ The ECHR does not 
give a meaning to the word ‘promptly.’ Art. 5(4) also provides that ‘everyone who is deprived 
of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness 
of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is 
not lawful. The right to be brought promptly before a judge or a judicial authority will be 
discussed in details under pre-detention below.  
The ICCPR of which the UK is a state party also guarantees the right of liberty and security of 
persons. Art 9 provides that ‘everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one 
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except 
on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law.’  
Art 9(3) also provides further that “anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be 
brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power 
and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release.” 
As stated previously, the UK is not party to the Optional Protocol I, thus the UN Human Right 
Committee has not had the opportunity to give a ruling upon the UK’s compliance with its 
obligations under the ICCPR with respect to individual applications.  
The UN HRC have in a number of occasions argued that determining the lawfulness of an 
arrest under the Covenant must be assessed on a case by case analysis.866 Much of these has 
been discussed in the previous chapter. The UN HRC provided some guidance in assessing 
whether Art 9 has been complied with. These are that it must be appropriate, just, predictable 
(proportionate) and necessary.867 If the law fails any of these tests, the HRC will deem it   
‘unnecessary’ and ‘unreasonable’ and not fit for the purposes of Art 9(1). The wording of Art 
9 clearly demands that once the procedure for an arrest is expressly established by the domestic 
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law, it becomes lawful. Consequently, it is safe to conclude that power of arrest based on 
reasonable suspicion under the TA 2000 is consistent with the power of arrest as envisaged 
under the ICCPR. Although as stated by the HRC, the law must not be inappropriate, unjust, 
must be proportionate and necessary. 
As expected, the ICCPR provides safeguards to prevent abuse. Anyone arrested under the 
Covenant must be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be 
promptly informed of any charges against him.868 Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful 
arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation.869 Furthermore, all persons 
deprived of their liberty (arrested) shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the 
inherent dignity of human persons.870 
It is important to note that the  ICCPR  allows State parties to derogate from their obligation 
under the Covenant In times of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the 
existence of which is officially proclaimed.871Similar to the Art 15 of the ECHR, the derogation 
here must be proportionate to the terror threat.  The first requirement for derogation under the 
ICCPR is that it must be officially proclaimed by the derogating State. Measures taken during 
this period of derogation must be such that are strictly required by the exigencies of the situation 
and they must be consistent with the State’s other international obligations.872 The derogation 
must not discriminate on the grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.  
The UN Human Rights Committee stated that the derogation under the Covenant must be on 
an ‘exceptional and temporary nature.’ 873 The Committee explained that the requirement of 
‘proclaiming a state of emergency’ is for the maintenance of the principle of legality and rule 
of law when they are most needed.874Derogation under the ICCPR does not include the right 
to life, torture, slavery or servitude, imprisonment from failure to fulfil a contractual obligation, 
and retroactive punishment.875  
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3.3 Pre-charge detention 
The right to personal liberty has been described as the “the most elementary and important of 
all common law rights.”876 On the other hand, prolonged-detention of suspect without charge 
or trial is one of the more draconian measures a state can adopt in counter-terrorism.877  
As established under the power of arrest in the preceding sub-section, Art. 5 of the ECHR 
guarantees the right to liberty and security is subject to limitations. The limitations on the right 
to liberty and security under the ECHR include ‘the lawful arrest or detention of a person 
effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable 
suspicion of having committed an offence.’878   
This clearly shows that the ECHR permits the lawful detention of a terror suspects under its 
limitation section of Article 5. Nevertheless, Article 5(1) requires that the deprivation of liberty 
must be in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law. As a safeguard against abuse,   
Article 5(2) also provides that a person detained must be informed “promptly” of his reason 
for his arrest and any charges against him. While Art 5(3) stipulates that every person detained 
must be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial 
power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. 
The ECHR so far has not given a precise definition of the word “promptly” in terms of a 
specific limit of time which the defendant must be brought before a judge. The ECrtHR in 
Brogan v UK879 was of the opinion that ordinarily this period should not be longer than four 
days or where the accused had to be hospitalized, five days. However the Court added that 
promptness must be assessed in each case according to it special features and the  significance 
to be attached to those features can never be taken to the point of impairing the very essence 
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of the right guaranteed by Art5(3).880 The EcrtHR reached a similar decision in Wemhoff v 
Germany.881 The Court in this case held that the issue of “promptness must be assessed 
according to each case.”  Although the EcrtHR in Brogan v UK882 held that detaining the 
suspects for more than four days 6 hours did not satisfy the requirement of “promptness” under 
Art.5 Para 3. The Court explained that because of the difference in the meaning of the word 
“promptly” in English and French-the Court must interpret them in a way that reconciles the 
meaning of the term as far as possible with the aim and objective of the Treaty.883 The UK 
government in this case argued that because to the nature and extent of terrorist threat in the 
country, the pre-charge detention was an indispensable part of an effort to counter-terrorism. 
Other reasons adduced by the Government includes the difficulty in obtaining evidence in 
terrorism cases, time to undertake scientific examination, time to correlate evidence from other 
detainees, and to liaise with other security forces.884 This argument was dismissed by the Court 
on the basis that attaching sufficient importance to the special nature of terrorist offences to 
justify lengthy period of detention would be an unacceptably broad interpretation of the 
meaning of the word ‘promptly.’885The Court remarked that ‘judicial control of interference by 
the executive with the individual’s right to liberty is an essential feature of the guarantee 
embodied in Art 5(3) which is intended to minimize the risk of arbitrariness. 886 The overall 
intention of the ECHR on liberty and security is to ensure that the detention after arrest of a 
suspect lasts as only as necessary.  
The decision of the EcrtHR in Sher and Others v. United Kingdom887is also worth mentioning 
here. The Court in this case dismissed the applicant’s claim that their detention for 13 days was 
illegal as “fundamentally flawed.” The claimant in this case were brought twice before a court 
with warrants for their further detention granted. The Court explained that the decisions of the 
City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court to issue warrants of further detention was lawful 
because adequate information was provided to the applicants about the reasons for their 
continued detention.888 The applicant also challenged the procedure for hearing applications 
for warrants of further detention the 2000 Act as incompatible with section 5 (4) and 6 (1) of 
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the Convention because although it allowed for a closed procedure, there was no system of 
special advocates in place. The Court ruled that the hearing of the case from 15 April was 
entirely open and that the closed hearing procedure was compatible with the Convention.  The 
Court in this case cited Ward v Police Service of Northern Ireland,889 where the House of Lords 
upheld the decision of the judge to exclude the appellant and his solicitor from a hearing on an 
application to extend a warrant of detention for about ten minutes to consider closed 
information. The ECrtHR in Sher emphasised that the requirement of procedural fairness under 
Article 5 (4) of the ECHR ‘does not impose a uniform, unvarying standard to be applied 
irrespective of the context, facts and circumstances. As a general rule, an Article 5 (4) 
procedure must have a judicial character but it is not always necessary that the procedure be 
attended by the same guarantees as those required under Article 6 for criminal or civil 
litigation.890 The Court stated that a key question for a court reviewing the legality of detention 
is whether a reasonable suspicion exists?  It will be for the authorities to present evidence to 
the court demonstrating grounds for such a reasonable suspicion.891 However, the Court 
specifically explained that that Article 5 (4) could not be used to prevent the use of a closed 
hearing or to place disproportionate difficulties in the way of police authorities in taking 
effective measures to counter terrorism.892  
 Going by the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in Sher v United Kingdom,  
the pre-charge detention of a terror suspect for 14 days as provided by the TA 2000 will be 
consistent with the ECHR provided that the Police/detaining  authorities disclose the nature of 
the allegations against the accused, provide the opportunity to lead evidence to refute them, 
and ensure that adequate information is provided to the accused about the reasons for their 
continued detention.   
The assessment of the pre-charge detention of terror suspects under the TA 2000 by reference 
to the ECHR will be incomplete without discussing the implication of Art 15 of the ECHR. Art 
15 of the ECHR allows the state to derogate from its obligations under the Convention in time 
of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation provided that such measures 
are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law. The requirement of such 
derogation is that the measures taken must be to the extent strictly required by the exigencies 
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of the situation. The consequence of this is that an accused can be detained for up to or more 
than 14 days, if it can be proven to the Court that it was strictly required by the exigencies of 
the situation. For example, the UK government availed itself from the six days pre-charge 
detention of the appellant in Brannigan and Mcbride v United Kingdom893 using Art 15.  
The Court in this case held that:  
     “It is the responsibility of each Contracting Party to determine whether it is  
     been threatened by an emergency. And if so, how far is it ready to go in attempting 
    to overcome the emergency, by reason of their direct and continuous contact with  
    this pressing need, of the moment, the national authority are in principle in a better  
   position than the international judge to decide on both on the presence of such  
  an emergency and on the nature and scope of derogation necessary to avert it.’894 
 
Furthermore, the Court stated that it gives a wide and unlimited margin of appreciation to 
national authorities in determining the nature and scope of derogation necessary to avert a 
public emergency. However, it is for the Court to decide and rule whether the State had gone 
beyond the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the crisis.895 In this case, the Court held 
that the UK government had not exceeded their margin of appreciation in considering the 
derogation. 
The EcrtHR reached  a different decision  in A & Others v United Kingdom.896The Court in 
this case  found that the derogating measures were disproportionate in that they discriminated 
unjustifiably between nationals and non-nationals. It follows there has been a violation of Art. 
5 (1) in respect of the first, third, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh 
applicants.897  
The requirement of pre-charge detention under Art 9(3) ICCPR is that anyone arrested or 
detained on a criminal charge shall be brought “promptly” before a judge or other officer 
authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial “within a reasonable 
time” or to release. This provision overlaps with Art 14(3)(c) ICCPR which provides that in 
the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall the right to be tried 
without undue delay.  
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According to the UN HRC: 
    “paragraph 3 of Article 9 ICCPR  requires that in criminal cases any person arrested  
    or detained has to be brought "promptly" before a judge or other officer authorized  
    by law to exercise judicial power. More precise time-limits are fixed by law in most  
    States parties and, in the view of the Committee, delays must not exceed a few days.”898  
 
This UN HRC’s decision was stressed in Freemantle v Jamaica,899 where the HRC held that 
detaining a suspect for four days without having access to counsel violates Art 9(3).The 
Committee however cautioned that what constitutes reasonable time under Art 9 must be 
assessed and depends on a case by case basis. 900 For guidance purposes, the Human Rights 
Committee in A.W Mukong v Cameroon explained that ‘remand in custody pursuant to a lawful 
arrest must not only be lawful but reasonable and necessary in all the circumstances.’901 It is 
for the state party to show that remand in custody pursuant to a lawful arrest is “lawful”, 
“reasonable,” and “necessary.” 902The Committee also stated that where pre-charge detention 
is used for reasons of public security it must not be arbitrary, must be established by law, and 
the Court control of the detention must be available.903The inability of the detainees to be 
promptly charged for whatever reason violates Art 9 ICCPR.   
Art 9(4) provides for a safeguard similar to the doctrine of Habeas Corpus that anyone who is 
deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, 
in order that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order 
his release if the detention is not lawful. Art 10 (1) of the ICCPR also provides that all detainees 
must be treated with humanity and with respect for their dignity.  
Thus, a careful examination and assessment of the period of pre-charge detention under the Act 
by reference to the above suggests that 14days pre-charge detention is not compatible with Art 
9 of the ICCPR. However, what would amount to “reasonable” and “necessary” is for the Court 
to decide. The rationale behind bringing an accused to court within a reasonable time is to 
assess the lawfulness of the detention and to determine whether the accused be released or kept 
in detention pending the duration of the case.  In order to check the consistency of international 
                                                          
898 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 8, Article 9 (Sixteenth session, 1982), Compilation of General 
Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 8 (1994). Para 2 
899 [2002] UN DOC CCPR/C/68/D 625/1995 
900 Kone v Senegal, Communication No. 386/1989, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/386/1989 (1994) 
901 Communication no 458/1991 Pg 181 Para 9.8 
902 H. Van Alphen v Netherlands, Communication 305/1998 
903 Ibid Para 4  
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law in the detention of a suspect under international law, the U.N in its resolution created the 
Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under any form of Detention or 
Imprisonment. This principle re-echoes human rights guarantees for a detained person under 
the HRA, the ECHR and the ICCPR.904 
3.4 Encouragement of Terrorism 
The Human Right Act 1998 and the ECHR do not provide for the offence of encouragement 
of terrorism. However, analogy can be drawn from the limitations on freedom of expression to 
cover the offence of encouragement of terrorism. One of the grounds for the restriction on 
freedom of expression is in the interest of national security and prevention of crime.  
Article 10(1) of the ECHR guarantees everyone the right to freedom of expression. The section 
reads “everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right includes freedom to   hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers.” The phrase “beyond frontiers” simply means that the 
right extends beyond the state’s jurisdiction or border of the state. This right is however 
qualified by the state interest under Art 10(2) HRA/ECHR. It provides: 
  “The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may 
   be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by  
  law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security,  
  territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime,  
  for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights 
 of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence,  
 or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.” 
 
As previously explained under the analysis of the right to liberty, to be prescribed by law, the 
law must be adequately accessible so that an individual would have an indication of how the 
law limits their right and must be formulated with sufficient precision so that the individuals 
can regulate their conduct.905   It must also be tested for ‘necessity.’ This means that the law 
must respond to a pressing social need and must be proportionate to the aim pursued.906  
Commenting on this, the EctHR in Özgür Gündem v. Turkey held that ‘the effective exercise 
of this freedom does not depend merely on the State’s duty not to interfere, but may require 
positive measures of protection, even in the sphere of relations between individuals. In 
                                                          
904 UN General Assembly Resolution 43/173 (9th Dec, 1988) 
905 Sunday Times v UK, [1979] 2 EHRR 245No 6538/74 Para 49 
906 ibid 
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determining whether or not a positive obligation exists, regard must be had to the fair balance 
that has to be struck between the general interest of the community and the interests of the 
individual, the search for which is called for throughout the Convention. The scope of this 
obligation will inevitably vary, having regard to the diversity of situations obtaining in 
Contracting States, the difficulties involved in policing modern societies and the  choices which 
must be made in terms of priorities and resources. Nor must such an obligation be interpreted 
in such a way as to impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities.’907  
In addition to that, in determining the term ‘prescribed by law’, the EcrHR imposes a sufficient 
element of control over the relevant decision makers so as to avoid the exercise of arbitrary 
action.908 The Court in Handyside v UK held that the word “necessary” meant that there must 
be a ‘pressing social need for the interference.909 The Court stated further that because of the 
importance of this right, the necessity for restricting them must be convincing.910 However, 
member states have some margin of discretion in assessing the existence of such need.911 It 
should be noted that the concept of ‘margin of appreciation’ was developed the ECrtHR, as 
such it only applies to the ECHR.  
Based on the above analysis, the offence of encouragement of terrorism under the T.A 2006  is 
consistent with Art 10(2) of the ECHR on the basis that it is prescribed by law (the Terrorism 
Act 2000) and the restriction on freedom of expression is in the interest of national security 
and prevention of crime. The UK government also fulfils the requirement of been ‘necessary 
in a democratic society’ as required  under Art 10(2) based on terror attacks in the country 
inspired by jihadist teachings, extremist speeches, online jihadi forum, and hate speech 
websites. For example, hundreds of young Muslims including Britons have been encouraged 
to join Isil and have travelled to Syria and Iraq to join and fight for  the terror group.912  
                                                          
907 (Application no. 23144/93) 19TH March 2000 
908 Malone v. The United Kingdom, judgment of ECHR 2-Aug-1984 (Application no. 8691/79) 
909 (5493/72) [1976] ECHR 5 (7 Dec 1976) 
910 Autronic AG v. Switzerland,  22 May 1990, Series A No. 178,  61, Thorgeirson v. Iceland, 25 June 1992, 
Application No. 13778/88, para. 63. 
911 ibid 
912 ‘Three missing London School girls travelling to Syria to join ISIL,’ The Telegraph, 20th Feb, 2015 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/11424884/Three-missing-British-schoolgirls-travel-to-
Syria.html accessed 12th August 2015 
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As discussed in the previous chapter, the ICCPR as well guarantees freedom of speech under 
Art 19(2).913Like most other rights in international law, this right is subject to certain 
restrictions. The restrictions permitted for freedom of expression under the ICCPR are “such 
as are provided by law and are necessary for the respect of the rights or reputations of others; 
For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or 
morals.’914   
The notion of “prescription by law” and “necessity” has been clarified under the right to 
liberty. This suggests for the State to justify limitation/restrictions on freedom of expression, it 
must first of all provide a law to that effect and the law must meet the test of necessity (strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation) and proportionality, that is, the impact of the 
limitation must be proportionate to the objective. The ECrtHR in Surek v Turkey915 clarified 
that national security concerns may in principle justify restrictions on the media, however these 
restrictions must not sweep too broadly.916   
Other restrictions permitted for freedom of expression under Art 19(2) of the ICCPR is that  
the law must be for the protection of the right/reputation of others, or for the protection of 
national security or public order of the State or for the protection of the health/morals of others. 
In fact the UN in its Resolution urged its members to enact laws against expressions that 
encourage terrorism.917  
Going by the above assessment, it would be safe to conclude that the provision on 
encouragement of terrorism under the UK TA 2006 is consistent with the ICCPR on the 
grounds of ‘protection of national security’ as per  Art 19(2).  
Having clarified the legality of encouragement under the TA 2006 by reference to the ECHR 
and the ICCPR,  the main requirements of a law restricting freedom of expression under Article 
10 of the ECHR and the Article 19 of the ICCPR is that the law must be adequately accessible 
for people to regulate their conduct and formulated with sufficient precision. The question that 
                                                          
913 It reads: “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include 
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, 
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.” 
914 Art. 19(3)(a)-( b)  
915 No.4 (application no. 24762/94) Para 36 
916 The ECrtHR in this case found a violation of Art. 10 on the grounds of disproportionate criminal penalties 
imposed in a case where a Journalist compared politicians in Turkey with Kurdistan separatists. 
917 UN Security Council Resolution 1624 
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needs to be asked is whether the provisions of encouragement of terrorism under the Act 
formulated with sufficient precision? 
A detailed look at the wording of S.1 of the Terrorism Act 2006 shows that there are three 
requirements that must be met at for a person to commit this offence. Firstly, the accused must 
publish or cause another to publish a statement. Secondly, the statement that is published must 
be likely to be understood by some or all the members of the public to whom it is published as 
a direct or indirect encouragement to them to commit, prepare, or instigate an act of terrorism 
or a Convention offences. And lastly, the accused must at least be reckless as to whether a 
member of the society will be directly or indirectly induced by the statement to commit a 
terrorist offence.918 S.1 (4) explained the questions how a statement is likely to be understood 
and what members of the public could reasonably be expected to infer from it must be 
determined having regard both—to the contents of the statement as a whole; and to the 
circumstances and manner of its publication. S. 2(4) goes further to explain what amounts to 
an indirect encouragement of terrorism.  
Juxtaposing S.1 of the UK’s TA 2006 with the prerequisite that a law restricting expression 
must be formulated with sufficient precision, applied only for those purposes for which they 
were prescribed, and must conform to the strict test of necessity and proportionality,919 to a 
large extent shows that the TA 2006 presented guidance as to how a statement or expression 
can amount to encouragement of terrorism.  While it can be argued that S.1 of the TA 2006 is 
lengthy, the writer  is of the opinion that it provides guidance to the public as per what sorts of 
expressions would encourage terrorism, a yardstick for determining statements that are likely 
to be understood by as a direct or indirect encouragement,920 what would include direct or 
indirect encouragement of terrorism,921 as well as clarifications on how a statement is likely to 
be understood and what members of the public could reasonably be expected to infer as 
encouraging the terrorism.922 The writer also of the view that the length of the provision of the 
Act on encouragement of terrorism is so that individual have a proper indication of how the 
law limits his or her conduct and the individual can regulate his conduct. Moreover, S.1 TA 
2006 does not in any way invalidate the right to freedom of expression under the ECHR and 
                                                          
918 Correspondence Terrorism Act 2006 11 April 2006 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-
terrorism-act-2006 Accessed 12th  Oct, 2014 
919 HRC General Comments No 34, Human Right committee 102nd Session Geneva , 11-29 July 2011 
920 S.1 (1)-(2) TA 2006 
921 S.1(3) TA 2006 
922 S.1(4) TA 2006 
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the ICCPR. If a State decides to limits freedom of expression on the basis of national security 
under the ICCPR, the HRC requires the State party to specify the precise nature of the threat 
alleged by the person’s expression and how the restriction dissipate the threat.923  Nonetheless, 
because encouragement of terrorism under the T.A 2000 covers acts done in the past, it could 
engage non-retroactive principle under Art.7 of the  ECHR and of the 15 ICCPR.  
3.5 Proscription 
Art 11(1) ECHR provides that “everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to 
freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the 
protection of his interests.” 
In addition, the Court in Wilson, National Union of Journalists and Others v. the United 
Kingdom924observed that though the essential object of Article 11 is to protect the individual 
against arbitrary interference by public authorities with the exercise of the rights protected, 
there may in addition be positive obligations on the state to secure the effective enjoyment of 
these rights. 
The right to freedom of association and assembly under the ECHR is subject to some 
restrictions.   
Art 11 (2) permits restrictions on the exercise of these rights other than “such as are prescribed 
by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public 
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of 
lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police 
or of the administration of the State.” 
This in effect means that restrictions on assembly and association must meet three criteria. 
Firstly, the State must show that the restriction is ‘prescribed by law’, that is, it must be 
adequately accessible and must be formulated with sufficient precision. Second it must be 
‘necessary’ meaning it is must fulfil the test of necessity and proportionality, and lastly it must 
be in the interest of national security or public safety- for prevention of crime, protection of 
health, morals, and freedom of others. 
                                                          
923 Park v Republic of Korea Communication 574/1994, UN Doc CCPR/C/64/D/574/1994 (1999) 
924 [Applications nos. 30668/96, 30671/96 and 30678/96] 2 July 2002 Para 41 
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Interestingly, Art 11(2) allows the member of Armed forces and the Police powers to carry out 
the imposition of lawful restrictions on these rights. By lawful restrictions, this suggests that 
unless there is a clear evidence of violence or imminent break down of law and order, or risk 
to health of others during a peaceful protest or assembly, the Police may not restrict these rights.  
In a terrorism related case that expressed the opinion of the Court on the right to freedom of 
assembly, the ECrtHR in Makhmudo v Russia925stressed that the state must not only safeguard 
the right to freedom assembly but must also refrain from applying unreasonable indirect 
restriction upon the right.926 The Court in this case also reaffirmed that in assessing evidence 
and compliance with Convention receding, it is guided by the principle of ‘Affirmanti Non 
Neganti, Incumbit Probatio’ meaning the burden of proof lies upon he who affirms, not upon 
he who denies. Thus, the onus is on the State authority or government to provide satisfactory 
explanation on the restrictions, failure of which the Court may draw inference of breach of the 
Convention right.927  
The ICCPR also guarantees the right to assembly and association. Art 21 of the ICCPR closely 
mirrors the provisions of Art 11 of the ECHR.  
Art. 21 provide that “the right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized.” Art. 22 stipulate that 
“everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form 
and join trade unions for the protection of his interest.” 
Freedom of association and the right to peaceful assembly are not absolute rights under the 
ICCPR. Both of them are qualified by Para 2 Art 2I and Art. 22(2). 
Art 22(2) provides: 
   “No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those which 
    are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests 
    of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of  
    public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.  
   This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on members of the  
                                                          
925(Application no. 35082/04) 26 July 2007 Para 64 
926 The Court explained further that in carrying out its scrutiny of the impugned interference, it (ECrtHR) must 
ascertain whether the respondent State has exercised its discretion reasonably, carefully, and in good faith. It 
must look at the interference complained of as a whole and determine whether the interference was 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, and also whether the reasons adduced by the national authority 
to justify the restrictions are relevant and sufficient. In so doing, the court must be satisfied that the national 
au8thorites applied standards that are conformity with the principles embodied under Art11 and their action is 
based on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts.    
927 Ibid Para 68 
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    armed forces and of the police in their exercise of this right.”  
 
Looking at Art 21 and 22, one can argue the restrictions provided gives the state power to 
proscribe an organisation involved in terrorism ‘in the interest of national security or public 
safety, public order” However, these must be prescribed by law and in conformity with the law 
and necessary in a democratic society. 
 The ECHR and ICCPR does not expressly provide for the proscription of terrorist organisation. 
However, proscription of terrorist organisations can be inferred from the restrictions and 
limitations on the right to freedom of association and the right to peaceful assembly under 
Art.11 of ECHR and Arts. 21 and 22 ICCPR (especially in the interests of national security,  
public safety, or for the prevention of disorder or crime). As earlier explained in the previous 
chapter, key features of the law that restricts assembly and association under  Art 22. of the 
ICCPR and likewise under Art.11 of the ECHR are that it must be prescribed by law, it must 
be necessary in a democratic society for the furtherance of some interests, including the 
protection of public safety and national security. Looking at this within the context of the 
current examination, S. 3(4) of the TA 2000 provides that an organisation is proscribed under 
the Act if it is concerned in terrorism.928 To be concerned in terrorism the group must commit 
or participates in acts of terrorism, prepare act or in acts of terrorism, promote or encourage 
acts of terrorism.929 “Generally” one would assume that the protection of national interest 
includes protection from terrorist threats and acts of terrorism. It is safe to deduce from this 
argument that the proscription of terrorism groups under the Act is consistent with the ECHR 
and ICCPR. Nonetheless, the European Court of Human Rights in Kadi Al Barakat Int. 
Foundation v Council Commission930 held that reasons justifying the proscription of an 
organisation must be given to the group or organisation, failure to do so infringe the group’s 
right to defence. A similar decision was reached by the Court of Appeal in A & Ors v HM 
Treasury931 where the Court also held that reasons justifying proscription and listing of an 
individual in the consolidated list must be provided. 
It is however important to note that while the proscription of violent, extremists and terrorists’ 
organisation might be unavoidable, caution must be exercised when restricting the right to 
freedom of assembly and association in order to ensure that the restrictions are not over-broad 
                                                          
928 S.3(4)T.A 2000 
929 S.3(5) Ibid 
930 [2008]  C-402/05 
931 [2008] ECWA CIV 1187 
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to limit the activities of opposition or groups that are opposed to government policies. 
Proscription should not be used as a diplomatic tool in the hands of the government to show 
support to the international community in the global fight against terrorism. Otherwise, as 
Anderson rightly points out, this would merely render it as a “cheap and straightforward way 
of achieving foreign policy objectives.”932 
Conclusion 
Having assessed the TA 2000 by reference to the ECHR and the ICCPR, it is important to 
reiterate that the domestic law on human rights in the UK is primarily the Human Rights Act 
1998 which primarily incorporates into UK law the ECHR. This is why the analysis and 
assessment of the TA 2000 is focussed on the ECHR and ICCPR. Accordingly substantively 
the law on the right to liberty and security, freedom of expression, and the right to assembly 
and  association under the ECHR at regional (European level)  will be the same as the domestic 
law of the UK (HRA 1998).  
Going by the assessment of the TA 2000 in this chapter,  it is clear that both domestic, regional 
and international human rights recognise that human rights are not absolute as some rights can 
be restricted in the interest of national security, public safety, or for the prevention of disorder 
or crime.  
The assessment revealed that the ECHR and the ICCPR are by implication in agreement with 
the legal basis for making an arrest under the Act, thereby making the power of arrest consistent 
with the three statutes. Although the majority of the judicial decisions examined suggests that 
determining the lawfulness of an arrest under the Act is a matter for the court to decide and this 
must be done on a case by case basis. Surprisingly, the ECHR and the ICCPR gave no precise 
length for the period of pre-charge detention of terror suspects. The ECrtHR in Sher v UK 
justified a  special regime of pre-charge detention for terrorism offences based on the special 
nature of terrorism offences. Nonetheless,  the Court held that adequate information must be 
provided to the applicants about the reasons for their continued detention and this must be 
judicially authorised. A consistent theme in the decisions of the ECrtHR and the HRC is that, 
it must be done promptly and within a reasonable time. But then again, what will amount to a 
“reasonable time” is a matter for the court to decide and not the executive.  This Judgement by 
                                                          
932 David Anderson, The Terrorism Acts in 2011 op cit  Pg 49 
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the regional and international body leaves the lawfulness of a period of pre-charge detention 
open for the courts to decide.  
Generally speaking, the ECHR and the ICCPR all permit the restriction of human rights and 
freedoms in the interest of national security and for the protection for the right of others. These 
limitations/restrictions give backing to most of the legal measures adopted against terrorism 
under the Act. However, the restrictions must be necessary/proportionate. 
In conclusion, borrowing the words of Bhagwati, human rights involve translating international 
ideas and objectives into rules.933 These rules require clarity in formulation untypical of 
ideological discourse which can only be done by a strong and independent judiciary which is 
in tune with the ideology of human rights. Even though restrictions under the ECHR are open 
to judicial review, the writer is of the opinion that the judiciary must brace itself up to adopt a 
creative and a purposive approach in the interpretation of fundamental rights embodied under 
the statutes with a view to advancing human rights jurisprudence. The States must also develop 
counter-terrorism policies that are consistent with the protection of human rights on the 
domestic, regional, and international levels.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
933 P.N Bhagwati, ‘Fundamental Rights In their Economic Social and Cultural Context ‘, in Ed, Developing 
Human Rights Jurisprudence; The Domestic Application of International Human Rights Norm’ Judicial Clloquim 
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CHAPTER 11 
PROPOSALS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LAW AND POLICY REFORMS IN 
NIGERIA AND UNITED KINGDOM 
    
1. Introduction 
The main theme that emerges from this research is that several counter-terrorism measures 
adopted by Nigeria and the UK under their Terrorism  Acts, in practice disproportionately 
infringe human rights.  Nigerians have in the last seven years (1999–to 2017) witnessed 
gruesome attacks from Boko Haram terrorists and the government forces alike. Notably, the 
government security forces have been responsible for several serious human rights violations 
that could constitute war crimes in international law. While domestic, regional, and 
international human rights frameworks recognise that human rights can be limited in times of 
emergencies, it does not give the States a carte blanche for human rights violations. These 
limitations must be prescribed by law, pursue a legitimate aim, and must be proportionate and 
necessary to achieve that aim. Consequently, there is an urgent need for a proper balance 
between legitimate security interests and the protection of fundamental human rights in both 
countries, especially in Nigeria. The question on the mind of many Nigerians is; how do we 
make Nigeria’s counter-terrorism law and in practice human rights complaints?  
Having analysed, assessed, and compared the Nigerian and UK’s legal responses to terrorism, 
the thesis has identified several lessons that Nigeria can learn from the UK to make her counter-
terrorism approach  more compatible with acceptable human rights standards.  Accordingly, 
this chapter will be used to highlight those lessons that Nigeria could learn from the UK, and 
vice-versa. In addition to that, this chapter will be used to put forward a number of proposals 
and recommendations for possible law and policy reforms in Nigeria and the UK. 
2. LESSONS LEARNED BY NIGERIA  FROM UK’S RESPONSE TO  
  TERRORISM 
 
The following are the lessons that Nigeria can learn from the  UK experience in dealing with 
terrorism as identified in this research; 
2.1 The “CONTEST” strategy 
Since the emergence of Boko Haram in 2009, Nigeria is yet to have a comprehensive strategy 
to tackle terrorism in the country. The absence of an effectual national security system 
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contributes to Nigeria’s vulnerability to terrorism.934 The writer admits that no State can 
completely prevent terrorist incidents from happening, nevertheless the UK’s “CONTEST 
strategy” for counter-terrorism presents a fine and workable model for a country like Nigeria 
to emulate. Although not completely fool proof, the CONTEST Strategy has achieved 
remarkable  result overtime. The aim of CONTEST is to reduce the risk to the UK and its 
interest overseas from terrorist attacks.935 The Strategy is organised around four work streams; 
Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare.936 Each of these strands has its key functions. The 
purpose of ‘Pursue’ is to stop terror attacks in the UK and its interest abroad. This is achieved 
by detecting and investigating terror threats at the earliest stage and also disrupting terrorist 
activities before it can endanger the general public. The purpose of ‘Prevent’ which is the 
second strand under CONTEST is to address the radicalisation of all forms of terrorism. This 
strategy is achieved by working with a wide range of sectors in the Country including charities, 
faith, education, internet, health and other sectors where there is risk of radicalization. The 
purpose of ‘Protect’ is to strengthen the UK’ protection and reduce its vulnerability against a 
terrorist attack. This is measured by an annual national risk assessment which assesses the 
threat faced and the country’s vulnerabilities to an attack. Key objectives of ‘Protect’ is to 
strengthen the UK security, reduce the vulnerability of transport networks, increase the 
resilience of the UK’s infrastructure, and improve protective security for crowded places. 
Lastly, the aim of ‘Prepare’ is to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack where the attack cannot 
be stopped. This involves an effective and efficient response which will save lives, reduce harm 
and aid recovery. This strategy also involves building a generic capability to respond and 
recover from a wide range of terrorist emergencies, improve preparedness for the highest risk 
impact in the national risk assessment, an improved ability of the emergency service to work 
together during a terror attack and an enhanced information and communication sharing system 
during an attack.937 Without doubt, the CONTEST Strategy paints a comprehensive approach 
to counter-terrorism which the Nigerian authorities can emulate.  
 
                                                          
934 Freedom C. Onuoha, ‘Nigeria’s Vulnerability to Terrorism; The Imperative of a Counter-Religious Extremism 
and Terrorism (CONREST) Strategy’ (Feb 2011) Peace and Conflict Monitor Pg 1 
935 CONTEST; The United Kingdom’s Strategy For Counter-Terrorism July 2011 HM Government 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97994/contest-
summary.pdf Accessed 28th Dec, 2014 
936 Ibid Pg 6 
937 Ibid Pg 6-15 
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 2.2     Detailed provision on the offence of encouragement of terrorism 
S.1 of the UK’s Terrorism Act 2006 pictures an “all-inclusive” provision on the encouragement 
of terrorism which Nigeria can learn from. It is imperative that the provision on encouragement 
of terrorism is written in a clear and precise language because of its potential in engaging the 
right to freedom of expression and freedom of thoughts, conscience, and religion.938 
Unfortunately, S.5(1)(2)(a) of Nigeria’s Terrorism(Prevention (Amendment) Act 2013 on 
encouragement of terrorism is vague and couched in imprecise terms. As previously elucidated, 
this section fails to explain properly the categories of statements which are likely to be 
understood by members of the public as directly or indirectly encouraging or inciting terrorism 
and a yardstick for determining how the statements or material on the internet or any printed 
material will support, encourage, or incite terrorism. On the other hand, a cursory look at 
Section 1 of UK’s T.A 2006 shows that it does not only provide for the offence of encouraging 
of terrorism, S. 1(2) goes further to explain ways through which a person can commit the 
offence of encouragement of terrorism.939 The UK TA 2006 clearly explains how a statement 
is likely to be understood and what members of the public could reasonably be expected to 
infer from it must be determined having regards to the contents of the statements as a whole, 
and the circumstances and manner of its publications.’940 Furthermore, S. 1(3) goes further to 
explain statements that are likely to be understood by members of the public as indirectly 
encouraging acts of terrorism or Convention offences to include statements which ‘glorifies 
the commission or preparation (whether in the past, in the future or generally) of such acts or 
offences941 and statements from which those members of the public could reasonably be 
expected to infer that what is being glorified is being glorified as conduct that should be 
emulated by them in existing circumstances.’942 The Nigerian TPAA 2013 does not make these 
clear delineations, thereby making the provision on the encouragement on terrorism vague. 
Remarkably, S.1 of the UK’s TA 2006 provides defences against encouragement of terrorism. 
The Act provides that a defence for a person under this section to ‘show that the statement 
neither expressed his views nor had his endorsement’ 943 and ‘that it was clear in all the 
                                                          
938 S.38 & 39 CFRN 1999 
 
 
940 S.1(4)(a) and (b) Ibid  
941 S.1(3)(a) T.A 2006 
942 S.1(3)(B) T.A 2006 
943 S.1(6)(a) ibid  
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circumstances of the statement’s publication that it did not express his view and (apart from 
the possibility of his having been given and failed to comply with a notice under subsection (3) 
of that section) did not have his endorsement.’944 These are important provisions that Nigeria 
can imitate under the TPA 2011 (as amended) to make it fit for purpose. Although, it is 
important to add that the S.1 of the UK Terrorism 2006 is not perfect, nonetheless its flaws can 
be ignored compared to the serious negative effects the current section on encouragement of 
terrorism in Nigeria can have on freedom of expression.  
  2.3   Appointment of an independent reviewer of the Terrorism Act  
The role of the Independent Reviewer of the Terrorism Act in the UK is of extreme importance 
in assessing the internal coherence, constitutionality and consistency of the Terrorism Act. This 
role has become inevitable and long overdue in a country like Nigeria with so many reports of 
human rights violations by government forces. For 35 years, the UK has appointed an 
Independent Reviewer to assess its Terrorism Act and make recommendations for reforms.945 
The Independent Reviewer’s Role is to inform the public and political debate on the anti-
terrorism law through regular reports prepared for the Home Secretary and then laid before 
Parliament and the general public.946 This role is important because of its complete 
independence from government coupled with access to sensitive and secretive national security 
information.947 An annual review of the operation of the UK’s Terrorism Act 2000 and 2006 
is required by S. 36 of the 2006 Act. The section stipulates that the person appointed by the 
Secretary of State must from time to time, carry out a review on the provisions of the Terrorism 
Act and report his views at least once in twelve months. The review which is usually published 
July of every year covers the definition of terrorism, proscribed organisations, arrest and 
detention, stop and searches, and terrorist offence amongst others.948 Other functions of the 
independent reviewer are to consider whether the applicable rules have been complied with 
especially with the detention of terrorist suspects, reviewing and reporting annually to the 
                                                          
944 S.1(6)(b) ibid 
945 The Terrorism Acts in 2014: Terrorism Act in 2014 Report of the Independent Reviewer on the Operation of 
the Terrorism Act 2000 and Part 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006 by David Anderson QC September 2015 Page 3 
https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Terrorism-Acts-
Report-2015-Print-version.pdf accessed 20th August 2015 
946 Independent Reviewer of Anti-Terrorism Legislation ; The Reviewer ‘s Role 
https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/about-me/ Accessed 6th January 2015 
947 ibid 
948 Ibid  
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Treasury on the terrorist asset-freeze.949 The Independent Reviewer is regularly briefed by 
intelligence bodies such as the M15 and the Joint Terrorism Assessment Centre whose 
assessment of threat he can use to inform his thinking and reports.950  
The job of the Independent Reviewer involves travelling to all parts of the country visiting 
Police counter-terrorism units, detention facilities, seaports and rail port terminals. The 
Independent Reviewer has regular interaction with lawyers, academic bodies, security forces, 
and prosecutors. Furthermore, the reviewer observes police patrols, talks to detainees, and 
hears directly from civil society organisations. The Independent Reviewer is on social media 
encouraging public engagement and also gives interviews on TV and radio.951 The Independent 
Reviewer serves as an “ombudsman” over the government counter-terrorism activities through 
regular scrutiny of the operation of the UK’s counter-terrorism laws and reports their findings 
and recommendations to the Home Secretary and the Parliament. Creating the office of an 
Independent Reviewer in Nigeria, with powers similar to that of the UK’s Independent 
reviewer would go a long way in checking the activities of the Police and JTF and minimise 
human rights violations by the State.  
  2.4   Proscription of terrorist organisations outside the country 
The procedure for proscribing a terrorist organisation in Nigeria is concluded when a notice of 
the proscription is published in the official gazette, two national newspapers or any other place 
determined by the Judge.952 Even though the TPA 2011 (as amended) covers terrorist 
organisations listed to be a regional and international terrorist organisation, it is clearly 
significant that at present only two terrorist organisations have been formally proscribed under 
the Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 and has been gazetted as the Terrorism (Prevention) 
(Proscription Order) Notice 2013. These are Boko Haram and its splinter group ‘Ansaru’.953 
This makes a mockery of the international reach of proscription of terrorist organization under 
the Act. Nigeria needs to at least include in its official gazette, terrorist organisations within 
the African Sub-region like Al-Shabaab, Al Qaida in North Africa, and the Lord’s Resistance 
                                                          
949 David Anderson, The independent Review of Terrorism Laws (Public Law; Sweet and Maxwell July 2014) Pg 
409   
950 Ibid 411  
951 Ibid Pg 411 
952 S. 2(2) TPA 2011 as amended.  
953 Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette Notice no 91 Terrorism (Prevention) (Proscription Order) Notice 
2013 Vol 100 
http://www.cenbank.org/Out/2013/FPRD/TERRORISM%20%28PREVENTION%29%20%28PROSCRIPTION%20O
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Army in its proscription list.  Schedule 2 of the UK Terrorism Act 2000 gives a comprehensive 
list of terrorist groups within and outside which is proscribed by the Act.954 A similar list also 
exists under the U.S Department of State list of Foreign Terrorist Organisations.955 This would 
clearly show the public as well as the international community that these terror groups are also 
outlawed in Nigeria.  
2.5 Respect for the  rule of law and Intelligence-led counter-terrorism policy 
Events in Nigeria have shown that the indiscriminate arrest, prolonged pre-charge detention, 
torture, and even the killing of terror suspects has not in any way reduced the activities of Boko 
Haram. If anything at all, it is counter-productive and has further increased terrorism in the 
Country. In 2015, the U.S Senate Intelligence Committee released a Report on Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) Torture programmes.  The Report which took about three years to 
complete established that torture methods such as waterboarding, shackling of suspects in 
painful positions, and other torture methods did not in any way  help to locate Osama Bin Laden  
neither did it help to thwart terrorist plots, but instead were counter-productive.956 This report 
suggests that modern and effective ways to counter-terrorism is through intelligence gathering 
and not torture or abuse of terror suspects. If we are to learn anything from this, it is that there 
is no amount of torture of suspects that can solve the issue of terrorism, particularly in Nigeria. 
Nigeria needs to stop the practice whereby the Police/Soldiers torture and abuse of terrorist 
suspect in unofficial military detention sites. Procedural safeguards such as arrest based on 
reasonable suspicion, presumption of innocence, right to counsel, and the right to be tried with 
a reasonable time which are the hallmarks of modern day criminal jurisprudence must be 
obeyed.957More importantly, Nigeria’s  approach to tackling Boko Haram needs be driven by 
intelligence-led counter-terrorism as currently practiced by the UK’s Security Service (M15). 
The M15 work with other  security agencies both at home and abroad to keep pace with the 
threats from international terrorism.958 The “Protect strategy” under the CONTEST is built 
around this approach. Nigeria can emulate this by collaborating more with foreign intelligence 
agencies like the UK’s M15, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the 
                                                          
954 The Proscribed Organisation (Name Change) Order 2009, Sch 2 Terrorism Act 2009 
955 U.S Dept. of State; Foreign Terrorist Organisation  Bureau For Counter-terrorism 
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Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and European 
Union Police Organisation (EUROPOL) on new methods of intelligence gathering.   
Having highlighted the lessons that Nigeria can learn from the UK experience in dealing with 
terrorism, the next section will be used to put forward proposals and recommendations for law 
and policy reforms in Nigeria. 
3. PROPOSALS & RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LAW & POLICY REFORMS IN 
NIGERIA 
As revealed in this study, several legal measures adopted by Nigeria against terrorism severely 
curtail fundamental rights recognised under the Nigerian Constitution, the ACHPR and the 
ICCPR. The following proposals and recommendations will greatly assist Nigeria in making 
Nigeria’s terrorism law and practices fit for purpose and more importantly, human rights 
compliant. 
3.1 Downward review of the 90 days pre-charge detention period  
The socio-legal assessment of Nigeria’s pre-charge detention of terror suspects has shown that 
the 90/180 days pre-charge allowed under TPA 2011 has not in any way reduced terrorism in 
the country. As it currently stands, Nigeria has no justification to continue its ‘excessive’ 
90days pre-charge detention period (subject to renewal for another 90days) under its Terrorism 
Act. While the government’s objective of maintaining national security is understandable, the 
90 days (180days) goes against the principle of necessity and proportionality. As an alternative, 
the writer does not recommend the 14 days of the UK TA but  recommends the “four days” 
pre-charge detention being practiced in Sweden. The Swedish system of pre-charge detention 
presents a good model for Nigeria to emulate. Though the pre-charge detention of a terror 
suspect is not expressly provided for under the Swedish anti-terrorism legislation,959 Chapter 
24 of the Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure (SCJP) stipulates “four days” as the maximum 
period of time which suspects (including terrorist suspects) can be detained for.960 The Swedish 
Code is enacted in such a way that torture and abuse of detainees is completely reduced. The 
SCJP stipulates that the Court shall hold a hearing on the issue of detention without delay and 
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this must not exceed four days and when the application for the detention of the suspect is 
presented in court, the arrested person shall attend the detention hearing.961 
Section 15 of the Swedish Code provides that the detention hearing of a suspect must continue 
without recess. The Court must not postpone the hearing unless there are exceptional 
circumstances to do so and the postponement must never exceed 4 days unless it is requested 
by the suspect. If the Court does not order the detention, the Court shall immediately rescind 
the arrest and the suspect must be released immediately.962 If the court orders the detention, the 
Court must prescribe a time within which prosecution of the case shall be initiated.963 
Furthermore, if a prosecution is not instituted within two weeks, the court shall hold a new 
hearing on the issue of detention at intervals of not more than two weeks, as long as the suspect 
is detained and until the prosecution is initiated. At these hearings, the court shall ensure that 
the inquiry is being pursued as speedily as possible.964 
Sweden’s pre-charge detention arrangement represents a consistent model with human rights 
safeguards available throughout the course of the detention. If Nigeria can emulate this model, 
the violation of terrorist detainee’s right by the Police and the JTF will be reduced, if not 
completely eliminated. Judging from the human rights abuse committed by the Nigerian 
Police/JTF, “4 days” or at most a week is enough time for the Nigerian Police to get whatever 
information/evidence from a terror suspect before he/she is charged. 
 3.2 Independence of the judiciary and the creation of terrorism courts  
In the opinion of the writer, the problem with Nigeria is not the law itself, most times where 
the laws are enacted, they are not implemented as stated. The  rule of law, separation of powers 
and more importantly the independence of the judiciary are key components in a democracy. 
Unfortunately in Nigeria, these key components have only sunk in theoretically but not 
completely in practical terms when compared with other advanced countries.965 As the third 
branch of government, the function of the judiciary is to interpret the law and administer justice. 
But at present, the Executive in Nigeria exercises too much control over the other arms of 
government including the legislature and the judiciary. For instance, the Executive decides who 
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gets appointed as a Judge into the Federal High Court, Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. 
The Executive also decides the allocation of funds to the legislature and the judiciary. The 
Nigerian Justice system remains under-resourced, resulting in slow court processes.966 In 
addition to that, the Police in Nigeria frequently disobey court orders.967 For the Courts to 
remain just and adjudicate effectively, there must zero influences over it from the other arms 
of government especially cases relating to terrorism offences. The Nigerian government as a 
matter of urgency needs to stop the practice whereby court orders are disobeyed by the Police 
and the JTF. Any officer that ignores a court order should be charged for contempt of court 
forthwith. Through this, rule of law will be protected. 
Presently, the TPA 2011 (as amended) gives the Federal High Court located in any part of the 
country exclusive jurisdiction to hear terrorism related cases.968  One of the weaknesses of the 
judiciary in Nigeria is the slow adjudication process of the courts due to congestion of cases. 
The Federal High Court in Nigeria is congested with cases, appeals, and election petitions and 
as such it might take a long while for terrorism cases to be quickly dealt with. Justice 
Musdapher, A former Chief Justice of Nigeria, revealed that there are more than 110,000 cases 
pending in the Federal High Court/High Court in Nigeria.969 He observed that because of the 
congestion in courts, it takes between 15 to 20 years to litigate a case from the High Court to 
the Supreme Court in Nigeria.970 This is unacceptable. As an alternative, the writer 
recommends the creation of specially designated courts for terrorism cases. Just as we have the 
Rent Tribunal Courts that deals with landlord-tenant cases, Customary Courts that deals with 
customary matters, Election Petition Tribunals that deal with electoral matters, Nigeria needs 
a “Terrorism and Other Related Matters Court” to deal with terrorism cases. This would relieve 
the pressure off the already congested courts in Nigeria. This will also assist in facilitating 
access to the criminal justice system by bringing terrorist to Court within a reasonable time. 
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3.2 Establishment of the “Nigerian Terrorism & Other Related Matters  
Commission”  
Although the afore-mentioned proposals and recommendations have the potential to 
significantly assist Nigeria in making her counter-terrorism measures human rights compliant, 
realistically speaking, it is unlikely that these reforms alone will stop Nigeria from committing 
serious human right violations in principle and in practice. As Ekundayo rightly stated, ‘no 
matter how well drafted a law is, it will only amount to a “paper tiger” if mechanism are not 
put in place to enforce or implement it.’971In other words, the law without an effective 
enforcement arrangement in place amounts to word on papers, nothing else. Until “concrete” 
measures are put in place, it is difficult to guarantee that Nigeria would not continue to execute, 
torture, arrest or detain terrorists unnecessarily. The writer strongly believes that what Nigeria 
needs at this moment is a practical strategy that checks the excesses of the government agencies 
like the Police and the Military. The writer hereby proposes the creation of a body known as 
“The Nigerian Terrorism & Other Related Matters Commission.” This proposal is predicated 
on the writer’s diagnosis and understanding of the events in the country. This Commission will 
serve mainly as an independent ombudsman against unnecessary human right infringements 
by government agencies with powers to impose sanctions and prosecute whoever is found 
guilty of human rights abuse. The proposed Commission is the panacea to Nigeria’s human 
rights conundrum as far as counter-terrorism is concerned.  
However in order for this body to perform its duties effectively, the National Assembly needs 
to vest it with powers to deal with terrorism related complaints such as terrorism arrests, 
continued pre-charge detention of terror suspects, proscription of an organisation, and other 
terrorism related human rights violations. The Commission should without prejudice to the 
authority of the Courts in Nigeria, have the powers to: visit and inspect prisons and other 
detention facilities where terrorist suspects are held in Nigeria; recommend or order the 
immediate release of a terrorist suspect held anywhere in Nigeria; recommend the dismissal 
and institute criminal proceedings against any officer of the Nigerian Police Force, Nigerian 
Army and the Security Services that is found to have tortured or abused or executed a terrorist 
suspect whilst in detention; order the immediate charge and prosecution of a terrorist detainee;  
order the closure of a detention site/facilities and have terrorist suspects transferred to another 
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prison; investigate the circumstances leading to the death of terrorist detainees and make 
recommendations to the government for either the prosecution of the officer involved in the 
killing or recommend a dismissal or demotion. 
In addition to the above mentioned powers, all the security agencies in Nigeria including the 
Police, the Army, the Air-force, the Navy and the State Security Service should be mandated 
to submit a quarterly report of their counter-terrorism activities to the Commission. This report 
should include, inter-alia, a comprehensive list of terrorist suspects arrested, the number of 
suspects charged to court, list of terrorist(s) killed in shoot-outs with security agencies, and a 
list of civilian casualties. This quarterly report should also include the date the suspects are 
arrested, place/location of detention, and the name(s) and telephone number of the counsel, 
representative or relatives the terror suspect.  
Having highlighted the lessons that Nigeria can learn from the UK, as well as proposals and 
recommendations for possible law reforms in Nigeria, the next section discusses lessons that 
the UK can learn from Nigeria.  
4. LESSONS LEARNED BY THE UK  FROM  THE NIGERIAN RESPONSE TO  
TERRORISM 
 
An observer of Nigeria’s approach to terrorism might wonder what the country could possibly 
have to offer the U.K in terms of counter-terrorism lessons, having been subjected to criticisms 
and accusations from several human rights organisations for serious human rights violations, 
including the extra-judicial execution of terror suspects. This is the idea behind a comparative 
research, to gain insights from other jurisdiction. The following are lessons that the UK can 
learn from Nigeria:- 
4.1 Counter-radicalisation programme 
Although not linked to the analysis and assessment in this thesis, one area which the UK can 
perhaps learn from Nigeria is its “de-radicalisation programmes” on TV and radio. These TV 
and radio commercials, short plays, and jingles are aimed at sensitizing and educating the 
people on the negative effects of terrorism. It might sound insignificant but these T.V/radio 
programmes and commercials have helped in discouraging young Nigerians from joining Boko 
Haram. In fact, at least 22 female “would-be-suicide bombers” and 47 erstwhile Boko Haram 
members have voluntary embraced the government de-radicalisation programme and were 
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rehabilitated and reformed.972 The writer is yet to see advert/commercial/jingles on BBC or 
ITV aimed at discouraging young individuals from joining terrorist groups in the UK. Even 
though this recommendation is already rooted under the  “CONTEST strategy- Prevent,” the 
relentless approach of the Nigerian government through the mass media aimed at discouraging 
people from being radicalised is quite commendable and worthy of emulation. 
Having highlighted the lesson that the UK can learn from Nigeria, the next section will be used 
to put forward proposals and recommendations for law and policy reforms in UK.  
5. PROPOSALS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR UK’S LAW REFORMS  
The following proposals and recommendations will help to position the UK’s counter-terrorism 
measures under the T.A 2000 in line with internationally acceptable standards, as against the 
Nigerian standards. As clearly seen above, the UK has little to learn from the Nigerian 
experience in dealing with terrorism.  
5.1 Policy that discourages selective arrest 
A strategy that prevents the selective arrest of ethnic minorities in the U.K and Muslims needs 
to be put in place. This might involve collaboration with Mosques and ethnic communities in 
the UK, especially in the arrest process. This would diffuse the tension that exists between the 
law enforcement agencies and these communities. These two bodies are critical in whatever 
de-radicalisation programme the U.K would like to adopt.  
5.2 Expiration of the proscription of a terrorist organisation after 2 Years 
The writer recommends that the period for the proscription of terrorist organisations in the UK 
should expire after 2 years subject to renewal by the Parliament. This would remove the 
bureaucratic bottleneck and the cost of de-proscription in the U.K. In addition to that, the 
‘closed material/evidence procedures’ used by the POAC which involves  materials which the 
Home Secretary considers sensitive to be made public should be reviewed to allow suspects 
know the case against his group and what evidence was used against them. This would also 
exculpate the government against the criticisms against fair trial during the de-proscription 
process. 
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6 Conclusion 
This chapter has identified lessons that Nigeria can learn from the U.K’s counter-terrorism 
approach and vice-versa. The lessons learned resulted in proposals and recommendations for 
law and policy reforms in Nigeria. From the onset the Writer made it clear that the primary 
focus of the research was to compare and explore the responses of Nigeria against terrorism 
under its Terrorism Act with the UK, with a view to improving the Nigerian law. The writer 
adopted a realistic approach in the recommendations and proposals proffered based on the 
findings from this research and a practical diagnosis of the nature of terrorism and counter-
terrorism in Nigeria and the UK. In view of the fact that an amendment to the law alone will 
not address the terrorism challenges faced by Nigeria, concrete proposals and 
recommendations for law and policy reforms were put forward for Nigeria to adopt. Although 
the research restricts itself to issues bothering on definition of terrorism, arrest, detention, 
proscription and encouragement of terrorism, nonetheless the proposals and recommendations 
put forward in this chapter covered wide ranging issues that will not only have legal 
consequences but also social and administrative impacts. These recommendations will help 
position the TPA 2011 (as amended) in line with Nigeria’s domestic, regional and international 
human right obligations. More importantly, this chapter was used to recommend a workable 
solution to Nigeria’s counter-terrorism problems with proposal for the establishment of the 
“Nigeria Terrorism and other Related Matters Commission.” Without doubt, if established, the 
Commission has ability to adequately address human right infringements relating to the 
counter-terrorism in Nigeria. Unfortunately there are not much lessons that the UK can learn 
from Nigeria. However the relentless nature of Nigeria’s counter-radicalisation programmes is 
noteworthy.  
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CHAPTER 12 
                                      CONCLUSION 
This thesis is a comparative analysis and assessment of Nigeria and the United Kingdom’s 
legal response to terrorism. The writer critically analysed, assessed, and compared  key 
provisions under the Nigerian TPA 2011 (as amendment) with the United Kingdom’s 
Terrorism Act 2000 and S.1 of the Terrorism Act 2006 with the primary aim of finding out  
whether the Terrorism Acts  unnecessarily infringe human rights provisions in both countries. 
In so doing, the thesis compared the Terrorism Act of both states with their domestic, regional, 
and international human rights provisions. Whilst recognising differences in the challenges and 
nature of the terrorist threats faced by the UK and Nigeria as well as differences in both states’ 
response to terrorism, the study also set out to identify lessons which Nigeria could learn from 
the UK’s experience in dealing with terrorism, vice-versa.  
It became necessary to question  the constitutionality and legality of Nigeria’s counter-
terrorism actions due to the allegations of serious human rights violations by the security forces. 
These include the razing of homes in communities suspected of harboring Boko Haram, 
arbitrary arrests, prolonged detention of terror suspects, extra-judicial killings and torture. This 
development has led to an increased interest and a rise in the number of studies that address 
Nigeria’s counter-terrorism practices and their impact on human rights. This is evident in  
recent yearly reports by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch amongst other 
studies. Unfortunately, only a few study have been able to directly analyse or assess key 
provisions under the  Nigerian TPA 2011 (as amended) to determine their coherence and 
compatibility with human rights provisions in the country. More importantly, limited studies 
exist that compares the Nigerian Terrorism Act with similar law of  another common law 
jurisdiction. This thesis therefore attempts to fill-in that gap.  
Although the writer admits that the state has a positive obligation to secure human lives and 
property, the study found that Nigeria’s response to Boko Haram attacks undoubtedly goes 
beyond the need to provide security and cannot be said to be a legitimate response to terrorism. 
Rather than address the terror attacks by Boko Haram, the Nigerian security forces have 
committed similar and even worse atrocities. A careful examination of the UK’s response to 
terrorism in general revealed that the country has managed to strike a balance in their fight 
against terrorism and the protection of human rights. The study found that the UK’s TA 2000 
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have been extensively challenged and criticised on various constitutional and human rights 
grounds. This is evidenced by the several judicial decisions that has provoked debates and 
arguments from scholars and human rights organisations. It is obvious from this study that the 
Nigerian TPA 2011 (as amended) remains largely unchallenged by the Courts or by scholars 
resulting in little or no judicial decision or studies that challenge the legality of the Terrorism 
Act. The Nigerian government seemingly preferred the heavy-handed security response that 
has not yielded any meaningful result. For over eight years, Nigeria has adopted a 
sledgehammer approach to fighting terrorism which has arguably been an abysmal failure.  
Returning to the main question posed at the beginning of this study which is to assess the effects 
of the Terrorism Acts of Nigeria and UK on human rights in both countries? The study found 
that several inadequacies and inconsistencies with human rights  exist under the Terrorism Acts 
of both countries, especially Nigeria. This conclusion is based on the fact that some of Nigeria’s 
response to terrorism under the TPA 2011(as amended) and in practice seriously interferes with 
human rights provisions  in the country. 
Beginning with the definition of terrorism in both States. Firstly, the study acknowledged that  
although there is no internationally agreed definition of terrorism. Nonetheless, the  analysis 
and assessment of the definition of terrorism under the Nigerian and the UK’s Terrorism Acts 
revealed that both definition lacks precision. The Terrorism Acts of both countries included 
not only actions that are widely regarded as terrorism but goes further to include acts such as 
“serious” damage to “public or private property,” damage that is likely to result in major 
economic loss and the destruction of government or public transport system as acts of terrorism. 
Several qualifications were also used to explain what would amount to terrorism in both states 
such as “unduly,”  “seriously” inter-alia. However acts that will be regarded as “serious” or 
“unduly” remains unclear under Nigerian TPA 2011. The study also found that definition of 
terrorism in both states include acts of terrorism done elsewhere. Additionally, the definition 
of terrorism in Nigeria recognises not only international resolutions on terrorism but also 
regional and sub-regional resolutions under the auspices of the African Union (AU) and the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as well as acts considered to be a 
terrorism by a competent authority of a foreign state. The Nigerian Supreme Court973 however 
made it clear that international instruments and  regional/sub-regional resolutions  are merely 
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“persuasive” and not “binding” on the Country, unless it they are enacted into the law by the 
National Assembly.  
This study established that there are significant differences in how the definition of terrorism 
in both states are interpreted and applied in practice. The UK Court in R v F974clarified the 
international reach of the definition of terrorism under the TA 2000  to include those in a 
legitimate armed struggle or armed conflict against oppressive and dictatorial regime and 
military or quasi-military activity aimed at bringing down a foreign government. Contrary to 
expectation, the scope and international reach of the definition of terrorism under the Nigerian 
TPA 2011 remains unclear. The Nigerian Courts are yet to give any ruling on the definition of 
terrorism under the Act. Additionally, elements of the definition of terrorism under the 
Nigeria’s TPA 2011 appears to be a duplication of the offences under the country’s Criminal 
Code such as threatening to burn or destroy property as per S. 461 of the C.C and destroying 
or damaging an inhabited house or a vessel with explosions as per S.451 of C.C. An implication 
of this is that an accused can easily be charged with terrorism offences instead of being charged 
with ordinary criminal offence for example murder, battery or manslaughter. This carries the 
potential for unintended human rights abuses and even the deliberate misuse of the term. 
On arrest, the study found that the grounds for making arrest in both states are similar. This is 
based on ‘reasonable suspicion’ that an offence is committed or is about to be committed. The 
Courts in both States have reached similar decisions in Chukwurah v C.O.P 975 and O’Hara v 
Chief Constable of the RUC976 that what would amount to “reasonableness” to arrest a suspect 
for terrorism must be a “genuine suspicion” in the mind of the arrestor that the arrestee has 
been concerned in the acts of terrorism and there are objectively reasonable grounds for 
forming that suspicion. However, the  EcrtHR977 has gone a step further to clarify that the 
‘reasonableness’ of the suspicion justifying such arrests for terrorism offences cannot always 
be judged according to the same standards as are applied in dealing with conventional crime.  
Returning the question whether the power of arrest under the Terrorism Acts of Nigeria and 
UK is consistent with human rights provisions in the States?  This study found that both Nigeria 
and the UK’s domestic, regional, and international law permits the restriction to the right to 
liberty and security as part of the States’ responsibility to protect individuals within their 
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jurisdiction. However these limitations must themselves comply with human rights. Clearly 
these limitations does not include arbitrary arrests of innocent civilians or deliberate acts of 
violence against civilians. This study found that the power of arrest under the Terrorism Acts 
of both states are legitimate and consistent with human rights provisions, however the 
application of this power differs in  both state. Rather than arrest on reasonable suspicion, it 
seems that the security forces in Nigeria generally do not follow the procedure prescribed by 
the law (TPA 2011), rule of law or due process. Instead they engage in indiscriminate arrests, 
house-to-house searches, intimidation of residents, and mass arrests of relatives of suspected 
Boko Haram members including children.  The writer argued that the methods of arrest by the 
Nigerian security agencies are generally not compatible with human rights provisions and 
standards under the Nigerian Constitution, the ACHPR and under the ICCPR. On a 
comparative note, the enforcement of the provisions of arrest in UK were found to be applied 
generally as prescribed by the law. Findings from this study also revealed that the Police in the 
UK do not engage in indiscriminate arrests of suspects, torture of terror detainees, intimidation 
of residents, or engage in the mass arbitrary arrests of relatives of terror suspects. Nonetheless 
the study suggests that terror arrest in the UK appears to be concentrated on Muslim and Asian 
communities. 
This comparative study also established that there is a difference in the pre-charge detention 
regime in Nigeria and the UK. While the Nigerian TPA 2011 (as amended) allows the pre-
charge detention of terror suspects for up to 180 days, the maximum period a terror suspect can 
be detained pending charge in the UK is 14 days. This study therefore set out to determine 
whether the 180 days and the 14 days pre-charge detention period under the Terrorism Acts of 
both States are consistent with human rights provisions. A juxtaposition of  the pre-charge 
detention period allowed  under  the Nigerian TPA 2011 with the country’s domestic, regional, 
and international obligations under the Constitution 1999, the ACHPR and the ICCPR showed 
that the 180 days pre-charge detention period permitted under the Act is inconsistent with the 
right to liberty and security and the right be tried within a reasonable time. However, the UN 
Human Rights Committee has held978 that what would constitute “reasonable time” to be tried 
must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The European Court of Human Rights in deciding 
the legality of the 14 days pre-charge detention under the UK’s TA 2000 held that the pre-
charge detention of a terror suspect will be consistent with the ECHR provided that the 
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police/detaining  authorities disclose the nature of the allegations against the accused, give the 
accused an opportunity to lead evidence to refute them, and ensure that adequate information 
is provided to the accused about the reasons for their continued detention.979  
Besides the difference  in the pre-charge detention  period of  Nigeria and UK, the manner 
which this provisions of the Terrorism Act are applied in practice differs in both states. This 
study has shown that both terror suspects and innocent civilians in Nigeria are detained for as 
long as the Police or Military authorities wish. The study also found that terror suspects in 
Nigeria are denied access to their lawyers and family members, abused, tortured, de-
humanised, and often extra-judicially executed. On a comparative note this study found that 
terror suspects in the UK are not denied access to their lawyers or held beyond the period 
provided by the Terrorism Act or tortured.  This study also revealed that the process of arrest 
and the pre-charge detention of terror suspects in the UK are done in line with the rule of law 
and as stipulated by the Act, with the courts actively involved throughout the process. From 
the moment an arrest is made in UK, the courts are involved in deciding whether there is a need 
for extension of the pre-charge detention period, up to when judgement is given for or against 
the accused with human rights safeguards maintained throughout this process. This is not to 
say that the UK pre-charge detention regime is faultless. The 14 days pre-charge detention 
period allowed under the TA 2000 has been heavily criticised as too high when compared to 
some other countries within the EU region. On the other hand, the  courts in Nigeria are 
generally not involved in the pre-charge detention of terror suspects in the country. The security 
forces in Nigeria are the accuser and the judge, all at the same time.  The writer notes that the 
Nigerian Judiciary have over the past eight years been reluctant to interfere with terrorism 
investigation, arrests, and prolonged detention of suspects. Likewise the Executive arm of 
government appear unwilling to prosecute members of the Police or the Military JTF that have 
been implicated in human rights violations including the excessive use of force, torture, arson, 
and the extra-judicial killing of terror suspects. The arrest and the pre-charge detention regime 
in Nigeria clearly does not represent a good practice of how terror suspects should be treated 
if international human rights are to be respected. Even though there are clear safeguards against 
the unnecessary interference with the right to liberty and security in both states, these 
safeguards/rights are generally ignored with impunity in Nigeria. 
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The general requirements of any law (both at the domestic level and under international law) 
that would restrict freedom of expression are that they must be prescribed by law, in pursuit of 
a legitimate purpose, and they must be necessary and proportionate. As demonstrated in this 
thesis, both the Nigerian and the UK Terrorism Acts fulfils these requirements going by the 
terror attacks experienced in both countries as a result of individuals being encouraged to 
commit acts of terrorism.  Encouragement of terrorism has become a strategy used by terrorist 
organisations to further support their cause and to call for violent action. However a careful 
examination of the Nigerian Terrorism Act revealed that what would amount to encouragement 
of terrorism and the public’s understanding of this is vague. Many human rights organisations 
in Nigeria have pointed out  that this portends a grave danger to freedom of expression in the 
country. There are fears that the TPA 2011(as amended) could be used to stifle dissent, 
opponents, and freedom of speech in the country. Presently, it is difficult to define the scope 
of direct and indirect encouragement of terrorism under the Nigerian TPA 2011 or a yardstick 
for determining how a statement is likely to be understood as encouraging terrorism. On the 
other hand, the UK TA 2006 provided some guidance between direct and indirect 
encouragement of terrorism. Section 2 of the UK’s TA 2006 goes further to enumerate ways 
and means which terrorist publications could be disseminated to constitute an offence. S.1(4) 
of the Act expressly provides that for the purposes of how a statement is likely to be understood 
and what members of the public could reasonably be expected to infer from it must be 
determined having regard both—to the contents of the statement as a whole; and to the 
circumstances and manner of its publication. Furthermore, S.1 of the Terrorism Act 2006 
requires either specific intent or recklessness for the prosecution for the offence of encouraging 
terrorism. Although this thesis makes clear that what would amount to encouragement of 
terrorism in UK is not easy to define in its entirety, nonetheless the clear explanations provided 
under the UK’S TA 2006 are absent under the Nigerian  Terrorism Act. As it currently stand, 
the provision of the Nigerian Terrorism Act on encouragement of terrorism threatens the right 
to freedom of expression and does not satisfy the principle of legal certainty and clarity of the 
law.  This study concludes that the provision of the Nigerian TPAA 2013 on encouragement 
of terrorism  under need to be reviewed urgently.  
On proscription, both the Nigerian and the UK Terrorism Acts provide similar grounds for 
proscribing terrorist organisations within and outside their jurisdiction. This study however 
revealed the differences in the procedure for proscribing terrorist organisations and the de-
proscription process in both countries. While the international scope of the UK’s TA 2000 was 
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reflected in its list of proscribed organisations with the banning of both domestic and 
international terrorist organisations, the Nigerian Terrorism Act which made a reference to 
international terrorist groups and terrorist listed in any resolution of the UN Security Council 
or in any instrument of the African Union and ECOWAS980 have only banned Boko Haram 
and Ansaru. It remains  unclear what the Nigerian Terrorism Act means by ‘reference to an 
international group’ without proscribing any terrorist  organisations outside of the country?  
In assessing whether the Nigerian Terrorism Act comply with the country’s regional and 
international human rights obligations, the study found that although the definition of terrorism, 
the power of arrest and the proscription of terrorist organisations were generally consistent with 
the country’s human right obligations under the Constitution 1999, the ACHPR, and the 
ICCPR, however some actions of the security forces and the 180 days allowed under the TPA 
2011 were  found to be inconsistent with Nigeria’s human rights obligation under the CFRN 
1999 and established principles of human rights under the  ACHPR and the ICCPR.  
Similarly, in assessing whether the UK TA 2000 comply with the country’s regional and 
international human rights obligations, the study found that the definition of terrorism, the 
power of arrest, the pre-charge detention of terror suspects, the proscription of terrorist 
organisations as well as encouragement of terrorism were generally consistent with UK human 
right obligations under the HRA/ECHR and the ICCPR. However, it should be noted that 
because encouragement of terrorism under the T.A 2006 covers acts done even in the past, it 
could engage non-retroactive principle under Art.7 of the  ECHR and of the 15 ICCPR.  
Following the comparative juxtaposition of the Nigerian and UK legal responses to terrorism, 
this thesis put forward several recommendations and proposals for law and policy reforms in 
Nigeria. These proposals and recommendations were a result of the findings and lessons learnt 
from the UK’s experience in dealing with terrorism. Chief amongst this is the “CONTEST 
Strategy” that prepares, prevent, pursues, protects the UK against terror attacks. Presently 
Nigeria does not have a holistic strategy for dealing with terrorism. The CONTEST strategy 
represents an ideal model for countering terrorism in Nigeria. Other lessons learned from the 
U.K include; the review of the provision of encouragement on terrorism to reflect a law that 
properly categorises statements that are likely to be understood by members of the public as 
directly or indirectly encouraging terrorism; the appointment of an independent reviewer to 
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review the Terrorism Act every year; and the inclusion of regional and international terrorists 
organisations in its list of  proscribed  organisations.  
Other proposals and recommendations put forward include the greater respect for rule of law 
and human rights of terrorist suspects, the independence of the Judiciary and the creation of 
Terrorism Courts to address the congestion of cases presently experienced in Nigerian Courts. 
The writer however understands that enacting and reviewing the law is one thing in Nigeria, 
implementing the law or reforms is quite another. In many instances the major problem is not 
the absence of the laws, but rather the absence of an effective enforcement mechanism. The 
Nigerian security agencies that are supposed to protect lives and properties and enforce human 
rights values in the countries are themselves the main culprits of their breaches. In order to 
address the human rights violations by the security forces, the writer recommends the 
establishment of the “Nigerian Terrorism & other Related Matters Commission.” The proposed 
Terrorism Commission would present a practical solution to the allegations of serious human 
rights violations by the security forces and also has the potential of positioning Nigeria’s 
counter-terrorism practices in line with internationally accepted standards.  
More than ever before, the opportunities now exist for Nigeria to review key provisions under 
its Terrorism Act to make it fit for purpose. It is hoped that this thesis would prompt a reform 
that will subject the Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 to an amendment as well as render 
Nigeria’s counter-terrorism policies and practices to the adversarial review and scrutiny of its 
own institutions. The National Assembly must rise up to its responsibility and make changes 
that reflect the recommendations and proposal put forward in this research. The Legislators 
will find recommendations this thesis useful when making changes to the current Act and 
policy.  
A CALL FOR REALISM  
The writer is of the view that although the proposals and recommendations put forward in this 
study are important in providing a sound legal code relevant to terrorism in Nigeria, it might 
not be possible for these proposals to be implemented straight away. It might take a few years 
before these proposals and recommendations can be fully realised. This is because upholding 
and protecting human rights does not come for free. States spend huge resources in protecting 
human rights. In 2014 alone, the defence sector took over 968.127 billion Naira accounting for 
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20% of Nigeria’s total budget sum of 4.962 billion Naira.981In a climate of global financial 
crisis coupled with dwindling crude oil prices, finance might be a problem in implementing 
some of the recommendations proposed. Hence there is a need to call for pragmatism. The 
question is how? There is a need for Nigeria to prioritize which of the recommendations or 
policy prescriptions it urgently needs and is able to afford at this moment. Realistically, it might 
require a 1 to 2 years plan. But whatever the government of Nigeria decides to adopt first, this 
must be combined with establishment of the “Terrorism Commission” in order to achieve a 
counter-terrorism strategy that is human rights compliant. This is because the “most internally 
coherent” and “most consistent” human right legislation or policy can be enacted or adopted, 
but without an effective enforcement mechanism in place, it will only amount to a farce. 
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                                                 APPENDIXES 
 
APPENDIX I 
LIST OF PROSCRIBED ORGANISATION UNDER THE UK’S TERRORISM ACT 
2000 
71 international terrorist organisations are proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000.982 These 
include;  
17 November Revolutionary Organisation (N17) - Proscribed March 2001  
Abdallah Azzam Brigades, including the Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalions (AAB) - Proscribed June 
2014.  
Abu Nidal Organisation (ANO) - Proscribed March 2001  
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) - Proscribed March 2001  
Ajnad Misr (Soldiers of Egypt) - Proscribed November 2014  
Al-Gama'at al-Islamiya (GI) - Proscribed March 2001  
Al Ghurabaa - Proscribed July 2006 Al Ghurabaa  
Al Ittihad Al Islamia (AIAI) - Proscribed October 2005  
Al Murabitun - Proscribed April 2014  
Al Qa’ida (AQ) - Proscribed March 2001  
Al Shabaab - Proscribed March 2010  
Ansar Al Islam (AI) - Proscribed October 2005  
Ansar al-Sharia-Benghazi (AAS-B) - Proscribed November 2014  
Ansar Al Sharia-Tunisia (AAS-T) - Proscribed April 2014  
Ansar Al Sunna (AS) - Proscribed October 2005  
Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM) - Proscribed April 2014  
Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan (Vanguard for the protection of Muslims in Black Africa) 
(Ansaru) - Proscribed November 2012  
(Ansaru is an Islamist terrorist organisation based in Nigeria.)  
Armed Islamic Group (Groupe Islamique Armée) (GIA) - Proscribed March 2001  
                                                          
982 Home Office: Proscribed Terrorist Organisation 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/417888/Proscription-
20150327.pdf accesed 3rd August 2015 
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Asbat Al-Ansar ('League of Partisans' or 'Band of Helpers') - Proscribed November 2002 
Sometimes going by the aliases of 'The Abu Muhjin' group/faction or the 'Jama'at Nour', 
Babbar Khalsa (BK) - Proscribed March 2001  
Basque Homeland and Liberty (Euskadi ta Askatasuna) (ETA) - Proscribed March 2001  
Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) - Proscribed July 2006  
Boko Haram (Jama’atu Ahli Sunna Lidda Awati Wal Jihad) (BH) - Proscribed July 2013 Boko 
Haram  
Egyptian Islamic Jihad (E  IJ) - Proscribed March 2001  
Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) including GIMF Banlga Team also known as Ansarullah 
Bangla Team (ABT) and Ansar-al Islam – Proscribed July 2016  
Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain (GICM) - Proscribed October 2005 
Hamas Izz al-Din al-Qassem Brigades - Proscribed March 2001  
Harakat-Ul-Jihad-Ul-Islami (HUJI) - Proscribed October  
Harakat-Ul-Jihad-Ul-Islami (Bangladesh) (HUJI-B) - Proscribed October 2005 
Harakat-Ul-Mujahideen/Alami (HuM/A) and Jundallah - Proscribed October 2005 
Harakat Mujahideen (HM) - Proscribed March 2001 HM, previously known as Harakat Ul 
Ansar (HuA)  
Haqqani Network (HQN) - Proscribed March 2015  
Hizballah Military Wing – Hizballah’s External Security Organisation was proscribed March 
2001and in 2008 the proscription was extended to Hizballah’s Military apparatus including the 
Jihad Council  
Hezb-E Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) - Proscribed October 2005  
Imarat Kavkaz (IK) (also known as the Caucasus Emirate) - Proscribed December 2013  
Indian Mujahideen (IM) - Proscribed July 2012 IM  
International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF) - Proscribed March 2001  
Islamic Army of Aden (IAA) - Proscribed March 2001  
Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) - Proscribed July 2005  
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) - Proscribed November 2002  
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) also known as Dawlat al-'Iraq al-Islamiyya, Islamic 
State of Iraq (ISI), Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Dawlat al Islamiya fi Iraq wa al 
Sham (DAISh) and the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham - Proscribed June 2014  
Jaish e Mohammed (JeM) and splinter group Khuddam Ul-Islam (Kul) – JeM proscribed March 
2001  
Jamaah Anshorut Daulah - Proscribed July 2016 
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Jamaat ul-Ahrar (JuA) - Proscribed March 2015 
Jammat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) - Proscribed July 2007  
Jaysh al Khalifatu Islamiya (JKI) which translates as the Army of the Islamic Caliphate – 
proscribed November 2014  
Jeemah Islamiyah (JI) - Proscribed November 2002  
Jamaat Ul-Furquan (JuF) - Proscribed October 2005  
Jund al-Aqsa (JAA) which translates as “Soldiers of al-Aqsa” - Proscribed January 2015  
Jund al Khalifa-Algeria (JaK-A) which translates as Soldiers of the Caliphate - Proscribed 
January 2015  
Kateeba al-Kawthar (KaK) also known as ‘Ajnad al-sham’ and ‘Junud ar-Rahman al 
Muhajireen’- Proscribed June 2014  
Partiya Karkeren Kurdistani (PKK) which translates as the Kurdistan Worker’s Party - 
Proscribed March 2001. The PKK changed its name to KADEK and then to Kongra Gele 
Kurdistan, although the PKK acronym is still used by parts of the movement.  
Lashkar e Tayyaba (LT) - Proscribed March 2001  
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) - Proscribed March 2001  
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) - Proscribed October 2005  
Minbar Ansar Deen (also known as Ansar al-Sharia UK) - Proscribed July 2013  
Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) which translates as Mujahideen of Eastern Indonesia - 
Proscribed July 2016 
National Action - Proscribed December 2016 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad - Shaqaqi (PIJ) - Proscribed March 2001 PIJ  
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) - Proscribed June 
2014  
Revolutionary Peoples' Liberation Party - Front (Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi - Cephesi) 
(DHKP-C) - Proscribed March 2001  
Salafist Group for Call and Combat (Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat) 
(GSPC) - Proscribed March 2001  
Saved Sect or Saviour Sect - Proscribed July 2006  
Sipah-e Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) (Aka Millat-e Islami Pakistan (MIP) - Proscribed March 2001  
Tehrik Nefaz-e Shari'at Muhammadi (TNSM) - Proscribed July 2007  
Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) - Proscribed January 2011  
Teyre Azadiye Kurdistan (TAK) - Proscribed July 2006  
Turkiye Halk Kurtulus Partisi-Cephesi (THKP-C) - Proscribed June 2014  
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